А. В. Лебедев

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РЕКОНСТРУКЦИЯ МЫСЛИ И СЛОВА

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(с новым критическим изданием фрагментов)

ANDREI LEBEDEV

THE LOGOS OF HERACLITUS: A RECONSTRUCTION OF HIS WORD AND THOUGHT (WITH A NEW CRITICAL EDITION OF THE FRAGMENTS).

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This work is dedicated with gratitude to the memory of my two teachers Greek, my grandfather Nikolaos Assimakopoulos (1893 – 1968), who taught me dimotiki and katharevousa in my schoolyears, and Aristid Ivanovich Dovatour (1897 – 1982), Professor of Classics at the University of Saint Petersburg, who taught me classical Greek in my student's years.

[Preliminary notice. This is English translation of pages 1-255 of the monograph originally published in Russian which include the whole of Part I 'The Life and Philosophy of Heraclitus' (chapters I to V) and a new critical edition of Heraclitus' fragments with English translation. The second half of the book with the commentary on fragments 1-160 is not included in this file. The complete original edition in Russian, including commentary, is available here: https://www.academia.edu/13585247/ The page numbers of the English translation do not correspond to the numbers of the published work. Please, cite by the pages of the published edition indicated in the square brackets in bold on the margins or by the number of the fragment. **The tables of number correspondence between the editions of Lebedev, Diels-Kranz and Marcovich** can be found on **pages 258-267**. Some explanatory remarks and supplements in the English translation are placed in square brackets.]

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PREFACE

Heraclitus of Ephesus is considered to be one of the giants of the early Greek philosophy. The annual bibliography of scholarly and philosophical works about him reaches impressive proportions, and the stream of articles, monographs, and conferences is constantly growing. In the whole history of philosophy, it is hard to find a thinker, whom representatives of very different, sometimes conflicting philosophical schools and trends would claim as their founding father, intellectual ally or someone who supports their own views. The fate of his philosophical heritage or the history of the reception of his ideas constitutes a separate branch of research. Platonic Heraclitus, the father of the relativistic theory of the Universal flux, differs from Aristotelian Heraclitus, the physicist who proposed the fiery version of the theory of the primary matter. The Stoics highlighted the ethics and theology of Heraclitus and ranked him among philosophical saints, the commensals of the gods. The skeptic Aenesidemus of Cnossus argued that the philosophy of Heraclitus provides the «best way» or the best introduction into Pyrrhonian skepticism, i.e. the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of the reality and truth. Plutarchus' Heraclitus is an existentialist who taught about the loneliness of the human I, trapped on the isolated island of its body, and that we are dying and are being reborn everyday. Heraclitus of Plotinus is a mystic who reflected on the mysterious incomprehensibility of the embodiment of our Self in a mortal body. The Neopythagorean Numenius compared the teaching of Heraclitus on the Logos with the Logos of St. John's Gospel. Early Christian apologists recognised Heraclitus, along with Socrates, as a Christian before Christ, whereas Soviet Marxists included Heraclitus in the canon of the "materialists" (i.e. atheists) of antiquity. Well known is Hegel's remark that there is not a single statement of Heraclitus's philosophy that he has not incorporated in his own logic. **[p.6]**

Nietzsche recognised in Heraclitus' «pessimism» and proud solitude a portrait of his own, and Heidegger interpreted his fragments in the context of his phenomenological theory of being. We find the same discord in the modern studies of Heraclitus.

Who was the historical Heraclitus? The complexity of the reconstruction of his authentic philosophy is due, above all, to the fragmentary state of our sources. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, whose works have been preserved in medieval manuscripts, the treatise of Heraclitus, known in

ancient times as "On Nature", has not been preserved. Only fragments survive (from 125 to 160 according to different estimates), that is, quotes from Heraclitus in later authors from Plato in the 4th century B.C. to the Neoplatonists in the 6th, as well as few quotes from the Byzantines (like Psellus) and medieval scholastics (Like Albertus Magnus). The second and inferior class of sources is the so-called doxography, i.e. later expositions and summaries of his "opinions" (δόξαι) from Aristotle to the medieval excerpts from the tradition of *Placita philosophorum*. Both of these classes of sources present their own difficulties and problems. In the case of fragments, problematic is the degree of authenticity of the quotation, as well as the distinction between quotation and its context. In the case of doxography, it is the difficulty of separating authentic content from later inauthentic formulations. And in both cases (more often in the case of fragments), there are problems of textual criticism, that is, the elimination of distortions of the Greek text introduced by medieval copyists and sometimes already by ancient authors quoting the fragments.

This monograph consists of two parts: Part I contains an essay on the life and philosophy of Heraclitus, as well as an analysis of his metaphorical language. Without such preliminary analysis, without a precise understanding of Heraclitus' metaphors and imagery the path to the understanding of the philosophical meaning of his words will remain closed. Part II is a new critical edition of the Greek text of the surviving fragments of Heraclitus with a Russian translation and commentary. This edition differs from the existing ones (Diels-Kranz, Markovic, Kahn, Conche, and others) not only by the new version of the Greek text, but also by the composition and arrangement of the fragments. Its aim is to reconstruct, as far as it is possible, the original text and the composition of the book of Heraclitus.

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The most conspicuous innovation is found in the reconstruction of the second chapter of Heraclitus' book (Λόγος πολιτικός), especially in the "technological" section on various human arts and skills (τέχναι) which is based on the reconsideration of the source-value of the Hippocratic imitation of Heraclitus in the first book of *De diaeta* (Περὶ διαίτης). [The chapter on «Heraclitus' book» in Part I contains a systematic criticism and refutation of the hypercritical approach to this text as a source of Heraclitus' philosophy by Kirk, Marcovich, Joly and others, and argues that the great Hellenists of the 19th century (Bernays, Bywater followed by Diels) saw the truth. 15 out of the 20 examples of τέχναι in the Hippocratic *De diaeta* are attested either in Heraclitus' fragments or in the Heraclitean tradition. Once we recognise that the main thesis of *De diaeta* I ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν «the art imitates nature» is an authentic thesis of

Heraclitus (possibly a verbatim quotation from Heraclitus), he is immediately transformed from a physicist or abstract metaphysician into anthropologial, ethical and political (as well as theological) thinker. In the proem to his books Heraclitus explicitly defines the subject of his treatise not as an enquiry inti nature like Milesians (nay he dismisses ἱστορία as empty talk!), but as «words and deeds» (ἔπη καὶ ἔργα). The «deeds» (ἔργα) or what the humans "are doing" (ποιοῦσι) in their everyday practices, is a reference to the forthcoming analysis of human τέχναι in chapter 2, whereas the chapter 1 "On the Universe" (Περὶ τοὺ παντός) described the «words and deeds» of the cosmic god. The subject of Heraclitus' book was not a scientific explanation of the origin of cosmos and etioligy of natural phenomena (as in Milesians), but a comparative study of how the divine (celestial) and human world are governed, a study of religion and politics, the first theory of the natural law and the first Greek philosophical *utopia* anticipating in many respects the subject and aim of Plato's *Politeia*].

It should be emphasised that the essay on Heraclitus' philosophy in the first part of our work relies entirely on the second, philological (text-critical and hermeneutical) part, as well as on many years of systematic study of the metaphorical language of Heraclitus and of the early Greek philosophers.

The title of our book "The Logos of Heraclitus" imitates Heraclitus' oracular language and is intentionally ambiguous. The Greek word *logos* can mean, among other things, a doctrine, theory, and a philosophical treatise, but also a word, speech or written text. When Heraclitus contrasts his *logos* with the *logoi* of others as the only true logos with false *logoi* of poets and philosophers, he has in mind both these meanings.

At the same time, he justified the superiority of his *logos* over the *logoi* of others by the fact that his *logos* — both as a philosophical doctrine and as a book setting forth this doctrine — is an exact copy of the divine *logos* of the Universe, which he has managed to read ('to listen') correctly for the first time in history, to translate it from the "language of nature" (*liber naturae* or τὰ τῆς φύσεως γράμματα in Philo's exegesis) into (not so) plain Greek and to set forth for the edification of his fellow citizens and all Hellenes in a work dedicated to the temple of Artemis of Ephesus. The opinion about "arrogance" and snobbery of Heraclitus, which dates back to ancient times, is somewhat exaggerated. In a certain sense, Heraclitus modestly renounces the authorship of his book in favour of the cosmic god who speaks through his mouth ("Listening not to my logos...") as Apollo speaks through the mouth of Sibyl. The first part of our work reconstructs the *logos* of Heraclitus as a thought and doctrine (philosophy), and the second the *logos* as a word (text, book). But since both of them, according to Heraclitus, derive from the same heavenly original, the title of our book contains an allusion to this third *Logos* as the central point of Heraclitus' philosophy.

PART I: THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

Chapter I: THE LIFE OF HERACLITUS

[*Abstract of chapter 1.* This chapter sets Heraclitus and his work in the historical context of the Ionian revolt (499 - 494 B.C.). The combined external evidence and the *ipsissima verba* of Heraclitus lead to the conclusion that the book of Heraclitus was not only a philosophical treatise, but also a program of radical political and religious reforms whose aim was the creation of a federal state of Ionian Greeks (presumably with further expansion of it into Panhellenic state) in order to match and to surpass the military might of the Persian empire. In religious sphere the Homeric anthropomorphic polytheism had to be replaced by a monotheistic cult of Apollo the Sun (being a visible manifestation of his Father Zeus, the imperceptible 'ever-living fire' imbued with mind, the creator of the Universe) who would unite the Greeks as a 'common' (ξυνός) patron of the unified mega-polis. Heraclitus was an ideologue of the Ionian revolt and probably was connected with the 'party of war' in Ephesus, hence his glorification of the fallen in battle who would be awarded with a 'better portion' in afterlife and become commensals of gods in the Sun region, according to the neglected verbatim fragment in Zenobius Sophista (fr. 159A Lebedev). Heraclitus intentional 'obscurity' and metaphorical language can be explained both as imitation of the oracular language of Apollo (whose prophet he claims to be by the prophetic formula 'listening not to my logos...') and as a conspiratorial protection against the spies of the Great king. Heraclitus' project probably failed because of the destruction of Miletus (494 B.C.), but his Panhellenic ideas may have influenced the founders of the Delian League who made the Delian Apollo the patron of the new confederation that by mid-fifth century B.C. had united 200 Greek poleis. Heraclitus' dream of defeating the Achaemenid empire was fully realized by Alexander the Great.]

Very little is known about the life of Heraclitus, and what is known is mostly untrustworthy. The only ancient biography of Heraclitus in the 9th book of Diogenes Laertius is a mixture of anecdotes of the Hellenistic era, the legend of the illness and death of Heraclitus reminds a surrealistic novel. A correspondence with Darius, cited by the same Diogenes, and 6 letters to friends, composed by the Cynics in the 1st century AD. are late rhetorical and moralistic exercises. And yet, thanks to the autobiographical fragments of Heraclitus himself, as well as Strabo's valuable testimony on Heraclitus's descent and some more reliable testimonies, one can reconstruct in general lines the historical context and some important events of his life, as well as to form an idea of his interests and intellectual personality.

The full name of the philosopher was "Heraclitus, the son of Bloson, from Ephesus" (Ἡράκλειτος Βλόσωνος Ἐφέσιος).[1] Apollodorus in his "Chronicle" dated his «flourishing» (*akme*) to the 69th Olympiad, i.e. 504-501. B.C. Combining this with another report that Empedocles and Heraclitus died at the age of 60 [2], we get the approximate dates of his life around 540 - about 480 B.C. plus or minus several years for dates of birth and death. The dates of Apollodorus were often questioned on the grounds that they were based on the purely hypothetical assumption of the age difference between a teacher and a student of 40 years. But since Heraclitus was considered an autodidact who had no teachers in ancient biography, such suspicions in this case are groundless. The dating of Apollodorus agrees with the biographical tradition about Heraclitus as a contemporary of Darius Hystaspes (reigned 522–486 BC).

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Therefore, all attempts to replace the date of Apollodorus (who relied on Eratosthenes' serious chronological work) with some dubious modern speculations should be firmly rejected. Heraclitus was a descendant of an ancient "royal" family (*genos*) of the Androclidae or Basilidae whose genealogy was traced back to the legendary *archegetes* of the Ionian colonisation and the founder of Ephesus Androclus, the son of the last Athenian king Codrus (11th century B.C. in

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[1] D.L. 9.1 According to a less probable version, Ἡράκων or Ἡρακίων. Kirk suggested that this is a name of Heraclitus' grandfather, but it looks rather as a confusion with another Ἡράκλειτος.

[2] D.L. 8.52 = Apollodor. *Chronica* 244 F 32 Jacoby keeping the MSS. reading Ἡράκλειτον (Ἡρακλείδης Sturz).

legendary chronology), and consequently, he was a distant relative of the philosopher Plato.[3] Heraclitus had the hereditary title of "basileus" or the king, but by his time this title had long since lost its political meaning and had only religious and ceremonial significance: Heraclitus was a hereditary priest with religious duties and some honorary privileges. The meaning of the royal title of Heraclitus is explained by Strabo (Geography 14.3) in his description of Ephesus of the Roman period:

"According to his (Pherecydes of Athens) words, the Ionian, and subsequently the Aeolian colonisation was headed by Androclus, the legitimate son of the Athenian king Codrus, and he became the founder of Ephesus. That is why, as they say, Ephesus became the capital of the Ionian kingdom, and the descendants of this *genos* (scil. of Androclidae) are still called "kings" (βασιλεῖς) and have some privileges: prohedria in *agones*[4], the purple mantle as the hallmark of the royal *genos*, the club instead of the scepter, and they are in charge of the sacred rites of Demeter of Eleusis"

Androclidae were in charge of the mysteries of Demeter Eleusinia in Strabo's time. Was it an ancient cult transferred from Athens to Ephesus by the Androclidae? Or was it introduced later in order yo strengthen the political influence of Athens in Ionia, for example, after 479 [or before 499]? Anyway, since the archaic Artemision (Croesus' temple) of the mid-6th century was actually built on the land of the Androclidae, and since the biographical tradition links Heraclitus (and his book) to the temple of Artemis, the Androclidae must have had some connection with the temple of Artemis of Ephesus: the chthonic cult of Demeter Eleusinia and the cult of the great Anatolian mother-goddess have some common features.

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The genealogy of Heraclitus explains his intense interest in religion and popular cults on the one hand, and in politics and laws on the other. In the archaic era, the connection between religion and politics was very close (for the Greeks the connecting concept of the two spheres was νόμοι "laws" or "customs"), one of the three chapters of the lost book of Heraclitus was devoted to politics (Λόγος πολιτικός), the other to theology (Λόγος θεολογικός). According to Diodotus the correct title of the treatise should be Περὶ πολιτείας "On the form of government» rather than

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[3] Plato was a descendant of Codrus by paternal line, and descendant of Solon by maternal.

[4] *Prohedria* is an honorary right of seat in the first row in a theater or a stadium.

Περὶ φύσωες "On Nature" since Heraclitus discussed cosmology only as a «paradigm» of political order, the polis of Zeus (i.e. the Universe) being the natural standard for human *nomoi*. The very fact of the dedication of the book to the temple of Artemis of Ephesus is significant by itself: no Greek would ever dedicate to a temple a naturalistic treatise with rational explanations of meteorological phenomena etc. which were regarded by many as «impious». A book with a chapter Περὶ θεῶν would be more suitable for this purpose.

According to Antisthenes of Rhodos, the Hellenistic author of the "Successions of the Philosophers", Heraclitus gave up his title of "basileus" to his younger brother.[5] When and under what circumstances this happened, how many years Heraclitus had this title before resignation, we do not know. But it is clear that he was the eldest son in an aristocratic family and received the best education that was available in his time, and moreover, it is quite possible that the knowledge of oral hieratic traditions of his family was an important part of his intellectual background. Heraclitus was born and died as a subject of the Persian king. Shortly before his birth, Ionia was conquered by the Cyrus' general Harpagus (546 BC), and the Greek cities of the Ionian Dodecapolis (Twelve poleis), including Ephesus, became tributaries of the empire of Achaemenids. In the conquered Ionian cities, the Persians used to install tyrannical regimes. The tyrants installed by the Persians were, as a rule, puppets of the Great King. According to Herodotus, their power depended entirely on Darius. Discontent with the tyrants-collaborationists in Greek cities was widespread and in 499 resulted in the Ionian revolt, which was initiated by the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras, who proclaimed the end of tyranny and a transition to the popular rule (*isonomia*) in order to win the support of the masses. One of the Persophile tyrants, Coes of Mytilenae was stoned. The Ionian revolt was crushed by the Persians with unheard cruelty and ended with disaster: after the Ionian allies lost the battle of Lade in 494, the Persians destroyed the beauty and pride of Ionia, Miletus, the most advanced in cultural, scientific, technological and economic terms city of the ancient world of its time.

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Herodotus describes the capture of Miletus as follows: "... men were mostly killed by the long-haired Persians, women and children were enslaved, and the sanctuary at Didyma and the

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[5] ap. D.L. 9. 6 = Antisthenes fr.10a Jacoby.

temple, and the oracle, were plundered and set on fire ..." (Herod. 6.19. 3). Heraclitus was a living witness of these and similar tragic events, the echo of them is heard in his words:

"Polemos (War) is the father of all beings, and the king of all beings: some of them he turns into gods, and others into humans, some he makes slaves, and others makes free." (Fr. 32L / B 53). After the destruction of Miletus, the policy of the Persians with regard of the form of government in the subordinate Greek cities suddenly changed. The commander of Darius in Asia Minor and Thrace Mardonius "deposed all Ionian tyrants and installed in the cities democracies."[6]

It was already the second wave of tyrants deposition in the Ionian cities during Heraclitus' life-time. The first, initiated by Aristagoras at the beginning of the Ionian revolt (499 B.C.), and the second, conducted by Mardonius after the suppression of the revolt (494 B.C.). Heraclitus's autobiographical fragment about his friend Hermodorus testifies, firstly, that Heraclitus was passionately involved in the politics of his time, and secondly, that he was involved in an acute conflict with his co-citizens:

"The Ephesians deserve to hang themselves and to leave the city to the minorse after they expelled Hermodorus, the most beneficious of all citizens, saying: «Let none of us be most beneficious for the city, otherwise let him be elsewhere and with others "!" (116 L/B 121 DK). Who was Hermodorus and when was he ostracised by the Ephesians? The answer to this question would be very important not only for the reconstruction of the chronological canvas of Heraclitus's life and the dating of his work, but also for the understanding of his political sympathies and possible participation in the events of that time. Apparently, Hermodorus was an influential political figure — a legislator, a party leader, or perhaps one of the rulers of Ephesus or a candidate for the post – who fell victim of the political turmoils and the change of regimes in 499 or 494 B.C.

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Still another wave of *metabole politeion* (revolutions) in the Ionian cities is likely to have happened after the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece in 479, when the Athenians began the

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[6] Herod. 6.43.1 τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλιας.

restoration of Miletus. If the chronology of Apollodorus is correct, Heraclitus in 479 may have already died (but this is uncertain). The same question arises in connection with the notice of Clement that Heraclitus "persuaded the tyrant Melancomas to resign" (Clem. Alex. Strom 1.65 = 22 A 3). One can only guess whether Melancomas' renunciation is connected with the nomination of Hermodorus, or whether these events happened in different times and are not related to each other. If Melancomas' renunciation happened in 499, Heraclitus certainly sympathised with the Ionian revolt.

Since Heraclitus was not a supporter of popular rule and considered democratic laws to be bad,[7] Hermodorus was hardly a democrat. The apocryphal letter of Darius to Heraclitus describes him as a Persophile and a friend of the Great king, but this is an unreliable source (Ps. Heraclit. Epist. 3). Cicero calls him the "supreme ruler of the Ephesians" (*princeps Ephesiorum*) [7], a late tradition of Roman times of uncertain origin, reflected in Strabo and Pliny, depicts Hermodorus as the legislator who allegedly participated in the drafting of the Roman laws of the Twelve Tables (22 A 13a DK). According to Eduard Zeller, ostracism presupposes a democratic system and therefore was impossible in Ephesus before 479 B.C., i.e. before the liberation of Ionia and the restoration of democracy, but this is refuted by Herodotus's testimony on the political reforms carried out by Mardonius after 494 B.C. Whereas in 499 B.C. the opposition to the popular rule (*isonomia*) was unequivocally Persophile, in 493 it could be anti-Persian. Therefore, we believe that the end of the 490-ies is the most plausible date of the expulsion of Hermodorus. The passionate tone of Heraclitus' invective against Ephesians can be best explained by the assumption that it was a relatively recent event, therefore the ostracism of Hermodorus provides not only a *terminus post quem*, but also an approximate date of composition of Heraclitus' book that cannot be much later than 490 B.C.

The autobiographical tradition about Hermodorus is intertwined with the biographical tradition about the civil war (στάσις) in Ephesus and the attempt of Heraclitus to act as an intermediary in it, reconciling the enemy parties. The concept of strife, στάσις, in the Greek political lexicon is the opposite of the concept of civil concord, ὁμόνοια.

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Plutarch tells the following historical anecdote about the "symbolic" speech of Heraclitus in the assembly of people at the time of war and "In response to the request of fellow citizens to

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[7] Cicero, Tusc. V.105 = Heraclit. 105 c 1 Marc.

express his opinion about (civil) consent (περὶ ὁμονοίας), Heraclitus took a kylix (cup) of cold water, sprinkled it with barley flour, stirred the drink with a twig of pennyroyal, drank it and left. Thus, he (symbolically) showed them that in order to preserve peace and concord in the polis, they must give up luxury and be content with what was at hand" (Plutarchus, *De garrulitate* 511B).

In the Homeric scholia it is clarified that the quarrel was "about money" (περὶ χρημάτων), and in a more detailed version of the anecdote from Themistius, preserved only in the Arabic translation, Heraclitus speaks in a besieged city. According to Themistius' story, the Ephesians were accustomed to luxury and pleasure, but when the war began, the city was besieged by the Persians. Nevertheless, the Ephesians continued to indulge in a *dolce vita*. Due to the shortage of food, a famine broke up, and so the citizens came together to discuss what should be done in order to overcome the shortage of food, but no one dared to make a proposal to curb consumption. Then Heraclitus rose, prepared a *kykeon* out of the water with barley flour in front of them and drank it. The Ephesians learned the lesson. And when the enemies discovered that the Ephesians eventually turned from luxury to moderation and adopted Heraclitus' diet, they lifted the siege and left. The moral of this story is: although the Persians had superiority in military force and weapons, they retreated in front of Heraclitus' *kykeon*, the invincible weapon of endurance. [8] With this anecdote scholars have compared the coins from Ephesus of the Roman period which depict Heraclitus standing with his right hand raised in the instructive gesture and with lowered left hand squeezing his royal club [9], as well as the statue of the philosopher from Gortyn in the Heraklion Archaeological Museum.[10] The anecdote may be a moral parable, but this moral parable is fully consistent with the ascetic ethics of Heraclitus, who condemned wealth and luxury, while civil strife and famine were not uncommon at the time of the Ionian revolt.[11] In the tradition about Hermodorus Heraclitus, on the contrary, refuses to give any

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[8] Themist. περὶ ἀρετῆς 40 ap. Mondolfo-Tarán, ETI, 62–63.

[9] Diels, Herakleitos[1], p. XI слл.

[10] On Heraclitus' portraits see Marcovich RE (1967): 256; G.Richter, The Portraits of the Greeks, Oxf., 1984, 127-129.

[11] *Pace* Marcovich and Mondolfo-Taran (*ad loc.),* there is no sufficient reason to connect the symbolic lesson of moderation to citizens in the biographical tradition with the *kykeon* in fr. B 72L/B 125 DK because the semantics of the image of *kykeon* in both cases has nothing in common: in the first case (in Plutarch and Themistius) this is an ethical symbol of simplicity (*kykeon* was the cheapest popular drink

advice and, in response to the proposal to draw up laws, sends the Ephesians to the devil and "advises" them to hang themselves.[12]

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Although the correspondence with Darius is nothing more than a moralistic rhetorical exercise on the topos "philosopher and ruler", it could be based on a historical fact: the refusal of the Ionian *basileus* Heraclitus to accept the invitation of the Great King (*Megas Basileus*) and to serve him, or his refusal to collaborate with the Persian administration. Clement mentions this as a historical fact, along with the episode with Melancomas (22 A 3); he does not quote Pseudo-Heraclitean letters as his source, therefore chances are that he and the epistolographers rely on a common historical source. Heraclitus no doubt was an influential figure in Ephesus and Ionia, and it is not improbable that the Persian administration tried to draw him to their side in order to carry out their policy through him. About his antipathy to the Persians testify both a threat with eternal punishment to "magoi" in Fr. 14 DK = 137–138 L. and the rejection of metaphysical and religious dualism typical for Zoroastrianism (Pythagoras in his eyes must have been Μηδίζων in metaphysics and theology, a plagiarist of alien wisdom with "barbaric soul"). Heraclitus not only proclaims War (Polemos) as the originating cause of all creatures and a way to freedom (fr.32L/B 53), but also in a number of fragments glorifies the fallen in battle and promises them a «greater shares» (μείζονας μοῖρας), that is a reward with immortality in heaven for their heroism: see the fragments on the heroic ethics of death in battle (fr.102-105 Leb.), on the «Judgment by Fire» (fr. 150-152 Leb.), on the post mortem fate of the souls (fr. 153-156), on the apotheosis of philosophers (fr.157-158 Leb.), and on the deified heroes and the wise as «commensals of the gods» in the region of Apollo the Sun (fr.159 and the new fragment 159A). His attacks on Homer and Archilochus (who told with cynical pride that he lost his shield, but saved his life) are directed primarily against their pacifism. In Ionia, at the time of the Ionian revolt, and even before and after it, such glorification of the «beautiful death» (*kalos thanatos*) and explicit exhortations to fight without fear of death, would be unambiguously perceived as a call for a revolt against the Great King and the struggle for freedom. The combined external evidence and the *ipsissima verba* of Heraclitus lead to the conclusion that the book of Heraclitus was not only a philosophical treatise, but also a political (and religious) program of reforms

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that coast virtually nothing), an antithesis to luxury, whereas in the second case (Theophrastus) *kykeon* is a physical image of body that remains solid only so far as it is «stirred» by the soul.

[12] Iamblichus *VP* 182 = Heraclit. 105d Marc.

related to the "party of war" in Ephesus during or after the Ionian revolt. [We assume that at the time of the Ionian revolt people in Ephesus, as well as in other Ionian cities that took part in it, were torn apart between two conflicting parties, the party of war supporting the revolt, and the opposite party of peace or compromise with Persians. Presumably, the party of war was supported especially by the land- owners and old aristocracy, as well as by peasants owning some land, and the party of peace primarily by the representatives of the new rich upper-middle class of merchants and manufacturers. This differentiation is suggested to us by the fact that the target of Heraclitus' moral and political invectives against *hoi polloi* seems to be this new Ephesian «bourgoisie» endulging in luxury and demonstrative consumption rather than simple peasants or artisans. These people were more prone to cosmopolitism and compromise with Persians because many of them obtained τὰ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν (means of living) from the sea, not from the land, and the sea is "no one's" possession and no one's motherland, it is owned by Poseidon. We do not claim of course that every Greek aristocrat was anti-Persian and every rich merchant was μηδίζων, we point to some predominant social tendencies in Ionians' attitude towards the Ionian revolt, which may have had quite a few exceptions to the rule.] The central metaphysical concept of Heraclitus, τὸ ξυνόν «what is common» (contrasted with the "private" ἴδιον) is taken from the political lexicon. This term, among other things, could mean a confederation of poleis, which in wartime would become a military alliance. The confederation of the Ionian poleis in Panionion, τὸ ξυνὸν τῶν Ἰώνων, known in modern historiography as the Ionian League is regularly mentioned by Herodotus in the story of the Ionian revolt.

[p.18]

Although Miletus was the initiator and the leader of the revolt, it is believed that after 497 all the joint operations of the Ionian cities against the Persians were carried out under the auspices and on the basis of common decisions of the confederation, and not of Miletus alone (Gorman 2001: 138 ff).

In the story of the conquest of Ionia by Harpagos Herodotus relates two «wise counsels» (*gnomai*) given by two of the Seven Sages, Bias of Priene and Thales of Miletus, at the meetings of the delegates of the Ionian confederation in Panionion. The pessimistic advice of Bias was given after the conquest, it recommended to all Ionians to board their ships, to emigrate to Sardinia and to establish a new common Ionian polis there. The advice of Thales was given before the conquest, its aim was to prevent the Persian threat (Herod. 1.170):

Χρηστὴ δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ διαφθαρῆναι Ἰωνίην Θαλέω ἀνδρὸς Μιλησίου ἐγένετο ... ὃς ἐκέλευε ἓν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Τέῳ (Τέων γὰρ μέσον εἶναι Ἰωνίης), τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλις οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατά περ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν.

"The advice of Thales of Miletus was also useful before the desolation of Ionia ... he ordered the Ionians to establish a single parliament (bouleuterion) in Teos, because Teos was the center of Ionia, whereas the other poleis, preserving their population, would be considered as if they were

demes. "

The advice of Bias proposes to merge all Ionian poleis in a new mega-polis in Sardinia, the advice of Thales formulates a revolutionary for Greece idea and project not just of a confederation of separate poleis, but of a unified federal state in which old poleis becomes demes (administrative units) whose inhabitants send their representatives to the unified single bouleuterion in Teos.

One important point should be emphasised: according to Herodotus, Thales made this revolutionary proposal in the Panionion, that is, in τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων, or in the Ionian dialect τὸ ξυνὸν τῶν Ἰώνων, at the meeting of the Ionian league. In the programmatic political fragment 131L (B 114) about the ideal and exemplary legislation (we take λέγοντας «setting forth their logoi» as a reference to law-makers or «law-pronouncers», in Greek perception *nomos* is a kind of *logos*) Heraclitus talks about ξυνὸν πάντων, about a certain cosmic state without borders, whose divine law is the ground and source of all human laws in different poleis. Formally, Heraclitus speaks here about the "Polis of Zeus" i.e. about the Cosmopolis, which unites gods and humans in a single power order (cosmos), but the text is an imperative (ἰσχυρίζεσθα χρή "one must take hold of...") and is addressed to human law-makers on earth, and primarily in Ionia.

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On the basis of this it can be assumed that the book of Heraclitus (or rather the main ideas of this book) was a program of radical reforms, prepared by him for the *probouloi* (delegates) of the general meeting of the Ionians in Panionion during or immediately after the Ionian revolt. There is no doubt that in wartime there were Persian spies in Ephesus («the eyes of the Great King»). His Greek political opponents from the other party could also bring against him an accusation of «impiety» (asebeia) on the ground that he «introduces new gods» etc. (cf. a similar accusation of Heraclitus by one Euthycles in Ps.-Heraclit. *Epistle*s V, 2) or denounce him to the Persian authorities. Heraclitus therefore chose a highly cryptic metaphorical language with innuendos and deliberately ambiguous syntax (syntactical polysemy), *asyndeton*, *hyperbaton* etc. to express his revolutionary political and religious ideas in such way that in case of emergency he could easily dismiss all allegations by interpreting the text the other way around and reducing it to

some innocent triviality (as he did in the story of Euthycles).[13] Heraclitus was well aware that the main obstacle to the creation of a Greek federal state for confronting the Persian empire was the polytheistic religion of the Greek polis. The creation of a unified state was impossible without the creation of a single cult of the one all-mighty god. If Iranian Zoroastrianism had any influence on Heraclitus, then it was not doctrinal (the metaphysics of Heraclitus denies dualism), but as an example of a successful monotheistic religion that strengthens the imperial power and the effectiveness of government. The monotheistic reform of Darius was carried out during the lifetime of Heraclitus; it must have impressed him and made him ponder on this subject. Researchers have repeatedly noted the "prophetic" tone and style of Heraclitus (Guthrie 1962: 403 ff.). This prophetic style is not that of Cassandra, predicting catastrophe and death. This prophetic style is that of a prophet-reformer who has a well-thought-out plan for the complete reformation of the political, religious, moral and educational spheres of Greek life, a plan supported by a tough system of numerous «proofs» (*tekmeria*) and substantiated by the constructed *ad hoc* system of Apollo-centered anti-individualistic metaphysics, ethics and monotheistic pantheism all of them stressing the primacy of all-powerful One over the weak and even irreal «many».

The ancient cult of Poseidon Helikonios, revered by the old Ionian League in Panionion on the mountain of Mycale, was too local and was not suitable for the unification of the Greeks. Therefore Heraclitus put on a masque of a prophet of Apollo - according to Strabo, the cult of Apollo Delphinios was a "common" (κοινόν) for all Ionians.[14] At the same time he also reserved in his theology an important place for Zeus: there was no contradiction here, because according to the law of the identity of opposites, father and son are one, they are consubstantial.

[p.20]

Zeus was allegorically understood as the "ever-living" and "keraunian" fire underlying the whole cosmos, and Apollo as its visible manifestation, the Sun (conceived as the cosmic mind). The motif of the "wisdom of Apollo" passes through the entire book of Heraclitus, starting with the prophetic formula of the first fragment ("Listening not to mine, but to this logos ... ", i.e.the

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[13] See the commentary to the fragments on «The Wise Being», Τὸ Σοφόν fr. 1, 139–141 L.

[14] Strabo, *Geogr.* 4.1.4 in the description of Massilia: ἐν δὲ τῇ ἄκρᾳ τὸ Ἐφέσιον ἵδρυται καὶ τὸ τοῦ Δελφινίου Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν· τοῦτο μὲν κοινὸν Ἰώνων ἁπάντων, τὸ δὲ Ἐφέσιον τῆς Ἀρτέμιδός ἐστι νεὼς τῆς Ἐφεσίας.

divine logos of the Universe) and ending with the final chord, the comparison of his logos with the voice of Sibyl that sounds through millennia thanks to Apollo.

We do not know to how many people Heraclitus disclosed his ideas and the plan of reforms, we also do not know whether he had an opportunity to expose his proposals at the meeting of the Ionian league. We do not know whether he acted as a loner or under the instruction of a certain party or a group of like-minded people. It cannot be ruled out that it was Hermodous who embodied his ideal of ruler and his hopes for the practical realisation of the great project, but after the expulsion of Hermodorus he had no choice but to make his reforms "in word" (ἐν λόγωι, like Socrates in Plato's "Republic") and entrust this logos to Artemis Ephesia as a testament to future generations. The tragic outcome of the Ionian revolt proved the correctness of Heraclitus' appeal for unification by transcending the borders of «private» and local political consciousness: the revolt drowned in blood due to private ambitions, internal quarrels and the lack of discipline and a unified command. The separatism of *poleis* (religious and political) and personal ambitions of the Ionian leaders could not withstand the imperial might and war machine of Achaemenids, based on the vertical of power and unquestioning execution of orders. But it is worth pondering whether the Delian League, which was formed shortly after the Ionian revolt, chose the sacred island of Apollo as its sacral center of common resistance by mere coincidence. The Delian League arose in response to a request for liberation by the former members of the Ionian League, and its original core was "Ionian" (CAH v 36 ff; Gorman 2001: 215). In the course of the Persian wars the «prophecy» of Heraclitus came true in a certain sense: in the battles of Salamis and Plataea Apollo, the patron of the unified forces, defeated Ahura Mazda, and by the middle of the 5th century the Delian League had already united 200 cities and was indeed transformed into a kind ξυνὸν πάντων, the common confederation of almost all Greek *poleis*.[15] Could the ideas of Heraclitus be known to the founders of the Delian League and influence their choice of the god- protector of the *koinon*?

[p.21]

There is no direct evidence, but some indirect plausible evidence can be found in the report of Demetrius, the author of the «Homonymous philosophers and poets", quoted by Diogenes Laertius 9.15 = Demetrius Magnes. F 27 Mejer:

"Demetrius says in the *Namesakes* that he (Heraclitus) scorned the Athenians as well, despite the

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[15] In the case of the battle of Salamis this is to be taken literally since before the battle the Greeks sang a paean to Apollo: Aeschyl. *Pers.* 392 sq.

fact that he enjoyed the greatest glory among them, and despite the fact that the Ephesians did not hold him in great respect, he preferred to stay at home."

This report of Demetrius is paired in Diogenes' context with the story about Heraclitus' decline of the invitation of Darius, so it is clear from the context that the Athenians invited Heraclitus to settle in Athens, because they saw that he was neglected by the Ephesians, but Heraclitus, exactly as in the case of Darius, "scorned" their the invitation, too, and stayed at home. That Heraclitus was held in highest respect or enjoyed greatest glory in Athens, is a somewhat surprising report. Heraclitus became fashionable in the intellectual circles in Athens in the thirties of the 5th century B.C. thanks to Euripides and the Sophists, but how he could enjoy greatest glory in Athens in early 5th century? Theoretically, Heraclitus could still be alive in the first years of the Delian League (say, 475 B.C.). He could become famous in Athens at that time not for his theory of Universal flux, but only as a political figure and only for his role as one of the ideologues of the Panhellenic resistance to common enemy whose ideas may have influenced the founding fathers of the Delian League. Another piece of evidence on the possible connections of Heraclitus with the representatives of the Delian League is found in the unique episode from the life of Melissus in Diogenes Laertius 9.24: Melissus first became a disciple of Parmenides, but he «also conversed with Heraclitus» (εἰς λόγους ἦλθεν Ἡρακλείτωι) «on which occasion he introduced him to the Ephesians who ignored him, just as Hippocrates introduced Democritus to the Abderites». At first glance, everything in this report is suspicious: 1) According to Apollodorus' dating of Melissus (acme 444/1), Melissus was 10 years old or so by 475 B.C. 2) It is hard to understand how could a young unknown man from Samos «introduce to the Ephesians» their own *basileus* known to everybody. 3) Melissus was a dogmatic Eleatic philosopher who denied the very possibility of motion, whereas Heraclitus held that «rest (στάσις) belongs to the dead» (in our edition we argue that the words εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν constitute a quotation and therefore should be treated as a separate fragment F 49 Leb., and not as «doxography» A6 DK). With Apollodorus' date the reliability of this evidence would be questionable, but if we assume that Melissus was 10 years older than the Apollodorus' date, that is, that he was born around 495–500 B.C., he could, in principle, as a young man in his twenties, visit the famous philosopher in Ephesus in early seventies and «to converse» with him (the event is considered credible by Reale, Melisso, 272, contra Zeller). And since he was a professional seaman and was elected *nauarchos* (admiral) of Samos in his mature age, it is conceivable that in his youth, before the Samian Revolt (in which he fought against Athens in 444 B.C.) he may have fought on the side of the Delian League and Athens against the common enemy. He may have been sent as agent or messenger (ἄγγελος) of the Delian League by her

founding fathers to Ephesus to «establish contact» (εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν) with the famous basileus whose Apollocentric political thought and Panhellenic ideas may have contributed to the choice of Apollo as a "common" and unifying god of the Delian League.

[It is worth noticing that both the report of Demetrius on the decline of the Athenians' invitation in DL 9.15 and the report on Melissus' contact with Heraclitus in D.L.9.24 share a common element, the «neglect» of the Ephesians: καταφρονούμενον ὑπὸ Ἐφεσίων in the former report looks like a rephrasing of Ἐφεσίοις ἀγνοοῦσι in the latter, and *vice versa*. Since both reports are quoted by Diogenes in proximity in the same 9th book of his *Vitae*, a conjecture lies at hand that they have a common source, i.e. *Homonymoi* of Demetrius Magnes. If so, they most probably derive from the same passage in this work since it is unlikely that Demetrius mentioned the «contempt» of Ephesians twice. And if so, they look like two parts of one and the same story: Melissus on behalf of the Delian league and the Athenians visits Ephesus, meets with Heraclitus, delivers to him the invitation of Athenians and «converses» with him on philosophical matters.

The invitation of the Athenians in any case must have been an official, not a private invitation, presumably based on an honorary decree of *proxenia* for his contribution to the great victory. It is on this occasion that Melissus «recommends» Heraclitus to his compatriots. The «contempt» of Ephesians should be interpreted as a reference to the conflict between Heraclitus and Ephesians after the expulsion of Hermodorus. The story of Heraclitus' decline was also known to Demetrius Phalereus (ap. D.L. 9.15 = Fr. 106 Fort.) in his «Apology of Socrates» in which it was probably cited aa parallel to the conflict between Socrates and the Athenians. Therefore the «recommendation» (συνέστησεν) of Heraclitus to the Ephesians by Melissus should be understood not as «introduction» of an unknown person, but as an *epainos* of Heraclitus and attempt of reconciliation.

It should be noted that the above interpretation of two reports on Heraclitus and the Athenians is intended only as a *possible additional* evidence supporting our main thesis about Heraclitus as the ideologue of the Ionian revolt which is *primarily* based on Heraclitus' *ipsissima verba* on war and glorification those fallen in battle, as well as on the historical context in which his book was composed.]

II. THE BOOK OF HERACLITUS

1. *The treatise of Heraclitus "On nature."*

According to Diels, the book of Heraclitus was a collection of aphorisms, notes and observations devoid of a systematic plan.[16] According to Kirk, Heraclitus never wrote any book at all: allegedly, it was some disciple of Heraclitus who collected and recorded the thoughts of his teacher for posterity. Both of these opinions are wrong. The opinion of Diels in this case at least has some semblance of credibility, it relies on the seeming stylistic similarity of some of the fragments of Heraclitus (especially ethical sayings quoted by Stobaeus) with the traditional *gnomai* of the sages of the 6th century or the "aphorisms" of Hippocrates. The opinion of Kirk is devoid even of faintest probability: it is an instructive example of an obsessive hypercriticism which has lost the sense of measure and seeks always and everywhere to "expose" some «fraud» or «later invention», to reject the ancient tradition and to replace it with worthless speculations unsupported by evidence. Robert Parker on another occasion has aptly termed this trend a «suspicious scholarship».

Against both opinions can be immediately raised an obvious objection: Aristotle and the subsequent writers who quote Heraclitus call his book σύγγραμμα, that is a written prose "composition" or "treatise". This genre definition is ill-suited for "notes from a notebook" (ὑπομνήματα) or oral conversations (διατριβαί). The preserved introduction to the book of Heraclitus (1-2 Leb. = B 50, B 1 DK) is written in philosophical prose with a complex syntax, atypical for aphorisms and *gnomai*.

Heraclitus' book was indeed a philosophical "treatise" written according to a well-thought-out plan and outlining at the beginning the main thesis of all-unity, and then systematically proving

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[16] Diels, Herakleitos (1901), S. VIII: «Notizen, Tagebuchblätter, ὑπομνήματα ... Notizenstil ... aphoristisch». The Hippocratic text from *Epidemics* with the history of Philiscos (1.13), quoted by Diels in support of this strange view, has nothing to do with Heraclitus, neither in style, nor in content.

it in metaphysics, philosophy of nature, ethics, politics and theology. A significant part of the preserved fragments constitutes examples of the identity and unity of opposites. These examples are intended as empirical proofs (τεκμήρια) of the fundamental theoretical principle ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι «to know all things as one» stated in the very first sentence. In extant sources there is no mention of any «disciple» of Heraclitus who collected the sayings of his teacher after his death. Instead the sources tell us that Heraclitus himself wrote his book and himself dedicated it to the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (cf. Conche 1998: 7). Both Aristotle in the 4th century B.C. and Sextus Empiricus in the 2nd century A.D. cite the *incipit* of Heraclitus' book, the same text with identical localisation, unchanged for 500 years.

Heraclitus speaks in the first person (ἐγώ), which is also not typical for *gnomai* and aphorisms that express an objective and collective practical wisdom, not a personal view. He uses traditional proverbs (φάτις), but puts in them an "authorial" philosophical sense. Polemics, sarcasm, even curses, on the one hand when it comes to the profane, and oracular, enigmatic, prophetic style on the other when it comes to high truths and the divine. Such uncommon combination makes the style of Heraclitus unique, at least among the early Greek philosophers. The ethical fragments of Heraclitus quoted by Stobaeus do have a gnomic form. But these again are «authorial» *gnomai*, thematically related to the metaphysics of all-unity and ethics of self-control and eradication of all passions. These aphorisms have little in common with the sayings of the Seven Sages: they anticipate the Aristotelian distinction of intellectual and moral virtue and formulate the principle of "acting according to nature", which has later become fundamental in Stoic ethics.

Diogenes Laertius (9.12) quotes four different titles of Heraclitus' book that were known in Roman times: "On nature" (Περὶ φύσεως), "Muses" (Μοῦσαι), "A precise guide (literally "steering") to the goal of life" (Ἀκριβὲς οἰάκισμα πρὸς στάθμην βίου) and "Moral wisdom (?) or one and the same order of conduct of all beings" (Γνώμην ἠθῶν, τρόπου κόσμον ἕνα τῶν ξυμπάντων). Diogenes was fond of displaying his erudition to readers, therefore he collected some rare and unknown in other sources "titles" of Heraclitus' book. The only "library" name under which the book of Heraclitus was listed in catalogs, most probably was the standard "On nature".

"Muses"is a playful reference to Heraclitus in Plato's *Sophist 242d*, no one else quotes Heraclitus in this way.[17] The last two are not even titles, but rather brief summaries. "The precise guide

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[17] Plato's motivation becomes clear from the preceding context of Plato, *Soph.* 242c Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις κτλ. Since the teachings of earlier philosophers about being are similar to the "myths" that they tell us "as as if we were children", Heraclitus and

etc.» is a iambic trimetre probably composed by Diodotus himself. The last one (of uncertain origin and with corrupted text) also looks Stoic, but with traces of authentic vocabulary of Heraclitus: γνώμη in the sense of "intelligence" or "wisdom" is Ionic, attested un Heraclitus' fragments. The value of the last two "titles" is that they show that for the Stoics Heraclitus was primarily an ethical philosopher, and not a "physicist" as for Aristotle. There is an opinion that the title "On nature" was attached to the Preplatonic philosophical works only in the 4th century in the library of Lyceum (Schmalzriedt 1970) and that in the archaic period and in the 5th century prose works started with the formula "Such-and-such says that…». According to Diels, the book of Heraclitus started with words Ἡράκλειτος Ἐφέσιος τάδε λέγει "Heraclitus of Ephesus says so ..." immediately followed by the fragment B1 DK. This hypothesis of Diels should be rejected for two reasons: first, there is no evidence to support it; secondly, it stands in flat contradiction with the prophetic formula «listening not to my logos…" in fragment 1L/B50. Heraclitus speaks about "nature" (*physis*) at the very beginning of his book (fr.2L/B 1). However, the term *physis* which was applied by the Milesians to the material substance, was reinterpreted by him and transformed from a purely physical (mechanistic) into ethical, teleological and theological (pantheistic) term and concept, anticipating the Stoic notion: «nature» (physis) in Heraclitus is the objective (and purposeful) order of things, identified with the providential cosmic god. It is a norm for human life and it should become the standard for the correct government and religious worship. When interpreted in this way, and not in the Peripatetic sense, the title "On nature" might be considered authentic in its meaning. Diogenes Laertius (9.16) quotes a unique and valuable report of the grammarian Diodotus, the friend of Cicero and author of a commentary on Heraclitus, on the subject and contents of Heraclitus' book: «out of grammarians (a commentary on Heraclitus wrote) Diodotus who says that his treatise (σύγγραμμα) is not about nature (περὶ φύσεως), but about the form of government (περὶ πολιτείας), and that what he says about the nature is presented (or conceived) as a paradigm to this (ἐν παραδείγματος εἴδει)".

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Παράδειγμα can mean a model, a prototype after which a copy is made, for example, a bronze statue is cast statue or a temple is built (architectural 'plan'), but it can also mean an 'example'. It is not quite clear in what sense precisely the word is used by Diodotus (more probably in the first), but in any case, Diodotus means that nature as such was not the subject of his work: he was an ethical-political philosopher who referred to nature only as a paradigm of the (ideal) form of government, The iambic verse, in which Diodotus summarised the content of Heraclitus '

Empedocles quoted in confirmation of this are playfully called "Muses", that is, myth-makers and story-telling inspirational poets.

book: "the exact guide (literally "steering") to the life goal (literally to the 'finish line')" makes it clear that Diodotus was a subtle interpreter of Heraclitus' metaphorical language.[18] The word οἰάκισμα from οἰακίζω 'to steer, to govern' is a reminiscence of the fragment 40L/B64, στάθμη βίου is an agonistic metaphor of a «race course of life», based on the analogy between human life and running at the stadium (LSJ, s.V. στάθμη III). This metaphor corresponds to the fundamental ethical concept of τέλος 'the ultimate goal (of life)' in Stoic ethics, the achievement of which leads to happiness (εὐδαιμονία).

Maybe from the same source, i.e. from Diodotus, Diogenes Laertius (9. 5) cites another important evidence on the book of Heraclitus, essentially the only one with an accurate description of its contents: «the book which is preserved under his name, in its content is on nature, and is divided into three chapters (*logoi*): "On the Universe", "On the polis" and "On theology". Contrary to Diels-Kranz's skepticism, this triple division is not an "Alexandrian excerpt" (there is no evidence that such «excerpt» ever existed)[19] and contrary to Kirk (Kirk HCF: 7) and others, it is not Stoic: in the context of Stoic pantheism theology is a part of the philosophy of nature (*physis* and *theos* being identical).

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Once we take into account that the phrase "this logos" in fr.1-2 L is a metaphor for the Universe (τὸ πᾶν), it becomes clear that the author of the triple division relied not on the unattested and invented by Diels *ad hoc* "Alexandrian excerpt" or "selection", but on the same *syngramma* of Heraclitus, the beginning of which is quoted by Aristotle and Sextus: the expressions Περὶ τοῦ παντός and Περὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε have one and the same referential meaning.[20] Diels's objection that in Heraclitus theology and the doctrine of the Universe could not be treated separately, should also be dismissed as inconclusive. Heraclitus in the first chapter «On the Universe» may have discussed natural theology (the doctrine of the divine fire) in the context of his cosmology and the doctrine of the divine fire, whereas in the third chapter «On gods" his subject was what the ancients called "political theology", that is polis cults and mysteries, as well as the poetic mythology. In the latter part of the third chapter he proposed allegorical interpretations of the

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[18] On metaphors from race and stadium in Heraclitus see our commentary to fr. 50, 55, 80 L.

[19] «Alexandrinischer Auszug» DK I, 140, adn. 28. Diels' note is surprisingly emotional and his reasons are ill-founded and dogmatic: «Bücher gab es zu Heraklits Zeit nicht» (?). This is wrong: Anaximander and Pherecydes wrote their books at least half a century earlier. This emotional note seems to be a veiled invective against Bywater who with good reason accepted the ancient triple division as a basis of his 1877 edition of Heraclitus' fragments. Our impression is that Diels tries to justify his chaotic order of fragments by the fantastic hypothesis of a «notebook». As a matter of fact, Bywater's edition was in 1877 and still is a true masterpiece of fine scholarship if compared with the terrible chaotic edition of Diels full of wishful and unnecessary alterations of MSS. text which corrupt rather than «emend» the transmitted text and have misled and are still misleading scholars for more than a century. The theory of a "notebook" was more suitable in the explanation of the origin of *Theognidea*, on which see Dovatour 1989: 39.

[20] See the paraphrases of Heraclitus' authentic λόγος ὅδε as τὸ πᾶν cited in the commentary to fr.2 L.

Homeric gods based on etymologies imitated in Plato's *Cratylus* and further developed by the Stoics who adopted Heraclitus' allegorical method. Consequently, those editors of Heraclitus' fragments (like Ingram Bywater and Charles Kahn) who recognised the division of Heraclitus' book into three chapters as authentic and took it as a basis for the reconstruction of the lost *syngramma* and of the original order of fragments, were right, while those who denied it (like Diels) were wrong. [21]

According to the biographical tradition, Heraclitus dedicated his book to the temple of Artemis Ephesia (D. L. 9.6). There are some rare cases of a dedication to temple of scientific discoveries. [22] The motives attributed to Heraclitus by Diogenes (because of his arrogance he wished to make the book unaccessible to the crowd) looks like a later conjecture, but there is no reason to deny the fact of dedication. Marcel Conche has conjectured that Heraclitus ' motives may have been exactly the opposite: Heraclitus deposited his work in the temple so that everyone could make a copy of it, in other words, it was a way of publication (Conche HF: 8). In fact, we do not know the conditions under which the book was preserved in the temple: if it was a votive gift to Artemis, it may have been inaccessible to all. According to the story quoted by Tatianus, it was Euripides who brought the «darkness of Heraclitus» to Athens after frequenting the Artemision and learning the book by heart.[23]

[p.27]

This story suggests that the book of Heraclitus in the temple could be read, but could not be copied. We believe that the motives of Heraclitus were different. First of all there was a practical reason: it was the best way to save the book from the flames of war raging around in the times of the Ionian revolt and after it. Secondly, there were "high" motives, religious and theological, as well: if our reconstruction of the Apollo motive in Heraclitus book is correct (as we believe it is), i.e. if Heraclitus put on a masque of a prophet of Apollo and disguised his philosophy as an interpretation of the symbolical wisdom of Apollo, then it was logical and prudent to deposit the book in the temple of Apollo's sister: Apollo and Artemis were often worshipped together as *synnaoi theoi*. The archetype probably perished in the fire set by Herostratus in 356 BC.

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[21] Kahn, ATH: 9 and note 24. However, our reconstruction of the «theological» chapter 3 is different from that of Kahn who includes in it ethics, whereas in our edition ethics is a part of the second chapter (*logos politikos*).

[22] Arimnestus, son of Pythagoras, dedicated to the temple of Hera a bronze *anathema* with his mathematical discoveries (the 7 *sophiai* or proportions) which were later stolen by the *harmonikos* Simos, DK I,98,12.

[23] Tatian. *Orat.ad Graecos*, 3: "I would not praise him (Heraclitus), either, for hiding his poem (?) in the temple of Artemis so that it would be publicised later mysteriously. Those who are interested in such stories, tell us the tragedian Euripides, returning there many times, and reading it repeatedly, gradually learned it by heart and so managed to transfer to Athens the darkness of Heraclitus.»

2. The Hippocratic treatise De diaeta I as a source for the reconstruction of the book of Heraclitus.

In the corpus of medical treatises attributed to Hippocrates has been preserved an idiosyncratic treatise Περὶ διαίτης "On diet" (or «On regime") in 4 books. The term "diet" in Hippocratic texts has a broader meaning than today and denotes the recommended healthy lifestyle or "regime", including not only nutrition, but also physical activity, such as walking and gymnastic exercise.[24]

This treatise is not technical, addressed to physicians only. It is addressed to a wider public ("most people") and sets educational goal to enlighten those who care for their health. The author is confident that he has discovered the ideal formula of the recommended diet and physical activity, following which any person can maintain good health for the longest time possible. He recommends a common seasonal diet to be followed in the course of the year, and besides he proudly advertises his "discovery" (ἐξεύρημα 3.69), a special method of pro-diagnosis of the deterioration of health on the ground of earlier symptoms, and an appropriate individual diet adjusted to such pro-diagnosis. He based his diet theory on a serious anthropological and even cosmological foundation: the whole book 1 is entirely devoted to the nature of man and the soul, to the analogy between micro- and macrocosm (chapters 3-10), and — what is quite unusual and has no analogues in the Hippocratic corpus — to what people are doing in various technical practices or "crafts", *tekhnai* (chapters 11-23). The descriptions of technical procedures are intended as empirical proofs (*tekmeria*) of his main fundamental theoretical principle "the art imitates nature" (ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν). The language and style of the 1st book are strikingly different not only from most of the other treatises of the Hippocratic corpus, but also from the subsequent books 2-4.

The problem of the authorship of the treatise De diaeta.

In view of its extravagant style and content, already in antiquity few people considered book 1 to be an authentic work of Hippocrates. According to Galen, it was variously attributed to

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[24] We prefer to leave the term δίαιτα without translation (while keeping in mind the semantic differences from the modern usage of the term), since the translation "On the way of life" elicits false associations with the ethical topos of the "three ways of life" (βίοι). Joly, in his CMG edition abandoned the traditional Latin translation *De victu* and replaced it with *De diaeta*. We use the term "Hippocratic" in the sense of "pertaining to the *Corpus Hippocraticum*," without any implication that we accept the authorship of Hippocrates. The term "Pseudo-Hippocratic", however, should also be avoided: to speak about «Pseudo-Hippocratic» works one should know for certain which works are «Hippocratic». But who knows this for certain?

Hippocrates, Philistion of Locri, Ariston, Euryphon of Cnidus, Philetas, or Pherecydes.[25] At the same time, all supposed authors were "ancient men, some of the older than Hippocrates, and some his contemporaries".[26] Galen knew two versions of this work: a brief one without the 1st book, and a complete in 3 books, in which our 4th book (on dreams) was a part of the 3rd. The two versions had different titles: the short version was titled simply "On diet" and started right away from the product catalog (in our 2nd book), the full one was titled "On the nature of man and diet" (Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου καὶ διαίτης).[27]

Galen considered genuine only the second and third books, since the first book, in his words, "is very different from the views of Hippocrates." Modern students of Hippocrates are also unanimous in denying the authorship of Hippocrates. However the problem of the *real* authorship of Hippocrates should be distinguished from another question: starting from which moment it *was believed* by some to be a genuine work of Hippocrates and cited under his name? Having this distinction in mind we would like to point out that the unique early reference to Hippocrates and his method in Platos' *Phaedrus* looks like a quote from *De diaeta* 1.10.[28] As the main medical source or even as the author of book 1 has been suggested Herodicus of Selymbria, who according to some was the father of Greek dietetics. Herodicus was an athletic trainer (*paidotribes*), who proposed a healthy lifestyle method in the times of the Sophists and Socrates. In addition to the diet, an important role in this method was played by walking and running, which helped to maintain a proper balance between the food consumed and physical activity. Plato, who in a reverend tone speaks about Hippocrates from "the family of Asclepiads", makes ironic remarks about the exhausting long walks prescribed by the method of Herodicus. The attitude of Hippocratic doctors to Herodicus can be compared with the attitude of modern official medicine to naturopaths and other adherents of alternative methods who do not belong to the official medical corporation.

In the Hippocratic "Epidemics" there is a caustic remark about Herodicus and his method: "Herodicus killed febrile patients with excessive running, wrestling, steam baths, a bad method ...".[29] Hippocratic doctors, on the contrary, prescribed rest to such patients. Herodicus was reproached for treating fever with fever. Plato in the *Republic* 406a complains that in violation of the traditions of the Asclepiads, Herodicus, being a trainer, "mixed gymnastics with medicine"

[25] Galen. D*e alim*. fac. CMG V 4,2 p. 212, 16 sq. Pherecydes: In Hipp. *Aphor*. VI 1; v.18 A, p. 8, 16 sq. K.
[26] Galen. *In Hipp. de victu acut. comm*. I 17; CMG V 9,1 p. 134, 33 sq.
[27] *De alim. fac.,* loc. cit.
[28] Plato, *Phaedr.* 270c οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος...scil. κατανοῆσαι δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως. cf. *De diaeta* 1.10 ἐν τῶι σώματι ... ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου.
[29] *Epidem*. 6.3.13 Ἡρόδικος τοὺς πυρεταίνοντας ἔκτεινε δρόμοισι, πάλῃσι πολλῇσι, πυρίῃσι, κακὸν κτλ.

and "tortured first of all himself and then many others". This is an allusion to the incurable disease (phthisis) from which Herodicus suffered all his life while resorting to self-medication.

It is difficult to say how fair these attacks against Herodicus are, and to what extent they are due to interdepartmental rivalry between pedotribes and Asclepiads. In a certain sense, Herodicus was ahead of his time and proposed a theory that recalls the recommendations of modern specialists in wellness about the need to supplement the correct diet with exercise to prevent serious illness. The *History of medicine* of Menon, also known as London Anonymous (Anon. Lond. 9) sets forth Herodicus' theory of disease and of sustaining good health that virtually coincides with what we read in the first book of the Hippocratic *De diaeta*: "Herodicus of Selymbria believes that diseases arise from the wrong lifestyle (δίαιτα), the lifestyle corresponds to nature when it includes exercise and appropriate load, so that the food is digested ... in his opinion, health comes from the conforming to nature condition of the body in the lifestyle, and the disease from the condition of the body that disagrees with nature». The «unnatural» condition of body is caused by an imbalance between the two basic elements of the body: heat and moisture (θερμότης καὶ ὑγρότης), which exactly corresponds to role of the proper balance between two basic elements "fire and water" in the physiology and cosmology of the first book of the Hippocratic *De diaeta*. The Hippocratic author believes that the human body is a microcosm which both by its composition and functioning imitates the Universe. Therefore the healthy and normal state of the body is a regular measured movement back and forth (ἄνω κάτω), without stopping, imitating the continuous movement of the sky and the luminaries. There is a striking similarity between this theory and the playful remark of Socrates in Plato's *Phaedrus* (see above) about Herodicus' health advice to walk "back and forth", for example, from Athens to the city wall of Megara and back to Athens.[30] "The road back and forth is one and the same," says Heraclitus fr. 50 L. Robert Joly, recognising that Herodicus' thought forms the medical background against which *De diaeta* 1 should be considered, also points to what in his opinion does not allow to recognise Herodicus as the author of the book 1. The chapter 24 of the 1st book contains a mockery of athletic trainers (*paidotribai*). How could Herodicus ridicule his own profession?

And again, continues Joly, the author of *De diaeta* sets forth a systematic anthropology and cosmology, a detailed dietetic theory of products etc., but for Herodicus there is no such evidence, as there is no attestation of the "invention" (ἐξεύρημα), of which the author of *De*

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[30] Phaedrus 227c {ΣΩ.} ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίῃς.

diaeta 1 is so proud of, i.e. the pro-diagnosis of the impending disease by certain symptoms, and the system of preventive measures (ch. 69), as well as the division of patients into non-working "bourgeoisie" and working people. The objections of Joly do not seem to us persuasive. The criticism of the athletic trainers in ch. 24 can be read as a complaint about the degradation of his own profession and a kind of self-advertisement: "look at those *paidotribai* of our days, they are swindlers, whereas I am something different, since my method is based on science!» As for the rest, none of the facts mentioned by Joly actually contradicts the doctrine of Herodicus. All these omissions may well be just lacunas in the tradition; arguments *ex silentio* are generally invalid. Thus, the London anonymous gives only a brief summary of Herodicus' doctrine, he is not interested in the details. We leave the question open, while recognising that Herodicus remains the number one candidate for the authorship of *De diaeta* 1. This attribution is also favoured by the linguistic fact: according to Joly, the native dialect of the author of *De diaeta* was Doric (Joly, Byl 2003: 44. 106 ff.), and the native city of Herodicus was Doric-speaking Megara, and not Selymbria where he settled later.

<div align="center">The date of De diaeta I.</div>

The question of the date of composition of *De diaeta* 1 is not a marginal question. It is important, as we will see below, for the reconstruction of the lost book of Heraclitus and of some of its fundamental principles.[31] We may try to determine the *terminus post quem* by some datable sources of *De diaeta* 1, and the *terminus ante quem* by quotations from it and polemics against it in later authors, primarily in other works of the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, the date of which is more certain. The generally accepted traditional dating of *De diaeta* was the end of the 5th - beginning of the 4th centuries. It was defended by Karl Fredrich in his influential "Hippocratic Studies" (Fredrich 1899: 223 - around 400). Werner Jäger in the second volume of his *Paideia* (Jäger 1997: 37–43) challenged this dating and proposed a much later date (350 BC). Jäger's dating had a significant impact on both Hippocratic and Heraclitean scholars, in particular on J. Kirk. Such late, post-Platonic date of *De diaeta* was put forward already in the 19th century by Schuster.

<div align="right">**[p.32]**</div>

 Some scholars saw in the analogy of micro and macrocosm in De diaeta 1.10 the influence of Plato's *Timaeus*. At the same time Jäger redated also Diocles of Carystus who was often

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[31] More on the date see Joly, Byl 2003: 44 sq.

considered as a *terminus ante quem* for the dating of *De diaeta*. Jäger made Diocles younger by a generation and a disciple of Aristotle, a Peripatetic who allegedly lived in 340–260 BC. e. (Jäger 1997: 43 sll.) As a result of these Jäger's revisions the value of *De diaeta* as a source for the philosophy of Heraclitus was reduced to zero: it was assumed that in his interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of the universal Flux the Hippocratic author depends on Plato and Aristotle. However, both of these Jäger's revisions of the date of Diocles and of *De diaeta* have been subjected to multifaceted criticism, and at present seem to be commonly rejected. Robert Joly returns to the traditional date of *De diaeta* citca 400 B.C. and Diocles is again considered as a contemporary rather than a disciple of Aristotle.

The first book of the treatise *De diaeta*, as well as the treatise *De hebdomadibus*, undoubtedly belong to the most "philosophical" (from the point of view of ancient doctor) and speculative in the Hippocratic corpus. "Philosophical" or cosmological trend in medicine was subjected to devastating criticism by the representative of the empirical school, the author of the treatise *On ancient medicine*. Therefore it is very likely that one of the main theoretical opponents and targets of his polemics was the author of *De diaeta 1.*[32]A concrete invective directed against the author *De diaeta 1* can be found in the ironic remark that the speculative theorising of the philosophising doctors resembles the "art of painting" (γραφικῆι) rather than serious medical science.

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The possibility of taking γραφική as 'art of writing' should be rejected.[33] The adjective γραφικός sometimes may have the meaning 'relating to the letter', but the substantive ἡ γραφική (scil. τέχνη) always means only 'the art of painting', never the art of writing. In the Greek classification of τέχναι, possibly going back to Democritus, painting and music were combined into an art group of pleasant pastimes (παιδιά) and contrasted with the group of "serious" (σπουδαῖον) arts, like medicine or agriculture, arising from and serving practical needs.[34] The author thus wants to say that speculative theories of human nature and diseases are like cute

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[32] This view was held by Fredrich (Fredirich 1899: 177 ff.). For details see Schiefsky 2005: 55 cl. Jaeger, *Paideia*, loc. cit. misled by his mistaken date of *De diaeta* has proposed an implausibe thesis that it is the author of *De diaeta* who critisises *VM* and not *vice versa*. Shiefsky in vain quotes the views of Fredrich and Jeager as comparable. Those who take seriously Jaeger's view must first prove that his date of *De diaeta* is defensible. According to Shiefsky, the opponent of VM is not a single particular physician, but a general tendency which he finds in different treatises: primarily in *NH*, but also *Morb*.1, *Aff*., in the pathological theories summarized in the *Menoneia*, including Philolaus and others. A general tendency, however, does not exclude distinctive features and recognizable phraseology, imagery etc. of concrete representatives of this tendency (Shiefsky himself singles out *NH*).

[33] «Art of writing» (Schiefsky 2005: 306 and others).

[34] Plato, Leg. 889c-e, Resp. 373b, Lucret. 5, 1448, Democrit. 68 B 144. Interpretation of Polenz cited by Schiefsky 2005: 307.

pastimes, like drawing pictures, but unlike evidence-based medicine, they have no practical value. In *De diaeta 1* human nature is explained by analogies with various arts (music, grammar, etc.). The author of the *VM* is probably ironic about such frivolous methodology, comparing it with drawing pictures. Cf. the comparison of the 4 elements with the colours of the painters and cosmogony with painting in Empedocles 31 B 23 and a possible allusion to it in *VM* 20 τείνει δὲ αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, κατάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη. "Their theory comes near to philosophy, as Empedocles and others have written from the beginning about nature, what is the nature of man, and how he originated initially and how he was composed [*scil.* from first elements]." One gets an impression that the author of *VM* knew the ancient title of the *De diaeta 1* Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου… "On the nature of man". Shiefsky dates *VM* approximately to 420 or to the last quarter of the 5th century (Schiefsky 2005: 64). Taking *VM* as a *terminus ante quem*, the work *De diaeta 1* should be dated approximately to 430–420 B.C.

The philosophical sources of the treatise De diaeta 1. Borrowings from Heraclitus.

Various scholars have found in *De diaeta 1* in different proportions traces of the influence of Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Hippo, Empedocles, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Philolaus and the Pythagoreans, the Sophists Protagoras, Gorgias and the author *of Dissoi logoi*, while those who dated it to the 4th century admitted the influence of Plato and Aristotle. The fourth century and the Eleatics should be excluded from the start. In the preface to the treatise (chapters 1–2), the author relates the *status quaestionis* and makes it clear that he has read various works on the subject. It is very likely, therefore, that in the text one may find reminiscences on particular issues from some of the authors listed above, but certain and important (i.e. doctrinal) is the influence of only two thinkers: Heraclitus and Anaxagoras and his school.

[p.34]

One cannot exclude the acquaintance of our Dietician (as we will conventionally call the author of *De diaeta 1*) with Empedocles, the Pythagoreans and the Sophists, but their influence would be limited. In early Greek physics there were two main types of theories of matter and material change: 1) the theory of a single substrate (type S), as in Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Diogenes of Apollonia and 2) the theory of a mixture (type M). The second type (M) can be in turn subdivided into two versions: mixture of several elements, e.g. two in Parmenides and four in Empedocles (type M1) and mixture of indefinite or infinite number of elements, as in Anaxagoras, Archelaus (type M2). From the modification of the second type arose the atomism of Democritus. In contrast to the type of M2, the theory of Democritus did not recognise

qualitative differences between the corpuscles and denied their divisibility. However, Democritus also accepted the concept of a "seed mixture" (πανσπερμία) and used the same mechanistic theory of change with a similar terminology, therefore we will call it type M3. Theories of matter like the universal mixture of the Anaxagorean type, although not atomistic in the strict sense, were nonetheless corpuscular.[35] The two basic types of theories of matter and material change that we labelled as S and M were already clearly distinguished by Aristotle in *Physics*.[36]

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These two types of theories of matter and material change differed not only in that in the type S a single substrate was postulated, while in the second several or infinite number of elements were posited, but also in the fact that the mechanism of material change was fundamentally different: in the type S, it was transformation, or , in Aristotle's terminology, "qualitative change" (ἀλλοίωσις) of one into many, and in the type M it was an exclusively mechanical "excretion from a mixture" (ἀποκρίνεσθαι) of preexisting qualitatively different particles with their subsequent "concretion" (συγκρίνεσθα) into composite bodies as well as "dialysis" (διακρίνεσθαι) in the end. In principle, the theory of a mixture and "excretion" from mixture of its compounds is incompatible with the theory of a single substrate and its "transformations". The mechanism of "excretion-division-concretion etc." requires at least two or more primary elements (as in Parmenides' *Doxa*). Being aware of this fact, our Dietitian showed great ingenuity and crossed Heraclitus' transformational philosophy of nature with Anaxagoras' mechanistic physics, admitting two primary elements, fire and water conceived as active and passive principles respectively, and at the same time admitted that both of them are mixtures, with the predominance of "fire" in the first case, and "water" in the second. He did this synthesis very subtly, because, firstly, the opposition of "fire and water" really exists in Heraclitus's cosmology and psychology (but does not play a cosmogonic role, since only fire is recognised as the initial principle). And secondly, he fully preserved the demiurgical function of the fire, which, again, is a Heraclitean and not Anaxagorean feature.

We now turn to the important question of the proportion of borrowings from Heraclitus, both

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[35] On corpuscular theories preceding atomism in Greek medical theories of nutrition and breathing (conceived as exhalation, ἀναθυμίασις), see Heidel 1911, with examples from *De diaeta*, p. 148 ff. 1 Observations of the processes of nutrition and growth played an important role in the empirical *tekmeria* of Anaxagoras' theory of matter, B 10, A 45–46. etc.

[36] Arist. *Phys.* A 4. 187 a 12 sq. = 12 A 16 DK. Whether Heraclitus' concept of "evaporation" or «exhalation» actually contained some corpuscular insights (so Heidel 1911: 129, 124 note) remains unclear. There would be no anachronism in this: Heraclitus no doubt knew Xenophanes' theory of the daily regeneration of the sun from the «sparks» of fire contained in the evaporation from the sea, Xenophan. A 32–33, 40. But corpuscular theory of matter is incompatible with Heraclitus' monism. The imperial doxography erroneously ascribes to Heraclitus a theory of ἐλάχιστα as a result of a misreading of Heraclitus' comparison of fire with gold sand quoted in Aristotle's *De caelo*, see fr. 116 (c) with commentary.

textual and doctrinal, in the 1st book of the treatise *De Diaeta.* The first scholar who drew attention to the borrowings from Heraclitus in *De Diaeta 1* in a special study was a German humanist and pedagogue of the 18th century Johannes Gesner (Gesner 1752, 1755: 67–156). The main thesis that Gesner set to prove is that both the Hippocratic author and Heraclitus mean by "souls" the *animalcula* discovered by Leeuwenhuk under microscope, that is spermatozoids (the author of *De diaeta* indeed identifies the soul with sperm). Trying to prove this extravagant thesis, Gesner rightly pointed out numerous traces of the influence of Heraclitus in the 1st book of the treatise *De diaeta.* Gesner did not notice the influence of Anaxagoras, but he found the Pythagorean metempsychosis in the Hippocratic author. A century later, the eminent Hellenist Jacob Bernays in his dissertation *Heraclitea* (1848) returned to the subject of Heraclitean material in the treatise *De diaeta.*[37]

Bernays expanded the list of Heraclitus quotations and reminiscences, and also made a significant contribution to the correction of the Greek text: a number of his conjectures became generally accepted, including the brilliant restoration of the mention of three musical intervals in *De diaeta* 1.8. Even further than Bernays in the recognition of the doctrinal influence of Heraclitus on *De diaeta 1* went Patin (1891/1892: 18 sq.). Due to the authority of Bernays in the editions of the fragments of Heraclitus by Bywater (1877) and Hermann Diels (1903) the Heraclitizing passages from *De diaeta 1* were included as "imitations" or testimonia.
Thus, the impressive consensus of Hellenists and historians of philosophy (with the exception of Zeller) of the 19th - early 20th century generally recognised Heraclitus' influence on *De diaeta 1* and, accordingly, regarded this treatise as a noteworthy auxiliary source for the reconstruction of the philosophy of Heraclitus. In the 20th century parallel passages from *De diaeta 1* continued to be occasionally quoted as *testimonia* relating to separate fragments, but on the whole, skepticism concerning the source value of *De diaeta 1* prevailed both among Heraclitean scholars and among the experts in Hippocrates. The roots of this skepticism should be sought in the influential work of Fredrich *Hippokratische Untersuchungen* (Fredrich 1899: pp. 141–158 on the Heraclitean material). Fredrich did not deny the presence in the text of *De diaeta 1* of "Heraclitising" passages, but at the same time he considered them, in a typical for the 19th century Quellenforschung manner of «suspicious scholarship» and a passion for «exposing» supposed interpolations and «compilations», to be mechanical «insertions» added by an unknown «compilator» to the alien physical system of a certain "physicist". This hypothetical «physicist» whose direct sources were Anaxagoras and Empedocles, Fredrich, following Zeller,

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[37] Bernays (1848) = Bernays, Jacob. Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Herausgegeben von H. Usener. Erster Band. Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1885. S. 1–36.

identified with Archelaus (Fredrich 1899: 129–130). The source of the Heraclitean passages in *De diaeta 1,* according to Fredrich, was not Heraclitus himself, but an intermediate "younger Heraclitean" (Jüngerer Herakliteer), allegedly a writer of the second half of the 5th century, whose late date is exposed by his late language and sophistic influences. Examples of the "late language" on which Fredrich's hypothesis is based are such words and phrases as γραμματικὴ τέχνη, παιδοτριβίη, etc. not attested until the second half of the 5th century. This Fredrich's argument is based on two methodological errors: 1) inconclusive argument *ex silentio* and 2) a confusion of word and concept.

[p.37]

The words at issue are prosaic words, not poetic words. But Greek prose *for us* starts with Herodotus and the early works of *Corpus Hippocraticum*, i.e. in the last third of the 5th century B.C. A lot of prosaic Greek words are not attested before this time, but this does not mean that they did not exist before. And besides, even if Heraclitus did not use exactly these words and phrases, he could express the concepts covered by them with different lexical means: there is little doubt that the phrase γράμματα διδάσκειν already existed at the beginning of the 5th century, even if the phrase γραμματικὴ τέχνη was coined later (something we doubt). In most examples from various *tekhnai* in *De diaeta 1* the word τέχνη itself is not used as such, but instead a live picture of technological procedures is given: γναφέες ... λακτίζουσι (1.14), σκυτέες ... διαιρέουσι (1.15) τέκτονες ... πρίοντες (1.16), οἰκοδόμοι ... ἐργάζονται (1.17), etc. Nothing prevented Heraclitus in the original text from describing the technological practices of men in the same way and such language is not in any sense "late". Cf. similar lists of actions preserved in Heraclitus' *verbatim* fragments: οἱ ἰατροὶ τέμνοντες, καίοντες, βασανίζοντες..., fr.111L/B58; χρυσὸν οἱ διζήμενοι... ὀρύσσουσι... εὑρίσκουσι, fr. 26L/B22; παίζων, πεσσεύων fr.33L/B52; φρονέουσι... γινώσκουσι ... δοκέουσι fr. 5L/B17; καθαίρονται... μιαινόμενοι... εὔχονται fr.144L/B5; πομπὴν ἐποιοῦντο ... ὕμνεον ᾆσμα... μαίνονται καὶ ληναΐζουσι fr. 148L/B15. In order to explain the presence in the Hippocratic imitation of Heraclitus, for example, of the theatrical art of actors, combined with an allusion to the Gorgian theory of aesthetic "deception", there is no need to postulate the existence of an unattested intermediate "junior Heraclitean": the Hippocratic author himself lived in the epoch of Sophists, and he could easily add some other arts to the original list of Heraclitus' *tekhnai*. The main conclusion of Fredrich's *Hippocratic Studies* was that the "Heraclitising" passages in *De diaeta 1* are superficial imitations of Heraclitus' style and philosophically insignificant rhetorical superimpositions on the basic physical system of Archelaus; the list of "arts" in chapters 11-24, according to him, contains limited and insignificant borrowings from Heraclitus. But the consensus of three important and independent sources, i.e. *De diaeta*, 11–2; [Aristotle], De mundo 5 (cf. authentic Aristotle in

Aristot. *EE* 1235a 25); and Philo Alexandrinus, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 208–214 (based on a learned Stoic source) that Fredrich tried to dismiss by suggesting (just hypothesising without any evidence!) that their common source was not the "ancient" book of Heraclitus, but the invented by him ad *hoc* "jungerer Herakliteer", a typical 19th century phantom of *Quellenforschung* (Fredrich 1899: 152 ff.), proves that his conclusions were built on sand. The two independent and precise parallels to *De diaeta 1*, containing among other things, the triad of the *tekhnai* in exactly the same order (grammar, music, painting) do not cite a hypothetical "jungerer Herakliteer", but they do cite by name real Heraclitus of Ephesus, since the author *De Mundo* documents the thesis «art imitates nature», which he ascribes to Heraclitus, by a unique quotation in Ionian dialect with typically Heraclitean *asyndeton*, and this proves beyond any doubt that his source is the original text of Heraclitus (Heraclit. fr. 106 Leb. cf. B 10 DK). This remarkable consensus of independent sources, verbal coincidences and the Ionian dialect are fatal for Fredrich's hypothesis of a "younger Heraclitean" as a source of *De diaeta 1* and leave no hope for its resurrection.

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We have dwelt a bit longer on the methods and arguments of Fredrich than it might seem appropriate for the present occasion, since it is his "Hippocratic Studies" (coupled with the mistaken dating of Diocles of Carystus by Jaeger) that had a serious impact on the "paradigm shift" in the history of our problem, that is a shift from the generally positive assessment of the source value of *De diaeta 1* in the 19th century to the prevailing skeptical attitude in the 20th century. The opinion of Fredrich about the merely "stylistic" influence of Heraclitus and the impossibility of extracting additional information or textual additions from *De diaeta 1* was accepted by Kirk, whose work had a strong influence on Marcovich and through his edition of Heraclitus on the whole Anglophone Heraclitean studies in the second half of the 20th century (Kirk 1954; 21-30). The author of the standard edition of *De diaeta* in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* series, Robert Joly, while rightly criticising Fredrich for his assessment of the author of *De diaeta* as a mere «compilator» and correctly pointing to the inconclusiveness of some results of his *Quellenforschung*, nevertheless still shares one of the main erroneous conclusions of Fredrich according to which the influence of Heraclitus on the author of *De diaeta* was stylistic and superficial, whereas the influence of Anaxagoras was doctrinal and fundamental (Joly 1960: 89 et passim. Joly, Byl 1984: 25-27). In his denial of the Heraclitus' influence on *De diaeta 1*, Joly goes even further than Fredrich, reducing it to the chapters 4-5 on the Universal flux only and completely denying the importance and the Heraclitean origin of the technological chapters 11-24. The denial of the Heraclitean origin of the technological chapters and of the theoretical principle "*tekhne* imitates *physis*" that they illustrate is based on the biased and

misleading stereotype about "Presocratics" as physicalists in the post-Burnet Anglophone historiography of Greek philosophy and on the resulting from this stereotype mistaken interpretation of Heraclitus as ordinary Ionian *physikos* (partly going back to Aristotle) with no interest at all in anthropology, ethics or politics.

The results of our studies of the metaphorical language and analogies in Heraclitus' metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of nature (which are taken into account in our new critical edition of the fragments and in the reconstruction of Heraclitus' book) confirm the correctness of the opinion of 19th century Hellenists (Bernays and Bywater followed by Diels) and refute the skeptical opinion of Fredrich, Kirk, Joly and others. 20 out of the 24 examples of crafts and other practices of men that "imitate nature" in the Hippocratic *De diaeta 1* are attested either by the authentic fragments of Heraclitus, or by the reminiscences and paraphrases in the Heraclitean tradition. All these data are ignored by Joly. Here is a summary table of correspondences between Heraclitus and the Heraclitean tradition on the one hand, and the first book of the Hippocratic *De diaeta*, on the other:

TEXNAI – ARTS, CRAFTS AND OTHER "WORKS" OF MEN

IN HIPPOCRAT. *DE DIAETA* I, 11–24	IN HERACLITUS
μαντική 1.12 (cf. *De diaeta*, book 4), manteis	fr. 123 L
ὀνειροκριτική, book 4, ch. 86 etc., oneiromancy	fr. 123 (a) L
παιδοποιεῖν 1.12, the art of childbearing	fr.124 L, cf. fr. 78 L / B 20
σιδηρουργοί 1.13, iron workers	cf. fr. 116 (b) - (c) L
γναφέες 1.14, fullers	fr.113 L / B 59
σκυτέες 1.15, shoemakers	——
ἰητροί 1.15, doctors	fr.111 L / B 58
τέκτονες 1.16, carpenters	fr.114 (a) L λαβδοειδῆ ξύλα
οἰκοδόμοι 1.17, builders	see "carpenters"
μουσική 1.18, music	fr. 106, 109 L
——	fr. 110 L ζωγραφία, painting
μάγειροι 1.18. (πόσιν), cooks	fr. 72 L / B 125 κυκεών
νακοδέψαι 1.19, tanners	——
πλοκέες 1.19, braiders	——
κόπτουσι, πλύνουσι 1.20, gold-seekers	fr. 26 L/ B22 χρυσὸν οἱ διζήμενοι
χρυσίον ἐργάζονται 1.20, goldsmiths	fr.116 (a) L (ψῆγμα συμφυσᾶν)
(ἀρτοπόκοι), σῖτον ... πυρώσας 1.20, bakers	fr. 117 (a) L (ἰπνός)

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ἀνδριαντοποιοί 1.21	——
κεραμέες τροχὸν δινέουσι 1.22, potters	fr.115 (a) L
γραμματική 1.23, grammar	fr.106, 108 L / B10 συλλάψιες
ἀγωνίη 1.24, athletics	50 – 51 L / cf. B60
τρέχουσι 1.24, race	fr.55 L / B 120, 57 L / B 100, 50-51A L ἐναντιοδρομία
παλαίουσι 1.24, wrestling	cf. ἀγχιβασίη fr. 119L / B 122 (?)
παιδοτριβίη 1.24, gymnastics	cf. στομωθεῖσαν fr.158 L
πωλεῦντες - ὠνεόμενοι 1.24, buying and selling, money	fr. 120 L, cf. fr. 42 L / B 90
ὑποκριταί - ἐξαπάται 1.24, theater, actors	cf. ἐξηπάτηνται ἄνθρωποι fr.20 L/ B 56
μάχονται 1.24, fighting	fr.31-32 L/B 80, 53; 43 L/B 67 etc.
παρανομεῖν, ἀδικεῖν, κλέπτειν 1.24, crime	fr.118 L / B 23
πίνοντες 1.24, drinking wine	fr. 74 L / B 117 etc.
μαινόμενοι 1.24, going mad	fr.8 L / B 46, 144 L / B 5, 148 L / B 15

We are talking in this case not only about numerous quotations, paraphrases, reminiscences and adaptations of Heraclitus' text, but also about borrowings of doctrinal content and methodology. The Hippocratic author borrows from Heraclitus some fundamental principles and ideas:

• The antithetic (polar) structure of the cosmos and man and the principle of the harmony of opposites.

• The study of the parallelism and isomorphism of the micro- and macrocosm.

• The doctrine of the permanent change of all things, which is understood as a fixed (cyclic) interchange of cosmic opposites, as a "way back and forth" between the preset maximum and minimum of growth and diminution. This is a much more accurate and more authentic exposition of Heraclitus' theory of change than the distorted version that we find in Plato and Aristotle, the relativistic theory of the "Universal flux," which omits the fundamental notions of *metron*, regularity, fate and divine providence present in Heraclitus' original version and instead contaminates it with the alien connotation of epistemological relativism.

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• The notion of fate (πεπρωμένη μοῖρα) and of the fatal necessity (ἀνάγκη) of such predestinated interchange.

• Although formally the author replaces the strictly monistic theory of Heraclitus with a kind of dualism of the original pair of elements "fire and water", that is, active (form-building, thinking) and passive (plastic, trophic) elements, this antithesis has Heraclitean roots, too, and is

reflected at the level of the macrocosm in the theory of two exhalations (light, dry and dark, moist), and at the level of the microcosm in the opposition between the "dry and wet souls", as well as in the concept of man as a synthesis of "light and night» (according to our new reading of Heraclit. fr.75L/B26 ἄνθρωπος εὐφρόνη φάος, cf. ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη).

• Like Heraclitus, the author explains stupidity and madness by the excess of "water", i.e. of the wet element in human psyche. But unlike Heraclitus, who believed that the soul is the wiser, the closer it is to the unmixed fire, he believed that the highest degree of intelligence is achieved by the proper balance of the dry part of the water and the wet part of the fire.

• The principle "art imitates nature" (ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν), i.e. the theory that in their crafts and other established practices (τέχναι) humans unconsciously imitate and reproduce the universal cosmic law of the harmony of opposites.[38]

• The antithesis of "nature" (physis) and "convention" or "custom" (nomos), contrary to the widespread opinion, is not a discovery of the Sophists, although it acquired immense methodological significance in the sophistic intellectual culture. It was known to Heraclitus and played an important role in his political philosophy and theory of law. Heraclitus rejected the conventional "nomoi" of *hoi polloi* as contradicting the universal (*xynos*) cosmic and divine law which is natural and objective. The Hippocratic author may have been influenced by contemporary sophists, but the possibility of the direct influence of Heraclitus on him cannot be excluded.

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Unlike many modern readers of Heraclitus, the author of *De diaeta* perfectly understood Heraclitus' metaphorical language, in particular the economic lend-and-borrow metaphorical code, in which cosmic processes are described as exchange, loan or payment between sellers and buyers, debtors and creditors. This metaphor goes back to Anaximander and is closely tied to the law of the conservation of matter.

Even the general composition and the thematic structure of the 1st book of *De diaeta* (from cosmology to the study of human behaviour in the world of the polis) reproduces the order of the first two chapters of the Heraclitus' book: from chapter 1 ("On the Universe") to to chapter 2 ("On the Polis").

  Thus, the influence of Heraclitus on the Hippocratic treatise *De diaeta* book 1 should be considered doctrinal and comprehensive rather than stylistic and superficial. But it should always be remembered that the Hippocratic author does not borrow mechanically the ideas of Heraclitus, he also adapts them to his own goals and different contexts. Heraclitus was a moral

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[38] On early views of τέχνη see Schneider 1989; Löbl 1997; Zmud' 2002: 75 ff. On the terminology of *tekhnai* Blümner 1912; Blümner 1875–1884 remains indispensable.

and political (as well as theological) thinker; his main subject was the ideal form of government, the "paradigm" of which he saw in the "polis of Zeus", that is in the physical cosmos. The author of *De diaeta* was a doctor and his main subject was human health, the standard of which he also saw in the natural harmony of opposites, as well as in the proper balance of nutrition and exercise. The Hippocratic author takes the analogies between the various crafts and the cosmic law of harmony, which Heraclitus used as an argument in his ethical-political doctrine, and transfers them into the field of medical dietetics, hence the original Heraclitean analogy between human craft and *universal* nature, is replaced by the analogy between craft and *human* nature, that is, the physiology of the human body. "Nature" (Φύσις) of Heraclitus becomes in the Hippocratic work *human nature*, ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, and physiological processes in human body are substituted for the cosmic processes, τὰ ἐν τῶι κόσμωι γινόμενα. Obviously, the author of the *De mundo* (see our fr. 106 L with commentary) reproduces in chapter 5 the authentic original context of Heraclitus' analogies between human *tekhnai* and the Universe with more accuracy and precision than the Dietician. Here are some examples of how the Hippocratic doctor «remakes» Heraclitus' original analogies. In Heraclitus (fr. 111 L / B 58) the medical operations of doctors illustrate the identity of good and evil (cure by pain), in Hippocratic doctor they are compared with the spontaneous movements of the body (which are also antithetic). In Heraclitus the «works» of the fullers reveal the identity of the straight and curved (fr. 113 L / B 59), the Dietician compares them with athletic exercises which seemingly "harm" the body, but in fact make it healthier. In Heraclitus the goldsmiths imitate the universal nature by casting and recasting from the same gold different figures (fr. 116 L, not in DK or Marcovich), in *De diaeta* the production of gold is analogous to digestion in human body.

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In some cases the meaning and subject of comparison are reproduced exactly or close to the original: the harmony of music brings pleasure by joining the dissimilar (fr. 109 L): τέρψις is an authentic Heraclitus' word for pleasure (Ionic for Attic and standard ἡδονή) and Hippocratic διάφορα ξυμφέρει echoes Heraclitus' συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον (fr. 29L / B10) and ξυμφέρον (fr. 34L/B8) Another possible instance is provided by the metaphor of "hardening" the body like iron (fr. 116A L, not in DK or Marcovich).

Most of the "crafts" and practices of men cited in *De diaeta* I, 11-24 are attested in the authentic fragments of Heraclitus or in the Heraclitean tradition. But there is a partial disagreement: shoemakers, tanners, braiders, cooks[39] and actors have no correspondence in

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[39] Cooks are not explicitly mentioned in Heraclitus' fragments, but a fragment about the *kykeon* may be a *tekmerion* from cookery. Both in the description of the art of cooking in *De diaeta* and in the Heraclitean fragment about *kykeon* the correct dish or drink is a (harmonic) combination of heterogeneous components. *Kykeon* is a mixture of dry (barley groats) and wet (water) elements, i.e. a unity of opposites.

Heraclitus' fragments. But virtually all crafts in Heraclitus are attested in *De diaeta* (with only one exception, the art painting). It is hard to determine whether the "additional" examples in *De diaeta* have not been preserved in the extant fragments of Heraclitus, or the Dietician has added them to Heraclitus' original list. One may agree with Fredrich that the example of actors and "deception" in theatre may have been suggested to the Dietician by Gorgias.

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III. Language and Style of Heraclitus

1.Ancient critics on the "obscurity" and "ambiguity" of Heraclitus' style. Oracular features.

Heraclitus already in antiquity earned the nickname "The Obscure" (ὁ Σκωτεινός, Obscurus) for the "want of clarity, uncertainty" (ἀσάφεια) of his style. Since there were several writers named Heraclitus, the philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus was often quoted as "Heraclitus the Obscure", that is, the nickname "The Obscure" ὁ Σκωτεινός was used as a distinctive *signum*. The ancient critics attributed the "obscurity" and the ambiguity of Heraclitus to two main factors: 1) the metaphorical use of names, allegorizing, imitation of Apollo's oracles; 2) grammatical irregularities, especially *asyndeton* (lack of conjunctions and connective words) and to *hyperbaton*, the irregular word-order and syntactic ambiguity.

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Both explanations are correct: the obscurity of Heraclitus's style is explained by the combination of the elaborate system of metaphorical codes with the syntactic polysemy and *asyndeton*. Heraclitus's intentional obscurity was aptly described by both ancient and modern critics as "oracular", he was compared to Apollo *Loxias* or to a *mantis*.[40] Heraclitus himself points to the oracular roots and features of his style in Fr. 27Leb/B93 about the "Delphic Lord", who "neither speaks out, nor conceals, but gives signs" (οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει), as well as in the parable of Sibyl (fr.160Leb/B92). If our reconstruction of the *incipit* of Heraclitus' book is correct, that is, if fragment 2Leb/B1 DK was preceded by the fragment 1Leb/B 50 containing the prophetic formula οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ λόγος "it is not my word,,," (with the implied "but the word of

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[40] Guthrie, HGPh, I, 414: "it is no metaphor to call his style oracular". Hölscher (1968).

God"), Heraclitus from the very start makes it clear that his *logos* is the voice of God, and he speaks as a prophet of Apollo. Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that he formulates his main metaphysical thesis, the law of unity of opposites, in the language of Apollonian symbolism of the bow and the lyre (29Leb/B51). It is very likely that the parable about Apollo and Sibyl alludes to the «prophetic mouth» of Heraclitus himself and is autobiographical (160Leb/B 92). In Lucian's *Auction of Lives* (Luc. *Vit. Auct.* 14), an annoyed buyer, upon listening to the "obscure" speech of Heraclitus on the identity and permanent cyclical change of opposites, exclaims: "Hey you, do you speak in puzzles or compose riddles? Just like *Loxias*, you say nothing clearly!" (Ὥσπερ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφεῖς). Quite independently of Lucian, Plutarch in *De garrulitate* 511AB compares Heraclitus' silent symbolic advice to the Ephesians (the story about *kykeon* as a symbol of frugal diet) with the brachylogy of the oracles of Apollo *Loxias*. The epiclesis of Apollo *Loxias* was intricately bound with his oracular function, pointing to the "crooked", i.e. "indirect, elusive" character of his responses; Λοξίου μαντέυματα is a stock phrase in Aeschylus and Euripides. But for Heraclitus himself, as for Aeschylus (*Ch.* 559), *Loxias* was a μάντις ἀψευδής, an infallible soothsayer.

2. Syntactic polysemy. Asyndeton.

In Heraclitus's times the *scriptio continua*, i.e. writing without separation of words, was a common practice; punctuation marks (e.g. a dot) were used only occasionally.

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Scriptio continua was used in inscriptions, in private letters, and in papyri containing literary and philosophical texts. Therefore, while reading a text, readers had to «divide» it into separate words or to apply "interpunction" (διάστιξις): διαιρέω, διαίρεσις was, *inter alia*, a grammatical term for distinguishing words in reading, for punctuation (LSJ, s.v.διαιρέω VI). This process was partly facilitated by numerous connective particles and conjunctions (σύνδεσμοι). Note that the ancients did not distinguish conjunctions and "particles" like modern grammarians, both are covered by a general term *syndesmoi* "connectors". The lack or irregular use of such connective words (the so-called *asyndeton,* lack of connective words) could result in difficulties of reading and understanding. Aristotle in *Rhetoric* specifies two main causes of the lack of clarity: *asyndeton* and irregular word order that results in syntactic ambiguity. The latter was also termed *hyperbaton* by 5th century sophists; later it became a standard rhetorical and grammatical term for irregular word order in Hellenistic and Roman times. Aristotle only once speaks of σύνθεσις

ὀνομάτων ὑπερβατή in *Rhet.* 1435a37. As an example, illustrating this rule, he quotes from the beginning of Heraclitus' book a part of fr. 2Leb/B1DK (Arist. *Rhet.* 1407b11- 18):

ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον · ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό · ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι <ἔχουσιν, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι> οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐδ' ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον διαστίξαι ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι, ποτέρωι πρόσκειται, τῶι ὕστερον ἢ τῶι πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῆι ἀρχῆι αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος · φησὶ γάρ " τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται », ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ πρὸς ποτέρωι <δεῖ> διαστίξαι.

"It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver. Such qualities possess the texts with many connecting words, but not the texts with few connecting words, nor the texts which is hard to punctuate, like the writings of Heraclitus. To punctuate Heraclitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, 'Though this logos is always men fail to understand it', where it is not clear to which of the two clauses the word 'always' belongs" (tr. Roberts with alterations).

[The author of the Derveni papyrus, whom we identify with Prodicus of Ceos, writing *circa* 430-420 B.C., uses for the irregular word order the term ὑπερβατόν that Plato ascribes to Prodicus' teacher Protagoras in *Prot.* 339a sq. Ὑπερβατόν occurs in *PDerv* twice: in col. IV,10 in the authorial comments on Heraclitus' quotation, and in col.VIII,6 applied to the verses of Orpheus (ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐόντα λανθάνει). In column IV the Derveni author compares the "enigmatic" style of Orpheus with that of Heraclitus and explains it by the common features, the use of "peculiar words" (τὰ ἴδια ὀνόματα, opp. κοινὰ ὀνόματα), i.e. metaphors and allegorical divine names, and the use of *hyperbaton* intended to conceal the true meaning of the text from ignorant *hoi polloi*. An example of ὑπερβατόν indicated in col.VIII, is the syntactically ambiguous position of the word αἰδοῖον. To use Aristotle's phraseology "it is not clear whether this word belongs to what precedes or to what follows it" (ἄδηλον...ποτέρωι πρόσκειται): if it belongs to the preceding clause, following the words δαίμονα κυδρόν, it is a second epithet of Protogonos meaning "revered". If it goes with what follows, αἰδοῖον becomes a substantive meaning "penis", and the resulting text reads αἰδοῖον ...κατέπινεν "(Zeus) swallowed penis." In fact, it is clear that only the first reading is natural and correct, and Prodicus most probably knew this. But he pretended to prefer the second, far-fetched reading in order to create an obscene joke intended as insult of religious conservatives: the name of the mantis, who prosecuted his teacher Anaxagoras for his "impious" cosmogony, was Diopeithes "One who obeys Zeus". For details

see Lebedev, The authorship of the Derveni papyrus… (2019)", pp.530-531 and especially pp.548-549].

The Hellenistic rhetorician Demetrius, the author of the treatise *On style*, explained the obscurity of Heraclitus by the scarcity of connective words, *asyndeton* (Demetrius, *De elocutione,* 191 sq.): μάλιστα δὲ σαφῆ χρὴ τὴν λέξιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ σαφὲς ἐν πλείοσιν. πρῶτα μὲν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς συνδεδεμένοις· τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὅλον ἀσαφὲς πᾶν · ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἑκάστου κώλου ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σκοτεινὰ ποιεῖ τὸ πλεῖστον ἡ λύσις.

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'The style should be first of all clear. And clarity depends on several factors. First, on the use of words in their proper meaning. Second, on the use of connective words, whereas the lack of connective words and the looseness make any text completely unclear, since, due to the looseness, it is unclear where is the beginning of each sentence, as in the writings of Heraclitus: it is looseness (*lysis*) that for the most part makes them obscure'.

Demetrius, who mainly follows the Peripatetic rhetorical tradition, probably depends on Aristotle's passage quoted above, but not completely. Aristotle puts an emphasis on syntactic polysemy, Demetrius on ἀσύνδετον, by which is meant the scarcity of conjunctions and particles. Aristotle quotes Heraclitus as an example of how one *should not* write. Demetrius, in the following context, notes the positive qualities of asyndeton in certain cases. According to Demetrius, the style, not overloaded with conjunctions and particles, is closer to the vivid oral speech, and the style overloaded with connective words, is closer to written text (γραφικὴ λέξις). Therefore the «loose» speech, characterized by asyndeton, is more suitable for actor's dialogue (ὑποκριτική) and for debate in forensic oratory (ἐναγώνιος), whereas the *syndedemenon* is more suitable for writing. The syntactically strict style of literary composition is dispassionate and detached, whereas the «loose» style (διαλελυμένη) is full of passion.[41] These subtle observations of Demetrius are applicable to the style of Heraclitus that displays many "oral" features. The style of Heraclitus is polemical (ἐναγώνιος) and passionate, often it comes closer to the vivid oral speech (with emphatic personal ἐγώ Ἰ') and may be contrasted with the factual, emotionless

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[41] Demetrius, *De elocutione*,193-194. Examples cited by Demetrius: Menander is performed on stage, whereas Philemon is read, since Menander's style abounds in asyndeton typical for oral speech, whereas Philemon' style is more literary.

and somewhat repetitious style of the Ionian scientific prose, best examples of which are provided by Anaxagoras' fragments: in these texts ἐγώ Ἰ΄ is strictly avoided. Hence the folkloric elements in Heraclitus' texts (on these see below for more detail, paragraph 8), which is hard to imagine in a traditional Ionian treatise Περὶ φύσεως.

Theon of Alexandria (1/2 century AD) in his Προγυμνάσματα also cites Heraclitus᾽ writings as a classic example of "lack of clarity" (ἀσάφεια), but unlike Demetrius, he focuses not on *asyndeton*, but on syntactic ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) and difficulties in "dividing" Heraclitus' text (διαίρεσις). It is also worth noticing that, unlike Theon, he does not associate Heraclitus' obscurity with *hyperbaton*, but only with *amphiboli*a. He warns against the excessive use of *hyperbaton* (as in Thucydides), but adds that he does not reject *hyperbaton* altogether since it can give to the style diversity (*poikilia*) and originality (82.21-24).

[p.47]

The meaning of the term "division" in Theon is to some extent similar to the meaning of Aristotle's term "interpunction" διάστιξις, properly "dividing by marks or dots, στιγμαί". But the examples he cites relate not only to the syntactic interpunction, as in the Aristotle's quotation from Heraclitus' fr. 2Leb/B1 (here only the syntactic position of the word ἀεί is ambiguous, but not the word as such), but also to the *isolation* from the *scriptio continua* of separate words, which may be termed *lexical diastixis* as distinguished from *syntactic diastixis*.

Theon. Alex. *Progymnasmata*, p. 81.30–82.19 (p.43-44 Patillon): Ἀσαφῆ δὲ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ λεγομένη ἀμφιβολία πρὸς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου τε καὶ διῃρημένου, ὡς ἐν τῷ ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ πεσοῦσα δημοσία ἔστω· ἐν μὲν γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἓν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, αὐλητρὶς ἔστω πεσοῦσα δημοσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ διῃρημένον, ΑΥΛΗ ΤΡΙΣ πεσοῦσα ἔστω δημοσία. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅταν τι μόριον ἄδηλον ᾖ, μετὰ τίνος συντέτακται, οἷον ΟΥΚΕΝΤΑΥΡΟΙΣ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς μάχεται· σημαίνει γὰρ δύο, ΟΥ ΚΕΝΤΑΥΡΟΙΣ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς μάχεται, καὶ ΟΥΚ ΕΝ ΤΑΥΡΟΙΣ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς μάχεται. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀσαφὴς γίνεται φράσις καὶ ὅταν τι σημαῖνον μόριον ἄδηλον ᾖ, μετὰ τίνος συντέτακται, οἷον "οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ᾽αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν" [Hom.Il.2.270]. ἀμφίβολον γὰρ πότερον ἐπὶ τῷ Θερσίτῃ ἀχνύμενοι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ καθολκῇ τῶν νεῶν· καὶ πάλιν, "δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος, ὅν ποτ᾽ Ἀθήνη θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα" [Hom.Il.2.547-548]. πότερον τὸν δῆμον ἢ τὸν Ἐρεχθέα φησὶν ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τραφῆναι καὶ τεκεῖν τὴν γῆν. παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν τὰ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βιβλία σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτῇ χρησαμένου ἤτοι ἐξεπίτηδες, ἢ καὶ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν.

'The lack of clarity is also produced by the ambiguity (*amphibolia*), as it is called by dialecticians, due to the fact that the text can be read both separately and inseparably. For example, in the text ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ πεσοῦσα δημοσία ἔστω one way of reading the text is to take ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ as one and inseparable word: "a flute-girl (αὐλητρίς) fallen should become public". Another way of reading is to take ΑΥΛΗ ΤΡΙΣ as two separate words: "a court thrice fallen should become public". Uncertainty also arises when it is not clear to which word a part of a word belongs, such as in "ΟΥΚΕΝΤΑΥΡΟΙΣ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς μάχεται". The text has two meanings: "Heracles does not fight with centaurs (οὐ κενταύροις)" and "Heracles does not fight among the Tauri (οὐκ ἐν Ταύροις)". Similarly, the expression becomes uncertain when it is not clear with what some significant part is construed, as in the verse "And they, though distressed by this, laughed sweetly".

[p.48]

It is ambiguous and uncertain whether they were distressed by Thersites (which is not true), or by the launching of ships into the sea. One more example: "The great-hearted people (demos) of Erechtheus, who was once nourished by Athena and born by life-giving Earth". Who was born by Earth and nourished by Athena, the people (demos) or Erechtheus? It is due to this ambiguity that the writings of the philosopher Heraclitus are obscure, since he used it immoderately, either deliberately or by ignorance.'

Theon's testimony is remarkable in that it contains a textual reminiscence of Heraclitus' fragment 2Leb/B 1, namely, διαιρέων (*scil.* ἔπη κα ἔργα) "dividing words and deeds."
This indicates that Theon's source correctly understood the grammatical logos analogy at the beginning of Heraclitus' treatise. Theon's testimony is important not only from the point of view of style, but also philosophically: it refers to the isolating of meaningful lexemes from an undivided text, that is, exactly as in Plato's anonymous quotation from Heraclitus in *Cratylus* (fr. *Probabilia* 3 Leb.), it refers to the true and false readings of the same *logos*, depending on its correct ("by nature") or incorrect "division" (διαίρεσις).[42] The examples of ambiguous lexical *diastixis* cited by Theon recall the story of Euthycles who accused Heraclitus of impiety for setting up an altar to himself on the agora and deifying himself in the inscription

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[42] Athen. vol. 2,2, p. 63.30 οὐδὲ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἀναγνωστέον [i.e. ὑπὸ πυθμένες], ὡς ὁ Θρὰξ Διονύσιος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σύνθετον ὑποπυθμένες.

ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΩΙΕΦΕΣΙΩΙ.[43] Heraclitus in his apology points out to the "ignorant" *hoi polloi* that they are illiterate and cannot read correctly, for the inscription should be read as ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙ ΤΩΙ ΕΦΕΣΙΩΙ "To Heracles the Ephesian", and not ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΩΙ ΕΦΕΣΙΩΙ "To Heraclitus the Ephesian". Although the *Epistles* of Pseudo-Heraclitus have been commonly treated with contempt and dismissed as a worthless source for the reconstruction or interpretation of Heraclitus' *syngramma* in modern Heraclitean studies, the author of Epistle IV (letter to Hermodorus) understood better than most modern critics the meaning of the words διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν (*scil.* ἔπη καὶ ἔργα) "dividing according to nature (*scil.* words and deeds") in the self-description of Heraclitus' philosophical method in fr.2Leb/B1, in other words he or his source had a clear understanding of the grammatical (alphabet) analogy in Heraclitus' theory of the universal logos. Note that the correct lexical *diastixis* in this anecdote transforms a mortal (Heraclitus) into immortal (Heracles). This is again based on a genuine idea of Heraclitus found in the commonly neglected *verbatim* quotation from Heraclitus in Ionian dialect: Ἄνθρωποι θεοί, θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι· **λόγος γὰρ ὡυτός** "Men are gods, gods are men, **for the logos is the same**", i.e. the conventional names "men" and "gods" are just letters of syllables MENGODS or IMMORTALSMORTALS which, in turn, are fragments of the "shared" universal logos: Clem. Alex. *Paedag.* III,1,5 (I, p.325, 24 St.) = Heraclit. fr. 154 Leb., incorrect text in Marcovich fr.47 (c).

Instances of syntactic ambiguity in the fragments of Heraclitus.

fr.1Leb/B50 ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν / ὁμολογεῖν · σοφόν ἐστιν ἕν
'It is wise to agree / one should agree: wise is to know'.

fr. 2Leb/B1 ἐόντος ἀεί / ἀεὶ γίνονται
'being always /always fail to understand'.

fr. 29Leb/B51 διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῶι / ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει
"[The One] Is at variance with itself / is in agreement with itself".

fr. 67(a)Leb/cf. B12 ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοτεραί / νοτεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται
"Souls being evaporated wet / always become wet".

fr. 67(b)Leb/B12 ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι / τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι ἐμβαίνουσι

'On those who enter into the same rivers / on the same bathers who enter into rivers,

fr. 78Leb/B20 γενόμενοι / ζώειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ᾽ἔχειν or γενόμενοι ζώειν / ἐθέλουσι…

'Once born, they want to live and to die / once born to live, they are prone to die'.

fr. 100Leb/B112 ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν / κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας

'Act according to nature / according to nature understand',

fr. 144Leb/B5 καθαίρονται αἵματι / αἵματι μιαινόμενοι

'They clean themselves by blood / polluted by blood'

fr 157Leb/B18 ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον / ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει

'Hope for the hopeless / he will not find what is hopeless'.

Ambiguity of oblique cases πάντων and πᾶσι: "all men" or "all things"?

fr. 2Leb/B1 γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κτλ.

'Although all things happen according to this logos' or 'although all men encounter this logos',

fr. 6Leb/B113 ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν.

'Intelligence is shared by all men' or 'by all things'?

fr.32Leb/B53 πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ κτλ.

'War is the father of all' men or things?

fr.37L/B30 κόσμον τόνδε τὸν αὐτόν ἁπάντων

'This cosmos, the same for all things' or 'one and same for all living beings' (i.e. gods and men)?

fr. 131Leb/B114 ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων

'should rely on what is common to all things' or 'to all living beings'?

fr. 139Leb/B108 σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον

'the wise being (i.e. god) is set apart from all humans' or 'is separated (distinct) from all things'?

3. The omission of the conjunction καί 'and' between the opposites.

Asyndeton in Heraclitus is primarily exemplified by the absence or omission of the conjunction καί "and". A striking and unique feature of Heraclitus' style is that in the authentic fragments in the Ionian dialect relating to the unity or harmony of opposites Heraclitus regularly omits the conjunction καί "and" between the opposites [44]:

[p.50]

fr. 43 Leb/ 67 DK ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος χρησμοσύνη
God is day night, winter summer, war peace, abundance scarcity.'
fr. 153 Leb/ 62 DK ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι
"immortals mortals, mortals immortals'

106Leb/B10 συμφερόμνενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶιδον διᾶιδον "agreeing with itself, being at variance with itsef".

In later paraphrases and inaccurate quotations καί has been in many cases "restored" and inserted in the original text by later authors who followed the common usage. A clear example of such "restoration" of καί is provided by fr.106Leb/B10 on *syllapsies* where it has been inserted by the author of *De mundo* in the first and fourth pair of opposites (correctly deleted in the text of Heraclitus already by Zeller), whereas the second and the third pairs (quoted above) have been preserved intact without καί. The anthropological fragment 76Leb/B88 quoted in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, with five καί joining the pairs of opposites of

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[44] There are two seeming exceptions to this rule: (1) |ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν in fr.14Leb/B57 and (2) ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα in fr. 55Leb/B120. But in (1) Heraclitus refers to Hesiod's ignorance and alludes to *Theogony*, 758 where Nyx and Hemera are represented as two separate goddesses meeting and greeting each other on the threshold. In the fr.43Leb/B67 that contains Heraclitus' own conception of day and night, they are conceived not as self-subsistent beings or entities, but as processes, i.e. phases of the diurnal cycle of "kindling up" and "going out" of the single common substrate, the "ever-living fire". In this doctrinal rather than polemical text the name of Day and Night are quoted without καί. In (2) ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα refers to the equinoxes, i.e. temporal points of the same cycle. For details see Lebedev, *The cosmos as a stadium* (1985) and *Logos Geraklita,* 71-75; 368-373.

life and death, sleep and awakening, youth and old age, is not a *verbatim* fragment, but a colorless paraphrase in late language of the authentic fr.75Leb/B26 and its context.[45]

In other non-metaphysical and non-physical contexts, unrelated with cosmic opposites and the theory of *palintropos harmonia*, especially in ethical fragments, as well as joining two clauses etc., Heraclitus seems to use καί following common usage.[46] These instances of authentic καί joining or introducing clauses or points should be distinguished from καί-s inserted by later authors quoting a series of two or more fragments or phrases of Heraclitus.[47] The conjunction καί never joins phenomenal entities, but it can join properties of the same entity (καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαρώτατον fr.95Leb/B61) and characteristics or actions (processes) of cosmic powers and supreme god: ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται 37Leb/B30; ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα ibidem; διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται 45Leb/B31; πυρός τε ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων κτλ. 42Leb/B90. Note that in all these cases καί joins cyclical processes and is inserted *between verbs*, not between nouns.[48] The verbs denoting opposite processes do not make opposites two separate things, since they have one the same subject, *hypokeimenon* in Aristotle's later terminology. Just as in the case of loan/security imagery (fr.42Leb/B90) Heraclitus anticipates

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[45] It is not worthless since it correctly paraphrases Heraclitus' thought and supplements the two pairs of opposites in 75Leb/B26 with a third one (youth and old age); therefore, it should be treated as a separate fragment, but not as a verbatim quotation.

[46] e.g. fr.103Leb/B24 θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι. A genuine καί introducing additional point (example etc.) or a new clause: 78Leb/B20 ἐθέλουσι ... καὶ παῖδας καταλείπουσι κτλ.

[48] The conjecture of Diels ἀνταμοιβή in the DK text of B90 should be ruled out for many reasons. All MSS. of Plutarch have the verb ἀνταμείβεται (once misspelled with οι). It is methodologically incorrect to "emend" a verbatim quotation in Ionian dialect on the basis of a late doxography. Heraclitus never uses πάντα with article (see above section 6), and it is inconceivable that Heraclitus would use πάντα/ἅπαντα in the same sentence with article and without it. In fr.42A Leb τά should be deleted as it spoils the hexameter meter, and in fr.40Leb/B64 the correct reading is τάδε πάντα, not τὰ δὲ πάντα. The meaning ἀμοιβή "transformation" cited in LSJ, s.v. III, 2 is ill-attested and probably does not exist. For details see our commentary to fr. 42Leb/B90 DK.

Aristotle's distinction of possibility and actuality (*dynamis/energeia*), so in the present case Heraclitus anticipates Aristotle's triadic conceptual scheme *hypokeimenon/hexis/steresis* ("substrate/possesion/privation") in the explanation of process (*kinesis*) and alteration (*alloiosis*).

A subtle imitation and a parody of Heraclitus' *asyndeton* we find in Lucian and Plutarch. In his *Auction of lives*, 14 Lucian puts in Heraclitus' mouth a theory of permanent cyclical change of opposites that is more authentic and accurate both in language and thought (no καί!) than the one in Plato: καὶ ἔστι τωυτὸ τέρψις ἀτερψίη, γνῶσις ἀγνωσίη, μέγα μικρόν, ἄνω κάτω περιχωρέοντα καὶ ἀμειβόμενα ἐν τῆι τοῦ αἰῶνος παιδιῆι "and it is one and the same thing: pleasure non-pleasure, knowledge ignorance, big small, circling up and down in the game of Time".

Plutarch in *De exilio* 601A elaborates on the Heraclitean idea of Cosmopolis imitating his asyndeton: οὗτοι τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν ὅροι [εἰσί], καὶ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φυγὰς ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ξένος οὔτ ἀλλοδαπός, ὅπου τὸ αὐτὸ πῦρ ὕδωρ ἀήρ, ἄρχοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ διοικηταὶ καὶ πρυτάνεις ἥλιος σελήνη φωσφόρος · οἱ αὐτοὶ νόμοι πᾶσι, ὑφ' ἑνὸς προστάγματος καὶ μιᾶς ἡγεμονίας τροπαὶ βόρειοι, τροπαὶ νότιοι, ἰσημερίαι, Πλειὰς, Ἀρκτοῦρος, ὦραι σπόρων, ὦραι φυτειῶν · Εἷς δὲ βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων ...".
"These are the borders of our fatherland (i.e. of the Universe), and no one in them is an exile, not a stranger, not a foreigner, where the same fire, water, air; the same rulers, governors and lords are the Sun, the Moon, Venus. The same laws for all, according to a single command and under a single authority, the northern solstices, the southern solstices, the Pleiades, Arcturus, time to sow, time to plant, one is the king and ruler ...".

In the case of the omission of the conjunction καί "and" between the opposites, we are dealing not with a negligence of style or with an influence of oral speech, but with a conscious, philosophically grounded work on the reform of ordinary language. According to Heraclitus, separate opposites are not autonomous entities, but aspects of a whole that are falsely disjoint and made into separate entities in ordinary language. According to grammatical analogy, the names of the ordinary language are not real «names» that stand for things, but letters (opposites) and syllables (pairs of opposites) of the universal natural indivisible logos. The conjunction "and" is misleading: it seems to join the opposites like day and night etc., but this joining is based on a presupposition that they are different, otherwise there would be no reason to join them. The joining by conjunction καί corresponds to the "apparent conjunction" (ἁρμονίη φανερή, fr.30Leb/B54), the elimination of καί corresponds to the ascent from the level of phenomenal duality to noumenal unity, the level of "invisible harmony" or "joining together" (ἁρμονίη ἀφανής, ibidem). Exactly as in Parmenides, this is the level of divine knowledge, and

not of human knowledge based on sense perception. The culprits to blame for this distorted and unnatural language are the poets, like Homer and Hesiod, who drank too much wine and due to the «wetness» of their souls lacked «sound mind» (νόος, φρόνησις, γνώμη). Hesiod, admired by the ignorant crowd as the teacher of Greeks who ostensibly knew more than anyone else, in fact was an unintelligent *axynetos* who knew nothing: he even "did not know day and night", because he thought that they are two separate beings, whereas they are one and the same thing (ἔστι γὰρ ἕν, fr.14Leb/B57). The fragment 43Leb/B 67 on the cosmic cycles is written not in the language of Homer, Hesiod and unintelligent *hoi polloi* (*axynetoi)*, but in the language of nature, which is also the language of gods known only to the wise (according to fr.2Leb/B1 to Heraclitus only) in which all opposites are integrated, like letters and syllables, into one and the same "common" logos (ξυνός λόγος, λόγος ὅδε) of the divine Universe.

[p.51]

4. The use of connective particles.

 In the authentic fragments, quoted verbatim in Ionian dialect in our best sources (such as Hippolytus, Stobaeus, Clement) not only the conjunction καί, but also connective particles introducing new sentences or joining two clauses, such a progressive δέ, γάρ, etc. are also often omitted in positions where they are required by the standard Greek syntax.

In the most authentic collection of fragments that we possess, quoted in the book IX of Hippolytus' *Refutation of all heresies,* 14 out of the 18 verbatim quotations from Heraclitus have no introductory particle.[49] In some cases Hippolytus has introduced Heraclitus' quotations by his own particles δέ, γάρ, γοῦν.[50] Only in two Hippolytus quotations the initial δέ seems to be

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[49] Fr.50Leb/B56, 18Leb/B55, 20Leb/B56, 29Leb/B51, 30Leb/B54, 33Leb/B52, 40Leb/B64, , 43Leb/B67, 50Leb/B60, 95Leb/B61, 111Leb/B58, 113Leb/B59, 15Leb/B53. We regard fr. 41Leb/B65 as a part of 43(a)Leb/B67 and therefore do not count it. In fr.156Leb/B63 δέ is a false conjecture of Diels (read ἐν θεοῦ δέοντι, cj.West), therefore we add it to the group without particle.

[50] In fr.150Leb/B66 πάντα γάρ, φησί, τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθόν κτλ. the particle γάρ belongs to Hippolytus, not to Heraclitus since it introduces explication of the preceding paraphrasis λέγει...γίνεσθαι. This apllies to fr. 111L/56 as well, where Hippolytus introduces by particle γοῦν a quotation that instantiates the general thesis of identity of good and evil (*contra* DK, *recte*

authentic.[51] The anthology of John Stobaeus is another excellent source of authentic fragments of Heraclitus in Ionian dialect, since the compiler pedantically rewrites his source without "weaving" a quote into his own text and without changing a single letter. Out of the 14 verbatim quotations in Stobaeus 11 have no connective particle, 2 have genuine γάρ, one is uncertain.[52] Clement of Alexandria is also one of the main and best sources of authentic fragments of Heraclitus in the Ionian dialect, although somewhat less accurate than Hippolytus and Stobaeus. 19 out of 25 quotations from Heraclitus in Clement have no particle, 4 have γάρ, one possible ὦν (= οὖν) and one certainly unauthentic late combination καὶ μέντοι καί.[53] Some of the four γάρ may also have been added to original sayings without particle. Other ancient authors, citing most probably from the original *syngramma* of Heraclitus (Diogenes Laertius, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus) in most cases confirm the general trend. And finally, Plutarch. Together with Hippolytus and Clement Plutarch belongs to the top three in the quantity of quotations from Heraclitus (about 20). Plutarch undoubtedly had in his library a copy of Heraclitus' book since many of his quotations are unique. He was fond of Heraclitus and he was a highly sophisticated interpreter if his thought, absolutely independent from the Stoics, his philosophical opponents. But since he gave much more attention to the elegance of his own style than Hippolytus or Clement, who quoted Heraclitus with precision as documentary evidence for apologetic purposes in their polemics against pagan philosophers , Plutarch more often rephrased the archaic Ionian wording with a style of more modern parlance; and besides, he more often used Heraclitus quotations for rhetorical embellishment and used to weave Heraclitus's words into his own text, but to do so without connective particles is not always possible. That is why in 8out of 20 or so

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Marcovich). For a complete list of Heraclitus quotations in Hippolytus, Clement, Stobaeus and other authors see the *index fontium* in our edition, pp.489-495.

[51] Fr. 2Leb/B50 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδε... and fr. 14L/B57 διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος...

[52] No connective particle: fr.6Leb/B113, 73Leb/B118, 74Leb/B117, 87Leb/B110, 88Leb/B111, 96Leb/B116, 100Leb/B112, 127Leb/B109, 131Leb/B114, 139Leb/B108. Fragment 42(A)Leb and 53Leb/B137 have authentic γάρ, fr.85Leb/B70 is uncertain (from Jamblichus).

[53] γάρ is found in two fragments: fr.56Leb(c) quoted in Derveni papyrus, and 56(d) Leb/B94. The Derveni quotation shows that εἰ δὲ μή belongs to Plutarch' paraphrase, not to Heraclitus. Fr.71Leb/B9 and fr.56Leb/B3 are uncertain. For the general list of Plutarch's quotations see our *index fontium* in *Logos Geraklita*, 493–494.

quotations from Heraclitus we find γάρ or τε that have been apparently added by Plutarch: it is indicative that fr. B95 on ἀμαθία is quoted by Stobaeus in its intact form in Ionian dialect without γάρ. We may conclude that the regular use of connective particles, typical for the classical philosophical prose, is either alien to or avoided by Heraclitus.

5. Ellipsis of copula: the omission of the verb ἐστίν in certain contexts.

In the authentic quotations from Heraclitus the grammatical copula "is" is regularly omitted. Often this is accompanied by the omission of the conjunction καί ("and") between opposites, as well as by dropping introductory or connective particles and articles.

(a) ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη ... God: day-night, winter-summer ... ' (fr.43Leb/B67);

(b) ἄνθρωπος εὐφρόνη φάος 'Man: light-night' (fr.75Leb/B26);

(c) συλλάψιες οὖλα καὶ οὐχ᾿ οὖλα ... 'Syllables: voiced and unvoiced letters'(fr.106, fr.108 Leb/ B10 DK);

[p.52]

(d) ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ... ἡ Ἄρκτος 'Turning posts of Dawn and Sunset: the Bear...' (fr.55Leb/B120);

(e) πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα ... 'Reversals of Fire: first the Sea ...' (fr.44Leb/B31);

(f) ψυχῆισι θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι ... Deaths for souls to become water ' (fr.69Leb./B36);

(g) ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία 'The road up and down /is/ one ...' (fr.50Leb/B60);

(h) ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων 'Invisible harmony stronger than the visible' (fr.29Leb/B51);

(i) τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον 'The adversary /is/ beneficial' (fr.34Leb/B8);

(k) γναφέων <ἵπου> ὁδὸς εὐθεία καὶ σκολιή 'The way of fullers' press /is/ straight and curved' (fr.113Leb/B59);

(l) ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι 'Immortals mortals, mortals immortals' (fr.153Leb/B62);

(m) κακοὶ μάρτυρες ... ὀφθαλμοί ... 'Bad witnesses ... eyes' (fr.19Leb/B107);

(n) τῶι οὖν τόξωι νομα βίος 'Bow's name /is/ life' (fr.28Leb/B48);

(o) εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι ... 'One for me /is/ myriad' (fr.128Leb/B49);

(p) νόμος ... πείθεσθαι ἑνός 'The law /is/ to obey one' (fr.132Leb/B33);

(r) σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη 'Self-restrain /is/ greatest virtue ...' (fr.100a Leb/B112);

(s) αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη The dry soul /is/ the wisest ' (fr.73Leb/B118).

The ellipsis of copula (verb «is») is typical for proverbs and gnomic sayings (Kühner, Gerth I: 40 ff.). But the omission of the verb «is» can be explained by the influence of the gnomic and

proverbial style only in ethical sayings (i), (m), (o), (p), (r), (s). In the physical fragments describing cosmic processes, such a style is quite unusual, it is full of expressive energy and renders the speed of cosmic changes: see especially examples (a) - (g). This style is characteristically Heraclitean, and it was imitated by the Hippocratic authors of *De diaeta* I, 11-24 and *De nutrimento*, IX, 98 ff. (τροφὴ οὐ τροφή etc.), as well as by Plutarch in *De exilio*.

Philosophical implications of the use of the verb "to be" in Heraclitus

It is philosophically significant and hardly accidental that Heraclitus regularly omits the verb "to be" (ἔστιν) in the contexts relating to interchanging opposites, i.e. to the phenomenal world of plurality and change. In describing the processes of the phenomenal world, Heraclitus uses either elliptical sentences that omit the copula "is" or verbs that designate processes like ψυχρὰ θέρεται, ὑγρὰ αὐαίνεται, διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται, σκίδνησι καὶ συνάγει, ἀμειβόμενα, πάντα χωρεῖ etc.[54] The word πάντα in Heraclitus is a technical metaphysical term for plurality (synonym of πολλά, contrasted with "one", ἕν) and a physical term for all pairs of cosmic opposites. But separate opposites in Heraclitus' view are not self-subsistent entities. Speaking in the 4th century philosophical language, they lack *ousia* 'substance'. That is why Heraclitus avoids to apply to them the verb 'is': let us not forget that the distinction of the two meanings of the verb εἰμί, the distinction between the grammatical copula ἐστί and the "existential" ἔστι (let alone the "veridical" use), is a modern convention unknown to Greeks. On the contrary, when Heraclitus speaks of the Absolute (logos, cosmos as a whole, fire) or the supreme deity, he uses the verb "is": λόγου ἐόντος ἀεί (2L/B1), ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ (37L/B30). According to fr.2Leb/B1, "this logos" *is* (ἐόντος), whereas "humans *become*", ἄνθρωποι γίνονται.

[p.53]

From this we can infer that Heraclitus was well aware of the distinction between being and becoming, contrary to the widespread opinion that it was invented by Parmenides. Moreover, both in Heraclitus and Parmenides, being corresponds to the "one", and becoming to the "many", understood as the totality of all pairs of opposites. And again, in both cases, the one is conceived as intelligible truth, perceived by the mind (νόος), whereas plurality is understood as an illusion

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[54] Fr.48 and 51Leb. A verbatim quotation attested by the consensus of three independent sources: Plato, Hippocratic *De diaeta* and Lucian.

produced by the "deception" of the senses (ἀπάτη τῶν φανερῶν in Heraclitus fr.20L/B56). The only difference (but a very important one) is that in Parmenides the ontological absolute is motionless and immutable, while in Heraclitus it is full of energy, movement and undergoes continuous cyclic change. One cannot exclude the possibility that Heraclitus' radical monism had an impact on Parmenides' metaphysics, and that Parmenides developed as a reply to Heraclitus (whom he attacks in fr.B6DK) a system of Western idealist (mentalist) monism, polemically opposed to the Eastern naturalistic monism, and *eo ipso* reformed the orthodox Pythagorean metaphysical dualism reflected in the Pythagorean table of opposites and in the fragments of Philolaus. According to an alternative scenario, which seems to us more attractive in view of the better supporting evidence, the metaphysical systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides have a common source in the 6th century Pythagorean tradition, i.e. in the philosophy of Pythagoras of Samos.[55] In this case it was not Parmenides who produced a new monistic (unorthodox) version of the original dualist Pythagorean metaphysics, but it was Heraclitus who produced a new naturalized version of Pythagorean first principles based on the fundamental opposition of (intelligible) One and (sensible) Two which is reflected in: 1) Heraclitus' "triadic structure" 2+1 (see chapter 5 of our monograph "The Logos of Heraclitus", section on metaphysics); 2) the poem of the orthodox Pythagorean Parmenides, contrasting intelligible One and sensible Duality; 3) the Platonic reception of this Pythagorean doctrine, the theory of One and *Aoristos Dyas*, the first principles of the *Agrapha dogmata* of Plato cited by Aristotle in the *Alpha* of *Metaphysics,* chapter 6.

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[55] In our article on Alcmaeon (Lebedev 2017-3) 244-247 we argue in detail that Aristotle ascribes the Table of opposites in *Metaphysics* A to Pythagoras personally. In our article on Epicharmus (Lebedev 2017-4) 21-25 we point to an early reflex of the Pythagorean table of opposites in Epicharmus, discuss Aristotle's report on Pythagoras' conception of matter as ἄλλο "other" and interpret it as one of the two terms of the original binary opposition ταὐτόν - ἄλλο or ἕν - ἄλλο which corresponds to the opposition of the soul and the body, as well as to that of god and matter. It is the source both of Parmenides' opposition of One (*Aletheia*) and Duality of *Doxa*, as well as of Plato's opposition of *One* and *Aoristos Dyas* in *Agrapha dogmata*. We side with John Dillon who recognizes the Pythagorean roots of Plato's theory of first principles in the *Agrapha dogmata*: Dillon (1996) 3.

6. The use of the article.

From the above examples it becomes clear that Heraclitus rarely and irregularly uses the article. As in the case of the conjunction καί, as well as of the introductory particles and the use of copula, the question arises whether the article(s) in a quote from Heraclitus belongs to the original or has been added by the author who quotes it or by a scribe. It seems likely that, just as in the case of the conjunction καί, Heraclitus intentionally avoids the use of article with words that refer to the phenomenal opposites subject to constant cyclic change and interconversion, since the article (that originated from a deictic pronoun) "substantivates" – both in grammatical and ontological sense – a transient phenomenon, a phase of a process inherent in a "shared" substrate rather than an autonomous and self-subsistent thing, what Aristotle later termed "this something" (τόδε τι). And exactly as in the case of the originally omitted καί and copula, the later authors who quoted Heraclitus, as well as Byzantine scribes, used to "supply" the "missing" articles following standard usage. An instructive example is provided by the Plutarchean *Consolation to Apollonius*: fr.76L/B88 ταὐτῶι τ᾿ ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ [τὸ] καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κακεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα τάδε. "In one and the same [*scil.* substrate or human being] is inherent the living and the dead, the awaken and the sleeping, the young and the old, for these, having dramatically changed, are those, and those, having again dramatically changed, are these." Most editors and commentators with good reason delete the two articles erroneously "supplied" by scribes. This comes from a brilliant Plutarchean passage full of compressed reminiscences of authentic ideas and metaphors of Heraclitus which contains much more than is recognized by Diels-Kranz and those editors who follow them. However, the language of fr. B88 DK and its context is the same Atticist Greek of the Imperial times as the language of its context. Contrast this language with the archaic Ionian prose of 75Leb/B26 which it actually paraphrases. The authentic fragment does not speak of abstract *neutra* like τὸ ἐγρηγορός καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον, instead it speaks about ἄνθρωπος who is now εὕδων, now ἐγρηγορώς, now ζῶν, now τεθνεώς. In the authentic fragments Heraclitus uses archaic and poetic words εὕδων, τεθνεώς (or νέκυες), but never standard late forms καθεύδων, τεθνηκός. Another indication of a paraphrase is the verb ἐστί applied to the changing opposites, which is impossible in authentic text of Heraclitus. These two facts are sufficient to demonstrate that B88 DK is a paraphrase (generally a correct one), not a verbatim quotation. Another example of a similar "restoration" of articles is provided by the comparison of Heraclitus original συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον (106Leb/B10, no articles!) with Aristotle's imprecise quotation (or rather summary of several "fragments") in *Eudemian Ethics* 1155b4 (fr. 34Leb/B8) τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν. In

the fragments, quoted in the Ionian dialect and relating to the opposites, articles are regularly omitted: ψυχρὰ θέρεται θερμὰ ψύχεται κτλ. (46Leb/B126); ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες...τεθνεῶτες (153Leb/B63); οὖλα καὶ οὐχ οὖλα κτλ. (106Leb/B10).

While Heraclitus regularly omits article when he speaks of phenomenal opposites and "parts" of the world, he does use article (or the demonstrative pronoun τόνδε) when it comes to the Whole, to what is common to all (τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, divine law), to eternal and divine beings, such as *logos* (1L/B50, 2L/B1, 7L/B2), *cosmos* (37L/B30, 38L/B14) and divine fire: in fr.150L/B66 we have τὸ πῦρ, but πάντα without an article; Heraclitus' word for the new philosophical god, who governs the whole Universe, is "τὸ Σοφόν "The Wise Being" (fr.140L/B41, 141L/B32).[56]

In Plato's *Theaetetus* 201d Socrates expounds the so-called "dream theory" which he allegedly "heard from someone" in a dream. At the core of this theory is the analogy between the relation of the simplest elements of everything to the Universe, on the one hand, and the relation of the letters of the alphabet (στοιχεῖα), that have no meaning, to a meaningful *logos*. Since the analogy between logos and the Universe (which we call the grammatical or the alphabet analogy), especially combined with the image of «dreamers», is attested only in the authentic fragments of Heraclitus (1L/B50; 2L/B1; 106L/B10 where συλλάψιες is Ionian equivalent of the Attic συλλαβαί "syllables" and οὖλα καὶ οὐχ οὖλα means "voiced and unvoiced letters", i.e. vowels

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[56] The use of σοφόν without article in fr. 1L/B50 and 139/B108 can be explained by the intentional syntactic polysemy. In these fragments Heraclitus actually introduces a new philosophical god within his project of monotheistic reform of Greek religion. To protect himself from possible charges of impiety (*asebeia*) or "introducing new divinities" (καινὰ διαμόνια εἰσάγειν), he makes the syntax of these fragments ambiguous, so that both of them allow alternative "innocent" readings, in which σοφόν means simply "wise" or "wisdom" rather than "The Wise Being": cf. Heraclitus' retort to Euthycles' charge in Ps.Heraclit. *Epist.*IV, pointing to the wrong *diastixis*. The name of the supreme god on Heraclitus' theology has been compared with Persian Ahura Mazda "The Wise Lord" by Martin West (1971) 180-181 and others. If there is indeed such connection, we would not consider it as a mere "influence" of the Iranian religion, but rather a as *peritrope*, a polemical Hellenic reply to the Persians, since in Heraclitus (as West himself correctly points out) the "Wise being" is intricately bound with Zeus. Zeus was traditionally regarded by Greeks as the "wise god" (Homeric stock epithet μητίετα Ζεύς) long before the formation of Persian empire.

and consonants) and since the paradoxical thesis "logos means Universe" is attested in Plato's *Cratylus* in a Heraclitizing context (408c2 = Heraclit.fr. prob.3 Leb.), we identify the author of the "dream theory" with Heraclitus rather with Antisthenes (a conjecture unsupported by clear evidence) , and include the passage from *Cratylus* in our edition of Heraclitus' fragment in a special section *Probabilia* (fr.4), i.e. fragments quoted without Heraclitus' name, although the attribution seems virtually certain. The author of the dream theory insists that the simplest "letters", which are perceived by the senses, but cannot be "known", have only "name", but lack logos. It is only the "combination of names" (συμπλοκὴ ὀνομάτων) that produces logos. For this reason the author of the dream theory prohibits to apply to these simples any demonstrative pronoun and any other deictic expression like «this», «that», «each», «single» (αὐτό, ἐκεῖνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον) etc. This prohibition to use deictic expressions with a reference to elements is in perfect agreement with Heraclitus' regular omission of articles and demonstrative pronouns (like τόνδε) when he refers to phenomenal opposites. Both in Heraclitus and in the «dream theory» the simple letters stand for the cosmic opposites or elements that in Heraclitus agonistic model of the cosmos constantly «run in a circle» on the road «up and down» (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω), while in the "dream theory" they also "run hither and thither" (περιτρέχοντα). An article, a demonstrative pronoun or any other deictic expression «fixes» an object and identifies it as it were something permanent. But the phenomenal opposites are not stable, since they are immersed in the Universal flux. As Aristotle puts it in his summary of Plato's metaphysics inspired by Heraclitus, «since all sensibles are permanently in flux and knowledge about them is impossible»: ὡς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, Arist. *Metaph.*987a33-34.

[p.54]

7. Pluralis poeticus (or philosophicus?)

Another idiosyncratic feature of Heraclitus style is that he often uses plurals where most writers of prose would have used singular. Here are examples of this seeming *pluralis poeticus:* ψυχρά, θερμά, ὑγρά, καρφαλέα (46L/B126), ποταμοῖσι, αὐτοῖσι, ἐμβαίνουσι, ὕδατα (φρ. 67b Leb/B12), ψυχαί, ὑγρῶν (67c Leb/B12), ψυχῇσι (69Leb/B36, 70Leb/B77), μόρους (78Leb/B20), γνώμας (82Leb/B78), συλλάψιες (106Leb/B10), μόροι, μοίρας (136Leb/B86), αἰδοίοισι, ἀναιδέστατα (148Leb/B15).

The easiest way to explain the use of *pluralis poeticus* in prose is to attribute it to the influence of the poetic language: Heraclitus is one of the earliest philosophical prose writers, he writes in the Ionian dialect cognate with the Homeric dialect etc. In some cases, this might be true, but not in most. E.g. the rare use of γνώμας in the sense of «wisdom» or «wise insights» may be poetic

(cf. Ion of Chios B 4 DK). But in the case of "rivers" and "souls," the *pluralis* seems to be philosophically significant and theoretically loaded, and not just a poetic feature. Virtually all numerous ancient quotations, paraphrases and reminiscences of this famous fragment with the image of "rivers" (67b Leb/B12), substitute for the original *pluralis* ποταμοί "rivers" a *singularis* ποταμός "river". And indeed, why a single river is not sufficient for a symbol of change? And why an image of the soul as a river flowing inside our psyche is not sufficient to convey the idea of the flux of consciousness and constantly changing sensations and impressions? Since fr. 67b Leb/B12, unlike Plato's too narrow ontological interpretation of it in *Cratylus* 402a, is concerned with personal identity (or lack of it), i.e. is primarily psychological and anthropological, and not (only) metaphysical and epistemological, we cannot exclude the possibility that this text provides yet another example of Heraclitus' reform of ordinary language, i.e. of bringing it in line with the objective reality or "nature". If a river is new every single moment, then what we call in ordinary language by a singular name "river", is in fact not one thing, but many things, a series of innumerable "rivers" that succeed each other in the flow of time, then the "correct" and "conforming to nature" way to name this temporal series is to use the plural instead of the singular. The same applies to our "souls" which, like the sun, are new every day, as we "kindle up in the morning after going out in the evening" (75Leb/B26). Hence Heraclitus' general predilection for *pluralis poeticus*, or rather *philosophicus*, when he speaks of the phenomenal world and the world of mortals. However, when he touches on the absolute and the divine, he switches from the plural mode to the strict singular. The "*logoi*" of humans, poets and philosophers, are many and empty (139Leb/B108). The divine "this logos", like "this cosmos", is one and the same for all and forever (ἀεί).

8. Folklore elements. Proverb, parable, riddle

Despite his contempt for *hoi polloi*, the Ephesian *basileus* was fond of the idiomatic and figurative demotic speech. He often makes use of folkloric proverbs, riddles and parables. However, he uses them not in the trivial sense of everyday practical wisdom, but he gives them an unusual philosophical meaning, expressing through them his paradoxical theory of knowledge or turning them into polemical invectives against his theoretical opponents. He quotes a popular proverb (φάτις) about those who are "absent while present" (παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι fr.9L/B34), which was commonly applied to an absent-minded. Heraclitus transforms this trivial absent-mindedness into a cognitive drama of humans, their disconnect from reality, the inability of the ordinary consciousness to see behind the veil of the plurality of disconnected phenomena a hidden harmony and unity. Another proverbial expression "babes of their parents" (παῖδες τοκεώνων fr.11L/B74) describes the commitment of the majority to traditional beliefs, the

inability to think independently and to rely on personal experience and sound judgment rather than to listen to the childish poetic myths about gods and the origin of the cosmos.

[p.55]

Another popular adage "eyes are more accurate witnesses than ears" (ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες fr.13Leb/B101a) puts personal experience, i.e. knowledge of a witness obtained by what he has seen "by his own eyes", above the "things heard", i.e. above the traditional myths told by the poets. There was a traditional Greek proverb about puppies who "bark at their master", i.e. about ingratitude towards masters, parents, teachers or benefactors quoted in Heraclit. fr. 126Leb/B97 κύνες καὶ βαΰζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι «the dogs bark at someone they do not recognize». Various conjectures have been proposed about who are the dogs and who is the one at whom they bark in Heraclitus' use of the proverb. We connect the conflict alluded to in this quotation with the "ancient quarrel" between poetry and philosophy by attributing to Heraclitus two anonymous quotations in Plato's *Republic* 607b A. (= Heraclit. *Fr. probabilia* 1-2 Leb.). This passage illustrates the "ancient quarrel" by a series of four quotations with mutual invectives: the first two (in Ionian prose) are invectives of philosophers against the poets, and the following two (in iambic verse) are invectives of poets against philosophers, including Socrates or Plato' Academy, from the ancient or middle comedy; this makes the expulsion of poets a just retaliation.[57] The poet who is "great in the empty talk of fools" (*aphrones* recalls *axynetoi* in Heraclitus) is Homer; he behaves like a "dog barking at his master" (λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπότεα κύων) when in his condemnation of war and strife (Il. 18.107) he attacks Polemos, the real "father and king of all" gods and men, and therefore his "master" as well.[58]

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[57] Ionian prose: κενεαγορίαισιν and δεσπότεα, a rare accusative in Herodotus misread by a scribe as a Dotic form δεσπόταν.

[58] Cf. Heraclit 31Leb/B80, 32L/B53, fr. 35Leb/A22, fr.36L = Plut. *De Iside* 370D. We recognize in the words Ὅμηρον εὐχόμενον... λανθάνειν φησὶ τῆι πάντων γενέσει καταρώμενον a neglected *verbatim* quotation from Heraclitus based on a typical Heracltiean paradox εὐχόμενον καταρώμενον which Plutarch *quotes* as words of Heraclitus.

The bizarre folk legend of the death of blind Homer on the island of Ios, containing the riddle of lice (fr.20Leb/B56), Heraclitus transforms into a highly sophisticated epistemological parable about ignorance of men who are deceived by the appearances (φανερά) and at the same time into invective against *polymathia* of natural scientists who do not understand that in reading the universal logos (ἀκούειν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε) one should «divide» only in order to reintegrate all phenomenal opposites into *xynos logos*, "killing" all the phenomenal "lice" by «grasping» them as unities (syllables) in the process of *reduction* of "many" (πάντα) to "one" (ἕν), rather than collecting empirical data in the way the Ionian *Peri physeos historia* does, and thus multiplying our ignorance. For «wisdom consists in knowing all things as one» (σοφόν ἐστι ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι, fr.1Leb/B50), as the first programmatic sentence of Heraclitus' book states in its authentic, undistorted by 19th century pseudo-emendation form (εἶναι for MSS. εἰδέναι, still accepted bu most editors and commentators).

«To forget the way back to home» was probably a proverbial expression applied to someone who got drunk at a *symposion* and therefore needed a slave with a torch that would bring him home. A drunkard who has forgotten the way home and "does not understand where he is going" (οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκηι βαίνει) is a moral parable of a hedonist who has forgotten the meaning of human life, and at the same time an illustration of the ethical-psychological doctrine of sensual moist and spiritual dry souls (fr.74Leb/B117). The procession of bacchants who perform *phallophoria* is a parable of insane humanity, not understanding that the generation of new life generates new death (fr.148Leb/B15).

The list of proverbial phrases, idiomatic expressions and stock formulas can be expanded: ὧραι αἱ πάντα φέρουσι "the seasons that bring forth everything" (57Leb/B100, hexameter); μαινομένωι στόματι "by raving mouth" i.e. inspired by god (160Leb/B92, of Sibyl); ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι "should be thrown out (from competitions) and whipped" (17Leb/B42, of poets Homer and Archilochus); ἱερὰ νοῦσος "sacred disease" (epilepsy) in the sense of madness, loss of mind (8Leb/B46, of poetic imagination or sense-perception); πάντων πατήρ...πάντων βασιλεύς "father of all, king of all" (32Leb/B53, Homeric formula of Zeus, turned against Homer in a kind of polemical *peritrope* and applied to *Polemos* cursed by Homer); πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν "one should know that the war indeed (i.e. as the proverb says) is common" (fr. 31Leb/B80, allusion to the epic formula ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος, of the vicissitudes of war); κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν "eternal glory among mortals" (102Leb/B129); ἰατροὶ τέμνοντες, καίοντες "doctors are cutting, burning..." (111Leb/B58); οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί "most men are bad, few are good" (130Leb/B104, apophthegm of the wise Bias of Priene that became proverbial). Aristid Dovatour (1958) distinguished the "scientific and narrative" styles in the

historical prose of Herodotus. One of them he traced back to the Ionian *historia* of early logographs, systematically comparing it with epigraphical documentary formulas, and the other to the oral story-telling and folklore *novella*. *Mutatis mutandis* this distinction can be, with some reservations, applied to Heraclitus' *philosophical* prose.

[The oracular, folklore elements and "oral" features in Heraclitus' style have been illustrated in the preceding pages. What about the influence, if any, of the Ionian scientific *historia*? We said "mutatis mutandis" implying that in the case of Heraclitus relevant is primarily the Ionian *historia peri physeos* rather than early logographs, and we said "with some reservations» implying that our remarks about the striking contrast between Heraclitus' style and that of the standard Ionian *Peri physeos historia* (best exemplified by the fragments of Anaxagoras) remain valid. However, when we try to understand precisely the relation between Heraclitus and the Milesians in cosmology and physics, Heraclitus' paradoxical rule "the adverse is helpful" applies. When Heraclitus says "Of all those whose *logoi* I have heard..." (139Leb/B108), he primarily means by *logoi* many books that he has read [59], the works and Anaximander and Anaximenes among them, as well as Xenophanes' popular exposition in verse of the new Milesian meteorology; influence of all these works on Heraclitus "cosmic" fragments has been correctly localized and variously discussed in modern literature. But one thing has escaped the notice of those scholars who performed such comparison following the general physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus in the hermeneutic tradition of Burnet-Kirk-Marcovich: that Heraclitus' use of the new cosmological, astronomical and meteorological theories of the Milesians was not a mere borrowing, but a *peritrope*, i.e. fighting the opponent with his own weapons. Heraclitus borrows from the Milesians the fundamental naturalistic concept of *physis* and reinterprets it teleologically. He borrows from the Ionian science the fundamental method of empirical inference from *tekmeria* and even proclaims himself on empiricist and sensualist: ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦα ἐγώ προτιμέω "Whatever can be seen, heard and learned [from experience], that's what I prefer" (fr.18Leb/B55). But all his alleged "tekmeria" of the identity of opposites, like his analogies between *physis* and *tekhnai*, are intended as "proofs" of the existence of the single divine mind "steering the whole Universe" and the "works" of man, and thus to refute the Milesian evolutionary (non-creationist) cosmogonies. He avails himself of the Milesian astronomical theory περὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἰσημερίας "on solstice and equinox" and "turns it around" against them: the fact that the Sun performs "reversal" (τροπή) always on the same "set month" (μηνὶ τακτῶι, PDerv, col.IV, 13) is for Heraclitus a proof that the cosmos is governed by

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[59] On the ambiguity of ἀκούειν and the meaning "to read a book" see the section on *logos* in our "Outline of Heraclitus' philosophy", *Logos Geraklita*, 103-114; on grammatical (alphabet) analogy in Heraclitus ibid. 61-69.

divine mind, and that the Sun is an intelligent god (identified with Apollo) who obeys the "divine law" of cosmic justice, and not a "hole" in the celestial wheel of Aneximader or a flying fiery "leaf" of Anaximenes. The cosmic cycle of Heraclitus, in fragments 44-45Leb/B 31 DK has nothing to do with "chemical" cosmogony or "transformations" of fire: it is a calendar of the "Great year" (*Megas Eniautos*) based on the Milesian astronomical *parapegma* and describing its "turning points" (*tropai*) as "reversals" of the great cosmic battle of the four world masses. In this case the Milesian science again is put in the service of theology and religion since the terminal stage of the great cycle, the domination of Fire (*Koros*), is conceived as a Last Judgement in which the sinners (κακῶς βεβιοκότες in Clement's paraphrase) will be punished, and only the "purified" souls of the heroes and the wise will survive the scrutiny (*dokimasia)* by fire, and will become good *daimones* and "guardians" (*phylakes*) of men (fr.156Leb/B63).

The most remarkable possible example of Heraclitus' direct use of the Milesian scientific astronomy is provided by the fragment on the phases of the Moon quoted in the Oxyrrhynchus fragment of a commentary to "Odyssey" published in 1986:
The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. LIII, ed. W.W. Haslam, London, 1986; # 3710 Commentary on Odyssey XX, col. ii, 43–47

(a) Ἡράκλειτος· **συνιόντων τῶν μηνῶν ἡμέρας — ἐξ [ὅ]του φαίνεται προτέρην νουμεν[ί]ην δευτέρην — ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐλάσσονας μεταβάλλεται ἄλλοτε πλεῦνας**
ibidem, col. iii, 7–11

(b) **μεῖς τρ[ιταῖος] φαινόμενος ἐκκαιδ[ε]κάτηι πασσέληνος φαίνεται ἐν ἡμέραις τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα, ἀπολιμπάνει τὸν ὑπόμετρον ἐν ἡμέρηισι ιγ´.**

(a) Heraclitus: "At the convergence of the months – from the moment it becomes visible on the day before, the new moon day or the second day – the moon accomplishes her transformations now in fewer days, now in more"

(b) "When the moon first appears on the third day, it becomes visible as full moon on the sixteenth. It wanes the remaining time (of the month) during 13 days."

I must confess that I have included this text in my edition into the main corpus of authentic corpus of Heraclitus' fragments (and not into the section "Dubia et spuria") with hesitations (fr.60 Leb). The style of this fragment is strikingly different from the style of all other extant fragments. No metaphors, no allusions, no figurative language, no peculiar features of Heraclitus' style and syntax discussed above, just a piece of plain, detached, descriptive,

objective astronomical prose. A confusion with Milesians or Democritus? On the other hand, the Ionian dialect, Thales' theory of eclipses quoted in the context (which rules out another Heraclitus), as well as the evidence of Hipocratic *De diaeta* 1.5 (= Heraclit. fr.54 L) that Heraclitus indeed cited the regularity of the phases of the moon together with the regularity of solstices. The authenticity of this fragment can be saved only if we assume that it is not a piece of descriptive astronomy, but is rather connected with Apollonian hebdomadism attested in fr.64L/B126a and possibly in the doxographic complex about "generation" (γενεά): $30 = 14 \cdot 2 + 2$.[60] In this case the connection of the cycles of the moon with the Apollonian number seven, according to Heraclitus, also is an empirical "proof" (*tekmerion*) that the cosmos is governed by the divine mind. It is conceivable that Heraclitus quoted or copied this passage on the phases of the moon from a Milesian Περὶ φύσεως or an early Ionian astronomical treatise without changes because it perfectly suited his purposes. However, the contrast with the style of the fragment on the Sun that "does not exceed the set limits" because of the fear of Erinyes, remains striking.]

9. Fränkel's "proportion"

In a classic article "A thought pattern in Heraclitus" Herman Fränkel described an important form of thought in the texts of Heraclitus, which he conventionally called "geometric proportion" (Fränkel 1938: ff. 314). By this term Fränkel means analogy or parallelism of two relations between three members: A, B, C, of which two (B, C) are well known from experience, whereas the third (A) transcends human experience, but can be elucidated *per analogiam*:

$$A: B = B: C$$

[p.56]

A classic example is the fragment of Heraclitus 83Leb/B79: "A man is considered a child by a god like a child by a man". This saying is based on the following "proportion" or analogy:

$$\text{god (A) : man (B) = man (B) : child (C).}$$

The relation between the intelligence of a child and that of an adult man is known to everyone. The intelligence of god is not directly known to us, but we can form an idea about it concluding by analogy: the intelligence of god is superior to the intelligence of an adult man in the same

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[60] Heraclit. fr.71L/A19DK, fr.108 Marcovich.

way as the intelligence of an adult is superior to the intelligence of a child. According to Fränkel, the sought-for A (Absolute or highest perfection) in Heraclitus belongs to the transcendental sphere, B is the human norm, and C is the lowest level. The adult man in our example is a "geometric mean": he is intelligent in relation to a child, but silly in relation to a god, and therefore combines in himself two opposites. The thought pattern of "proportion" simultaneously elevates the hierarchical status of a god and lowers the status of a man. However, Heraclitus does not set a goal to humiliate or to mock humanity; his goal is to enlighten humans, to make people "wake up", to realize their deficiency and to rise to a higher level (Fränkel 1938: 318). Theological implications can also be found in the hierarchical triad of god, man and a monkey (84Leb/B83), as well as in the important fragment on the Cosmopolis or the polis of Zeus, fr.131Leb/B 114:

Citizens of the polis: the law of the polis = all human laws: the one Divine law (cf. Fränkel 1938: 320).

According to Fränkel, Heraclitus borrowed this thought pattern from the Pythagoreans, since he mentions Pythagoras and could be familiar with his discovery of the musical intervals and the geometric progression (Fränkel 1938: 321–22). Fränkel's article may well be one the most brilliant and important contributions to the Heraclitean studies in modern times, but in this particular derivation he was mistaken. Heraclitus was undoubtedly familiar with the Pythagorean metaphysics and borrowed from it, with modifications, the idea of cosmic harmony. But the three-term analogy has nothing to do with mathematics and Pythagoreans. As we hope to show in a special study, it derives from oracular practice and is connected with the oracles of Apollo; therefore, it is older than both Heraclitus and Pythagoras. The three-term analogy should not be confused with the metaphorical analogy also used by Heraclitus, based on parallelism (and not on the gradation) of four or more terms. In the three-term analogy, all levels are "referential", but arranged in a hierarchical scale. [61]   **[p.57]**

In the metaphorical analogy (which can be "compressed" into a metaphor), one level is iconic, and another is referential. For example, in fr. 69B Leb/67a DK:

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[61] The three-term analogy displays a certain similarity with the rhetorical figure of *climax* (Demetrius, *De elocut.* 270, Quint.9.3.54 etc).

<div align="center">Soul: Body = Spider: Web.</div>

The image of the spider and the web pertains to the iconic or modelling level and explicates the relation of the soul to the body which pertains to the referential or modelled level. In the three-term analogy there is no iconic level in the strict sense, but its function (modelling) is performed by the relation of the two lower "known" terms B: C; it is this relation of two lower terms that models the relation A:B between one known (B) and one sought-for unknown term (A) by "projecting" B:C on A:B. In some sense, the iconic equivalent of the referential (A) is the "magnified" middle term (B), but the proportion of magnification cannot be known without the lowest term (C).

10. Chiasmus (χιασμός)

The word order in some fragments of Heraclitus can be determined only by the chiastic structure. Therefore, the knowledge of this peculiarity of Heraclitus' style is a practical necessity, since due to the rare use of the article, in some cases it is only relying on the chiastic structure of the text that we can distinguish a subject and a predicate. We distinguish below the four main types of chiasmus in Heraclitus' fragments.

<div align="center">**Type 1: A fit B | B fit A**</div>

fr. 46Leb/B126: ψυχρὰ (A) θέρεται (B), θερμὰ (B) ψύχεται (A)

"the cold (A) becomes hot (B), the hot (B) becomes cold (A)

fr. 76Leb/B88: τάδε (A) μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνα ἐστι (B), κἀκεῖνα (B) μετεπεσόντα τάδε (A).

"these things (A) become those (B) and those things (B) become these (A) again"

fr.45Leb/B31+45A Leb: θάλασσα (A) διαχέεται ... ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ (B), <γῆ (B) διαχέεται ... ἢ γενέσθαι θάλασσα (A)>

the sea (A) is scattered and replenished to the same amount as before it became earth (B), <earth (B) is scattered and replenished to the same amount as before it became sea (A)

fr.106Leb/B10: ἐκ πάντων (A) ἓν (B) καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς (B) πάντα (A)

from all (A) one (B) and from one (B) all

fr.153Leb/B62: ἀθάνατοι (A) θνητοί (B), θνητοὶ (B) ἀθάνατοι (A)

immortals (A) mortals (B), mortals (B) immortals (A)

fr.42Leb/B90: πυρὸς (A) ἀνταμείβεται πάντα (B), ἁπάντων (B) πῦρ (A)

χρυσοῦ (A) χρήματα (B) καὶ χρημάτων (B) χρυσός (A)

<god> exchanges fire (A) for all things (B) and all things (B) for fire (A) as if gold (A) for property (B) and property (B) for gold (A).

Type 2: S P | P S (S = subject, P = predicate)

fr.31Leb/B80: τὸν πόλεμον (S) ἐόντα ξυνὸν (P) καὶ δίκην (P) ἔριν (S)

War (A) is common (B) and normal, i.e. common (B) is strife (A)

Type 2bis: non-A est B | non-B est A

fr.77Leb/B21: θάνατός (non-A) ἐστι ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες (B) ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες (non-B) βίος (A)

Death (non-A) is what we see awaken (B), what we see sleeping (non-B) is life (A)

Type 3: A fit B | B fit C || C fit B | B fit A

fr.69Leb/B36: ψυχῇισι θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι κτλ.

For the souls it is death to become water etc.

Type 4; A fit B | B fit C | C fit D || D fit C | C fit B | B fit A

fr.47 (b) Leb /B76: γῆς (A) θάνατος ὕδωρ (B) γενέσθαι, καὶ ὕδατος (B) θάνατος ἀέρα (C) γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀέρος (C) πῦρ (D), καὶ ἔμπαλιν.

Of the earth (A) death is becoming water (B), of the water (B) death is becoming air (C), of the air (C) becoming fire (D), and in reverse order, i.e. (D), (C), (B), (A).

[p.58]

The types of chiasmus in Heraclitus can be classified in two ways: as binary versus multi-term on the one hand, and as dynamic versus static (FIT/EST), on the other. The types 1 and 2 are binary, the types 3 and 4 are multi-term. The types 1, 3, 4 are dynamic and describe processes of becoming (FIT), the type 2 is static and establishes an identity between terms (EST). This distinction is formal and grammatical rather than metaphysical, since speaking of the cyclic interchange and interconversion of opposites, Heraclitus asserts their identity.

Note that the main and prevalent in Heraclitus type of chiasmus (A) corresponds to the formula "the way up and down" (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία) which, judging by its very high frequency of occurrence in the Heraclitean tradition, was a standard universal formula of cyclical change used repeatedly in the cosmological section of Heraclitus' book, not only in a single fragment 50Leb./B60. The words words χωρεῖ πάντα … ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα *De diaeta* I,5 "All things are moving…alternating up and down" constitute a verbatim quotation and a separate fragment of Heraclitus 51 Lebedev, independently quoted by Lucian, Philo Alexandrinus and Plato in *Cratylus* (see testimonia in our edition pp.165-166).

   The chiastic structure of the text is based on the principle of a mirror symmetry: there is a "left" and a "right side" in it, and in the "right side" the word order is inverted with respect to the left. When it comes to opposites and cosmic elements, the amoebean structure of the text reproduces, consciously or not (it is hard to say), the "*palintropic*" ("reversed") harmony of the cosmos. The type (1) chiasmus is attested in early inscriptions and is therefore a pattern of thinking rather than a rhetorical figure. As Dover acutely pointed out, "the fact that boundary stones may be chiastic shows that chiasmus is not necessarily a literary embellishment" (Dover 1960: 54). Heraclitus's chiasmus resembles the ring-composition in Homer and in archaic poetry, which is regarded as a feature of the "oral" style. Moreover, the Homeric type A - B - C - X - C - B - A formally coincides with the Heraclitus' chiasmus type (4).[62] To the central element in the Homeric scheme (X) in Heraclitus's dynamic types (3 and 4) corresponds the implied "turning post" (τέρμα) in the imagery of the cosmic stadium, a terminal point of a momentary stop and "reversing" the course (παλίντροπος κέλευθος) in the eternal "race" (cf. ἐναντιοδρομία, fr.51A Leb.) on the "road back and forth" (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω, fr.50-51L). What is primary in this case, the thought or the word, is hard to say, but the archaic feature of literary style (chiasmus) and the cyclic symmetry of Heraclitus cosmology are in perfect harmony. The type (1) of chiasmus in Heraclitus can be also compared with the archaic feature of Greek inscriptions, the principle of *boustrophedon*, following which the hand of a stone-cutter moves "back and forth".

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[62] On the ring-composition in Homer see, e.g. St. Nimis, Ring-composition and linearity in Homer, in: Mackay (1998) 65-78. Nimis emphasises that this is a speech movement rather than a static literary form. This makes the parallelism with Heraclitus even more striking. On the ring-composition in Greek vase-painting see the work of Mackay-Harrison-Masters, ibidem 115-142.

IV. METAPHORICAL CODES AND MODELS OF THE COSMOS

1.Models of the cosmos, analogies and metaphorical codes: general introduction

In an era when a stable and generally accepted scientific and philosophical terminology had not yet been developed, philosophical metaphor and analogy played an important role in early Greek philosophy and science.[63] A philosophical metaphor differs from a poetic in two respects: 1) it has a cognitive and explicative rather than (only) aesthetic and expressive function, 2) the philosophical metaphor is often not isolated, but is part of a metaphorical code. A metaphorical code is a system of metaphors, a kind of "language game", which serves to describe a specific model of the cosmos in terms of one particular *techne*. The classical triad of Greek analogical cosmic models, which we will call biomorphic, technomorphic and sociomorphic, has been described in a pioneering and unjustly underestimated work of G.E.R.Lloyd (Lloyd 1966 who does not use these terms). As a matter of fact, technomorphic models – understanding *techne* in the Greek broad sense, including all the arts, crafts, and specialized practices – are as many as there "arts" and crafts (τέχναι) of the Greeks. Lloyd was not aware of the agonistic model of the cosmos of Heraclitus (first described in Lebedev 1985), as well as the economic ("lend-and-borrow") model of cosmic change in Anaximander and Heraclitus, which serves to formulate the law of conservation of matter (Anaximander B 1 DK, Heraclitus 45Leb/B 31, 31Leb/B 80, 42Leb/B 90). We believe that it is necessary to distinguish between a metaphorical analogy and a natural analogy. A metaphorical analogy can be "curtailed" into a metaphor; it has a certain resemblance to a poetic metaphor. A natural analogy differs from a metaphorical one in that - using the Lakoff-Johnson terminology (Lakoff, Johnson 1980) - its source domain and target domain (field of application) do not differ, but coincide. For example, a comparison of the

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[63] For metaphor and analogy in early Greek philosophy and science, see first of all Lloyd (1966) and the chapter "Metaphor and Language of Science" in Lloyd's book (Lloyd 1987: 172–214).

cosmos with a stadium, opposites with runners, the sun with an arbiter in Heraclitus (55Leb/B120, 56Leb [not in DK], 57Leb/B100) is a typical metaphorical analogy, since the description model is taken from the source domain of culture and transferred to the target domain of nature. An example of a natural analogy is the basic cosmogonic mechanism in the Ionian evolutionary history of cosmos: the cosmogonic "vortex" (δίνη). This concept is not poetic, but scientific: it is based on the observation of vortex movements in nature (for example, whirlwinds), which serve as an empirical "confirming evidence" (τεκμήριον) of the hypothesis of the origin of our world from a similar "large" vortex, in which heavy bodies also agglomerate in the center, and light ones are "pushed" or "squeezed" to the periphery. A natural analogy is also the comparison of the motion of atoms with the motion of dust particles in the sunbeam of Democritus (Aristotle. *De anima*, 404 a3). We call this type of analogy natural, since the modeling paradigm of explanation is taken from the observation of nature itself. A natural analogy appeared in Greek thought only thanks to the scientific revolution that took place in the 6th century BC. e. in Miletus, when Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes created the first naturalistic picture of the world in the intellectual history of mankind, replacing the complex theological apparatus of mythopoetic cosmogonies with only one wonder-word φύσις 'nature'. Heraclitus was a staunch opponent of this new, naturalistic and mechanistic, view of the world, since he perceived it as a threat to religion and morality. In his polemic with the Milesians, he for the first employed the cosmological argument in favor of the existence of god, conceived as the "Wise Being" (τὸ Σοφόν) or the divine Mind (Γνώμη), "governing the entire Universe".[64] If the world arose from a spontaneous vortex, and not according to the divine plan (or planning mind, γνώμη), says Heraclitus, we would now contemplate not "the most beautiful world-order

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[64] We read: 131 Leb = 41 DK ἓν τὸ σοφόν ἐπίστασθαι · Γνώμην ἤτε οἵη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων. 'Recognize only one Wise being (i.e. God): that Mind, which alone governs the entire Universe' (literally "all things to the last one").

(κόσμος), but "a bunch of garbage scattered randomly." [65] [This is the earliest attestation of one of the greatest debates in the history of Western thought, the debate between evolutionism and creationism, between naturalistic determinism and teleology. It is remarkable that 2500 years ago Heraclitus anticipated Fred Hoyle's "junkyard tornado argument", although Hoyle himself intended it only as argument against abiogenesis and not as a creationist argument against Big Bang and Darwinian evolution used by modern proponents of the "intelligent design" theory. Incidentally, Heraclitus' γνώμη combines the basic meaning of "intelligence" or "mind" (standard in Hippocratic corpus and early Ionian prose) with a connotation of "plan" which comes close to "design". The comparison of Heraclitus' polemics against Milesian vortex-cosmogony with modern "junkyard tornado" argument and "intelligent design" requires two serious reservations. Heraclitus rejected not only Ionian mechanistic naturalism, but also Pythagorean metaphysical substance dualism. Genuine theistic creationism is based on the substance dualism of god and matter, which is denied by Heraclitus' pantheism, by his identification of god and nature (*physis*). The Pythagorean and Platonic concept of *demiourgos* is inextricably linked with substance dualism. Heraclitus' creative cosmic mind is not "separated" from nature (which is not a passive matter-material of the Western Greek metaphysics!), but inherent and immanent in the fiery energy of *pyr aeizoon*, the remainder of which is Apollo the Sun. So, if Heraclitus was a creationist, he was a pantheistic, and not a theistic creationist. And creation of the ordered Universe in his cosmology was conceived not as a single event of primordial past, but as eternal dynamic process of periodic 'kindling and going out' of the 'ever-living fire' in an endless series of recurrent cosmic cycles. Therefore, Heraclitus' dynamic "creationism" should be compared not with the Biblical creation story, but with modern "process theology". The closest parallel to Heraclitus' concept of the divine creator of the Universe is found in the Stoic pantheistic notion of 'Nature-Craftsman' (φύσις τεχνίτης, *natura artifex*) which is directly derived from Heraclitus.]

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[65] Fr. 38 Leb = 124 DK ὥσπερ σαρμὸς εἰκῇι κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, κόσμος.

Unlike the Milesians, Heraclitus in his philosophy of nature did not deal at all with the etiological explanation of individual natural phenomena which was the core of the standard Ionian treatises Περὶ φύσεως. He was interested only in the "one and the same order of behavior of all beings"[66], the divine law (*theios nomos*) of the measure and harmony of opposites, permeating all spheres of cosmic and human life, from the movement of celestial bodies to human "practices" (*technai*) in *poleis* on earth. In the second chapter of the treatise "On Nature", in the '*Logos politikos*', which included not only political philosophy and philosophy of law, but also anthropology and ethics, Heraclitus, by dozens of examples or 'confirming proofs', strived to demonstrate the fundamental thesis "art imitates nature" (ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν). In their technological practices, humans unconsciously follow the divine law of the harmony and identity of opposites. The thesis "art imitates nature" is reversible: the 'works' (ἔργα fr.2Leb/B1) reveal purposeful operation and intelligent behavior similar to the works of a craftsman. From this it follows that the cosmos is not a product of random agglomerate of alien parts, rather it is a wisely designed beautiful work of art and at the same time a living organism, as well as a "shared" community of gods and humans, flawlessly ruled by the divine cosmic Mind localized in the Sun, an ideal monarch (identified with Apollo) who strictly adheres to the 'limits' (οὖροι) imposed by the "divine law".

2. The grammatical analogy: the cosmos as a *logos* (metaphor of liber naturae).

[This section of chapter IV of the Introduction (2014) is now superseded by a substantially expanded version published under the title "The *liber naturae* metaphor and alphabet analogy in Heraclitus logos-fragments" in: : E. Fantino, U. Muss, Ch.Schubert, K. Sier (Hrsg.), "Heraklit im Kontext" (Studia Praesocratica, v.8), Walter de Gruyter: Berlin/ New York, 2017, pp. 233. Online version is available here: https://www.academia.edu/8177637/.]

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[66] Τρόπου κόσμον ἕνα τῶν ξυμπάντων D.L. 9.12, one of titles of Heraclitus' work quoted by Diogenes Laertius. Like γνώμη ἠθῶν, it preserves traces of Ionian dialect and may be based on Heraclitus' text.

3. The mantic metaphoric code: the logos as an oracle

The mantic or oracular metaphorical code in a certain sense is not metaphorical, since Heraclitus himself believed that he was a prophet of Apollo and that through his mouth speaks the divine wisdom that he "heard" in the divine logos of the Universe just as Pythagoras perceived by his supersensitive ears the cosmic music of the celestial Sirens. Once we admit that "this logos" in the fragments 1Leb/B50 and 2Leb/B1 at the iconic level of meaning is not just a speech or a text, that should be correctly «divided» and «read», but an oracular text, a χρησμός, to be interpreted by a special hermeneutic technique, the grammatical (alphabet) analogy and the mantic (oracular) metaphorical codes merge into a single whole, or rather, the mantic code is superimposed on the grammatical one, since the interpretation of an oracle does not exclude, but requires its preliminary correct "division" (*diairesis*). In favor of this speaks fr.27Leb/B93 which asserts that the cognition of truth and reality is similar to the interpretation of the oracles of Apollo and his prophetic "signs", as well as fr.160L/B92 which compares the logos of Heraclitus with the prophetic voice of Sibyl. In Lucian's imitation of Heraclitus' style his speech (that is his "logos") is directly compared with the ambiguous oracles of Apollo Loxias. The oracular text is "obscure" and unclear to most due to its intentional ambiguity: it has a deceptive surface meaning, and a deep, hidden true meaning.

The surface meaning confuses the profane, only a skillful interpreter can get to the true meaning. "The nature of things is hidden" (Fr.25Leb/B8). The parable of the death of Homer and the world riddle (Fr. 20Leb/B21) says that in the cognition of the world men have been "deceived by the appearances" like Homer, who could not solve the riddle of the fishermen. In the passage of Plato's *Cratylus* about the etymology of the name "Pan", which we regard an unnoticed quotation from Heraclitus (see *Fragmenta probabilia* No.3 with commentary below) Plato says that the Logos-Universe can be true and false. This means that when read incorrectly

(as "many") the world-as-text is false, and when read correctly (as "one"), it is true. The true upper (celestial) part of the logos is divine, and the false lower (earthen) part is human; the latter is associated with poetic myths and lies of "tragic" life. Now it becomes clear what was Homer's mistake according to Heraclitus' Fr. 20Leb/B21: Homer confused lice, which are killed when 'grasped' and therefore become less, with fishes which become "more" when caught. He could not understand the logic of the paradox "the more we grasp, the less we have" because he was thinking about fish, not about lice. Homer mistook the letters of the cosmic alphabet (which denote nothing), out of which the Logos-Universe is composed, for real names of some real beings, as a result of which he saw many gods in the phenomenal world of τὰ φανερά, although in reality there is only one true god hidden behind the deceptive appearances. The results of our study also explain why quotations from Heraclitus play such important role in the Pythian dialogues of Plutarch and at the same time show that the Stoic theological interpretation of Heraclitus's logos was based on a better understanding of his metaphorical language and on a more adequate understanding of his philosophy in general, than the one that was followed by the adherents of the positivist interpretation, who saw in Heraclitus *logos* a scientific "formula of things".

Traces of the mantic metaphorical code can be detected in the terminology that Heraclitus employs in connection with the interpretation of "*this logos"* un fr. 2Leb/B1 DK: the terms φράζω and διαιρέω were part of the professional lexicon of the diviners (manteis).[67]

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[67] Plut. *Cimon* 18.3 Ἀστύφιλος ὁ Ποσειδωνιάτης, μαντικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ συνήθης τῷ Κίμωνι, φράζει θάνατον αὐτῷ προσημαίνειν τὴν ὄψιν, οὕτω διαιρῶν· κύων ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ὃν ὑλακτεῖ πολέμιος κτλ. Fontenrose, Delphic Oracle, 170: φράζεο is often found in the beginning of oracular response. Parmenid. B 1.4 πολύφραστοι ἵπποι. Porphyrius, *De abstinentia* 2,41,7 διαιρεῖσθαι interpretation of oracle, syn. ἀναγιγνώσκειν, see the text in the commentary to Heraclit.fr 27Leb/B93.

The verb πειρᾶσθαι (πειρώμενοι) can mean "to enquire an oracle', literally 'to make trial of'.[68] The mantic code also explains the choice of the word ἔπη (πειρώμενοι ἐπέων) as a synonym for λόγον τόνδε: on the iconic level an oracle in hexameter verses is meant. On the referential level the cosmos (book of nature) is meant, conceived as a true "epic" and contrasted with the false epic of Homer and the poets. It follows that the theme of "the ancient quarrel" between philosophy and poetry is already present at the very beginning of the book of Heraclitus. Another fragment that may be inked with the motif of the "wisdom of Apollo" and that employs mantic metaphorical code is fr. 97 Leb/B101 ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν 'I explored myself'. It was Friedrich Nietzsche who pointed out that ἐδιζησάμην alludes to the interpretation of an oracle, which is confirmed by one passage in Herodotus.[69] Plutarch quotes this saying as a response of Heraclitus to the imperative of the Delphic God: Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem,* 1118 C. Καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θειότατον ἐδόκει τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν "And of all Delphic inscriptions he regarded as the most divine the saying "know thyself". This unique evidence of Plutarch should be treated not as Plutarch's own interpretation, but as a paraphrase or a summary of Heraclitus' context, i.e. as a separate fragment of Heraclitus with one word, θειότατον, as a possible verbatim quotation from Heraclitus' book (Heraclitus, fragment 98 in our collection). Heraclitus quotes an apophthegm of one of the Seven sages (Bias on οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί), so why he could not quote another one (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) when Plutarch assuredly states that he did?

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[68] Lucian. *Philopseudes,* 38 πειραθῆναι τοῦ χρηστηρίου καί τι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων συμβουλεύσασθαι τῷ θεῷ. Aesop. 36, v.2 ἀνὴρ κακοπράγμων πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντείου ἦκε βουλόμενος ἐκπειρᾶσαι τοῦτο. Pausan. 3.4.5 μαντείου τὴν διάπειραν Sozomen. Hist. eccles. 1.7.3 ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ ἐν Μιλήτῳ μαντείου τοῦ Διδυμαίου Ἀπόλλωνος κτλ.

[69] Herod. 7.142 Ὡς δὲ ἀπελθόντες οἱ θεοπρόποι ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆμον, γνῶμαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἐγίνοντο διζημένων τὸ μαντήιον κτλ. Fr.Nietzsche, Preplatonic philosophers, Urbana & Chicago, 2001, p. 56.

4. Agonistic model: the cosmos as a stadium

The agonistic model of the cosmos is reliably attested both in the authentic fragments and in the secondary sources.[70] It is closely tied by the relationship of metaphorical synonymity with the military and economic (lend-and-borrow) codes, as well as with the game (*lusoria tabula*) metaphorical code. In the sources these codes are sometimes intertwined. It is these codes that are most appropriate and adequate for iconic representation of the relationship between conflicting or competing cosmic forces as well as of the reciprocity and mutual interdependence of two members of a single pair. The agonistic competition of athletes in the stadium is analogous to the war of opponents on the battlefield, to the winning and losing of players in *pesseia*, as well as to participants in binary transactions - debtors and creditors, sellers and buyers. The agonistic code differs from other members of this group in that it is simultaneously parallel to the "river code" comprising metaphors for the universal flux and change of all things.

[p.72]

The metaphors of "running, race" and "flowing", distinct on the iconic level (stadium or road, one the one hand, and river on the other), convey the same referential concept of rapid movement and change. In English we speak about "running water", the verb *теку* ('to flow' in Modern Russian), was regularly used in the Old Slavonic and Old Russian in the sense 'to run' and was used as translation of Greek τρέχω. The third metaphorical synonym of "river" and "stadium" in Heraclitus is the *kykeon*, a symbol of the ongoing movement that ensures stability and homeostasis of the body and the cosmos. In order to differentiate agonistic and "river" metaphor in secondary sources (paraphrases, reminiscences etc. in the Heraclitean tradition) it is necessary to keep in mind that only the words ῥέω, ῥοή 'flow, flux' are connected with the river symbol, while the verbs 'go, pass, run, change place, turn around, run over a long distance', etc.

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[70] Lebedev, The cosmos as a stadium (1985). Relevant fragments 50-51A Leb, 55-57Leb, lampadedromia fr.78-80Leb. with comm. On the agonistic aspects of Greek culture in general see Zaicev (2002).

(ἰέναι, χωρεῖν, θεῖν, τρέχειν, ἀμείβειν, ἀνακάμπτειν, δολιχεύειν) are associated with the image of the stadium (or sometimes the hippodrome) or of a road, and not with the river image; they do not pertain to the agonistic (athletic) metaphorical code. In Heraclitus'original text the image of river was applied not to the macro-, but to the microcosm, i.e. to man, and it primarily illustrated the process of "exhalation" of souls from blood, assimilating human souls to "rivers". (We do not exclude that in some contexts, speaking about the parallelism between the macrocosmic and microcosmic *psyche-anathymiasis*, Heraclitus could apply the image of river and flux to both). Only in Plato's free paraphrase did the "Heraclitean river" became a symbol of the universal change of *all things*. Note that Heraclitus could not even speak of τὰ ὄντα in plurals since he recognized only one ὄν. His authentic term for (deceptive) plurality of things is πάντα (without article), never πάντα τὰ ὄντα. Rivers do not flow "up and down" (ἄνω κάτω), and the image of river itself does not contain iconic equivalents of the opposing forces, which play so important part in Heraclitus' philosophy of nature, it contains only the opposition of "the same and the other", ταὐτόν vs. ἕτερον. Therefore, it was the agonistic model that was predominantly Heraclitus model of universal movement and cosmic change. Unlike the image of the river, it not only contains opposing iconic equivalents of opposite powers (competing athletes), but also clearly expresses the idea of a programmed regularity of change. Unlike modern stadiums, in Greek stadiums they ran not in a circle, but in a straight line, turning 180 degrees at the finish line (if it was not a simple "stadion race", but a double-diaulos or long-dolichos) and returned back to the start. In athletic language, the runner's course from start to finish was called ὁδὸς ἄνω 'road up', and the return course from finish to start was called ὁδὸς κάτω 'road down'.

[p.73]

It was the stadium race track, in Heraclitus's poetic "cosmology", and not just a road (like the one from Athens to Thebes) that was a universal model of cosmic change, ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω - "the road up and down"), conceived as a cyclic (pendulum-like) and predetermined process of

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interchange of opposites which constantly "run" from minimum-point to maximum-point and backwards. Turning points in stadiums were marked with "turning posts" (τέρματα). In Fr. 55Leb/B120 DK Heraclitus metaphorically calls by this name the turning points of the year (τροπαί), the spring and autumn equinox, when Day and Night (Sunrise and Sunset) begin to get "bigger and smaller" than adversary until the next "reversals". At the point of the summer solstice (τροπαί), they will stop, and "will change their paths": Day from the "road up" (increase) to the "road down" (decrease), and Night from the "road down" to the "road up". The mathematically calculated accuracy and "justice" of these changes, according to Heraclitus, could not be accidental: it pointed to an invisible regulator or moderator, the divine cosmic mind (Γνώμη). In the agonistic model, the moderator becomes the Umpire or Supervisor (σκοπός, βραβεύς, ἐπιστάτης fr. 57Leb/B100) and is identified with the Sun, which regulates the cycles of day and night, as well as of the seasons (*Horai*). Greek athletes before the start of the competition took an oath not to violate the rules. Oath breakers according to popular belief were punished by Erinyes, the goddesses of revenge. It can be assumed that in some oaths the one who gave it, finished his swearing with the words "and if I break this oath, let me be punished by Erinyes, the ministers of Justice!" In this case, the use of this formula of conditional self-curse in Fr. 56Leb (= B94 + Derveni pap., col. IV,9) is simply a rhetorical circumlocution (imitating Apollo Loxias' language) meaning that the Sun itself is bound by a great oath (the divine law of fr.131Leb/B114), which it can never break. The oath is an archaic form of a contract, and the contract in Greek, in particular, could be called *logos* (LSJ, s.v. λόγος, VII 4). A close parallel to such metonymical use of "oath" (*horkos*) in the sense of "law" is provided by Empedocles who speaks of "ancient decree of the gods," that is, the divine law prohibiting bloodshed, which is "sealed with broad oaths" 31 B 115, i.e. spread over wide space and unbreakable.

[p.74]

The reconstruction of the stadium model helps to resolve the debate of commentators that has never stopped since the 19th century, whether Heraclitus held himself a theory of the Universal Flux or it is a later doxographical aberration that goes back to some passages in Plato. Eduard Zeller firmly adhered to the traditional interpretation, going back to Plato, Aristotle and doxography. In the 20th century, a skeptical school of thought (Burnet, Reinhardt, Vlastos, Kirk, Marcovich and many others) became prevalent among students of Heraclitus. Those who denied the authenticity of the theory of universal flux, as a rule denied also the authenticity of the periodical cosmic conflagration (ecpyrosis), and emphasized the "quantitative" rather that temporal meaning of the so called "cosmic measures" in Heraclitus' cosmology. Some serious voices of dissent have sounded in recent decades. Jonathan Barnes advocated trust in Plato and Aristotle (Barnes 1979 I: 65: "Flux is Heraclitean"), Charles Kahn recognized *ecpyrosis*,

criticized the quantitative and static interpretation of Heraclitus's cosmology, and rightly pointed out the temporal nature of "measures" (*metra*) and its inextricable connection with the periodic cosmic cycle (Kahn HCF: 147–153). Marcel Conche defiantly included the famous dictum "everything flows" (πάντα ρεῖ) in his edition of Heraclitus' fragments (Conche, HF, fr.136, p. 466). But the positivist interpretation of Heraclitus advanced by Burnet is not going to give up positions: Graham (FEGP I 135, 139) still denies the "strong" interpretation of the identity of opposites and the authenticity of *ecpyrosis*.

The agonistic model of the cosmos, that we extracted in 1985 from the darkness of oblivion, changes the picture and, with some reservations, provides a new substantial support to the traditional view. Even if Heraclitus didn't say literally that everything is flowing, he clearly says in genuine fragments that everything is running, and running incessantly and at a high speed of a stadium race. The race of cosmic opposites only slows down for a moment at the point of "reversals", when they change their course for the opposite direction and shift from "the way up" to "the way down" (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται). The cosmos operates like a pendulum, it literally goes back and forth in perpetual cycling according to ἀμοιβαὶ ἀναγκαῖαι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων "necessitated (or "fated") changes from the contraries" (neglected verbatim Heraclitus quotation in Plotinus, fr.52Leb in our edition). This model - contrary to Burnet and his followers - confirms the temporal, cyclical nature of the so called cosmic "measures". All ancient readers of Heraclitus unanimously understood the word μέτρα in fr.37Leb/B30 DK adverbially with a reference to "measured periods of time", and not to some "measured volumes of matter", as Burnet's far-fetched interpretation would like us to believe.[71] These measured periods of time or cosmic cycles, hierarchically arranged from shortest to longest, were enumerated by Heraclitus in the following context, i.e. in fr. 43Leb/B67 DK: diurnal ("day and night"), annual ("winter and summer") and periods of the Great Year "Excess and Need" or "Wealth and Poverty" of

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[71] μέτρια by Galenus, κατὰ χρόνων περιόδους by Diogenes Laertius and Simplicius, χρόνου τάξις, χρόνος τεταγμένος, ἐναλλάξ etc. – see all testimonia to fr.51 in Marcovich's edition.

fire.[72] Burnet and his followers tried to support their materialist interpretation of cosmic "measures" in Heraclitus by citing another supposed instance of μέτρα in Heraclitus, the fragment on the Sun and Erinyes fr.56Leb/B94 in which μέτρα allegedly refers the size of the sun. Plutarch quotes this fragment twice from memory with divergent readings μέτρα in *De exilio* 604A and ὅρους in De Iside 370D. The verbatim quotation in Derveni papyrus col. IV,8 (apparently from a written source because of its extension and pure Ionian dialect) proves that the authentic reading is οὔρους, and not μέτρα. The word ὅροι, Ionian οὖροι has nothing to do with "measured volumes of matter"; it is even more often that μέτρα associated with temporal "limits" and fixed "terms" or terminal points of time. In Heraclitus fr.55Leb/B120 the phrase οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός, literally "the limit of cloudless Zeus", means "the limit of the (period) of clear sky", i.e. the end of good weather, and refers to the autumnal equinox which is "opposite to Arktos", i.e. to the time of upper culmination of the constellation of Great Bear which in northern hemisphere falls on the end of March, i.e. coincides with the vernal equinox.[73] Our reconstruction of the economic (lend-and-borrow) metaphorical code also confirms the temporal nature of the cosmic "measures", since the debt term (προθεσμία, χρόνος τεταγμένος, χρόνου τάξις) of this metaphor refers to a predefined moment of time in the cosmic cycle. The

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[72] We read κόρος χρησμοσύνη, the authentic text quoted by Hippolytus in fr. 41Leb/B65. Λιμός is an imprecise paraphrase in standard Greek of the archaic Ionian word χρησμοσύνη. In later Greek and in patristic authors κόρος has predominantly a narrow sense of "satiety" opposed to "hunger". In Heraclitus, as in archaic poetry (Theognis, Solon), κόρος 'aboundance'is associated with "wealth" (ὄλβος) opposed to "need" or "poverty".

[73] I am grateful to late distinguished astronomers Lidiia Nikolaevna Radlova (1913 – 1999) and Boris Iul'evich Levin (1912 – 1989), a renowned cosmogonist, for the astronomical consultation in 1985 which confirmed my guess on the possible connection of B120 DK with equinoxes. I was certain that "the limit of clear sky (Zeus)" refers to autumnal equinox, but was puzzled by the connection of Arktos with spring equinox. This explanation was proposed in my 1985 article "The cosmos as a stadium" published the same year in *Phronesis*; as it seems, it has remained unnoticed for the last 35 years.

comparison of the exchange of "all things" for fire with a mortgage (ὑπαλλαγή) loan in fr.

42Leb/B90 DK unequivocally proves the authenticity of the world conflagration (ecpyrosis) and

its connection with the idea of fate (ἀμοιβαὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, εἱμαρμένα πάντα πάντως etc.): a pledge

(χρήματα) and a loan (χρυσός) cannot be in the same hands at the same time, and a repayment

period of "abundance" (domination) of fire is inevitable.

[p.75]

The agonistic model is important not only for the debate on the universal flux in Heraclitus, but

also for understanding the fundamental doctrine of unity and harmony of opposites in

Heraclitus's philosophy. It is in the agonistic model that the Umpire or Moderator stands above

the opposing forces. This radically changes the meaning of the doctrine of opposites and

transforms it from an abstract metaphysical theory into a practical political theory: in more detail

we discuss the "triadic structure" (2+1 formula) in Heraclitus's metaphysics below in the chapter

"An outline of the philosophy of Heraclitus". See also our commentary on fragments either

containing agonistic metaphors or describing real agonistic practices that are listed in fr.122Leb.

5. Military model: the cosmos as a battlefield

The key terms of this metaphorical code are "war" (πόλεμος) and "strife" (ἔρις). In the

framework of this model, the cosmos is conceived as a battlefield, the opposites (which means

"all things", πάντα, since no cosmic phenomenon or power exists by itself without pair) as

opponents and enemies, the cosmic processes are described as alternating "attack" and "retreat"

corresponding to "increase and decrease", "scatter and replenish", "borrow and repay" in the

economic code. The word χωρεῖ (πάντα χωρεῖ is a verbatim quotation fr.48Leb) in Homer is

used in military contexts for "for giving way" to advancing enemy. So, all things not just "pass",

but retreat giving way to advancing adversaries. The last judgement at the end of the *Megas*

Eniautos is conceived as an "attack of Fire" (πῦρ ἐπελθόν): on ἐπέρχομαι in military contexts

(attack, invade etc.) see LSJ, s.v.I (b). Ἔφοδος is a standard Greek military term for "attack" (LSJ, s.v. II). The Hippocratic author of *De diaeta* perfectly understood this metaphorical language of Heraclitus and imitated it: he explains the solar and lunar cycles as alternating 'attacks' or 'advance' of fire and water (I,5 πυρὸς ἔφοδος καῖ ὕδατος). Due to the paradoxical identification of war and harmony, *Polemos* becomes in Heraclitus the main cosmic and "divine" law to which absolutely all beings are subordinate: cosmic elements, luminaries, gods and humans, animals etc. In the fragment 32Leb/B53 the personification of war - *Polemos* - replaces the name of Zeus in the epic formula of the supreme god "the father and king of men and gods." "Victory" in the military metaphorical code corresponds to "wealth, abundance" (κόρος) in the economic code, and "defeat" - to "poverty" or "need" (χρησμοσύνη). The "attack" of Fire at the time of *ecpyrosis* is also his "victory" over all other cosmic masses (Earth, Sea and Prester-Air) in the great cosmic battle of elements described in fr.44-45Leb/ B31 DK. The cosmic war proceeds according to strict rules and with cyclical regularity: the adversaries take turns traversing "the road up and down" from start to finish, from minimum to maximum (τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον in *De diaeta* I,5), advancing and retreating, "turning around" from increase to decrease *et vice versa* at the predefined "turning points, τροπαί. Τροπαί "reversals" is a polysemic metaphor: in military language, τροπή was a decisive moment when one of the parties, unable to withstand the enemy's attack, "turned around" and fled; at this spot the winners used to put a "turning monument", trophy (τρόπαιον). On the referential level the "reversals" (tropai) in Heraclitus refer to astronomical "turning points" in the structure of a calendar year (as well as of Great Year), i.e. to solstices and equinoxes.[74]

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[74] Τροπαί is regularly used of solstices, especially of winter solstice, when used alone. But it was also occasionally used of the moon and other luminaries, and also applied to solstices and equinoxes together, as in Sext.Emp. 5.11 (LSJ, s.v.I b).

Fragments 44–45Leb (B31 DK) were misinterpreted already by the Stoic source of Clement as a cosmogony describing material transformations of the simple first element (fire) into a diverse cosmos. This error is due to the incorrect interpretation of the word τροπή as "transformation". It can sometimes mean "change" like a change of weather, but it never denotes a material transformation of something, a transformed *object*. Bruno Snell in his 1926 article on Heraclitus' language rightly pointed out that in archaic Ionian prose such meaning should be ruled out.[75] Fragments 44–45Leb on the iconic level describe a grandiose cosmic battle of the four world masses (Fire, Wind-Prester, Sea and Earth), cold Prester fights with hot Fire, wet Sea with dry Earth. At the referential level this battle encodes a calendar of the Great Year, in which the change of "seasons" corresponds to the successive domination of each of the four elements (the cosmic cycle of Empedocles provides a striking parallel).[76] This interpretation is additionally confirmed by the evidence of the scholia to Nicander (fr. 45B Leb/A 14a DK), a neglected paraphrase of fr.44-45 Leb/B 31 (and may be of the part if its wider context that is not preserved elsewhere) which provides a connecting link between the fragment about Polemos and the "cosmogony" of fr.44–45: the Sea and Fire are attacked in the cosmic battle of elements, subjugated and "enslaved" by the enemy "storm-winds", i.e. by Prester of Heraclitus' original text. The doxography speaks of abstract "opposites" (τὰ ἐναντία) in Heraclitus, but in the authentic fragments this term of the 4th century (and later) does not occur.[77] The closest

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[75] Bruno Snell, Die Sprache Heraklits (1926) 359-360 and note (1). Snell correctly criticizes Diles's 'Wandlungen' and connects τροπαί with 'Sonnenwende', but his impressionist ('Erlebnis') reading of the fragment is mistaken and does not support Reinhardt's denial of *ecpyrosis*.

[76] We do not ascribe to Heraclitus Empedocles' "chemical" concept of elements, by four elements we mean "maxima membra mundi" which, unlike the Empedoclean elements, are constantly transformed into each other.

[77] One cannot exclude the authenticity of the phrase ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων in Plotinus' quotation (Heraclit. fr.52Leb), but in such case this is a *gen.plur.* from οἱ ἐναντίοι "adversaries", not from τὰ ἐναντία.

authentic analogue is the term "the hostile" (τὸ ἀντίξουν) 34Leb/B8 taken from the military language.[78]

One should note the special proximity (metaphorical synonymity) of military and economic (lend-and-borrow) metaphorical codes in Heraclitus: in Fr. 31Leb/B80 they are intertwined, "borrowing" (χρεώμενα), "or living at the expense of other's death" is understood as a war and strife, debtors and creditors are compared with military adversaries. For the ancient reader, such associations did not seem strange: both those who did not repay a debt and those who lost a battle became slaves. We can say that the idea of class struggle as the law of history was invented by Heraclitus, and not Karl Marx. However, Heraclitus would not approve of the idea of the proletarian revolution and the destruction of one class by another: in his opinion, this would lead to the collapse of the whole system and to the extinction of the human race. Both the military and the lend-and-borrow metaphorical code, in turn, are "parallel" to the agonistic, political and gaming codes. In all cases, it is a matter of competition between two parties, and in all cases, winning of the one side means losing of the other. It can be assumed that "strife" or "rivalry" (ἔρις) is Heraclitus' general term for all specific types of competitive relations on which human society is based just as the 'Republic of Zeus' (cosmos) is based on the competitive interaction of cosmic powers supervised by the impartial Moderator who transforms their conflict (agon) into *palintropos harmonia*, literally 'turning back' or 'reversive' harmony.

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Together, these codes belong to the sociomorphic type, which differs from the biomorphic and technomorphic in that it is better suited to describe not cosmogony in the proper sense, not the origin (birth or creation) of the world, but the organization, functioning and "management" of the world system. Since the book of Heraclitus, according to Diodotus, was "On the form of

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[78] 6 out of 9 instances of ἀντίξοος in Herodotus (Powell, Lex. Her. s.v. and TLG) come from military contexts, in two cases it is applied to army: 6.7 στρατὸν…ἀντίξοον Πέρσηισι, 4.129 τὸ Πέρσηισι σύμμαχον opp. Σκύθηισι ἀντίξοον.

government" (Περὶ πολιτείας), and not "On Nature" (in the Milesian sense of the term), we can now understand why the sociomorphic code (including all its variations) is prevailing in metaphorical language of Heraclitus. The political ideal of Heraclitus was an enlightened monarchy (εἷς ἄριστος) or the rule of the philosophical elite, ἄνδρες φιλόσοφοι. The divine law of strife and the harmonious unity of opposites in Fr. 32 Leb (B 53) is explicitly called the "king" (βασιλεύς). In the agonistic code, this wise ruler, standing above the competing parties and saving them from mutual destruction by strict moderation of the eternal conflict (imposing the "limits" of the maximum and minimum), transforms into a Judge or an Arbiter (Βραβεύς) of the competition, in the economic lend-and-borrow code this is supposedly a loan agreement or contract (λόγος), "the same" for mortals and immortals according to surprisingly neglected quotation in Ionian dialect from Clement (λόγος γὰρ ὡυτός, fr. 154 Leb). In the game (*pesseia*) model it is Time (*Aion*), moving the game-pieces of gods and humans on a gameboard of life (αἰών) according to strict rules and making them to exchange their roles of mortals and immortals, free and slaves, as they win or lose the game (fr. 33 Leb/ B 52). In mythological language, this supreme principle corresponds to Zeus and Apollo who are 'consubstantial' as 'Father and Son': Apollo the Sun is a 'portion' of the purest 'Keraunian' fire, the skillful craftsman-creator and the 'intelligent' (φρόνιμον fr.39Leb, cf.B64) Pilot of the Universe: τάδε πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός "This Universe is governed by Thunder bolt" (fr.40Leb/B64). Heraclitus also refers to this supreme principle in non-anthropomorphic, more abstract terms, such as Logos, Harmony and Techne. We call this figure, referred to by many metaphorical names, but essentially the same, the *Moderator*. In metaphysics, theology and philosophy of nature of Heraclitus (which serve as a "paradigm" for his political philosophy and a foundation of his ethical philosophy), the formula "Two plus One", comprising two opposites and one Moderator, is what we call the *triadic structure*. In Greek political philosophy and practice, the idea of the beneficial "Third party", of an impartial Mediator or Διαιτητής, standing outside and above the conflicting parties and saving them from mutual destruction, was not new, it goes back

to Solon, the father of Greek political "centrism". But Heraclitus, unlike Solon, grounded it in a metaphysical and theological foundation, creating the first consistent theory of natural law and expressing it in the language of metaphorical parables, to which he owed the later nickname "Obscure". The dominant position of the theme of "strife" and "war" in the texts of Heraclitus is explained, apart from philosophical tasks, also by urgent practical needs at the time during the Ionian revolt or after its bloody suppression by the Persians in 494 B.C.

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 The study of Heraclitusʼbiography has led us to conclusion that he sided with the party of war in Ephesus that faced opposition from the persophile party of reconciliation. The "pacifist" supporters of the latter party probably cited Homer's condemnation of strife in the famous verse of "Iliad" turning it into the current slogan of peace. This explains why Heraclitus attacks Homer (and another "pacifist" Archilochus who boasted that he threw his shield) with such passion, disproves the verse of the *Iliad* 18.107 and justifies the "naturalness" of the war and strife. He also appeals to the ancient aristocratic ideal of self-sacrifice and heroic death in battle awarded by 'immortal glory' (κλέος ἄφθιτον). The practical purpose of these patriotic exhortations was the unification of all Ionian poleis into a single federal state with a common cult of Apollo the Sun, common government and common command, that would defeat the Achaemenid empire and will save the Greeks from slavery (a project ascribed by Herodotus I.170 to Thales).

The main texts on war and strife, military metaphors. Πόλεμος: Fr. 32Leb (B 53) πόλεμος πάντων πατήρ; cf. 43Leb (B 67). Ἔρις: fr.31Leb (B 80) δίκη ἔριν, γινόμενα πάντα κατʼἔριν; fr.34 a Leb (B 8) πάντα κατʼἔριν. Controversy with Homer: fr.35–36 Leb (A 22 DK). The cosmic cycle of Great Year as a war of four world masses: fr. 44–45 (τροπαί, διαχεέται).

6. The economic metaphorical code: the cosmos as a household

The lend-and-borrow economic metaphorical code was invented by Anaximander, who used it in Fr. B1 DK in the first formulation of the law of conservation of matter: "From which /elements/ all things originate, into the same they perish according to a fatal indebtedness: they [the things

that arose, one the one hand, and the original elements, on the other] pay a just recompence among themselves at the appointed time" . This is a universal law that applies to all things (animals, men, worlds, etc.), and not to "opposites" in spite of the widespread erroneous interpretation that goes back to Burnet. Anaximander is not talking about any "reciprocity" or cyclical change. The word ἀλλήλοις does not imply any reciprocity, it means nothing and may have been added by Simplicius to clarify that compensation is paid between two groups of eternal elements on the one hand, and generated things, on the other, and not between generated things themselves. The Greek word for cannibalism, ἀλληλοφαγία, does not imply that a man A eats a man B and is in his turn eaten by B, it just refers to the fact that one member of a group eats another member of the same group, not that they eat each other in turn. Things derive from elements and depend on elements, but elements do not derive from generated things and do not depend on things. These two groups are unequal. Things correspond to "debtors", the elements to "creditors", the generation of things out of elements is compared with a loan (borrowing of stuff) secured by one's own body. The lifespan of any being is determined by the "set" debt repayment term (χρόνου τάξις = προθεσμία). After the expiration of the loan term (χρόνου τάξις), every being repays its debt (χρέος is alluded to in τὸ χρεών) to creditors-elements. It repays (τίσις) the just amount (δίκην), i.e. equal to inflicted damage (ἀδικία is a legal term for damage with no moral or religious connotations). The innumerable worlds after expiration of loan term are dissolved in the "boundless nature" (φύσις ἄπειρος, ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγήρως) which according to Theophrastus and Aristotle is a mixture of different "seeds" like that of Anaxagoras (hence the plural ἐξ ὧν).[79] Not a single gram of matter is lost in these transactions of nature. In the cosmic

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[79] Τὸ ἄπειρον is not an authentic term of Anaximander, it is Aristotle' own term which he does not even ascribe specifically to Anaximander in Phys. Γ 4, for details see Lebedev (1978,). The authentic term φύσις ἄπειρος can be reconstructed on the basis of Hippolytus' doxography which quotes the archaic ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγήρως as epithets of φύσις, not of an abstract neutrum τὸ ἄπειρον unattested before 4th century. Τὸ ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀγήρων ἄπειρον is a linguistic nonsense. Both Aristotle (Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου 1069b17; Phys.187a18 ἐκ τοῦ

household, all expenses are covered by equal recompenses, not a bit of "eternal nature" disappears, only individual beings are born and die due to mechanical reshuffle of particles of matter. Anaximander was a physicist, and he formulated the law of nature, which later became a "common opinion" (κοινὴ δόξα) of all *physiologoi* according Aristote, the law *ex nihilo nihil fit* or ἐκ μηδενὸς μηδὲν γίγνεσθαι.

[p.79]

  Heraclitus was a moral and political thinker, so he was not so much interested in the laws of nature that have no direct relationship to ethics and politics, but in the idea of cosmic justice, which could become the basis of the theory of natural law and applied to practical legislation. Therefore, he borrowed from Anaximander only a formal scheme, but with two serious modifications. Firstly, it was Heraclitus who first applied the lend-and-borrow analogy to the description of cyclic transmutation of opposites inherent in the same single substrate. This is impossible in the mechanistic physics of Anaximander, since all the processes of change are understood in it as recombination of corpuscles: separation from a mixture, combination, dissolution, but not alterations of a substrate. Secondly, the materialist law of nature, the principle of ex nihilo nihil, in the context of the teleological holism of Heraclitus has been transformed into the providential will of the cosmic god (Γνώμη) and the inevitability of Destiny (εἱμαρμένη). This is a classic case of the polemic device περιτροπή: a form of thought or an argument borrowed from an opponent is "turned around" and used against him like a boomerang. Researchers who conflated both concepts in single ill-defined category of "cosmic justice" overlooked the fundamental difference between the law of nature and natural law.

μίγματος) and Theophrastus (ἐκεῖνος in Simpl.Phys. 27,12 refers to Anaximander) describe this 'boundless nature' of Anaximander as a 'mixture' similar to the panspermia of Anaxagoras. I cannot see how one can neglect this precise evidence and consensus of the earliest sources, of two independent readers of Anaximander's book, and rely on second-hand imperial doxography. For a defense of the panspermia interpretation see Lebedev (1988).

Physicists do not deal with theories of natural law, political thinkers do not deal with laws of nature. Heraclitus was a moral and political thinker, not a physical scientist.

The lend-and-borrow metaphorical code is directly attested in three authentic fragments of Heraclitus fr. 31 Leb/B80 (χρεώμενα), 42Leb/B 90 (ἀνταμείβεσθαι, cf. ὑπαλλάττουσαν "bailing" in the context of Plutarch), 45Leb/B31 (διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται "is scattered and replenished"). It is also presupposed in the Accusativus pretii ζῆι θάνατον "live at the cost of death" in fr. 47 Leb/B 76, ζῶντες θάνατον in fr. 153 Leb/B 62. Λόγος ὠυτός in the new fragment 154Leb, according to one interpretation, may refer to a "common account" or "common agreement" that binds mortals and immortals. Mortals are born when immortals (elements earth, water etc.) "die", i.e. are borrowed by human bodies, the death of mortals is the rebirth of immortals: earth to earth, water to water etc.

7. The game model of the cosmos: Lusoria Tabula.

The Greek game of *pesseia* itself is a model of war, with two 'armies' of game-pieces lined up against each other on a gameboard. Therefore, the game of the Time-god Aion in fr.33Leb/B52 DK with the fate of the gods and humans is completely parallel to the cosmic war in the military model of the cosmos in fr. 32Leb/B53.

[p.80]

 The game-pieces change their positions on the opposite sides of the gameboard in the same way as the celestial and earthen beings (mortals and immortals), as well as souls (*psychai*), which travel on the "road up and down" (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω) in the cosmic stadium and in the cosmic *enantiodromia* (fr.51A Leb). Aion and Polemos are exact metaphorical synonyms from two distinct metaphorical codes, with the same referential meaning of the Supreme being that governs the Universe, the new philosophical god of Heraclitus. Note that Hipolytus quotes the fragments on Aion and Polemos from the same chapter (κεφάλαιον) of Heraclitus' book; probably, from the same context. The term "kingship" (βασιληΐη) is ambivalent: it retains the political meaning of "kingship" similar to *Polemos basileus* in fr.32Leb/B53, but at the same

time it alludes to the technical term basileus "king" in the game of petteia that denotes prize-winning throw of dice or astragals with a numerical value of 30: for details see our commentary on this fragment. According to our hypothesis, two pairs of opposites from fr. 43 Leb/B67 πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος χρησμοσύνη 'war and peace, abundance and need", were symbolical names or meanings of the four sides, and of corresponding four throws, of an astragalos (knuckle-bone) in the Greek dice divination, *astragalomanteia*, a popular type of cleromancy, lot divination. The standard names of the four sides were Κῶιος (best throw with value 6), Χῖος (worst throw with value 1), πρανές and ὕπτιον with values 3 and 4. Sides with values 5 and 2 existed only in a cube dice, not in an astragalos. The sum of the numerical values of the opposite sides is always 7, the sacred number of Apollo. Three out of the four names of the sides of an astragalos – **Κῶιος**, **Χῖος** and **Π**ρανές – display acrophonetic correspondence with Heraclitus' **Κ**όρος, **Χ**ρησμοσύνη, **Π**όλεμος in fr.43Leb/B67. "War or peace?", "Poverty or wealth?" were among the most often asked questions in popular divination. This hypothesis explains the graffito πόλεμος εἰρήνη on kleromantic bone plates from Olbia, which we attribute to the "diviner of Hermes" (θεοπρόπος Ἑρμοῦ) Pharnabazos attested in another 5th century B.C. graffito from Olbia. It is unlikely that this street fortuneteller at the end of the 5th century BC. had read the book of Heraclitus. It seems more probable that Pharnabazos and Heraclitus had a common source, the popular language of *astragalomanteia*. Traces of astragalos symbolism have been also seen in the word μεταπεσόντα in fr. 76Leb/ B 8 with the alleged meaning of "falling with another side up", although this is a common word for a sharp change (possibly, a dead metaphor from dicing), and it comes from a paraphrase. In the imitation of Lucian *Vit. Auct.* 14, παῖς παίζων, συμφερόμενος διαφερόμενος the last two words echo fr. 106Leb/B 10, but in this context probably mean 'now winning' (bringing profit), now losing (causing devastation)', i.e. alternating wealth and poverty. On the relation between *pesseia* metaphors and hebdomadism see section 12 below.

8. The sacral model of the cosmos: *Templum Naturae*

Heraclitus introduces the concept of "ever-living fire" in Fr. 37Leb/B 30, in a style reminiscent of a pantheistic hymn to the cosmos, with a majestic triple "was, is and will be." The religious coloring of the fragment also corresponds to the sacred epithet ἀείζωον, which is taken from the cult sphere: ἄσβεστος φλόξ "inextinguishable flame", was sustained in a special hearth (ἐσχάρα) inside the temple, from which the external altar fire was ignited, as in the temple of Apollo in Delphi. The word κόσμος, although applied here to the Universe, has not yet completely lost its metaphorical character. In order to refer to the Universe, it still requires a deictic pronoun "this one" τόνδε, clarifying that the reference is not to some ordinary "decoration" or "ordered construction", but to the "construction" we all have before our eyes, that is, the visible world.

[p.81]

By saying that "this particular ordered construction" was not made by any god or man, Heraclitus implies that there are some man-made (χειρόκμητοι) "ordered constructions" (κόσμοι). The allusion is most probably to temples. A man-made temple is a house in which a cult statue of a god resides. "This cosmos" is a house in which lives not a cult statue of god, but a living god himself. We know that Heraclitus rejected adoration of marble statues as "madness" or "childish toys". The theoretical foundation of this rejection was his pantheism. All of these temple allusions in the text of the fragment suggest that the concept of divine fire in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus is neither isolated nor comes from everyday life, but rather is, like 'this logos', a metaphor of an elaborate sacral metaphorical code that describes the world as a miraculous "not-wrought-by-hand" temple of nature. The idea and conceptual metaphor of the 'temple of nature' (Templum Naturae) is attested in the 4th letter of Pseudo-Heraclitus (Ps.-Heraclit., *Epist.* IV, 2 p. 315, 11-18 Mondolfo-Taran):

ποῦ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; ... ἀπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς χειρόκμητος, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἔχει ἕνα περίβολον, ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶι ναός ἐστι ζώιοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος;

'Where is the god? Is he locked in temples? ... Ignoramuses! You do not know that God is not made by hands, that he does not have a pedestal, and that he is not enclosed in one fence, but the whole cosmos is a temple for him, decorated with living beings, plants and luminaries!'".

The fact that Heraclitus's concept of "ever-living fire" is inextricably linked with the *Templum Naturae* metaphorical model is further proved by the "incenses" metaphor in fragment 43Leb / B 67. Atmospheric phenomena (day and night, winter and summer) are compared in it with "incenses" burnt on a temple altar. These sense-perceptible "incenses" are distinguished only by their deceptive subjective "smell" (ἡδονή), but their imperceptible objective essence-substrate is one and the same, the ever-living fire (πῦρ ἀείζωιον). The word for incenses, θυώματα derives from the same root, as ἀναθυμίασις 'exhalation', and both are etymologically cognate with Russian *дым* 'smoke'. Doxography ascribes to Heraclitus a theory of two exhalations, the light and dark one, which exactly correspond to the "day and night" of fragment 43Leb/ B67. According to the common doxographical source of *Placita* and Diogenes Laertius, the light and dark exhalations in turn gather in certain "bowls" or "cavities" (σκάφαι) and so produce the alternation of day and night. This may be a later rationalistic interpretation of the original Heraclitean image of an altar with a cup-shaped groove on the top. Here we can see how the doxographers extract from Heraclitus' poetic and theological discourse a "meteorological theory" that "explains" natural phenomena. One can argue about details, but in general terms it is possible with certain probability to reconstruct the basic image of the *Templum naturae* model: the space between heaven and earth is a kind of cosmic altar in the temple of nature, into which an invisible hand throws sensually perceptible "incenses": day and night, winter and summer, etc.

[p.82]

The theological (monotheistic and pantheistic) message of this metaphorical construction is correctly explicated in the fourth pseudo-Heraclitean letter cited above. Only the fools (*axynetoi*) can worship the soulless stone idols locked in man-made temples. One should worship

only the one true and living God, the Wise Being (Τὸ Σοφόν) who inhabits this common house and polis of gods and men. Sacrifice is the nourishment of God. The living god does not need "corpses" (νέκυες) of slaughtered animals, they must be "thrown away sooner than dung" according to fr. 143Leb/B98. The cosmic god feeds himself with evaporation (*anathymisasis*) from the sea, which daily rises to the cup of the sun.

Among the possible sources of this mythopoetic model of the cosmos, as well as parallels to it, one can cite architectural analogies in Anaximander's cosmology: the Earth has the shape of a drum of a stone column of a temple, and its diameter serves as a module for the frontal size of the temple (Lebedev 1980; Couprie 2011: 156–157 ; see also Hahn 2001; 2010). In Philolaus' cosmology (44 A 16 DK), the Central Fire is compared to an altar (βωμός), which suggests the comparison of the cosmos with a temple.

9. The Biomorphic model: the cosmos as a living organism (isomorphism of macrocosm and microcosm).

 One should distinguish two types of the biomorphic model of the cosmos and biological analogies in cosmology in early Greek thought: a naturalistic and a teleological one. They differ because they are based on two different metaphysical paradigms, two different world-views. Biomorphic analogies can be both genetic, that is, modeling the origin and development of the cosmos, and structural-functional, that is, explaining the general structure and functioning of the cosmic organism. In the technomorphic model of the cosmos "matter", or "what all things are made of and consists of," is conceived as a passive "material" to be "molded" (by potter's craft), melted into different forms (by metallurgical craft), transformed by the art of carpenter, like Aristotle's ὕλη which originally meant "wood" in a technomorphic analogy. On the contrary, in the biomorphic model of the cosmos the primary elements are understood as "seeds" (Anaximander's γόνιμον, Anaxagoras σπέρματα) or Empedocles ριζώματα, and the development of the cosmos is compared with "growth": For example, in the cosmogony of Anaximander, a

"sphere of flame" is separated from the cosmic germ and "grows around the circumterrestrial air as a bark around a tree "(12 10 A DK).

[p.83]

The "growth" of the organism, in turn, is understood as "nutrition" (τροφή, τρέφεσθαι), therefore the matter of the cosmos is understood as a kind of "food": in the Ionian tradition of Anaximander – Anaxagoras – Democritus (continued by Epicurus and Lucretius' *semina rerum*) matter is as panspermia, a mixture of various seeds (σπέρματα). Another theory of cosmic "nutrition" (relating to everyday "nutrition" of the sun and the stars rather than to cosmogony) was the Ionian theory of "evaporation from the sea": in this case water or humid air was the cosmic "food". Aristotle ascribes to Thales the widespread Ionian theory that the sun and luminaries "feed" and live off "evaporation" (*anathymiasis*) from the sea.[80] The use of some biological (in particular embryological) analogies does not in itself speak of the general teleological character of a physical system. As a matter of fact, biological analogies are used, for example, in the cosmogony of Democritus, whereas the mechanistic determinism of Democritus and the atomists strictly excludes all teleology and divine providence.[81] Therefore, biomorphic analogies can be used in naturalistic (or mechanistic) physics, and in this case we are talking about natural analogies (on this concept see the beginning of this chapter). For example, the analogy between gray hair and withering of grass in Alcmaeon of Croton is a natural and not a

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[80] Aristot. Metaph. 983b 22 = Thales 11 A12 DK ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτωι ζῆν.

[81] In Democritus, the innumerable worlds "grow and perish" αὔξειν καὶ φθίνειν Hippol, *Ref.* 1.12.2 = Democrit. fr. 291 Luria. - the terminology seems to be authentic, since in peripatetic doxography the standard terms are γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι. The world germ (a panspermia of atoms) is enclosed in a "shell" or "membrane" (ὑμήν), D.L.9.32 = Democrit. fr. 382 Luria. The term is taken from embryology, see LSJ. q.v. 1; Baldry 1932: 28. The term microcosm, μικρὸς κόσμος may have been coined by Democritus.

metaphorical analogy, as it explains one observed natural phenomenon by analogy with another natural phenomenon.[82] Only when biological analogies are systemic and combined with a pronounced isomorphism of micro- and macrocosm, as well as pantheism and panpsychism (the concept of *anima mundi*, identified with the fundamental principle of the world), we are dealing with a teleological version of biomorphism.

[p.84]

 Mechanism is excluded in this model; it is an example of ethically relevant holism and organicism, usually in combination with a belief in divine providence and the theonomic ethics of the "following divine law". It is this version of pantheistic biomorphism (= panpsychism) that we find in Heraclitus and the Stoics; in the first century BC. it was synthesized with ancient Platonism and led to the emergence of "Stoic Platonism" (Bonazzi, Helmig 2007: passim). The parallelism of micro- and macrocosm in Anaximenes and Diogenes from Apollonia is more likely to be of a naturalistic (ethically irrelevant) type, although Heraclitus's teleological reinterpretation of Anaximenes' physics cannot be ruled out. We believe that two types of pantheism should be clearly distinguished in Greek thought: naturalistic pantheism (irreligious and ethically irrelevant) and ethical-religious pantheism. In the first case, God is reduced to nature, in the second, nature is reduced to God. The pantheism that Aristotle attributes to "the majority of *physiologoi*", is naturalistic.[83] "Nature" (φύσις) or the fundamental principle of the cosmos is identified in it with "deity" (τὸ θεῖον) only in the sense of being "immortal", that is eternal and indestructible in contrast to the "mortal" things, i.e. generated and destructible

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[82] Arist. *De gener. an.*785a 25 sq. On this neglected fragment of Alcmaeon see Lebedev (2017) "Almaeon of Croton on human knowledge, the seasons of life and isonomia".

[83] Arist. Phys. 203b 6 sq. = Anaxim. A 15 DK. Contrary to Diels-Kranz, Aristotle speaks here not specifically about Anaximander, but about the "majority" of *physiologoi*, for more details see: Lebedev 1978: part 1. Cf. note 16 above.

particulars. In most Ionian cosmogonies the world is produced by a cosmogonic vortex in the infinite ocean of matter. No Greek in his sound mind could ever believe that a cosmogonic vortex takes care of humanity or may be addressed in a prayer, or should be "followed" in practical life as a moral standard: Aristophanes points to the absurdity of this in the "Clouds". It was Heraclitus who subjected this naturalistic version of the pantheism to a polemical reinterpretation (*peritrope*)[84], that is, he transformed the naturalistic concept of "nature" as material substance of all things (φύσις) into theological and teleological concept by identifying nature with god. By making *physis* a teleological concept, Heraclitus anticipated Aristotle, while by making it a theological concept, he anticipated the Stoics. Ignoring the philosophical differences between these two types of pantheism sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings, for example, to mistaken identification of the naturalistic monism of the Milesians with the ethical-religious monotheistic pantheism of the Orphic theogony.[85] If there is indeed a connection between these two philosophies of nature, then it is exactly the reverse: that is, it is not the Milesians who depend on the so-called "Orphism", but the authors of Orphic theogony counterposed to the Ionian naturalistic cosmogony a creationist one.

[p.85]

According to reliable evidence of Aristotle, the author of the Orphic theogony was a diviner (*chresmologos*) at the court of Peisistratids in Athens, falsifier of oracles and adventurist Onomacritus.[86] It may be assumed that considering the naturalism of the Milesians as a threat to traditional religion and morality, Onomacritus composed an alternative creationist account of the

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[84] On the polemical device of *peritrope* in Greek philosophy see Lebedev (2019) "The authorship of the Derveni papyrus", p. 593-595.

[85] *Contra* Finkelberg (1986) 325.

[86] Philopon. *In de anima* p. 186, 24 = Aristot. *De philosophia*, fr. 7 Rose, cf. Orph. fr. 1109–1119 Bernabé.

history of the world, in which the origin of the cosmos is explained not by the "eternal motion" of matter, but by the act of creation performed by the demiourgos Phanes (*aka* Erikepaios, Eros and Metis = Intelligence).[87] In this version Onomacritus substitutes for Anaximander's "panspermia" of simple substances, the "sperm" of Phanes, which contains the "seeds" of all gods.

The reconstruction of the systemic parallelism of micro- and macrocosm in Heraclitus is based on three main testimonies:

The fragment 75Leb/B26 unequivocally draws a parallel between the cyclical "kindling and quenching" (ἅπτεται - ἀποσβέννυται) of the divine cosmic fire in Fr. 37Leb/B30 and the alternation of light and darkness, sleeping and waking, life and death in man (ἄνθρωπος), conceived as microcosm.

According to the author of the Aristotelian *Problems*, the followers of Heraclitus recognize that "evaporation" from moisture occurs both "in the Universe" and in the human body, fr.69A (b) - (c) Leb. This refers to the evaporation from liquid food in the stomach, homologous to the sea in cosmos. Heraclitus fragments quoted in Stoic sources (fr.67Leb/B12 DK) speak of the evaporation of souls from the blood. Fragment 69Leb/B36 apparently, is taken from the context of parallelism of the micro- and macrocosmic soul, as pluralis ψυχῇισι may indicates. The author of "Problems" interpreted the transformation of souls into water within the body as physiology of secretions, the formation of urine. If so, then the formation of "earth" inside the body should have corresponded to the formation of feces. However, such a straight physiological interpretation does not have clear parallels in other sources and is not found in the fragments of Heraclitus themselves. In other sources, and in the authentic fragments of Heraclitus,

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[87] Orph. fr. 140 Bernabé Μῆτιν σπέρμα φέροντα θεῶν.

"moistening" of the soul is connected with psychology and ethics, as well as with cognition and sensuality (pleasure), but not with the physiology.

The Hippocratic imitation of Heraclitus in *De diaeta*, book 1, chapters 9–10 sets out a detailed doctrine of the isomorphism of the human body and the Universe.

[p.86]

The similarity between the structure and functioning of the human body on the one hand, and the cosmos on the other, is explained by the teleological operation of active and intelligent cosmic principle "fire" which constructed human body as "imitation of the Universe" (ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά).[88] Some passages remain obscure, and not all details can be attributed to Heraclitus. It is clear that the stomach is correlated with the sea, and the digestive tract with the earth. This first correlation system is supplemented by a second one on "three circuits (*periodoi)*" that the demiurgical fire created in the human body "in imitation of the Universe": the first circuit is localized "close to cavities with liquids" and corresponds to the Moon; the second, presumably, in the head and corresponds to the sphere of fixed stars; and finally the third, middle circuit in the region of the heart. This circuit corresponds to the Sun in the cosmos. "In it is the soul, mind, understanding, movement, sensation, growth, decline, separation, sleep, wakefulness, he always controls everything, and this and that, never taking a hold." The identification of the mind (and governing principle) of the cosmos with the Sun in Heraclitus is confirmed by fr. 69B Leb/B67a DK from Hisdosus) and fr.Probabilia 13 Leb. (Scythinus). The contrast between the pure solar region (heart and chest) and the impure region of the moon (abdomen) finds some correspondence in the doxography of Diogenes Laertius D.L. 9.10 τὴν δὲ σελήνην ... μὴ διὰ καθαροῦ φέρεσθαι τόπου, τὸν μέντοι

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[88] It is unclear whether the words ἑνὶ δὲ λόγωι ἐποιήσατο simply mean "in one word" or "by a single principle" (or "design"). In the latter case, we would have the only reminiscence of Heraclitus' concept of logos in *De diaeta*.

ἥλιον ἐν διαυγεῖ καὶ ἀμιγεῖ κεῖσθαι κτλ. 'The moon moves through impure region, while the sun is in a transparent and unmixed region etc.'.

The biomorphic model of the cosmos serves not only theological and eschatological, but also the ethical and political tasks of Heraclitus' work. Firstly, as with Marcus Aurelius, this holistic model emphasizes the need for cooperation and close interaction of citizens in the polis (on the often neglected 'workers'- *ergatai* and 'co-workers'- *synergoi* see our commentary on fr. 107Leb/B75) in order to achieve a common goal, while also condemning *pleonexia* and individualism as contradicting nature. Men should "work together" as organs of a single body and follow the *xynos logos*, not their "private intelligence" and hedonistic desires. Secondly, humans do not occupy the best and purest place inside the body of the cosmic god. The best place is occupied by Apollo the Sun, in after-life it is reserved only for the wise and heroes "slain by Ares" in the battle for freedom (they become commensals at the symposium of gods), whereas humans in earthly life are literally "buried in barbaric filth" ἐν βορβόρωι βαρβαρικῶι (see fr. Probabilia, 10 Leb), swarming around like worms in the "earth", that is, in the guts of the cosmic god.

[p.87]

This rhetoric was part of the military-patriotic exhortations of the liberation project of Heraclitus, it was addressed to the "snickering" Ephesian bourgeoisie and to all who trembled for their lives and did not want to fight against the Great king at the time or after the Ionian revolt. There is nothing to lose on this earth, the heroes will be awarded with a "better share" (Fr. 105Leb/B25), their souls fly to a much cleaner and more honorable places of residence in heaven in the company of the gods. "The souls of those who fell in battle are purer than those who died in disease" (Fr. 104Leb/B136). Anonymus Iamblichi in 5.1 probably elaborates on this ethical topos of Heraclitus: he censures someone who 'spares his life' (φειδόμενος τῆς ψυχῆς) and suffers from excessive 'love of one's own life' (φιλοψυχία is a vice!) because 'immortal glory' (apparently of a fallen hero) is more enviable than the evils of old age.

10. Technomorphic (demiurgical) analogies: metallurgical, pottery, etc.

There is no more erroneous and easily refutable stereotype in the history of early Greek philosophy than a view by which the concept of a demiurge or creator god was unknown or impossible before Plato.[89] Indeed, in the early mythopoetic cosmogonies of the Greeks (especially in Hesiod), dominant is the genealogical model of the origin of the world, and not a creation story. But this does not mean that the myths about the divine creation were unknown to the Greeks or represented – according to the pseudo-historical evolutionist scheme – a certain advanced stage of "development" to which the Greek mind allegedly had not yet ascended. Prometheus fashioned the first man from clay (and Athena breathed an intelligent soul into him) with the same ease with which the biblical god created Adam from the dust. Firstly, creation myths are much more ancient and archaic than the early Ionian physical theories of matter and vortex-cosmogonies. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that Hesiod prefers the genealogical model because it is "more archaic" and creationism has not yet been "invented". Hesiod's "Theogony" is not a scientific logos; it is a hymn to Zeus and its goals are primarily religious, moral and didactic-educational, as well as poetical. The triumph of Zeus after defeating the forces of evil is also a triumph of Justice (Dike): all forms of legal and political life of mortals, as well as privileges of "kings" and distribution of honors (τιμαί), are based on the Justice of Zeus. Hesiod could well compose a story about how Zeus "made" heaven and earth, but firstly, this is not a royal occupation; for such works there is a blacksmith god Hephaestus.

[p.88]

And secondly, to derive the origin of Justice from the heroic victory in the great war over the forces of evil is much more meaningful and persuasive for the audience of Hesiod than to derive

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[89] Recently, D. Sedley (2007) overcame this stereotype, recognizing as the first example of "rational creationism" the cosmogony of Anaxagoras. A step in the right direction, but insufficient. Sedley ignores Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans and Philolaus.

it from a technological process which is unworthy of Father and Kings of gods and men and as such, and has no relation with good and evil.

Already by the 6th century BC the cosmic demiourgos appears in Pherecydes' *Pentemychos* and in Orphic theogony. In the 5th century the Nus of Anaxagoras, and Love and Strife in Empedocles function as demiourgic (though not anthropomorphic) forces in cosmogony. We believe that the demiurge (identified with the mind) was also well known to the Pythagoreans: Philolaus compares the creator god with a ship builder who laid the central fire in the center of the Kosmos, just as the ship builder first laid the keel.[90] Thus, the demiurge of Plato was not an invention of the 4th century, but was a revival of ancient tradition, and Plato himself recognizes the fabulous nature of this image, calling the entire cosmogony of Timaeus a "plausible fable" (εἰκὸς μῦθος).[91]

There are indications that the Milesians before Heraclitus used analogies from metallurgy and other industrial crafts, creating a new demythologized picture of the world. In Anaximander's cosmogony, the process of segregation of the initial mixture was compared with the washing of gold in a sieve; as a result of rotational motion, the gold particles and waste rock (earth) were separated. [92] In this case, an analogy was apparently implied between the rotational motion of the sieve and the cosmogonic vortex (δίνη). In explaining the nature of the sun Anaximander used an

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[90] Stob. 1.21.6b = Philolaus A 17 DK. This testimony should be regarded as a "fragment" since the imagery is authentic. No doxographer could ever invent *ad hoc* the unique image of ship builder.

[91] Plat. Tim. 29d, 68d.

[92] Anaxim. ap. Simpl. Phys. 27, 12 ἐκεῖνος γάρ (scil. Ἀναξίμανδρος) φησιν ἐν τῆι διακρίσει τοῦ ἀπείρου τὰ συγγενῆ φέρεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐν τῶι παντὶ χρυσὸς ἦν, γίνεσθαι χρυσόν, ὅτι δὲ γῆ γῆν κτλ. He (= Anaximander) says that when the infinite was separated, the similar particles were carried towards each other, and that which was gold in the Universe, became gold, and that which was earth, became earth (Lebedev 1988–1).

analogy from the blacksmith craft: the fiery "exhaust" from the wheel of the sun was compared with the blower tube (διὰ πρηστῆρος αὐλοῦ) of the smith's bellows.[93] Anaximander explained the production of wind by the "melting" of air particles under the influence of solar heat (A 24). Anaximenes compared thickening of air into denser bodies with "felting" (πίλησις).

[p.89]

Miletus was one of the world centers for the production of woolen fabrics, and Anaximenes undoubtedly observed this process in workshops.

The list of 20 different crafts (τέχναι) in *De diaeta* 1. 10–24 is largely based on Heraclitean material (with revisions and additions) and aims to prove that "art imitates nature".[94] Of the "productive" arts, that is, working with the material, three or four are attested also in sources independent from *De diaeta*: goldsmiths (fr. 116Leb), iron craftsmen (f. 116A Leb), potters (f. 115 Leb) , and, presumably, builders (114A Leb). For more details, see our commentary on these fragments.

It should be emphasized that, as in the case of biomorphic analogies, Heraclitus reinterprets them in a teleological vein, that is, gives them a meaning that was not intended by the Milesians. The thesis "art imitates nature" (ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν) is reversible: nature is a paradigm, a role model for human arts, and therefore nature itself is an "craftsman" or "master" (τεχνίτης). The neglected fragment of Heraclitus quoted in Aristotle's *De Caelo* draws an analogy between the cosmogonic process and the casting of various figures from the gold material (Fr.116 Leb). This proves that the Stoic concept of "fire-craftsman" (πῦρ τεχνικόν), if not verbally, then conceptually goes back to Heraclitus. Heraclitus's own sources, in turn, may have been both the observation of blacksmiths and gold workers in Ephesus, as well as the mythopoetic tradition linking the creative blacksmith god Hephaestus with fire.

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[93] Πρηστῆρος αὐλοῦ 12 A 21 = B 4 DK.

[94] For details see our commentary on. Fr. 106-124 Leb.

11. Sociomorphic (political) model: The Cosmopolis or the City of Zeus.

While engaging in a controversy with Homer about the benefits and harms of strife and war in the world of gods and men, as well as rejecting together with Homer's "pacifism" his anthropomorphism and polytheism in theology, Heraclitus at the same time breathed new life into the ancient military aristocratic ethics of "knightly honor" and heroic glory associated by Greeks with the Homeric "Iliad". He may have also found inspiration in the full of combatant spirit military-patriotic poems of his compatriot the poet Callinus of Ephesus.

[p.90]

Heraclitus may also have borrowed from Homer and the epic tradition and adapted to his purposes another important idea, that gods, like humans, are also organized and live in a community with Zeus as their "king". But since the traditional Homeric gods in Heraclitus' perception, under the influence of the Ionian enlightenment, lost their human shape and turned into luminaries and elements, from the synthesis of the Homeric 'community of the gods', on the one hand, and of Ionian cosmology, on the other, Heraclitus constructed the fundamental idea of his ethical and political philosophy, the idea of Cosmopolis or the City of Zeus (Zeus being identical with the cosmos and ever-living fire). The Cosmopolis binds together mortals and immortals by a 'shared agreement' (ξυνὸς λόγος) into single community (πόλις), governed by the 'divine law' (θεῖος νόμος), the citizens of this community are gods and men. But *hoi polloi* remain 'unfaithful' (ἄπιστοι, ἀπιστία fr.10 Leb/B19; 136Leb/B86) to this law, they 'do not recognize it' like the 'dogs who bark at their master'(126Leb/B97), they *do not obey it* (ἀκοῦσαι with genitive, as in ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ λόγου B2Leb/B1, means 'to listen' in the sense of 'to obey'), because they do not perceive (ἀξύνετοι) this 'shared agreement', and they do not perceive it, because their souls are "barbaric" and "wet", that is unintelligent and immersed in Bacchic pleasures. This conceptual metaphor and political idea of Heraclitus had a tremendous impact on the Stoic concept of cosmos and Stoic doctrine of natural law, as well as on the cosmopolitism of the Cynics, especially Antisthenes and the authors of *Letters* of Ps.-Heraclitus.

The idea of Cosmopolis is attested primarily in Heraclitus' own words κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων "this cosmos, one and the same for all beings", fr. 37Leb/B30 DK. It is clear from the context that by "all beings" (ἀπάντων) Heraclitus means "gods and men" (cf.οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε τις ἀνθρώπων = οὔτις ἀπάντων), two broadest possible categories of living beings, the totality of which exhausts the entire content of the Universe. This *prima facie*

archaic understanding of the world was borrowed from Heraclitus by the Stoics, who defined the concept of "cosmos" as "the compound of gods and men" (τὸ ἐξ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα SVF II 169).[95] However, the archaic language of Heraclitus can be deceiving, in this case we are dealing with a revolutionary idea that subverts the very foundations of Greek religion. The "communities" of the gods and men in Homer and in the traditional Greek beliefs are divided by an unbridgeable gap. Mortals by definition can never become immortal, of all mortals only one Heracles – due top his superhuman *arete* – managed to ascend to Olympus and become a member of the divine community. Heraclitus unites them into one common and 'shared' community, the gods and humans differ only in their temporary status (free and slaves, winners and losers), that can be reversed by personal effort, and not in essence or 'by nature' (κατὰ φύσιν). The gods die, taking on the shape of mortal bodies, and elect humans ascend to heavens as a reward for their virtue and become the commensals of the gods. Ἦθος ἀνθρώπωι δαίμων "Man' character is his *daimon*", i.e. personal protector god who determines one's good (*eudaimonia*) or bad (*kakodaimonia*) fortune. One should 'hope for the hopeless' (ἔλπεσθαι τὸ ἀνέλπιστον fr. 157Leb/B18, i.e. aspire for becoming a commensal of the gods. Exactly as later in the Stoic and Cynic philosophy, the wise in Heraclitus is first of all a citizen of the world, and only after this a citizen of the human polis. The author of Heraclitus' malicious biography in Diogenes Laertius book IX perfectly understood and parodied this idea of Heraclitus: refusing to "engage in the affairs of the community" (πολιτεύεσθαι) with corrupted Ephesians, Heraclitus leaves for the mountains and lives *sub Jove frigido* in the city Zeus, following the "divine law". He refuses to kill animals and goes vegan πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας, gets sick and self-medicates, practicing invented by him "cosmic medicine" which "imitates nature" by sustaining

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[95]On the idea if cosmopolis in Stoic philosophy see Schofield (1999) 57 ff.; Vogt 2008.

the balance of opposite powers. Dropsy is the predominance of the humid element, a metaphor of sensuality and hedonism that can be cured by ascetic "dryness".

[p.91]

Unlike biomorphic and technomorphic metaphorical codes, the sociomorphic code is absolutely unsuitable for the description of the genesis (birth or creation) of the cosmos, but is invaluable for someone whose goal is to describe the Universe in terms of hierarchical system, management and control. The concept of the "law of nature" is a faded metaphor of the sociomorphic metaphorical code, just as the concept of "matter" (*hyle, materies*) is a faded metaphor of a technomorphic code.

It is worth asking whether it is correct to speak about sociomorphic analogies or metaphors in Heraclitus. Heraclitus really believed that the visible cosmos is the polis of Zeus, inhabited by gods and humans who are bound by *xynos logos* and *theios nomos*. For him, it was not a metaphor, not an analogy, not a poetic image. One more caveat is necessary: although for the sake of clarity we have described the "economic" (lend-and-borrow) metaphorical code as a separate and independent code (it really has its own stable set of recognizable terms), in fact it is inextricably linked with the idea of Cosmopolis and the sociomorphic code, since it is primarily employed to explicate the operation of the "cosmic justice" and the underlying basic principle of "equal recompense" in a set term.

More can be found in the commentary on the principal text of Heraclitus about Cosmopolis and the "divine law", fragment 131Leb/B114. This text can be considered the first known formulation of the theory of natural law, and also -– in the historical context of the Ionian revolt -– an eloquent exhortation of ex-Basileus of Ionia to the Hellenes to unite in a "cosmic" super-state in order to defeat the Great king. This call of Heraclitus was heard and fully realized only by Alexander the Great, but above we have advanced a hypothesis that his ideas may have influenced the founding fathers of the Delian League.

12. Hebdomadism in Heraclitus' philosophy of nature?

The special significance of the number 7 in Greek popular arithmology and folklore is due to its connection with the cult of Apollo. Seven is the sacred number of Apollo, he was born on the 7th day of the month of Thargelion. The collegium of *molpoi*, the priests of Apollo Delphinios in Miletus and Olbia consisted of 7 members.

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The oracle of Apollo Didymeus from Olbia Pontica (beginning of the 5th century BC) on a bone plate contains a prophecy with numbers 7, 70, 700, 7000.[96] Both in the game of dice and in astragalomancy, ancient fortune telling based on dice, number seven plays important role, since in dice (both in classic cubes and in older four-sided astragals or knuckle-bones) the sum of the numerical values of the opposite faces is always seven: 1 + 6, 3 + 4, 5 + 2. Astragals were found during excavations in the ancient layers of the temple of Artemis of Ephesus and the temples of Apollo in Asia Minor (Seipel 2008: 185, Nr 164). The legend of the 7 sages is associated with the Delphi and the Pythian games in honor of Apollo (D.L. 1.27–29). Hebdomadism, an esoteric cosmological doctrine of the universality of the number seven in all spheres of being, is rather a marginal phenomenon in the early Greek philosophy of nature, but quite ancient. Hebdomadism is often combined with the doctrine of the parallelism of micro- and macrocosm, therefore it is not surprising that in medical circles it attracted the attention of the supporters of the "cosmological medicine", criticized in the Hippocratic treatise "On Ancient Medicine". There is no sufficient reason to postulate its oriental origin, since it has ancient roots in Greek folklore and the cult of Apollo. Solon, who in his elegy proposed a division of human life into ten hebdomads (fr. 27 West), did not know Accadian. A classic example of a cosmological-biological hebdomadism is the treatise "On the Hebdomads" in the Hippocratic corpus. Rocher considered h the oldest prose treatise - a kind of incunabula, preserved in the library of the Kos School of Medicine (Roscher 1906: 44 ff.). Mansfeld came to the directly opposite conclusion that it was a product of Roman time, detecting the influence of Posidonius and the medical

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[96] Editio princeps Rusjaeva, VDI (19860 Nr.2, 25-64.

school of pneumatics (Mansfeld 1971: 229).[97] In our opinion, such a late date should be ruled out.

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The text contains archaic elements, for example, the pre-classical use of the word κόσμοι in the plural in the meaning of the concentric spheres of the same cosmos. Such a usage is attested only for Anaximander, that is, it points to the 6th century (Kerschensteiner 1962: 29 pp.). In any case, the treatise should not be dated later than the middle of the 5th century BC. e., since probable traces of acquaintance with him are found in the treatise "On Diet", which we date approx. 430-420 BC e. .

In authentic verbatim fragments-quotations from Heraclitus we not only do not find explicit Hebdomadism, we do not find any mention of numbers at all, and this is consistent with his hostility to Pythagoras. There are only two exceptions: fragments 60Leb and 64Leb/B126a. In the new Oxyrrhynchus fragment on the phases of the moon 60Leb it is said in section (b) that when the crescent appears on the third day after the new moon, it becomes full moon in 14 days. But the authorship of Heraclitus does not seem indisputable to us, and some doubts are especially raised by the (b) section (see our commentary to this fragment). The astronomical fragment of Anatolius on the seven stars of Arktos in "On the Decade" (Fr. 64Leb/B126A DK) is undoubtedly hebdomadist. Its language and style do not look as suspicious as those of the Oxyrrhynchus fragment. The author of this text definitely strives to 'demonstrate' the divine and universal-cosmic nature of the number 7, arguing that the count of days according to the moon in months, and the count of months in a year is somehow determined by the number 7. Evidence on

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[97] Mansfeld's date is 60–30 BC e., between Posidonius and Varro. In order to be able to distinguish the specific vitalism of Posidonius from, say, the panpsychism of Heraclitus, the animistic conception of elements in Empedocles, or from the doctrines "everything is full of gods" or "the soul is mixed in the Universe" (which Aristotle attributes to Thales, who lived 500 years before Posidonius) one needs a special gift of discernment. The author of these lines does not possess such a gift and therefore considers the vitalism of Posidonius as an ancient Stoic heritage dating back to Heraclitus.

Heraclitus' interest in chronological numbers in general, and in hebdomads of human life in particular, can be found in the complex of doxographical reports relating to the human "generation" (*genea*) as 30 years, defined as "the time in which a man can become a grandfather" and derived from duplicating the cycle of maturity plus one year of pregnancy: (14 + 1) • 2 = 30 (fr.71Leb, cf.A 19 DK). There are also two divergent doxographical reports on the duration of the Great Year (*Megas Eniautos*) in Heraclitus: 10800 years according to Censorinus' *De die natali*, 1800 years according to Stobaeus (see fr. 63Leb = A13 DK). Censorinus' figure 10800 has been explained as the duration of human generation (30 years) multiplied by the supposed number of days in the "Great year" (360), on the assumption that human "generation" (*genea*) constitutes one day in the Great year, the lifespan of cosmic god. The only possible trace of hebdomadism in all this is the age of maturity (14): Ps.Plut., *Placita,* p.184 Lachenaud Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῆς τελειότητος περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα, περὶ ἣν ὁ σπερματικὸς κινεῖται ὀρρός κτλ. "Heraclitus and the Stoics hold that men attain maturity at the second hebdomad when the seminal liquid starts to be ejaculated…". Heraclitus's supposed hebdomadism would be in perfect agreement with the theme of Apollo's wisdom, a leitmotif of his book, and the dominant role of Apollo in Heraclitus' cosmotheism: the "signs" (σημαίνει) of the Lord of Delphi are everywhere. Hebdomadism is often an integral part of the isomorphism of micro- and macrocosm, and so would be for Heraclitus a welcome confirmation of the latter. All extant Heraclitus' fragments and testimonia with possible relation to hebdomads, concern the importance of the number 7 in biological cycles on the one hand, and in astronomical cycles, on the other, that is, establish a mirror correspondence and parallelism between the earthly and heavenly, and thus the dependence of the human world on the divine, which was one of the main theses of Heraclitus' book.

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Assuming the authenticity of the doxographical tradition on the hebdomadic structure of the

human generation in the anthropology and psychology of Heraclitus, one might regard the relevant texts as a series of "empirical proofs" (τεκμήρια) of the divine (Apollonian) origin of the human soul, or rather of its noblest part, the intellect (νόος, φρήν, γνώμη). In terms of the Heraclitean physics of elements, the sensory soul is an "exhalation" (*anathymiasis*) from the blood, while the intellect (*noos*), presumably, corresponds to the purest solar fire in macrocosm. Apollo is allegorically identified by Heraclitus with the sun.

The skeptic would make the following objections to this optimistic reconstruction. First, the authenticity of fragments 60Leb and 64Leb/B126A remains controversial. We cannot rule out the possibility that these fragments derive not from the authentic book of Heraclitus, but from a heraclitizing Neopythagorean astronomical treatise on hebdomads of Imperial times. Just as some Hippocratic doctors were attracted by Heraclitus' idea of the isomorphism of micro- and macrocosm that provided them with a theoretical basis of a "cosmology-based" medicine, therapy , and diet "according to nature", so Pythagorizing astrologers of Imperial times could be attracted by Heraclitus' doctrine of the periodic conflagration (ecpyrosis), which they connected with the recurrent configurations of the planets and the theory of eternal return. An example of such astrological reception of Heraclitus' genuine doctrine of ecpyrosis is provided by Georgius Pachymeres: τερατεύονται γαρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον τὴν συντέλειαν τοῦ παντός, εἰ κατὰ διάμετρον πάντες γένοιντο. "The followers of Heraclitus predict the end of the world when all planets will line up in diameter".[98] Another warning is provided by the text which Diels mistakenly included in his collection of genuine fragments of Heraclitus, B105DK: certain "Heraclitus" regarded Homer "astrologist" on the ground of his interpretation of Homeric verse Σ 251.[99] In Heraclitus' time ἀστρολόγος could only mean "astronomer", whereas the

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[98] Georg. Pachymer. *Quadrivium: astronomia* 14, p. 385, 22 Stephanou = Heraclit. fr. 118 (d) Marc.

[99] We include this text in "Dubia et spuria", see Nr. 1 with our commentary. *Contra* Marcovich, ad fr.63ab.

interpretation of Homeric verses at issue is astrological. This Heraclitus lived in Roman times, he was either the well-known grammarian (Allegorist) or an astronomer, a representative of the learned *Homerolatria* of Roman times, that saw in Homer's wisdom the source of all philosophy and sciences, including astronomy and astrology. Against the authenticity of Heraclitus quotation in Anatolius' "On the decade" also speaks Suda, s.v. ῥυμὸς τοῦ ἅρματος (= Heraclit. fr.118b Marc.)... καὶ τῆς Ἄρκτου οἱ κατὰ τὴν οὐρὰν γʹ ἀστέρες ὑπὸ Ἡρακλείτου 'Heraclitus calls the three stars in the tail of the Great Bear 'Cart tax'. It is hard to imagine Heraclitus of Ephesus counting the stars in the tail of Ursa Major; for him this was, no doubt, futile "gathering information" (ἱστορία) and *polymathia*. Meanwhile, the quotation in Suda and the quotation on *Arktoi* in Anatolius cannot be separated: both are concerned with the number of stars in Ursa Maior, both derive from the same common source and therefore stand or fall together.

[p.95]

As for the doxographic numbers for the "generation" (γενεά) and the "Great Year" (Μέγας Ἐνιαυτός), they are not attested in verbatim quotations, neither the numbers nor the words γενεά and Μέγας Ἐνιαυτός, and therefore may derive not from the original text of Heraclitus, but from exegetical literature, from numerous ancient commentaries whose authors competed in solving the "riddles" of the "Obscure" philosopher. Hebdomadism and the number 30 may have been reconstructed by Heraclitus' commentators from the fragment about Aion playing *pesseia*. Γενεά 'generation' may well be commentator's rendering of the original αἰών in the sense of 'man's life' or 'lifespan'. Note that in Censorinus, De die nat. 17,2 (= Heraclit. fr. 108b2 Marc.) *vocat orbem aetatis* (scil. *genean*) may be rendering Greek καλεῖ κύκλον αἰῶνος (scil. γενεάν). The word πεσσοί could denote not only game-pieces in a backgammon-type boardgame, but also knuckle-bones for dicing; the author of Heraclitus' vita in Diogenes took πεσσεύων in this way (ἀστραγαλίζων). The best throw of four dice was called 'king' βασιλεύς, its prize value was 30 (see our commentary on fr.33Leb/B52 for details). Taking αἰών in the sense of 'man's life' (rather than of long time or eternity) and the mention of 'kingship' as a cryptic allusion to

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number 30, the commentators 'reconstructed' Heraclitus' doctrine of 'generation' as 30 years. The artificial character of such theory is obvious: very few, if any, Greeks could become grandfathers at the age of 30, and γενεά in Greek language never refers to the combined lifespan of *two* generations. The numbers for the 'Great year' were obtained by multiplying the human 'generation' 30 by 360, the supposed number of days in the Great year. The discrepancy in the numbers of the Great year (10800 in Censorinus and 18000 in *Placita*) may be explained not as a corruption of the original 'correct' number in transmission, but as a discrepancy between two divergent calculations. The optimist (who believes in hebdomadism in Heraclitus) may try to counter this pessimistic conclusion. He may object that even if there was no explicit mention of number 30 in Heraclitus' text, and even if it was explicated by commentators, this explication may well be correct: the fragment 33Leb/B52 is an Apollonian γρῖφος, Heraclitus himself "encrypted" in it a hebdomadic message through the symbol of Apollonian astragalomancy, which indeed is based on the sacred number seven. It is not easy to answer the question if the Fr.33Leb/B52 indeed alludes to numbers seven and thirty, or this is a conjecture of ancient commentators, only Heraclitus himself could answer this question with certainty. The same uncertainty remains in the case of the image of cosmic lyre of Apollo in Scythinus of Teos: does it contain an allusion to *seven strings* and Apollonian number seven? In our opinion, Fr.33Leb/B52 can be satisfactorily interpreted without reference to numbers associated with astragalomancy. It is largely "parallel" to the fragment about *Polemos* with which it is quoted by Hippolytus from the same context of Heraclitus' book. Both fragments speak about the Supreme Being, the 'king' of the Universe, the new philosophical god of Heraclius. Both contain the 'triadic structure' of Heraclitus' metaphysics and theology (2+1), but express it in two different metaphorical codes, the military and the game code. Hebdomadism is certainly present only in Fr.64Leb/B126A, and possibly in the Oxyrrhynchus fragment on the phases of the moon (60Leb), but how reliable are these sources? We leave the question of hebdomadism in Heraclitus open, although we do not exclude that cosmic symbolism of number seven may have

played some role in the 'mantic' metaphorical code as elaboration on the theme of Apollo's wisdom and as one of the 'empirical proofs' (τεκμήριον) of the theory of 'mimetic' relation between heaven and earth, which the Stoics later transformed into their doctrine of cosmic *sympatheia*. This uncertainty about hebdomadism should not cast any doubt on the reconstruction of the game (pesseia) metaphorical code above (section 7). That the symbolical names of the alternating periods of 'Megas Eniautos' in fr. 43Leb/B67 ´war and peace, abundance and need" (πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος χρησμοσύνη) derive from Apollonian astragalomancy and are connected with the imagery of playing (πεσσεύων) divine child Aion in fr.33Leb/B52, seems to us certain. This is confirmed by the graffito πόλεμος εἰρήνη on the kleromantic plates from Olbia, buy the acrophonetic correspondence noticed above, and by Heraclitus' speech in Lucian, *Vit.auct.*14, in which the 'pesseia' of Aion refers to the alternation (ἀμειβόμενα) of gain and loss, wealth and poverty: παῖς παίζων, πεσσεύων, συμφερόμενος διαφερόμενος: "Aion is a child playing pessoi, now bringing profit, now devastation".

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V. AN OUTLINE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS.

1. The fundamental principles. The main system of arguments.

From the end of the 19th century on the mainstream of Preplatonic studies was dominated by a pseudo-historical evolutionism and hypercriticism. Pseudo-historical evolutionism is inextricably linked with Plato-centrism and the ill-defined and misleading category of 'Presocratics'. [By pseudohistorical evolutionism we mean a supposed scheme of historical development of thought which is "imposed" on the available historical data on some *a priori* grounds rather than «retrieved» from them. In the case of Early Greek philosophy such «imposed» aprioristic scheme and the theoretical postulate on which it is based is the assumption that the «development» of thought always proceeds from the «simple to the complex», from the concrete to the abstract, from the tangible to intelligible, and hence from naturalistic «Presocratics» in the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. to Plato' idealism in the 4th. This *pseudohistorical stereotype* stands in flat contradiction with the following *historical fact*: idealist metaphysics combined with creationism is a much more archaic ontology and world-view than the Ionian concept of «nature» (*physis*) and naturalistic cosmogony based on it, the achievement of the Scientific revolution in the mid-sixth century B.C. Miletus. Plato's dualist metaphysics and immaterial concept of soul was an *archaic revival* (accomplished already by Pythagoreans in the second half of the 6th century B.C.) rather than a revolutionary innovation. In Preplatonic studies hypercriticism often takes on the form of "projectionism" (projectionism still remains the main reductionist tool of the "suspicious scholarship", using J.Parker's term), that rejects the ancient tradition as a supposed "projection" of later philosophical doctrines and concepts into earlier systems of thought.] John Burnet in his influential *Early Greek Philosophy* (1892) argued that all doxographical tradition on Heraclitus is marred by «Stoic» distorting influences.

An important argument for Burnet (1930: 32 n. 1) was the alleged evidence of Philodemus that the Stoics practiced the method of "assimilation" (συνοικειοῦν) of the theological views of the ancient poets (Orpheus, Musaios, Homer, Hesiod, Euripides) reading into their poems Stoic doctrines (Philod., *De pietate*, c.13; Cicero, *De nat. dor.* 1.15.4).[100] This method, according to Burnet, "has had serious results upon our tradition, especially in the case of Heraclitus" (1930: 32 n. 1). However, the critical remark of Philodemus refers only to the allegorical interpretation of poetic mythology. Heraclitus was a philosopher, not a poet, and the preserved specimen of a Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus by Zeno and Cleanthes, quoted by the Stoic Arius Didymus in Eusebius' *PE*, does not contain any allegoresis: see our fr.67 L (cf. B 12) with a commentary. Cleanthes derives from Heraclitus Zeno's view of the soul as "exhalation from blood imbued with sense-perception" (αἰσθητικὴ ἀναθυμίασις), but this derivation and interpretation are historically correct. Doxographical excerpts from Arius Didymus, the most significant Stoic doxographer, preserved by

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[100] Burnet (1930: 32 n. 1)

Stobaeus, are among the best examples of this genre. Stoic allegorical interpretations could sometimes be far-fetched, but the Stoics' persuasion that the views of ancient poets-theologians display certain affinity with their own doctrines, is not totally unfounded. Of all the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic era, the Stoic pantheistic philosophy of nature was the most archaic, and precisely due to the influence of the archaic philosophy of Heraclitus: the Stoic definition of the «cosmos» as a «compound (σύστημα) of gods and men» is virtually a quotation from Heraclitus fragment 37L/B30, while the Stoic doctrine of the divine providence (πρόνοια) is just an explication in plain Hellenistic *koine* of Heraclitus' archaic and Ionic γνώμη (fr.140L/B41). Likewise, their terms for periodic "conflagration and world-formation" (ἐκπύρωσις καὶ διακόσμησις) are not "projections", but correct "translations" into Hellenistic *koine* of Heraclitus' archaic metaphors "excess and poverty" of fire (κόρος καὶ χρησμοσύνη). Stoic cosmotheism, like that of Heraclitus, was essentially a restoration of the (abolished by the Milesians) mythopoetic and religious world-view stripped of all anthropomorphism of poets. The Stoics could sometimes misinterpret individual fragments (for example, the Stoic source of Clement misunderstood the word τροπαί in fr. 44L/B31 as "transformations", rather than «turning points» of the Great Year), but on the whole, their understanding of Heraclitus' philosophy was incomparably superior to that of Plato and Aristotle, first of all because it was based on a close reading and systematic commenting on the authentic text of Heraclitus' book as well as on a genuine congeniality of their thought.

In the 20th century, the hypercritical tendency was reinforced by another influential work, *Aristotle's Criticism of the Presocratic Philosophy* by Harold Cherniss (1935). On the one hand, this work stimulated critical discussion of the value of doxography and correctly drew the attention of scholars to the fact the so-called «doxography» of Preplatonic tenets in Aristotle is not a detached «history of philosophy», but serves as a dialectical argument supporting his theoretical theses.

On the other hand, Cherniss' somewhat «angry» criticism of Aristotle sometimes turns into advocacy and hypercriticism; his emphasis on «exposing» doxographical «distortions» (instead of explaining calmly the forms and mechanisms of reception) reinforced the trend of the «suspicious scholarship» the results of which are always reductionist, and never constructive. Not only separate theories (for example, the genuine doctrine of innumerable worlds in Anaximander, the periodical *ekpyrosis* of Heraclitus etc.), but also individual philosophers, including both founding fathers of Greek philosophy, Thales and Pythagoras, fell victims of this anti-doxographic "cleansing." Thales was thrown out of the history of Greek philosophy and science by Cherniss and Dix, who pointed to

the unreliability of doxography[101], while Pythagoras was first divorced from the Pythagorean school, founded and cherished by him, and then declared a shaman (Burkert).[102] As a result of this, it became politically incorrect even to mention Pythagoras as a philosopher and take him into account in the reconstruction of the 6th century Western Greek metaphysics and philosophical theology.[103] Under the impact of the influential works of Kirk and Marcovich (both of whom laid much stress on «exposing» the imaginary Stoic fraud) the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus became dominant; the ethical *verbatim* quotations of Heraclitus in John Stobaeus (the authenticity of which is proved beyond any doubt not only by the Ionian dialect, but also by characteristically Heraclitean syntactical ambiguity alien to Stoic prose), were declared Stoic forgeries. [104] Any mention of the world-conflagration or of the concept of Fate (Heimarmene), attested in a *verbatim* quotation 53L/B137 and wrongly athetized by Diels, could bring an immediate charge of being "uncritical". [Diels' denial of the authenticity of this *verbatim* quotation in *Placita* was based on an ill-founded assumption "Zitate Heraklits gibt es in Placita nichts" and on "suspicion" that εἱμαρμένα is a "stoische Terminus", DK, I,182, adn.4. However the publication of the Derveni papyrus with the quotation of the sun fragment in col.IV –the same as in *Placita* II,21,4 – refutes this claim as factually wrong, and the participle form εἱμαρμένα δῶρα is attested in archaic poetry: Theognis, v. 1033. We defend its authenticity in the commentary to fr.53L].

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While philologists were engaged in exposing the imaginary «Stoic fraud», philosophers were doing their best in removing from the history of Greek philosophy everything that did not seem to be of theoretical interest from the point of view of a modern analytical philosopher, for example, the problem of idealism, although it is one of the central and fundamental problems in ancient philosophy, as well as a subject of continuous thousand-years debate on the nature of reality starting with Pythagoras, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Paradoxically, the misguided fight against the aberrations of ancient doxography led to much more serious, in our opinion, aberrations produced by modern academic "doxography". Stereotypes, which are inseparable from the very notion of "Pre-

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[101] Cherniss 1935: 375 and Cherniss 1951: 323: Thales was a «culture hero of philosophy». According to Dicks (1970) 44, the astronomical views of Thales «did not differ much» from Hesiod, contrary to the unanimous consensus of the ancient tradition starting with Heraclitus and Democritus and ending with Aristarchus of Samos.

[102] Burkert 1972. The separation of Pythagoras from the Pythagorean school started already in 19th century with Zeller followed by Windelband. In Diels-Kranz Pythagoras (chapter 14) is strictly separated from the Pythagorean school (chapter 58). However, we argue in our paper on Alcmaeon (2017) that in *Metaphysics Alpha* Aristotle ascribes the Table of opposites to Pythagoras and the 6th century Pythagoreans.

[103] L.Zhmud' (2012) correctly objects to the shamanisation of Pythagoras and the denial of his contribution to science. At the same time he displays immoderate hypercriticism in his approach to the Pythagorean philosophy of number and mathematical metaphysics, committing what we call a "nihilistic fallacy" in doxographical analysis, i.e. failure to distinguish the authentic conceptual content from the later terminology, as a result of which "the baby is thrown out together with the bath water". A more sensible approach to the Pythagorean philosophy of number we find in Kahn (2001), Riedweg (2005) and Horky (2013), among others.

[104] Kirk (1962), Marcovich (1967), Marcovich (1978) and Marcovich RE.

Socratics" (Lebedev 2009 # 2), also contributed a lot to this, as well as the baleful heritage of Diels's *Doxographi Graeci* (1879), that monument of 19th century Quellenforschung in which conjectures are built on conjectures (for the criticism of Diels' "Aetius" hypothesis and Pantheophrasteanism see now Lebedev 2016). We are talking about the mainstream which fortunately was not omnipotent. We should single out two scholars who saw the truth and went against the current. Charles Kahn recognized as genuine the alleged "Stoic" tenets in the philosophy of Heraclitus, including the periodical *ekpyrosis*, while Tony Long saw genuine borrowings of Heraclitus' doctrines by the Stoics rather than «projections» of them into Heraclitus.[105] The Stoic reception of Heraclitus, unlike the casual superficial remarks with inaccurate quotations in Plato and Aristotle, was based on a systematic study and commentary of his text, as is demonstrated by the context of the fragment on river-souls, the best sample of Stoic exegesis of Heraclitus: Heraclitus' views on a certain subject are quoted with precision in the original Ionian dialect and then methodically interpreted. The «Stoic» Heraclitus, i.e. the ethical, political and theological thinker, is much more authentic and closer to his Ephesian prototype than the physicalist Heraclitus of Aristotle or the relativist epistemologist of Plato. The fundamental principle of Stoic ethics "to live according to nature" is almost literally formulated in the Heraclitus' fragment 100 (b) L / B112. Two out of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, physics and ethics, are essentially prefigured in chapters 1 and 2 of his work respectively, whereas their theology and allegorical method of interpretation of Homeric gods is prefigured in the chapter 3 «On gods». Only the logic of the Stoics has nothing in common with the dialectical logic of Heraclitus that rejects the law of non-contradiction since it contradicts the reality (*physis*). The denial of the Heraclitean roots of Stoic ethics and the philosophy of nature can serve as an instructive example of the methodological "error number one" in the historiography of ancient philosophy, the confusion of words and concepts. Heraclitus certainly did not use the later terms ἐκπύρωσις and διακόσμησις, but he expressed the concepts of alternating phases of the global conflagration and world-formation by archaic metaphors from the economic metaphorical code - "abundance and poverty" (κόρος καὶ χρησμοσύνη).

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When historians of Greek philosophy formulate the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Heraclitus, they commonly lay emphasis on his monism and the principle of unity (harmony) of opposites in metaphysics and on the doctrine of the universal substrate (fire) and the regularity (measure) of its changes in physics. It is impossible to deny that Heraclitus held these two theses, or to maintain that they were marginal or insignificant. But it would be wrong to represent Heraclitus as an abstract metaphysician (ontologist), exploring the purely logical relationship between the one and

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[105] Kahn 1979: 135. A.Long, Heraclitus and Stoicism in Long (1996) 35-57.

the many and seeking to find an answer to the question discussed in Plato's Academy πόσα τὰ ὄντα "how many entities are there?" for its own sake. In the like manner, it would be wrong to represent Heraclitus as a "physicist", who studied the factors of stability and "measures" in cosmic processes as a kind of "law of nature", which was for him interesting and important in itself. And metaphysics, and the theory of knowledge, and the problem of "names", and the cosmic elements, and astronomy, and human nature, and animal behavior, and the world of arts and crafts, were subjects in which Heraclitus was not interested as such. He was interested in all this in the context of his comparative study of the divine (natural) and human world at the intersection of religion and politics. Moreover, such a comparative study was also undertaken not for its own sake, not for a positivist description of the facts of similarity and difference. The tacit assumption of Heraclitus - in a full accordance with the archaic world-view - was his belief that the structure of the divine world should be a model (paradigm) for the structure of the human world, the world of polis. Therefore, the work of Heraclitus set a practical goal: to show the similarities and differences in the organization of the world and the norms of behavior of gods and men (that is, nature and society), and to demand from co-citizens to bring the political, legal, moral and religious standards adopted by the Greeks of his time in line with the "divine" eternal standards; to bring local human forms of "justice", based on the subjective opinion (*doxa*), in line with the universal and shared-by-all (ξυνόν) Justice (Δίκη), corresponding to the objective and natural order of things (κατὰ φύσιν). This means that the book of Heraclitus was in its conception ethical-political, reformist in spirit and in many respects typologically coming closer to Plato's *Politeia* than to the Milesian physical-geographical treatises "On Nature".

Hence the prophetic tone of Heraclitus (he speaks as a prophet of Apollo), the devastating criticism of all the authorities of Greek culture, and discontent with all spheres of Greek life. It is indicative that for Heraclitus, exactly as later for Plato, the poets (Homer, Hesiod, Archiloch) are "false authorities" guilty of the corruption of morality, false ideas about gods and bad form of government among the Greeks. Here we are witnessing the birth of the "ancient quarrel" (παλαιὰ διαφορά) between philosophy and poetry mentioned in Book 10 of Plato's *Republic* 607b. The correct understanding of the general character and goals of Heraclitus' book is attested in the invaluable testimony of the ancient reader of the Ephesian, the grammarian Diodotus who, unlike us, had in his hands the complete text of Heraclitus and wrote a commentary on it: "Diodotus, who says that the treatise (σύγραμμα) current under his name is not on nature (περὶ φύσεως), but on the form of government (περὶ πολιτείας), while what he says about nature is intended as a model (*scil.* of the ideal *politeia*)" (DL 9.16).

Nature (physis), conceived by Heraclitus not as a blind material substance, but as a providential god, speaking to humans through the cosmic *this logos*, serves him as a "paradigm", that is a norm

and standard for the ideal organization and "mode of governing" of the society and the state, exactly as the intelligible world and the idea of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) in Plato.

Cosmos in Heraclitus is a religious and political rather than physical concept. The *cosmos* of Heraclitus consists not of elements or corpuscles, but of "mortals and immortals," "gods and men," that is, of living wills. This archaic division of the world into heaven and earth, celestial-divine and lower-human, on which the Greek religion and the mythopoetic picture of the world were based, was abolished by the scientific revolution in Miletus in the middle of the 6th century BC. The Ionian *physiologoi* conceived the heaven and the stars not as divine beings, but as physical bodies consisting of the same elements: in Anaxagoras the Moon is a «celestial earth» with mountains and ravines. In the new cosmology the reverend Gaia of Hesiod was transformed from a «safe foundation» (ἕδος ἀσφαλές) of mortals into a point lost in the infinite Universe. In an isomorphic infinite Universe without a center, there is no up and down, and therefore there is no "heaven and earth" in the sense required by any traditional religion.

A polemical reply to the new Ionian cosmology, undermining, as it seemed to many, the very foundations of religion and morality, was the idealist philosophy of Pythagoras who proclaimed that in the beginning was the immortal soul (*psyche*) and not the mortal body (*soma*).

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Only the soul and the mind detached from bodily sensations have access to the «true» reality: the immaterial mathematical principles (limit and unlimited, even and odd) and the numbers generated by them, which are "imitated" by physical bodies. The Pythagoreans saved the "inherited from fathers" (*patrios*) faith in immortal gods, dismissed as a nightmare Anaximander's theory of the infinite Universe with innumerable planetary systems being generated and destroyed by a cosmogonic vortex. They replaced the Ionian «chaotic» (from the teleological point of view) infinite Universe with a beautifully «ordered» finite *cosmos*, constructed by a divine mind (*nous*) as a work of art, whose wisdom is displayed in the cosmic *harmonia* and the movement of luminaries, and who has reserved a region of hell for the punishment for the sinners (the sublunary world) and a paradise for the «pure», the islands of the blessed in the Milky Way (or in the Sun region), i.e. for those who have been initiated in the *sophia* of *Pythagoras himself* and have purified their souls from the Titanic miasma of the body and *sarkophagia*. Justice (*Dike*), the concomitant of Zeus, has returned to the world of mortals: the Pythagorean Parmenides solemnly announced that Dike "guards" the boundaries of being, keeping it in the «chains of Limit», a transparent allusion the divine principle of Limit (*Peras*) in the Pythagorean table of opposites. Through this image, Parmenides indicated the primacy of religion over science, as well as the triumph of the religious philosophy of Pythagoras over the «godless» vortex-cosmogony of the Ionians.

In the conflict that has arisen as a result of the scientific revolution between the scientific and

traditional religious picture of the world, Heraclitus occupies a special position. He goes against the current alone, he opposes both the mythopoetic tradition and the new Ionian science. He shares some common features with Pythagoras, like Pythagoras he is primarily a moral and religious philosopher driven by a reformist spirit. He borrows some very important Pythagorean ideas (the harmony of the cosmos, catharsis the soul, ethics of self-restraint and following God, even the naturalistic analogue of the transmigration of souls), but at the same time he attacks him in rude and sarcastic invectives as an intellectual adversary, probably because Pythagoras' metaphysical dualism flatly contradicts his absolute and radical monism, as well as because of the Pythagorean «Egyptian» concept of god as immobile and immutable, whereas Heraclitus' god is «fire» and incessant drive towards «reversal» (*trope, i.e.* victory), a concept more suitable as a paradigm for psychological engineering and military ethics intended to contribute to the education of ideal warriors who will stop the military aggression of the Achaemenid empire and save Ionian Greeks from slavery.

Contrary to the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus, the subject of his work was not a study of the "nature of every particular thing" which is allegedly mentioned in Fr. 2 L = B 1. Heraclitus undoubtedly would have dismissed such task as an empty "knowledge of many things" (*polymathia*) in which he reproaches Hesiod, Hecataeus, Pythagoras and Xenophanes. In the text of Hippolytus (quotation of fr.2L/B1) whose text of quotations is generally more reliable and accurate than that of Sextus Empiricus, there is no word ἕκαστον 'every single thing'; therefore the object of the verb διαιρέων 'separates, divides', and therefore, the subject of Heraclitus's book, as delineated in the proem, is the pair ἔπη καὶ ἔργα "words and deeds». This pair corresponds exactly to the verbs ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν 'to act and to speak', which at the end of fr. 2L/B1 and other paraphrases of the 2L/B1 fragment refers to the "deeds and words" of humans (ἄνθρωποι), and not to the natural phenomena, as the physicalist interpretation of Heraclitus by Kirk and Marcovich wants us to believe. This is a comprehensive polar expression that covers all human activities: both their *legomena* or what they are saying (myths about gods, political speeches, laws etc.) and their *dromena* or what they are doing in their technological practices such as arts and crafts (τέχναι), but also in their religious rituals.

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Consequently, in his treatise Heraclitus, according to his own words, undertook a comprehensive study of the "words and deeds" of the cosmic logos and the corresponding cosmic processes in a comparison with the "words and deeds" of humans in their technological, political and religious practices. This means that the subject and purpose of Heraclitus' book, explicitly stated in the preface to his book, was not «physical» and scientific, not an explanation of the nature of «everything» (the word ἕκαστον is a misleading explanatory addition of Sextus or his source, it is not found in the superior text of Hippolytus), but anthropological, ethical, political, sociological and theological.

As we have already noted above, the unity (or rather identity) of opposites is a very important thesis in the philosophy of Heraclitus, but in his main system of arguments this thesis acquires its full and transparent meaning only in the combination with another, less known thesis of Heraclitus "the art imitates nature ", ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν. Investigating the "divine" (cosmic) and human (society, polis, religion) world, Heraclitus discovers that the fundamental "divine law" of the Universe, the law of the all-unity, is the law of the identity of opposites, which works flawlessly in the cosmos and cosmic cycles (Great Year , the seasons, the diurnal cycle), is also found in human nature (cycles of sleep and wake, life and death) and in the world of crafts and the arts, and more generally, all human practices with fixed procedures (what Heraclitus calls "deeds" of men in the preface to his book, fr. 2L/B1). This "technological" section of Heraclitus' book has been preserved in a free paraphrase (an adaptation to the purposes of dietetics) in the Hippocratic treatise "On Diet" I, 11-24. On the basis of these «empirical proofs» (*tekmeria*) Heraclitus concludes that man is an integral part of the cosmos, and that in his biological nature, in the physiological processes of the body, as well as his in technological practices (*tekhnai*), i.e. in the sphere of *dromena*, he "acts" "according to nature", without realizing this. On the contrary, in the sphere of *legomena*, i.e. of politics, morality, religion, literature and art his behavior and his "words" are completely unnatural and resemble a drunken consciousness or a delirium of an insane. Normal or conforming to nature (κατὰ φύσιν fr. 2L/B1), according to the divine law, is the subordination of the "many" to "one" in the paradigmatic "this cosmos" (i.e. divine order, fr.37/B30), i.e. in the polis of Zeus, and the subordination of the "many" (οἱ πολλοί) to "one the best" ruler (εἷς ἄριστος) in human politics, since unity is the principle of harmony of the opposites in physics mirrored as «civil concord» (ὁμόνοια) in politics: cf. the authentic political context about ὁμόνοια in fr.106L/B10 (not in DK or other editions) and the quotation in *PDerveni* col.IV according to which the Sun "rules the cosmos according to nature" (κατὰ φύσιν) as an ideal or paradigmatic monarch. From this comparison and contrast between the natural norm and unnatural human convention Heraclitus draws as conclusion a revolutionary demand for radical reforms, a demand (χρή) to bring the social norms and laws into conformity with the natural (divine) norms and the fundamental principle of «single command» on which the Universe is based (fr.131L/B114). The unnatural polytheism should be replaced by natural monotheism, the unnatural popular rule by the power of "one best", and the unnatural hedonistic cult of pleasures and greed (*pleonexia*) by self-control (σωφρονεῖν), contentedness (εὐαρέστησις fr. fr.101L/21, ὀλίγωι ἀρκεῖσθαι in bioigraphical tradition), the pursuit of one super-value, the eternal glory and *apotheosis* of heroes and the wise.

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Let us now turn to a more detailed exposition of how Heraclitus demonstrates his main thesis of the superiority of one over many in his metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of

language, the doctrine of fire, ethics, politics and theology.

2. *Logos: metaphysics and theory of knowledge.*

The word λόγος is used by Heraclitus in a number of fragments in common, non-specific meanings: "measure" or "volume" fr. 45L/B 31, "speech" or "teaching" (12L/B 87, 139L / B108), "respect, honor" (129 / B 39). It is used in unusual sense, apparently in a new philosophical sense, only in three epistemological fragments and in Marcus Aurelius' paraphrase of this group deriving from beginning of Heraclitus' book. A neglected fragment from Clement fr.154L about the common *logos* of mortals and immortals should be probably added to this group.

1 (B 50 DK)

Verbatim quotation

Hippolytus, Refutatio, IX 9,1

οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ‹δε τοῦ› λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν· σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι.

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τοῦ‹δε τοῦ› supplevi, cf. fr. 2 ‖ λόγου Bernays : δόγματος Parisinus ‖ ὁμολογεῖν· interpunxi, infinitivus quasi imperativus : ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν, fere omnes ‖ εἰδέναι cod. : εἶναι Miller, edd.

Listening not to mine, but to this logos*, one must agree: wisdom consists in knowing all things as one.

Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: "Listening not to mine, but to this logos, one must agree: there is only one Wise being (i.e. god) to know (or to control) all things"

*i.e. to the visible "book of nature", the Universe conceived as text.

2 (B 1 DK)

Sextus. adv. math. VII 132; Hippolyt. Refutatio IX 9.1 [τοῦ δὲ λόγου ... ὅκως ἔχει]

τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιουτέων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

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τοῦ δὲ Hippol. : om. Sextus ‖ αἰεί Clem. Alex. Str. V.111.7 : ἀεί Hippol. : om. Sextus ‖ πάντων Hippol : om. Sextus ‖ καὶ ἐπέων Hippol. : ἐπέων Sextus ‖ τοιουτέων Hippol. : τοιούτων Sextus ‖ διερέων κατὰ φύσιν Hippol.: κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον Sext. ‖ ποιοῦσιν Sextus : ποιοῦσιν καὶ λέγουσιν, ut videtur, Marcus, vide fr. 3 infra.

But although this logos exists forever humans fail to understand it both before they have listened to it and once they have listened. And indeed, although all /humans/ encounter this logos *, they look like ignorant of it even when they try /to understand/ such words and deeds as those which I expound by dividing them according to nature and

indicating how they are. As regards the rest of humanity, they do not realize what they are doing awaken, just as they are oblivious /=unconscious/ of what they are doing when they sleep.

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* Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: "although all things happen according to this logos".

"This logos" can be «heard» by anyone, and yet nobody understands it. What is the precise meaning of the term λόγος and of the phrase "this logos" (λόγος ὅδε) in these fragments has been a subject of endless debate. The Stoics understood the *Logos* of Heraclitus as reason and identified it with the divine providential mind that governs the Universe, as well as with "nature", the objective order of things. Since the nature of the cosmos in Stoic physics is fire, the *Logos* was identified with fire. Man has his own *logos* and his own nature; according to the imperative of Stoic ethics to achieve happiness (*eudaimonia*) one should "live according to nature", bringing his private *logos* into perfect agreement with the universal logos. The *Logos* of the Stoics is a metaphysical and theological concept, which according to some influenced the Christological concept of *Logos* through the intermediate works of Philo Alexandrinus. It must be admitted that in the texts of Heraclitus the term *logos* never means "mind" or «reason» in the sense of a rational capacity of reasoning and thinking; this is a later, predominantly Hellenistic meaning of the word. From the 19th century on, in the interpretation of Heraclitus' *logos*, two main schools of thought opposed each other in a debate that resembles the medieval debate between the realists and the nominalists: the traditional metaphysical (realistic) understanding of "this logos" as an objective cosmic law (*Weltgesetz)* or divine reason was opposed by the "trivial" or verbal understanding of the expression "this logos" as a simple reference to Heraclitus' own work, to his "discourse" or doctrine.[106] Some tried to find a compromise solution: while not recognizing directly the metaphysical interpretation of the *logos*, they emphasized that it is not just the doctrine of Heraclitus, but also its objective content, a certain "formula of things" or a "structure of the world " (Conche HF 33).[107]

The syntactic ambiguity in the text of fr.2L/B1, the ambiguous position of the adverb αἰεί 'always', which seemingly allows both the reading "always exists" (in favor of the realists, since in this case the *logos* is eternal), and the reading "always do not understand" (in favour of verbalists),

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[106] «Though this Word is true evermore…», Burnet (1930) 133; «Of this my account, which stands throughout …» West (1971)117.

[107] To this compromise position comes close Kahn's view as well, although he criticises the verbalist interpretation (Kahn ATH 98): «The *logos* can be his 'meaning' only in the objective sense: the structure which his words intend or point at, which is the structure of the world itself (and not the intentional structure of his *thought* about the world)».

did not allow any school to pull the rope over. Both interpretations, the metaphysical and the "verbalist" one, have their strong and weak points. It might seem *prima facie* that the verbalist interpretation is favored by the fact that the word λόγος never means "reason" in Heraclitus, and the fact that in early Ionian prose the word "*logos*" at the very beginning of a written work usually denotes the *logos* of the writer himself, that is, his book or his doctrine, and not a divine law. But against the verbalist interpretation can be put forward three serious objections:

1) Verbalists, in order to get rid of the undesired "reality" of the Logos, interpret ἐόντος ἀεί not as "always exists", but as "is always true" (or "always holds true"). But, as far as we know, when used with an adverb of time or place, the verb εἶναι in Greek language always has an existential, and never a "veridical" meaning. When Heraclitus himself in fr. 37L / B 30 states (κόσμος) ἀεί ... ἔστι, he means «(the cosmos) always is (=exists)», and not «always is true» (?).

2) The second objection constitutes a real stumbling block for the verbalists: in fr. 1 L/ B 50 οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας 'listening not to me, but to the *logos*' (according to MSS. reading) or "listening not to mine, but to this *logos*" (according to our supplement), the *logos* that people should attend is apparently the same *logos* as the one they fail to understand in fr. 2L/B1. It is explicitly *contrasted* with the *logos* of Heraclitus, i.e. with his discourse or teaching. Therefore the phrase λόγον τόνδε (λόγου τοῦδε) in fr.2L/B1 cannot mean "this discourse of mine".

3) The verbalists are kindly asked to explain how it could happen that the Stoics confused a trivial colloquial phrase («this doctrine of mine» or «this book of mine») with a fundamental concept in their metaphysics, theology, philosophy of nature and ethics? This is especially surprising given the fact that the Stoics had a complete text of Heraclitus and carefully studied it and commented on it. Therefore, they may have known other passages in the lost book of Heraclitus with specific use of the term *logos*. Any Stoic surpassed in his command of ancient Greek in general, and of philosophical ancient Greek in particular, any modern scholar (including myself) even of highest qualification. But there were hundreds ancient Stoics, and none of them in the course of many centuries did not notice this ridiculous mistake: is this a plausible scenario? Can we believe it?

The realists, the supporters of the metaphysical interpretation of *logos*, avoid these difficulties, but they can also be asked to answer some difficult questions. How is it possible to "hear" a cosmic law (structure, reason etc.) and to describe it as something that is right there, in front of us? In Greek language the deictic pronoun ὅδε, τόδε «this» commonly refers to something that is before our eyes, something you can point to with your finger. Is it possible to point with one's finger to the divine reason (cosmic law etc.) and to say "here it is"?

The only way to avoid the difficulties of both interpretations is to assume that the expression "this logos" in two fragments of Heraclitus 2L/ B1 and 1L/ B50 is a metaphor that preserves the semantics

of "speech" or «word» that can be «heard», at the iconic level, whereas at the referential level it denotes the Universe, τὸ πᾶν.[108] This interpretation, unfamiliar to modern scholars, was well known to the ancient readers of Heraclitus, in particular to Plato in the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*, as well as to Philo of Alexandria, Sextus Empiricus, Hippolytus, Diodotus and others.[109]

The basic mistake of many modern interpretations is that they understood the *Logos* of Heraclitus as "the logos *of* something," as a principle, a law *of* the cosmic change, or an "intentional structure" (Kahn) *of* reality, that is, as an *abstraction*. But in fact, the metaphorical expression "this logos" referentially denotes the reality itself, the Universe itself, understood at the significative or iconic level of meaning as "Speech" or "Book of Nature" (*Liber Naturae*). It *connotes* "logos" with all the richness of the semantics of this Greek word, but it *denotes* the "visible world", directly perceived by the senses.

This interpretation is supported first of all by a hardly accidental parallelism between the expressions «this logos» λόγον τόνδε in the beginning of the section on metaphysics and epistemology in fr.1–2 L (B1, B50) and the expression «this cosmos» κόσμον τόνδε 'this cosmos' in fr.37 L (B 30) in the beginning of the section on philosophy of nature in chapter I Περὶ τοῦ παντός of Heraclitus Περὶ φύσεως / Περὶ πολιτείας. In both cases, the demonstrative pronoun ὅδε 'this one' indicates the immediate presence of the object, its obviousness, something we see directly in front of us. In both cases, the logos-cosmos is described as "common" (ξυνός) for "all" (πάντων). The "common" in Heraclitus' metaphysics and epistemology (as well as in ethics and politics) is opposed to the "private" or individual (ἴδιον) as something objective (existing "by nature," that is, independently from our perception) to the subjective or doxastic, the product of the imagination of a «private intelligence», ἰδίη φρόνησις (Fr.7L/B2), like that of the poets, drinkers and Bacchic initiates.

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The fact that by "this logos" Heraclitus means reality itself, and not just its abstract structure or logical principle (though the connotation of a logical arrangement as *immanent feature* of this reality is conceivable), is also proved by the words "although all men encounter (or «come across») this logos…" (Fr. 2L/B1) . The expression γίνεσθαι κατά τινα means in Greek «to come across» or «to confront» something or someone, to meet face-to face. It is synonymous with the term ἐγκυρεῖν τινί «to stumble upon something», which Heraclitus uses in the closest context (fr. 5L/N17, cf. 3L/B72-73) in the sense of "raw sense data", a bare sensation that is not interpreted by the intelligent mind

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[108] We use the term "iconic level" of a metaphor for the symbolic level, the level of imagery (cf. the "source domain" in Lakoff and Johnson's terminology) and distinguish it from the referential meaning (cf. the "target domain" in Lakoff and Johnson). At the iconic level the metaphor "this logos" means "speech" or "text", at the referential level it denotes the Universe, the visible world conceived as a "book of nature".

[109] See the *testimonia* collected in our commentary to fr.2L/B1; 106B L.

(νόος). "Confronting" an object and "coming across" it in Heraclitus' epistemology stands for empirical "acquaintance" with an object without its proper "understanding" (γινώσκειν) and without grasping or perceiving it by the sound mind (φρονεῖν). An example of such a "sensation without perception or awareness" in Heraclitus is the case of "barbaric souls" (βάρβαροι ψυχαί, fr. 19L/B107): Persians can hear Greek language (they are exposed to it or «confront» it), but they do not understand the meaning of the words they hear. In the same way the unphilosophical crowd of *hoi polloi* hears, but does not understand the voice of Nature and the *logos* of the Universe because they are unfamiliar with the language in which it is written or «spoken out» by the divine cosmos.

In fr.2 L/B1DK Heraclitus distinguishes 3 categories of "listeners" of logos: 1) those who have never tried to understand the voice or book of nature, the majority of people or the non-philosophers; 2) those who have tried but failed, i.e. all other philosophers except Heraclitus; 3) those who have tried and succeeded. To the last category belongs only Heraclitus of Ephesus himself, who has deciphered the secret code of the Universe and read the message of the cosmic god addressed to all humanity. Specialists who could "translate" the messages of gods from the symbolic divine language of omens, dreams or oracles to the simple language of mortals, the Greeks called diviners (μάντεις). In the case of important issues concerning not the fate of private individuals, but the public sphere, matters of the state like questions of war and peace, the great oracles of Apollo at Delphi and in the Ionian Didyma were consulted. In the very first sentence of his book (fr.1L/B50) Heraclitus makes use of the prophetic formula "listening not to my logos...", which means: it is not me, it is the God who is speaking through my mouth. This «Apollonian» metaphoric code is resumed repeatedly in the following text of all three chapters and in a manner typical for the archaic «circle composition» provides an effective finale of Heraclitus' book that compares Heraclitus' logos with the voice of Sibyl and the cosmic god speaking through her «inspired mouth» with Apollo. Not only Heraclitus, but also his contemporary and opponent Parmenides of Elea, also disguises his philosophical poem as an oracle, which the semi-divine Apollonian Kouros (Pythagoras of Samos) «heard» directly from the heavenly philosophical Pythia called *Aletheia* in Olympus, bypassing the mortal Pythia in Delphi.

In the text of the fr. 2L/B1 the metaphor of "this logos" is synonymous with the expression "words and deeds" (ἔπη καὶ ἔργα), and this is an additional confirmation of the correctness of our interpretation of "this logos". It is clear that this is not an isolated rhetorical or poetic metaphor, but a philosophical conceptual metaphor and analogy, a carefully thought-out grammatical model of the cosmos.

[p.108]

If the world as a whole is a *logos* (speech, text), then individual things must somehow relate to the division of this text into "words" or names, syllables and letters. It should be borne in mind that when the alphabetic analogy is used, Greek philosophers often do not distinguish between the phonetic

level (letters as phonemes) and the graphic level (letters as written signs). The Greek verb ἀκούειν 'to listen' is likewise ambiguous, it can mean both «to listen» to a spoken word and «to read» or «to understand» a written text. The title of Plutarchus' treatise Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν means 'How young people should read (or understand) poets' (literally 'listen to poets'). We believe that in fr.1–2 L (B 1, B 50 DK) "to listen to this logos" means primarily "to read this book", that is, to understand the visible "Book of Nature".

Heraclitus can be considered the father of the philosophical hermeneutics: the method of knowledge for him is not a causal or material explanation (in this he diverges sharply from the Milesians), but the art of interpretation of reality conceived as a text. Therefore, a philosopher for Heraclitus is an experienced and sophisticated reader who understands the language of nature or the language of the gods, which is the same, since Heraclitus is a pantheist, and knows the rules of reading and the cosmic grammar. Let us remember that the Greek writing in the archaic and classical times (and even later) was continuous, without word-division, the so called *scriptio continua*. Heraclitus makes it clear that he penetrates into the meaning of the book of nature by the method of the correct "division" or "distinction" of "words and deeds" in "this logos". The verb διαιρέω «to divide» is used in grammatical contexts exactly in the sense of dividing words in reading, its synonym is διαστίζω, διάστιξις "punctuation".[110] In Greek school grammar logos ("speech" or text) is usually divided into "names" (ὀνόματα), names are divided into syllables (συλλαβαί), and syllables into letters (στοιχεῖα or γράμματα).

How to read or to divide the *scriptio continua* of the cosmic logos according to Heraclitus? Let us try to answer this question taking as an example Heraclitus' fragment 43 L / B 67. This fragment uses not the grammatical (alphabet) analogy, but an analogy between a plurality of «sensible» incenses and imperceptible fire (single substrate), in order to illustrate the same relationship between one and many.

[p.109]

We choose it as a sample for the elucidation of the logos-syllables-letters analogy primarily because we have here a list of four pairs of opposites in a *verbatim* quotation from Heraclitus in Ionian dialect, that preserves two peculiar features of Heraclitus' style: *asyndeton* (ellipsis of the copula ἐστίν «is») and the omission of the conjunction καί "and" between the opposites. This indicates that Heraclitus in this fragment speaks in the «language of nature» distorted, in his opinion, by the poets and *hoi polloi*.

1. ΗΜΕΡΗΕΥΦΡΟΝΗΧΕΙΜΩΝΘΕΡΟΣ = DAYNIGHTWINTERSUMMER
 a continuous text (undivided logos), sensory data, the cognitive level is ἐγκυρεῖν 'to confront', 'to

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[110] LSJ, s.v. διαιρέω VI: «divide words, punctuate in reading», Isocr. 12.17; Arist. *Rhet.* 1401a 24.

come across' something without realizing what it is.

2. ΗΜΕΡΗ | ΕΥΦΡΟΝΗ | ΧΕΙΜΩΝ | ΘΕΡΟΣ = DAY | NIGHT | WINTER | SUMMER

the wrong division of «this logos» by the crowd of *hoi polloi*, the division into 4 names generates 4 objects, the cognitive level is «opinion» (*doxa*, δοκέοντα).

3. ΗΜΕΡΗΕΥΦΡΟΝΗ | ΧΕΙΜΩΝΘΕΡΟΣ = DAYNIGHT | WINTERSUMMER

a correct division "according to nature" (κατὰ φύσιν: 2 names correspond to two objects which are joined pairs of opposites, the cognitive level is that of "knowledge" or «understanding» (γινώσκειν). In the fragment 43L/B67 the imaginary objects (separated opposites) are correlated with the "names" of the ordinary language, such as "day", "night", etc. The question whether in Heraclitus the grammatical analogy contained an alphabet analogy as well, as in Democritus and Plato, or it was limited to the division of logos into names and syllables only (but not into letters), should be rather answered positively: yes, it was both. The fragment 106L(cf. B 10 DK), in our interpretation, definitely speaks in favor of the complete grammatical analogy, including the alphabet analogy i.e. in favor of the division "logos - names - syllables - letters", since the pairs of opposites in this fragment are not abstract metaphysical terms like «wholes and non-wholes» with mysterious and unintelligible "Zusammenfügungen" of Diels-Kranz, but are clear and simple examples taken from concrete *tekhnai* explicitly mentioned in the context of quotation: grammar, music, painting. The pairs of opposite taken from the arts of grammar and music are called "syllables" (συλλάψιες). In addition to a fragment of 106L in favour of the alphabetical analogy also speaks the evidence of Philo Alexandrinus in fr.106B L. In this case, the grammatical analogy between the cosmos and the logos (text) in the epistemology of Heraclitus can be represented as follows:

Referential level	*Iconic level*
world, Universe	this logos (book or speech)
pairs of opposites (like day-night, winter-summer)	syllapsies (syllables)
separated opposites (day, night, summer)	letters («voiced and unvoiced»)

From this it follows that the «names» (*onomata*) of the conventional human language are just «letters» of the language of nature, of «this logos», and consequently, lack autonomous substance and separate existence.

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The advantage of this version is that it better explains the monistic symbolism of the grammatical analogy: all pairs of opposites (and there is not a single phenomenon in the world that would not be an opposition member) after integration turn out to be the "syllables" of a single logos, meaningful text.

Most researchers of Heraclitus, regardless of whether they follow the metaphysical or verbal

interpretation of the *logos* in the fr. 2L/ B 1, agree that the concept of the *logos* of Heraclitus, like the concept of harmony, is directly related to his main metaphysical thesis of all-unity ("everything is one," πάντα = ἕν). However, the semantics of the word λόγος as such, that is, the lexical semantics (and not philosophical or metaphorical), contrary to all attempts to prove the opposite, are in no way connected with the concept of "unity" or "identity". The interpretation of "this logos" as a metaphor of the universe based on the grammatical analogy for the first time explains the monistic connotation of the term, its intrinsic semantical connection with the principle of *coincidentia oppositorum*, as well as its theological implications, correctly understood and developed by the Stoics. The Stoics must have understood the meaning of the grammatical analogy and the metaphor of the «book of nature» in Heraclitus logos-fragments, and on the ground of this interpretation they have concluded that "logos" and "fire" are identical: after all, the referential meaning of logos in Heraclitus is the physical Universe, and the nature of the Universe is the divine fire. However, while relieving the Stoics from the allegations of distortions in their theological approach to *logos* (it was a theological concept in Heraclitus as well), one should not equate the semantics of Heraclitus' and Stoic use of this term. Heraclitus' *logos* remains an epistemological metaphor associated with acoustic speech or written text, and, in contrast to the Stoic *logos,* never means "reason". In Heraclitus' vocabulary there are several mental terms for mind, reason, intelligence etc. (νόος, φρήν, φρόνησις, γνώμη), but λόγος is not one of them. Being inextricably linked with the semantics of language and speech, speaking, the logos of Heraclitus is rather a communicative (and therefore political and ethical, as well as religious) rather than a mental or psychological concept. But the fundamental principle of the Stoic ethics according to which man's individual *logos* should be brought in conformity and agreement (*homo-logia*) with the universal and divine *logos* is already prefigured in the texts of Heraclitus and his concept of the «common *logos*» (*xynos logos*).

More on the alphabet analogy in Heraclitus' metaphysics and philosophy of nature see above in the section on metaphorical codes and models of cosmos in Heraclitus.

[p.111]

The identity of opposites and the triadic structure in Heraclitus' metaphysics.

The proponents of the naturalistic interpretation of Heraclitus (e.g., Kirk HCF: 222 ff; Marcovich 1967: 105 ff.) understand the unity of opposites as their "connection" or connectedness. The "connection" between x and y implies their separate existence: in order to be "connected", x and y must exist separately from each other. But it is precisely this separate existence of the opposites that Heraclitus denies with his doctrine of *coincidentia oppositorum*. In the authentic fragments we find another formulation: opposites are not «connected», but are "identical" (τωὐτόν) or are "one and the same" (ἕν). From his predecessors, both the Ionian naturalists and the Italian idealists, Heraclitus

learned well that the whole sensually perceived world has a polar structure and can be completely analyzed into and reduced to pairs of opposites. Anaximander recognized such fundamental physical opposites as the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, corresponding to the four world masses (*maxima membra mundi*), in the Pythagorean Table of opposites the principal position is accorded to the immaterial mathematical essences of the limit and the unlimited, the even and the odd. The doctrine of opposites is not important for Heraclitus as such, i.e. as a scientific theory about the objective structure of the world. It is inextricably linked with his metaphysical holism (related with his theology, ethics and politics), with the idea of absolute casual nexus and interdependence of all phenomena, as well as the doctrine of fate and predestination. In the terms of the land-and-borrow or economic metaphoric code in the world of the phenomenal plurality nobody and nothing whatsoever is «self-owned», all are «debtors» who live «at the expense of others (their opposites)»; sooner or later they must "pay" for their lives to creditors, to whom they owe their existence and «property», i.e. being. Our reconstruction of the grammatical analogy in the metaphysics of Heraclitus shows that separately taken opposites (and therefore, all components of the physical world) are illusory objects, the result of the linguistic error of mortals, their inability to correctly read (ἀκούειν) the eternal Book of Nature (λόγον τόνδε). That the phenomenal cosmic opposites are not self-subsistent entities, but – like subjective incenses and flavors – are illusory objects, epiphenomena of the underlying imperceptible «common» substrate, is clearly stated in fr. 43L / B 67. The parable of the death of Homer and the gullible mortals deceived by the appearances (τὰ φανερά, see our commentary on fr. 20L/B56) compares "the grasping of opposites" in the study of the physical world with «grasping» the lice on one's own body: the more one «grasps», the less one has.

[p.112]

After one has comprehended and «grasped» all pairs of opposites that constitute the whole of the phenomenal world, they lose their imaginary individuality and become «one»; in a different metaphorical code they disappear like syllables integrated into a single Word. In his doctrine of the phenomenal world Heraclitus, like the Eleatics, comes close to the subjective idealism or the "theory of hieroglyphs" in epistemology. In other words, according to Heraclitus opposites are not separate substances, but aspects of the same «One», and processes of the single substrate, phases of cosmic cycles, produced by the same substrate.

The interpretation of the unity of opposites as a "connectedness" is based on the fragments about harmony (29-30 L/B 51,54), since ἁρμονία in Greek can mean "conjunction", "joint", for example, of two pieces of wood in carpentry. But this applies to the "apparent harmony" (ἁρμονία φανερή) only, the illusory harmony of similars, whereas the "invisible harmony" (ἁρμονία ἀφανής), which is superior and «stronger than apparent», according to our interpretation of fr. 29L/B54, speaks of an inseparable and indistinguishable *identity of opposites* using the Apollonian symbolism of the

bow and the lyre: war and peace, discord and concord, merge into a single graphical symbol of A (acrophonetic for «Apollo»), which in the «right» position looks like a bow, hanging on a wall (symbol of war), and in the «turned upside down» (*palintropos*) position looks like a lyre (symbol of peace). The relativity of good and evil and other values in Heraclitus' ethics can also serve as an example of the subjective nature of opposites (fr. 82–95 of our collection).

In a number of fragments, primarily related to the cosmic war or the *agon* of opposite forces, Heraclitus puts a third element above the two, a Moderator or Umpire (βραβεύς, ἐπιστάτης). We call this conceptual scheme a «triadic structure». The Moderator establishes the rules of the competition and regulates it by set "limits" (ὅροι, τέρματα), thus saving the adversaries from a mutual annihilation. The Moderator takes on different guises expressed in a series of parallel metaphors (we call this «metaphorical synonymity»): he is the Sun – Umpire (βραβεύς) ensuring the regularity of the change of seasons, the reciprocal increase and decrease of the duration of day and night (fr. 55 L /B120 DK seriously misinterpreted by Kirk and Marcovich), he is Polemos (War) reversing the roles of gods and men, free and slaves (fr. 32 L /B 53), he is Aion (Time), playing with the fates of gods and men in a cosmic *pesseia* (33 L /B 52), he is the Shepherd who drives all living creatures to pasture by scourge or Thunder-strike of Zeus (*Keraunos*) that governs the Universe (62L / B11).

The triadic structure can be also discovered in the most important metaphysical fragments of Heraclitus about Logos and harmony.

In the grammatical analogy, "syllables", according to Heraclitus, combine opposite letters, vowels and consonants, high and low pitch, fr. 106L/B10. Consequently, the Logos is a metaphorical synonym of *harmonia*, and it is a great integral in which all opposites are united. In the fragment on harmony (29 L / 51 DK), the active "third" element appears to be Apollo himself, who "holds together," in one hand two attributes, a bow and a lyre, the symbols of war and peace (29 L / 51 DK). Finally, in all the fragments from the "Political Logos" about the "works" (*erga*) of men in the sphere of arts and crafts (τέχναι) it is the *tekhne* itself that assumes the role of the active "third element" in the triadic structure, the power of art that harmoniously unites the opposites (fr.106–115 L). Heraclitus's thesis "art imitates nature" means that in their technological practices humans unconsciously "imitate" the universal divine law of the identity of opposites: grammar unites vocals and consonant letters (106–107 L), music unites high and low sounds (*ibidem*), painting unites different colors (*ibidem*), medicine unites good and evil (recovery by pain) (108 L), the craft of fullers unites the straight and the curved (109), the art of carpenters unites pushing and pulling in sowing, etc.

The fundamental and central concept in Heraclitus metaphysics and political philosophy, the concept of «common» or universal (τὸ ξυνόν), cannot be reduced to a simple sum of the elements or

to their "connection". The universal is ontologically and axiologically superior to the particular and individual. Inside the human polis it is the law (*nomos*), one and the same for all, that assumes the role of the «third element» or Moderator and unites individual citizens into polis; remember that in Greek political life these citizens were commonly divided into rival parties, i.e. opposites. Inside the «city of Zeus», i.e. the Universe, it is the «divine law» (*theios nomos*), i.e. the same law of the harmony of opposites, that unites and transforms the opposition of mortals and immortals into harmonious «arrangement» of «this cosmos», one and the same for all.

Only in the light of the triadic structure (and not in the light of bare polarity or even identity of binary opposites) the political subtext and the political message of Heraclitus' metaphysics and philosophy of nature becomes transparent: the arrangement of the polis, the ideal form of government that exactly corresponds to nature (is κατὰ φύσιν) is that in which the supreme political power belongs not to the one of the opposites (rival or warring political parties), but to a "third man above the fray", an impartial Moderator like an Umpire in a stadium (βραβεύς, ἐπιστάτης fr.57L/cf.B100) who acts in the interests of the whole, not of a part, who monitors the compliance with the rules of the game and severely punishes violators. At the referential level both an ideal ruler, i.e. an enlightened monarch (εἷς ἄριστος), and a wise legislator can be meant.

Apart from political connotations the triadic structure also has a theological dimension. The figures of the Shepherd (fr. 62L/B11), of Zeus' *Keraunos* (fr.40L/B64), of the divine child-king *Aion* (33L/B52) etc. apparently point to a supreme god.

Formally, Heraclitus' triadic structure can be compared with the Pythagorean Table of opposites, in which One is correlated with the good, and Many (i.e. duality) with the evil, as well as with the One and Indefinite Dyas, the first principles in Plato's «Unwritten doctrines» that have Pythagorean roots. In both cases, the active One (the source of good and order) is placed above the Duality, the source of evil and disorder.

3. Cosmos and fire: the philosophy of nature.

The section of the treatise of Heraclitus, devoted to the philosophy of nature, the doctrine of the cosmos and fire, apparently adjoined to the metaphysical and epistemological introduction on the universal logos. Both of them constituted the first "Discourse on the Universe" (Λόγος περὶ τοῦ παντός) in the *opus tripartitum* described by Diogenes Laertius. The fragment about "this cosmos", echoing the introductory fragments on «this logos» (Fr. 1–2), most probably was the opening of this second section of the first «discourse»:

fr. 37L/B 30 κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἦν

ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

"This cosmos, one and the same for all, no god and no man has ever made, but it has ever been, it is and it will be an everlasting fire, kindling regularly and regularly going out."

The physical cosmos is common to the gods and the men, two classes of being of which it is composed. This definition of the cosmos ("a compound consisting of gods and men") was subsequently adopted by the Stoics from Heraclitus.[111] The gods here mean not the anthropomorphic gods of poets, but the elements and luminaries. However, the fact that "all" (πάντων) is here masculine (from πάντες) and therefor refers to animate beings, rather than to "all things" (τὰ πάντα), gives to the Heraclitus' concept of cosmos («order» or «arrangement») an animistic character: it is a cosmos consisting not of inanimate physical objects, but of living wills, and only from them. Only some of them are mortal, and others are immortal. The common home of mortals and immortals is a kind of natural "community" (πόλις), living by natural law.

[p.115]

This is the first attested instance of the use of the term "cosmos" in the new philosophical sense, as applied to the Universe. Tradition ascribes this semantic neologism to Pythagoras (Placita 2.1). Perhaps the addition of the deictic pronoun «this» (τόνδε) indicates that in Heraclitus the word has not yet completely lost its metaphorical character. The assertion that "this arrangement" or "order" has not been created by any god or any man, somehow suggests that some other «orders» or «arrangements» are human artefacts (χειρόκμητα). Such are, for example, the temples of gods, created by men or some political «orders»: the term *cosmos* was used in the social sphere, both political and military, for example, the leaders of the Achaeans under Troy were called *cosmetores* of troops (Il. 1.16 κοσμήτορε λαῶν).; and officials in Crete, analogous to the Spartan ephors, were called *cosmoi*.

We believe that just as the concept of "this logos" is introduced by Heraclitus within the framework of the grammatical analogy or the metaphorical model "the world as text" (Liber Naturae), so the concept of "this cosmos" is introduced within the framework of another metaphorical model: the cosmos as a "Temple of Nature" (Templum Naturae). We will call this code a sacral metaphorical code.

Two facts support this interpretation. 1) The expression "ever-living fire" and the corresponding practice come from the cult sphere: in the Greek temples an "eternal flame" was maintained;[112] the eternal flame in the temple of Apollo in Delphi was especially revered, but also of Apollo the Lycian

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[111] Chrysipp. fr. 527: τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα. fr. 528 τὸ οἰκητήριον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ibid. ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων.

[112] Cornutus. *De natura deorum.* P. 53, 1: τὸ δ' ἀείζωον πῦρ ἀποδέδοται τῇ Ἑστίᾳ διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι [ὄν], τάχα δ' ἐπεὶ τὰ πυρὰ ἐν κόσμῳ πάντα ἐντεῦθεν τρέφεται.

in Argos and Apollo of Carneios in Cyrene.[113] 2) In the second part of the fr.43L/B67, the relation between the imperceptible essence of the world and sensible phenomena is compared with the relation between fire and incenses. This comparison recalls a scene of an altar in front of the temple, into which various incenses are thrown. As we see, not only Heraclitus' metaphysics and ethics, but also his philosophy of nature is also connected with the theme of the "wisdom of Apollo" whom Heraclitus regards the supreme and only authority in philosophy. The metaphor of the "temple of nature" (Templum Naturae) is not just rhetoric, it is philosophically meaningful and inextricably linked to Heraclitus' philosophical theology, his pantheism and monotheism.

[p.116]

Unlike many man-made temples in which the fools (*axynetoi*) perform meaningless rituals and pray to stone sculptures, «as if they were talking with a wall»[114], in the temple of nature dwells the only alive and real cosmic god, who in vain speaks to the *axynetoi* thorough his logos, «this logos» of nature, but they do not listen to him.

Epithets like "ever-living" and "the one who was, is and will be" in Greek perception even linguistically are equivalent to «immortal» and «divine». The threefold repetition of the verb "to be" (εἶναι) has no analogs in the remaining fragments and sounds like a religious hymn to a new god.

The subject of endless disputes were two inextricably related questions: what is the nature of the "measures" to which the lighting up and the extinction of divine fire are subject, and how reliable is the interpretation going back to antiquity, according to which kindling and extinctions are related to the doctrine of *ecpyrosis* and *diacosmesis*, that is, to the cyclic cosmogony, in which the periods of the universal "conflagration" of the world alternate with the phases of the world formation as a result of the extinction of the cosmogonic fire. Almost all ancient interpreters and writers who cite this fragment or paraphrase it, understood it precisely as a cosmogonic one, and the term "by measures" (μέτρα) as a reference to «measured periods» of time, i.e. regular cycles. John Burnet in his "Early Greek Philosophy" (1930: 158-163, first edition 1892) put forward an alternative quantitative (non-temporal) understanding of "measures" as "portions" of fire, and replaced the traditional cosmogonic interpretation with a "meteorological" one: ostensibly the fragment refers to the ordinary events of everyday life, like alternation of day and night, or the change of seasons. The cosmogonic interpretation was declared a Stoic invention: according to Burnet, Kirk, Markovich and others, the fragment describes only "partial" changes inside "this cosmos" that affect separate things, but not the cosmos as a whole. According to Burnet, the words "was, is and will be" allegedly prove that Heraclitus recognized the eternity of the world. Therefore, his supporters, like Marcovich in his edition, put a colon after ... καὶ ἔσται ... 'and it will be', intending to separate the words "kindling and

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[113] W. Burkert. *Greek Religion* (1985) 61.
[114] Fr. 145L / B 5. The section with a critique of popular religion in our edition: fragments 142-149 Leb.

going out" from "this cosmos" as a subject. But this is grammatically impossible: Heraclitus does not say that this cosmos "was, is and will be" he clearly says that this cosmos "was, is, and will be ever-living fire, kindling regularly and regularly going out ".

Of the researchers who correctly objected to the Burnet's interpretation, Charles Kahn should be singled out: see his important appendix "On the cosmic cycle" in Kahn, ATH, 147 sq. But in our opinion, in the heat of controversy, Kahn goes too far when he says that "such (temporal and cyclical) concept of measure is the only one that is clearly described in the texts" of Heraclitus. The law of preservation of matter is well known to Heraclitus from Anaximander (fr.B1) and he repeatedly uses it in cosmological fragments, but precisely because this law is formulated in both Anaximander and Heraclitus in the terms of lend-and-borrow metaphorical code – generation as a «loan» and destruction as «repaying the debt» with exactly the same amount – the quantitative concept of a measure, i.e. the amount taken as loan and a then returned, does not exclude the cyclical regularity, because the lend-and-borrow model includes the temporal notion of the fixed «term» of repayment, and this notion of *prothesmia,* of fixed time, is very important in Heraclitus' doctrine of fate and predestination.

The "kindling and going out" of ever-living fire in fr.37L/B30 describes the complex hierarchy of cosmic cycles, which Heraclitus himself lists in the first part of fr.43L/B67, starting with the smallest and ending with the biggest: "day - night", "winter - summer" and ending with the periods of the Great year, metaphorically called "abundance and poverty" and "war and peace" (on the restoration of the original text of this fragment see details in our commentary to fr.43L). This interpretation is supported by the text of the most important anthropological fragment of Heraclitus (fr.75L/B26) as reconstructed in our edition: in exact parallelism with the macrocosm, man "kindles in the morning after going out in evening"; this daily cycle of alternation of awakening and sleeping is, in turn, strictly paralleled by the cyclical alternation of life and death.

Burnet's anti-cosmogonic «everyday» interpretation of «kindling and going out» of cosmic fire in fr.37L/B30 is based on a questionable assumption that the word μέτρα is an "internal accusative" with the participles ἁπτόμενον / ἀποσβεννύμενον and that its meaning is "measures" in the sense of "portions" of fire: ostensibly, it is not the cosmos as whole that is kindled and is going out, but only some "portions" of it. This interpretation, accepted by Diels, Kirk, Marcovich and then by most of those who deny a cosmogony in Heraclitus, is both syntactically and semantically incorrect and should be rejected. Even if μέτρα is formally an "internal accusative", it should be understood adverbially and with reference to time, as it was understood by Galen (μετρίως) and a consensus of

ancient readers who paraphrase this word as κατὰ περιόδους "periodically".[115] That Burnet's interpretation is wrong, and that the ancient interpretation (followed by Aristotle, many Stoics, the source of Diogenes, the *Placita* tradition, Galen, Simplicius and many others) is correct, has been proved beyond any doubt by the publication of a text unknown to Burnet, the Derveni papyrus. In support of his «quantitative» (and not temporal) interpretation of *metra* in fr.37L/B30 Burnet cited the fragment 56(c)L/B94 in the version of Plutarchean *De exilio* ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα "the sun will not transgress its *metra*"; in Plutarch's *De Iside* we have a *varia lectio* οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται προσήκοντας ὅρους "the sun will not transgress appropriate limits". The 5th century *verbatim* text of Heraclitus quoted in the col. IV of the Derveni papyrus supports the authenticity of the reading ὅρους «limits», and not of μέτρα "measures". This makes Burnet's alleged supporting evidence invalid. But what is really fatal for the "quanta" or "portions" interpretation of *metra* by Burnet and all his followers, it is the words μηνὶ τακτῶι «at prefixed month» that we read in line 13 of column IV of the Derveni papyrus in the context of quotation from Heraclitus. This proves beyond any doubt that the "limits" or "terms" (οὔρους) of the Sun in Heraclitus quotation have nothing to do with "portions" of fire or the size of the Sun, but refer to the solstices (τροπαί) that occur regularly "at prefixed month" every year.

The word ὅρος (Ionian οὖρος) is even more often than μέτρον used in temporal sense referring to fixed terms. In Heraclitus' poetic cosmology similar and synonymous words are τέρματα 'turning posts» of day and night (of the solstices, fr. 55L/B120) and τροπαί 'reversals' of the opposite elements in the cycle of «Great Year» (fr. 44L/B31). We may conclude once again that Heraclitus' world-order (κόσμος) is a dynamic concept, inextricably linked with the idea of time, measured periods (*metra*), recurrent cycles and fate.

For Aristotle and the Peripatetics the "fire" of Heraclitus was a material cause or element (ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον), "from which" all things come into being and consist. But the semantics of fire in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus is much more complex and multifaceted. The choice of fire in Heraclitus was influenced by traditional *valeurs* and functions of fire in Greek culture: first of all, the role of fire in the cult and ritual, as well as in the household and crafts. In the heroic epic, fire is a power hostile to the body and corporeality, the funeral fire incinerates bodies. Of all the elements the fire is closest to the type of element that Aristotle characterized as "most incorporeal" (ἀσωματώτατον), a physical body so thin (λεπτομερέστατον) that it borders on the incorporeal. The

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[115] In doxography and ancient paraphrases of this famous fragment μέτρα of Heraclitus is correctly interpreted as «measured periods of time», περίοδοι, so Theophrastus in the context of. 38L/B144. In the *Placita* (cf. fr. 51A L) the words πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα are paraphrased as τὸ περιοδικὸν πῦρ ἀΐδιον, cf. also περιόδους in fr. 51(c); Plutarch in the context of frt.57L/B100 κίνησις ἐν τάξει μέτρον ἐχούσῃ καὶ πέρατα καὶ περιόδους and in fr. *Probabilia,*12 Leb.; in the doxography of Diogenes Laertius, 9.8 ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατά τινας περιόδους. LSJ, s.v.μέτρον, 2 consideres such instances as μέτρα ἐνιαυτῶν, νυκτός (Arat. 464. 731) late («later of Time, duration»), but Heraclitus in 37 L / B 30 provides exactly an early instance.

sacral and religious associations of fire relevant to Heraclitus' cosmological imagery have been already discussed above. Of all the elements fire is also the most energetic and resembling more a process or a power than a stable body; much more fortunate than the quantitative interpretation of «measures of fire» in Heraclitus was Burnet's subtle analysis of the image of flame as a symbol of incessant cosmic change. For his dynamic and dramatic model of the cosmos Heraclitus needed a «first element» or rather a divine essence (*physis*) that would antithetically combine in itself the opposite powers of generation and destruction, of creation and annihilation. Fire was exactly such essence and cosmic power that possessed this paradoxical property. Fire can destroy and annihilate, but at the same time in crafts and skills it can display a "creative" power, primarily in blacksmithing, metallurgy, pottery, bread baking, cooking, surgery, etc., in all those "arts" (*tekhnai*) which Heraclitus analyzed in his "Political logos" (see fragments 111, 115, 116, 116A, 117, 75A in our edition, most of them not in DK, Marcovich or other editions). Thus, the Stoics did not invent the concept of the creationist "artistic fire" (πῦρ τεχνικόν), but borrowed it from Heraclitus.

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The choice of Heraclitus could have been partly influenced also by the *Zeitgeist*: his book was written at a tragic time when the fire of war literally burned around, temples and whole cities were annihilated by fire. In fr. 135L/B43 Heraclitus compares civil war with fire.

The debate between the supporters and opponents of the cyclical cosmogony in Heraclitus (*ecpyrosis* and *diacosmesi*s in later terminology) that continues since the 19th century should be ended by the recognition of the validity of the ancient tradition and relegated to the archives of scholarship. The reconstruction of the lend-and-borrow economic metaphorical code in the cosmological fragments of Heraclitus (the predestinated interchange of opposites as a "repayment of debt" at a fixed term, *prothesmia*), leaves no doubt that the cyclical cosmogony is directly attested by Heraclitus' *ipsissima verba* in fr. 42/B90: just as a loan (money, χρυσός) and a pledge (property, χρήματα) cannot be in the same hands at the same time, in other words they cannot coexist, in the same way fire (πῦρ, referential equivalent of "gold") and all things, i.e. the actual world-formation (πάντα, referential equivalent of "property") can only alternate in time within two different phases of a cosmic cycle, the phase of «abundance» or «wealth» (κόρος) and the phase of "need" or "poverty" (χρησμοσύνη). The simile of this fragment is based on a subjective perspective, like some other fragments of Heraclitus, i.e. the exchange of gold (money) for property (pledge) should be seen by the eyes of a participant of transaction, and not by the eyes of external observer. In the economic metaphorical code «property» is a metaphor of being, therefore «to have» or «to be available» at the iconic level means «to exist» at the referential level of meaning. Phase one: «Now I have gold» = «Fire exists». Phase two: «I give my gold as loan, and I exchange it (ἀνταμείβομαι) for the pledge" = "Fire disappears, the world comes into being". Phase 3: "At the prefixed time my gold is returned

and I return the pledge" = «The world disappears, Fire exists». By this analogy Heraclitus anticipated the Aristotelian distinction between possibility (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια) and provided a basis for the cyclical cosmogony of the Stoics.

Let us now turn to the theory of elements in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus. Theophrastus, who, unlike us, had in his hands the complete text of Heraclitus, could not construct a coherent exposition of his "physics": according to his testimony, there were contradictions in the physics of Heraclitus, while some parts remained unfinished (Theophrastus ap. D.L. 9.6). For those who consider the book of Heraclitus as an ethical-political and theological treatise with paradigmatic analogies from the natural world, and not as a version of the standard Ionian Περὶ φύσεως, there is nothing surprising in this statement of Theophrastus. In different chapters or passages of his book Heraclitus used physical theories taken from various sources. The existence of contradictions in the «physics» of Heraclitus should be accepted as established fact. Already Aristotle hesitated whether the material principle of Heraclitus should be identified with fire (so he thinks in *Metaphysics* and *Physics*) or with the "exhalation" (ἀναθυμίασις, so he thinks in *De anima*). Aenesidemus, who carefully studied the text of Heraclitus, believed that the original substance in Heraclitus' physics was «air», and not fire (air is identical with the «exhalation» from water). In the authentic fragments of Heraclitus we indeed find texts that support both views: fragments 42L (B90), 42A unequivocally identify the cosmogonic principle as "fire".

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On the contrary, in fr.69L/B36 the cycle of interconversion of three elements begins with air (the cosmic psyche), whereas the fire is not even mentioned. Moreover, in fr.69L/B36 on the one hand, and in the complex fr.44–45L/B31 on the other, we find two different systems of elements: in the first case, a system of three elements (breath=air, water and earth), in the second a system of four: fire, whirlwind (= air), sea and earth. The theories of change that underly these two systems are also different: the first is taken from Anaximenes (the transformation of a single substrate), there are no pairs of opposites in it. The second implies a cyclical interconversion of opposites. The four elements fall into two pairs of opposites: a hot fire paired with cold air and a dry earth paired with wet water.

Although Heraclitus held the doctrine of the periodic "conflagration" of the polymorphic world of the four world-masses, the complex of fragments 44–45L/B31 is not a cosmogony in the usual sense. What we have here, is not a scientific description of material change or of cosmic evolution, but a metaphysically and politically loaded parable about the "war" of the four world masses, demonstrating how the "law of pendulum" (or the «way up and down») of the cosmic justice, the inevitable exchange of damage and retribution between the opposite powers, works at the macrocosmic level. The fragments 44–45L/B31 contain a "calendar of the Great Year (*Megas*

Eniautos)", describing the change of the four epochs as successive domination and defeat of each of the four elements. The key-term τροπαί denotes in this text the temporal "turning-points" and not "transformations", (a mistaken interpretation that goes back to the Stoic source of Clement and is commonly uncritically accepted in modern literature, Charles Kahn being a notable exception). This is a complex metaphor that simultaneously contains an allusion to the "turning-points" of the year, i.e. solstices and equinoxes, and also, within the framework of the metaphorical model "the world as a battlefield", to the "reversals", that is, the «retreats» of the defeated adversaries in the cosmic battle. At the same time, the fragment 44L/B31 is an Apollonian conundrum (γρῖφος): "The turnings of Fire are first the Sea, and the turnings of the Sea are half Earth, and half Whirlwind." One can understand the meaning of these enigmatic words only having in mind a diagram representing five «turnings» of a four spoke chariot wheel, the popular sacred symbol of Apollo in archaic times. Both in Heraclitus and Empedocles the revolving («turning around») four spoke wheel is a symbol of time. This Apollonian symbol of time is mentioned in Heraclitus fr.65L/B103 and in Marsilio Ficino's paraphrase of Heraclitus fr.68L/cf. B91. Fire dominates on June 22nd (the Great Year is isomorphic to the astronomical year) in the epoch of Great Summer, then it suffers a first defeat (τροπή, ´reversal", i.e. turns back and retreats) in Great Fall, when the Sea dominates on September 22nd (the epoch of rains begins); in the Great Winter at Winter *Tropai* on December 22nd dominates the enemy of Fire, the cold storm-wind *Prester* (gales are typical for the winter months in Greece); and finally in the Great Spring, on March 22nd after the defeat of *Prester* dominates Mother Earth, when plants start growing and flowering begins.

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At the moment of domination, each element is in the phase of "abundance" or "excess" (κόρος), and its opposite is in the phase of "scarcity" or "need" (χρησμοσύνη), then they switch their roles. In the temple of Apollo Didymeus near Miletus, the local Pythia ("prophetess"), while foretelling the future, sat not on a tripod, as in Delphi, but "on the axis" (Iambl. *De myst.* 3.11 ἐπὶ ἄξονος καθημένη προλέγει τὸ μέλλον), that is, on a chariot four spoke wheel, lifted up on the axis.[116] Since this practice is not an "imitation of Delphi", which is typical for the period of the renewal of the Didymaean oracle in the Hellenistic era, it can be assumed that this is an ancient tradition dating back to the 6th century. On the image of a rotating wheel, as a symbol of change, which to some extent is parallel to the symbol of the river, but at the same time is a symbol of *cyclical* change (a connotation missing from the river image), see further our commentary to fr. 65 and 68 with a unique quotation in Ficino from unknown source (rotae currentis…). Since Heraclitus allegorically identified Apollo with the

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[116] Jamblichus. *De mysteriis* 3.11: ἡ ἐν Βραγχίδαις γυνὴ χρησμωιδός... ἐπὶ ἄξονος καθημένη προλέγει τὸ μέλλον. (Parke 1986: 124; Herda 2008: 58, n. 343; 60, n. 355–356).

sun[117], and the sun, according to Heraclitus, controls the cycles of day and night, as well as the change of the seasons (fr.57L, the text of B100 in DK is incomplete), it will not be too bold to assume that the cycle of the Great Year (*Megas Eniautos*), isomorphic to the astronomical year, was also modelled in Heraclitus by the same Apollonian symbol of revolving four spoke wheel, in which the four spikes correspond to the four elements and the rotation of which corresponds to the change both of year *Horai* and of the Great Epochs. The striking similarity of the cosmic cycle of Heraclitus with the cosmogony of Empedocles makes us to think about two possible scenarios: either Empedocles is the debtor of Heraclitus, or both depend on a common (probably Pythagorean) source. The Pythagorean Oath by *Tetraktys* contains a possible allusion to the 4 "roots" of Empedocles, but it may be older than Empedocles.[118] Note that we do not ascribe to Heraclitus the Empedoclean theory of *immutable* elements and his mechanistic theory of «mixture» and separation, we ascribe to Heraclitus the theory of 4 world-masses (*maxima membra mundi* in Lucretius' phrase) which, unlike Empedocles' «roots» constantly change into each other. The theory of 4 *maxima membra mundi* may have existed even before Heraclitus in Anaximander, and it is directly attested in fr.44-45L. For more details on the cosmic cycle see our commentary to fr. 44–45L (cf. B31) and especially the diagram on page 343 of the published version. [Our commentary on these fragments is summarized in the pdf file «Heraclitus' Cosmic Cycle Explained» uploaded in our personal page on this site; it also contains the diagram which illustrates the calendar of the Great year in Heraclitus].

4. *Man and soul: anthropology and psychology*

The key text of Heraclitus on human nature 75 L (B 26 DK) has undergone significant distortions in the medieval manuscript transmission. In the form in which it is printed in the editions of Clement's *Stromata*, this text is grammatically impossible and philosophically meaningless.

We propose the following reconstruction of the Greek text and interpretation (for the justification of the emended text see the critical apparatus and our commentary):

ἄνθρωπος εὐφρόνη φάος · ἅπτεται ἑῶιος ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὀψίας. ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται, τεθνεῶτος, εὖτε {ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις} ἐγρηγορὼς ἅπτεται, εὕδοντος.

«Man is night and light: he kindles in the morning after going out in the evening. And he kindles alive after he has died, just as he kindles awakened after sleep».

A parallelism between fr.75L/B26 and the fragment about the «kindling and going out» of the

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[117] In the cult of the Milesian Apollo Didymeus this is attested quite early, see Herda (2008) 33, n. 54; 38.

[118] [Plut.] *De placitis philosophorum* 877A οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεος ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσαν.'

cosmos in fr.37L/B 30 is obvious and is a clear evidence of the fact that the archaic idea of parallelism of the microcosm and the macrocosm played an important role in the anthropology of Heraclitus. Man, like cosmos, is subject to a regular rhythm of kindling and extinction. The alternation of day and night in the cosmos corresponds to the cycle of wakefulness and sleep in humans. On the ground of this parallelism Heraclitus *per analogiam* makes a bold conclusion that life and death are also cyclical: death is followed by a new life just as sleep is followed by awakening.

If our emendation is correct, Heraclitus' theory on the nature of man reveals a striking resemblance to the theory of Parmenides, according to which man consists of two elements: active spiritual (light) and passive carnal (night). The opposition of light and darkness also appears in the Pythagorean Table of opposites: in this Table light (φῶς) corresponds to good (ἀγαθόν) and limit (πέρας), while darkness (σκότος) corresponds to evil (κακόν) and unlimited (ἄπειρον) (Parmenid. B 16, cf. B 8, 56 sq. Pythag. 58 B 5 DK). Heraclitus, unlike the Pythagoreans, was not a metaphysical dualist, and therefore could not accept a radical dualism of the spiritual (mental) and physical. The night in Heraclitus was most probably understood as the absence of light (fire) or "extinction." But it is quite possible that general theoretical monism did not prevent him (as it did not prevent the Stoics) from recognizing a *relative (axiological) dualism* of God and matter, body and soul, regarding the corporeal as "extinguished fire". Within the ethical sphere, such an antithetical conception of a person will "work" in the same way as the "strict" dualism of the Pythagorean type, since the soul receives a privileged status, and it is the concern for the soul, not for the body, and for moral rather than material values that becomes a priority. The words of Heraclitus "The *ethos* of man is his *daimon*" (i.e. his fate and source of his genuine well-being) anticipates the Socratic ethics (see commentary on fr.96L/B 119).

This dualistic anthropology explains the noticed by many similarity between some views of Heraclitus on the soul with the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines. The tradition of Heraclitus' vegetarianism and his ascetic life in the mountains, his contempt for luxury and pleasures, also receives some explanation. If the soul is a spiritual light, enclosed in the darkness of sensual flesh, moral life should become a *katharsis*, a purification of the soul from bodily filth. It is conceivable that Heraclitus played on the homonymy of the words φῶς 'light' and φώς "man".[119]

In his authentic psychological fragments Heraclitus contrasts the "dry" and the "wet souls": a dry soul is "the wisest and best" (which corresponds to the intellectual and moral virtues of Aristotle), while the "wet" soul of a drunk is deprived of reason and turns humans into cattle (fr.73–74L/B117-

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[119] This word pun may be also alluded to in Parmenides 28 B 1, 3: the man of knowlege, i.e. a philosopher, εἰδὼς φώς travels from the realm of darkness and ignorance to the realm of light and wisdom.

118). It stands for reason that the story of the "drunk", who forgets the road to his home, is a parable about all non-philosophical humanity that lives in the pursuit of pleasures, without «listening with understanding» to the nature and the divine *logos*.

Aristotle and the doxography describe the physical substrate of the soul in Heraclitus as "exhalation from the blood." This is confirmed by two fragments quoted by Arius Didymus together with the river fragment; the first we attribute to Heraclitus, emending the MSS. νοεραί «intelligent» to Ionian and poetic νοτεραί «wet», its authenticity is guaranteed by the syntactical ambiguity; the second may be a later paraphrase of the first. 67(a)L

ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοτεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται «the souls, being evaporated [scil. from the blood] always become moistened».

 and fr.67(c)L/cf. B12 αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται «souls are evaporated from liquids"
This conception of the soul is also based on the parallelism of the micro and macrocosm: the evaporation from the blood in the human body is analogous to the "evaporation" from the sea
in the «great body» of the cosmic god, which «feeds» the sun and the stars. The Hippocratic author of the treatise *On Diet*, book I in his imitation of Heraclitus understands the soul as a "mixture of fire and water," an active light and a passive dark elements, from which both the cosmos and human body are composed. All cosmic cycles, like those of day and night, the change of seasons, are conceived as alternating "advance and retreat" (military metaphors) of fire and water, oscillating between a prefixed maximum (μήκιστον) and minimum (ἐλάχιστον). The influence of Heraclitus' battle of elements and his concept of fixed «turning points» (*tropai, termata*) is obvious. Fire and water are powers rather than bodies, it seems that they are associated with the Sun and the Moon respectively, the male and female *dynameis* (De diaeta 1.7). The attempt of Kirk, Marcovich and some others to interpret *anathymiasis* "evaporation" in Heraclitus as "fire" should be rejected. The *anathymiasis* both in Aristotle and Heraclitus is not "fire", but a steam or vapor, an intermediate phase in the transition from wet to hot, from the sea to the *aither*, something close to air. The interpretation of the Hippocratic doctor is closer to Heraclitus' conception since the steam is indeed, from the Greek point of view, "a mixture of water and fire", a suspension of hot particles of water, but not a pure fire.

[p.124]

So, the structure of the soul according to Heraclitus (like everything else in the world) is antithetical: as in the Orphic anthropogony, the divine "fiery" part of the human soul is "mixed" with a dark element. In the Orphic myth it is called Titanic, in Heraclitus it is described as a «wet soul». However, «wet» in Heraclitus is more than a physical quality or a *dynamis* of the Ionian physics, it is also a psychological and ethical concept: it is a sensual, emotional, sexual, intoxicating, Bacchic and feminine element that may cause madness of crowds resulting in anthropomorphic polytheism, the

rule of *hoi polloi* and the pursuit of egoistic pleasure. Its eternal adversary both in nature and in human soul is the «dry» and fiery Apollonian element responsible for *sophia* and *sophrosyne* of the wise, political *homonoia* under the rule of the best, and the heroism of fallen in battle. Behind this symbolic axiological system lurks a system of *systoikhiai* that resembles the Aristoxenian, more archaic than the one quoted by Aristotle, version of the Pythagorean Table of opposites (Aristoxenus Fr. 13 Wehrli).

5. Ethos: moral philosophy.

Heraclitus is the first Greek philosopher, in whose texts of we find not only an interest in moral issues (the history of Greek ethical thought in such extended sense one should start from Homer), but also virtually all the fundamental concepts of classical philosophical ethics. He is the first to speak about the moral character of a person (ἦθος), about virtue (ἀρετή), about practical intelligence (φρόνησις) and about wisdom (σοφία), about happiness (using the more archaic concept of δαίμων rather than εὐδαιμονία), about the nature of good and evil, about pleasure as a false human value (τέρψις – Ionian equivalent of attic and general ἡδονή). Heraclitus can also be considered the father of moral psychology: for the first time in his fragments the term *psyche* becomes a carrier of intellectual (wisdom) and moral (virtue) qualities, i.e. is identified as a moral agent and a moral personality. Moreover, it is in Heraclitus that the term "nature" (φύσις) for the first time is transformed from a scientific physical concept into ethical and theological one. Just as later in Stoics, "nature" (physis) in Heraclitus signifies the objective order of things (as opposed to the subjective *dokeonta* of the *axynetoi* and the poets), and exactly as in Stoics it contains the divine «universal logos» proclaimed as the new moral standard as well as a paradigm for the «correct» political and religious legislation. [However, as we have already noticed, the meaning of logos in Heraclitus differs from the Stoic usage in one respect: although logos may be «spoken out» by the cosmic god through the visible «works» of nature, it is not directly identified with the divine mind, because it is a metaphor and not a mental term for "reason". Heraclitus has different words that refer to the divine cosmic Mind: Γνώμη, τὸ Σοφόν, φρόνιμον τὸ πῦρ].

Some 100 years before Plato and some 150 years before Aristotle Heraclitus for the first time addressed the fundamental in Greek philosophical ethics problem of the relation between reason and emotions (passions), as well as the problem of the internal conflict between rational mind and irrational desires that recalls the problem of *akrasia*. It stands for reason that he formulated all this not in the standard 4th century terminology (like τὸ λογικόν and τὰ πάθη), but in archaic Ionian prose and relying on his symbolical psychophysical concepts of the «wet» (sensual, irrational) and «dry» (intellectual and spiritual) elements in human psyche. Heraclitus' word for the emotional part of the

soul and passions is *thymos* (θυμός fr.89L/B85) in its archaic and poetic sense of «heart» (not in the fourth century sense of anger), the seat of passionate desires (ὀκόσα θέλουσι, fr.87L/B110). The rational faculty of the soul is represented primarily by "intelligence" or "sound mind" φρόνησις, φρονεῖν, as well as by intellect (νόος, γνώμη). Despite the lexical differences, Heraclitus' moral psychology *grosso modo* agrees with the central demand of the classical virtue ethics, the demand of the strict control of emotions and subordination of desires to the dictates of the «ruling» reason. In this demand he goes even further than Plato and certainly further than Aristotle; his position comes closer to the ascetic anti-hedonism of the Pythagoreans, Antisthenes and (no wonder) to the Stoics. His ideal is a kind of *apatheia*, i.e. a radical extermination of all passions of the heart (*thymos*), rather than their education and control as in Plato and Aristotle. As in Plato, so in Heraclitus' philosophy ethics is inextricably linked with his politics, and both ethics and politics rely on his metaphysics and philosophical theology. Both in his metaphysics and in his ethics, Heraclitus points to Apollo as his teacher and the source of wisdom, the god of measure and harmony of opposites. Long before Socrates, Heraclitus responded to the imperative of the Delphic god "Know thyself" by saying "I have searched myself" (fr.97L / B 101). The seeming subjectivism and relativism, that might be found in the fragments about the relativity of human values, supported by *tekmeria* (empirical instances) from animal behavior (fr.90–95L,), should not be misleading: in these fragments Heraclitus criticizes the false values of *hoi polloi* in the context of his radical polemics against hedonism and the pursuit of pleasure. The relativity of false values is contrasted with the eternal and absolute genuine value or human good (ἀγαθόν) based on the "divine knowledge", that is on the surpassing human subjectivity cosmic point of view conforming with nature (fr.82L/B78).

[p.125]

Like Plato, Heraclitus must be classed with the representatives of moral realism in ethics, he is convinced of the objectivity and eternity of moral and legal standards, as they have superhuman, and therefore, extra-subjective, justification. The chances are that Heraclitus already knew the classical ethical *topos* about the "three ways of life" (βίοι), corresponding to three different conceptions of happiness. Here is the contrast between the hedonism of *hoi polloi* and the heroic elite choosing immaterial values.

102L/B 29 αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέο ἀέναον θνητῶν · οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.

«The best (or "the noblest") of men choose one thing only instead of all /other goods/, the eternal glory among the mortals[120], whereas the crowd indulges in gluttony like cattle».

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[120] A possible another instance of intentional syntactical ambiguity: θνητῶν can mean both «mortal men» and «mortal things». In the latter case one should translate «one thing to all other: the immortal glory to what is transitory".

In the aristocratic lexicon of the Greeks οἱ πολλοί is not just a "majority" in a quantitative sense, but also democratic party. And *aristoi* in the sphere of politics are not just the "best", but primarily the aristocrats who have the sense of superiority and possession of excellence (ἀρετή) that distinguishes them from the crowd. But did Heraclitus really intend by this contrast the traditional conflict of two parties, the demotic and the aristocratic? This can be questioned. In the language of Greek philosophers and especially moralists, elitism seldom, if ever, has an explicit class character: the *hoi polloi* contrasted in their discourse with *sophoi*, *agathoi, kharientes, spudaioi* etc., are not aristocrats by the social status, but *aristoi* according to meritocracy, the intellectual and moral elite of the philosophers, whose «excellence» is accorded to them by education rather than descent. Heraclitus does not seem to provide an exception to this rule: fragment 99L/B116 explicitly proclaims that the acquisition of the «greatest excellence» in Heraclitus's ethics, *sophrosyne*, is open to all men. While condemning the "gluttony" and the bestial hedonism of the Ephesians, Heraclitus hardly targets simple peasants and craftsmen: his lively interest in the world of crafts (τέχναι) and the «works» of all kinds of non-aristocratic professions does not square with a supposed aristocratic snobbery.[121]

[p.126]

Rather, the target of his passionate invective is the Ephesian «bourgeoisie», the new rich middle class of merchants and manufacturers, whose wealth has long surpassed the wealth of the old land-owning aristocracy. Heraclitus condemns their "demonstrative consumption" at the time of need and scarcity or resources (χρησμοσύνη), presumably at the time of the Ionian revolt or soon after it.

These people apparently did not want to fight the Persians, fearing for their lives and wealth. That is why Heraclitus appeals to the "old noblesse", to the traditional military-aristocratic ethics of heroism and self-sacrifice with its cult of the "immortal glory" and the apotheosis of the fallen.

The ideal of this knightly ethics was the Homeric Achilles, who "chose" a heroic death in battle when he was young instead of the innumerable joys of a non-heroic long life in peace. The fragment is also interesting as an illustrative example of how Heraclitus applies in ethics his central metaphysical opposition of «one and many» with a clear assertion of the axiological primacy of the one over the many. Just as in physics one thing (fire) costs as much as the whole cosmos (πάντα, fr.42L/B90), just as in politics "one the best" costs more than "myriad" (fr.128L/B49), and one divine law surpasses all human laws taken together (fr.131L/B114), just as in theology the divine cosmic mind (*Gnome*) that alone governs the whole Universe, deserves to be worshipped by the Greeks more than all the gods of the poets (fr.140L/B41), so in his ethics one immaterial value (the immortal glory) costs more than all the goods of the world combined. Given that the immortal glory

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[121] In this Heraclitus seems to be a more "democrtatic" character than Plato. It is hard to imagine Plato visiting smitheries, washeries (fuller's shops), potters etc., studying with attention their "works" (ἔργα) and trying to discover in what they are doing a *mimesis* of the heavenly *theios nomos* of the harmony of opposites.

(*kleos*) is an award for *arete*, and that *arete* in Heraclitus' ethics has already become something that belongs to one's inner self or *psyche* (as later in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics), we may conclude that Heraclitus anticipated the central principle of the Socratic and Stoic ethics ὅτι τὸ μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν "(Remember) that the only good is what is noble" where by the "noble" is meant the excellence (*arete*) of the soul, the immaterial *agathon*. If this analysis is sound, we may also conclude that Heraclitus can be regarded as the earliest attested representative of the tradition of moral philosophy known as «virtue ethics».

The verb κορέννυμι "to engorge, to full oneself", used by Heraclitus in his invective, is cognate with the word κόρος which is used in two main senses, gastronomical and economical: 1) 'satiety'(opp. λιμός hunger), in contexts relating to food and eating and 2) "excess, abundance, wealth" (opp.χρησμοσύνη in archaic Ionian, and πενία in Attic and koine, "poverty") in context relating to property, wealth. It is virtually certain that in his description of the cosmic processes and in the calendar of the Great year Heraclitus uses, it as economic metaphor for "wealth and poverty" or "excess and deficiency", to denote the peaks of the opposite processes of growth (*koros*) and diminution (*chresmosyne*).

In Greek moralists, poets and philosophers, *koros* is a pejorative word, that may include both connotations, and also refer to all kind of moral vice associated with insolence (*hybris*) punished by the gods. The proverbial *locus classicus* comes from the mouth of another unhappy aristocrat of the same epoch of civil discord and revolutions, Theognis of Megara (Theogn.153): Τίκτει τοι   κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἕπηται / ἀνθρώπωι καὶ ὅτωι μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι. "Glut breeds insolence when wealth falls in the hands of an evil man who is deprived of a sound mind."

Heraclitus would have applauded these words, especially since Theognis, a victim of civil war, probably suffered in Megara from the same nouveau riches as those whom Heraclitus denounced in Ephesus. *Hybris* "insolence", cursed by Heraclitus as the greatest evil for the polis, results in the transgression of due measure (μέτρα) and leads to tyranny (fr.135L/B43). The best prevention of these diseases of the soul and of the polis Heraclitus seeks in the propagation of the virtue of moderation, restraint, curbing of desires and chastity (fr.99-100L/B116.112), the *sophrosyne*.

Here are the ethical fragments of Heraclitus preserved by Stobaeus that are of primary importance for his theory of virtues. (For the defence of their authenticity *contra* Kirk and Marcovich, and for the justification of our text and the separation of the DK fragment into two quotations joined by the καί of the anthologist, see our commentary):

[p.127]

 Heraclitus fr.100L / B 112 DK = Stobaeus, *Anthol*. III, 1, 178
"σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη" καὶ
"σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας"

(a) "Moderation is the greatest excellence" and

(b) "Wisdom is to speak out the truth and to act in agreement with nature, understanding her" [scil. understanding the voice of nature, the universal *logos*].

The promotion of the moderation to the highest position in the hierarchy of virtues indicates the aristocratic, conservative and ascetic (anti-hedonistic) character of Heraclitus' ethics. Plato, Heraclitus' intellectual twin, in the fourth book of *Politeia* recognizes justice (δικαιοσύνη) the main excellence of the soul, yet temperance or self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) is also accorded an important place. Σωφροσύνη both in popular Greek morality and in philosophical ethics is used in two main senses: a more restricted one relating to interpersonal relations and family life, and a wider sense relating to social and political behavior. *Sophrosyne* in the first more specific sense is the ability to curb the desires (especially in sexual sphere), to withstand the temptations, it comes close to chastity; in popular morality it is commonly regarded as a distinctive virtue of a woman, of a faithful wife (but not only). *Sophrosyne* in the second sense signifies self-control not only in the private, but also in the civil sphere and it comes close to mindfulness and sound mind of a man who observes the limits imposed by law and custom, as well as by his social status. The vice opposed to the *sophrosyne* in private life is licentiousness (ἀκολασία); the vice opposite to the moderation in the second civil sense is the lack of sound mind and folly (ἀφροσύνη), and from this there are only few steps to insanity (μαίνεσθαι) and the peak of insolence (*hybris*), characterized by a total disrespect and humiliation of others (e.g. in tyranny), as well as by arrogant behavior that insults the gods and provokes their nemesis. Heraclitus' concept of moderation (*sophrosyne*) combines both these senses, both the cathartic chastity, the taming of one's desires, the victory over one's violent *thymos*, on the one hand, and the civil self-control, mindfulness combined with observance of law, on the other. The civil *sophrosyne* in Heraclitus, in turn, is also twofold: on the one hand, it is a respect for custom and law in one's own polis; on the other hand, it is a respect for the divine cosmic Justice (*Dike*) in the Republic of Zeus, of which the philosopher is also a citizen.

It may seem that the emphasis on two most important virtues, moderation (moral) and wisdom (intellectual), anticipates Aristotle's distinction of moral and intellectual virtues. But this is not exactly the case: in Heraclitus wisdom (*sophia*) is both theoretical («to speak», i.e. to pronounce a logos) and practical («to act») virtue. It is worth noticing that before Plato and Aristotle the term *arete* was primarily associated with active, practical life (the traces of this traditional conception are still visible in Aristotle's discussion of three *bioi* in *EN* I.5), often with military and athletic excellence, and therefore *arete* could be counterposed to *sophia* (intellectual excellence). According to the author of the *Dissoi logoi* (circa 400 B.C.), sophists and philosophers of his time teach «virtue and wisdom» (ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν), i.e. both practical skills and theoretical knowledge. That is why Heraclitus does not call wisdom *arete*.

It seems that the two most important excellences in Heraclitus, s*ophrosyne* and *sophia*, correspond to the two parts or faculties of the soul: the emotional faculty (*thymos*) and the rational faculty (γνώμη, φρονεῖν, νόος). We should not tacitly assume that the Platonic concept of "parts of the soul" (τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς) was known to and shared by Heraclitus; he may well have conceived them as "powers" or *dynameis* of the soul. And we should not ascribe to Heraclitus the division of the rational part or faculty of the soul into theoretical and practical reason with two distinct virtues of *sophia* and *phronesis*. This was a revolutionary innovation of Aristotle's moral psychology in EN book 6; in Heraclitus, as in Plato, σοφία and φρόνησις must have been closely related, not contrasted, terms. The conceptual pair "to act and to speak" (ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν) in fr.100L/B112 exactly corresponds to the programmatic distinction of "words and deeds" (ἔπη καὶ ἔργα) in fr. 2L/B1. In the proem Heraclitus specifies the main subject of his work as a comparative enquiry into «words and deeds» in the human and divine world, i.e. in the cosmos. This is an anticipation in archaic phraseology of the future Stoic division of philosophy into logic (ἔπη «words», cf. λόγον τόνδε ibidem), physics (ἔργα, the "deeds" of the cosmos, i.e.cosmic processes) and ethics (the «deeds» of men). Now it becomes clear why «wisdom» consists in «speaking out the truth» (logic and physics) and «acting according to nature» (ethics). Both speech and action should be grounded in «agreement with nature», i.e. with the objective order of things directed by divine mind and omnipotent fate, and such following and agreement is possible only through «listening to» and «understanding» (ἐπαΐοντας) the voice of nature, the eternal logos. On this text of Heraclitus is directly based the fundamental principle of Stoic ethics "to live in agreement with nature", ὁμολογουμένως τῆι φύσει ζῆν.[122]

One should stop speaking about "the distorting lens" of the Stoic reception of Heraclitus. Instead one should admire the Stoics as the best interpreters of Heraclitus of all ancient commentators. Yes, they have rephrased the main doctrines of Heraclitus, originally expressed in archaic Ionian prose and metaphorical language, in a plain Hellenistic koine of their time using the conceptual and terminological apparatus of their own school, but what is wrong with this? Isn't any modern historian of ancient philosophy doing the same? One should rather speak about the distorting and deforming lens of the 19th century hypercritical "projectionism" which produced the ill-founded and philosophically dull materialist falsification of Heraclitus' utterly ingenious and profound ethical-political-theological thought, a falsification that still mars many expositions of his philosophy.

6. Polis and Cosmopolis: the practices of men. State and laws.

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[122] On this principle, the τέλος formula, see e.g. Schofield, Stoic ethics, in: Inwood (2003) 239 ff.

We find a similar contrast between the ideals of the unenlightened crowd and those who "listen to" the logos in the political philosophy of Heraclitus. As in his ethics, so in his political philosophy Heraclitus asserts the axiological primacy of the "one" (common) over the "many" (individual):

fr. 130L/B104 τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι ἕπονται καὶ νόμοισι χρέονται (scil. δήμων), <οὐκ> εἰδότες ὅτι 'οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί'.

'What kind of mind do they have? What kind of reason? They follow the singers of the crowd (demos) and they rely on the laws (of the crowd) ignoring that most are bad, few are good."

[Preliminary note on the Greek text, for details see our commentary to this fragment, Lebedev, Logos Geraklita, pp. 435-437. It is hard to understand why most editors of Heraclitus (Marcovich, Kahn and Conche among them) follow Diels-Kranz and Bywater and prefer the inferior and heavily corrupted version of Proclus to the superior version of Clement. The corrupted version of Proclus omits the word νόμοισι "laws" which is of primary importance not only for the interpretation of this fragment, but also for the reconstruction of Heraclitus' political philosophy in general. Clement is generally an incomparably superior source of Heraclitus quotations than Proclus both with regard of quantity and quality of quotations. And besides, Clement's quotation is in Ionian dialect (νόμοισι χρέονται!), whereas Proclus' quotation in a colorless late Greek, with the exception of one word, νόος. Note that the Ionian dialect in Proclus is otherwise «restored» by Diels, not attested in MSS.!]. By "they" Heraclitus means the unphilosophical and ignorant *hoi polloi*, those «lacking understanding» (*axynetoi*) who do not heed the universal *logos*, but indulge in gluttony, sex, intoxication and ecstatic «madness» of the Bacchic cult. The culprits, the teachers of this hedonistic way of life, according to Heraclitus, are the poets whose «words» (ἔπη) they heed: Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus. What is the link between the poets and the "laws of the crowd"? The link becomes transparent once we clarify the conventional translation of the term νόμοι as "laws". This word in classical Greek has a broader meaning than our «laws»: it covers not only political laws, but also customs, religious cults and rituals. We say «to believe in gods», the Greek used to say θεοὺς νομίζειν, literally "to recognize the gods by custom or law". Homer and Hesiod, according to Heraclitus, taught the Greeks the false religion of many anthropomorphic and immoral gods, which is harmful both for the human soul and for the state, as polytheism promotes the "private" and individual (ἴδιον) to the detriment of the "public" and common (ξυνόν), the separatism and disunity of communities (poleis), and their inability to withstand the might of the Persian Empire. Religion and politics for Heraclitus, as well as for the entire archaic period of Greek history, are inextricably linked, in a sense they are the same, the collective bonds, that transform a mass of people into single body of a polis, animated by a collective will of government. To create a unified state, you need a

unifying god. The *aristoi* in the ethical fr.102L/B29 choose "one instead of all". In fr.130L/B104 Heraclitus calls upon Ephesians to make the same choice in the sphere of *nomoi*, i.e in the sphere of *both* religion and politics. Like Plato in the 10th book of the *Politeia* (in which Heraclitus' invective against Homer' pacifism is quoted), Heraclitus believed that the philosophers should succeed poets as the teachers of the Greeks (according to our interpretation of fr. 133L/B35; cf. Heraclit. *Probabilia* fr.1(a) and (b) Leb. = Plato, *Resp.*607b).

Central to the understanding of Heraclitus' political theory and philosophy of law is the programmatic fragment quoted *verbatim* by Stobaeus: Fr. 131L/B 114:

ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου · κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

'Those who wish to speak [properly, "speak out their logos"] with mind, should strongly rely on the common for all /logos/, as a community [= many citizens] relies on [one and the same] *nomos*, and even much stronger. For all human *nomoi* [= customs and laws] are fed [= supported like nurselings by their Breadwinner, i.e. Father], by only one *nomos*, the divine. His power extends as far as he wills, he is sufficient for all and he even overpowers them all.'

As regards the text, the phrase ξυνῶι πάντων "common for all" is either elliptical for ξυνῶι πάντων λόγωι «common for all logos», or (as we are inclined to think) the word λόγωι after ξυνῶι has been lost in medieval transmission. This is more than just a conjecture: 1) λόγωι is supplied and then for some reason deleted in one of the two best MSS. of Stobaeus, the codex Napolitanus (N); 2) the chances are that Heraclitus' fr.7L/B2, that contains the phrase ξυνὸς λόγος "common logos" in Ionian dialect, derives from the context of fr.131L/B114 or even is partly based on it, as has been suggested by West and Marcovich.

This fragment cannot be adequately interpreted before we answer the preliminary question: who are the "speakers" that in their «speaking» (i.e. in their individual *logoi*) should rely on the "common *logos*"? The following reference to the *polis* and laws makes it clear that Heraclitus does not mean *in this particular passage* all men and the ordinary language they speak, although he may have said something like this in the first chapter in his theory of names. In this fragment Heraclitus apparently refers to «speakers» who speak or deliver their «speeches» (*logoi*) in an assembly, i.e. to political orators, or to those who «speak out» or write political or religious laws, *nomoi* (or *nomoi hieroi «sacred laws»*), i.e. legislators.

[**p.130**]

In Greek linguistic consciousness *nomos* (νόμος) «law or custom» is a kind of *logos*.[123] The

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[123] In the *Nicomachean Etics*, speaking about the educational role of the laws, Aristotle says: *EN* 1180a 21ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ "the law has a compulsive force, being a

fragment is a constructive supplement and a direct continuation of the preceding critical fragment 130L/B104. The bad *nomoi* criticized in the latter fragment were invented by *aoido*i, i.e. by poets like Homer. Therefore, the reference should be to religious *nomoi* (or at least should include religious *nomoi*), i.e. to anthropomorphic polytheism invented by poets who drank too much and were deprived of «sound mind». The fragment 131L/B114 says how one should establish good laws: legislators who wish to «speak out» laws «with sound mind» (ξὺν νόωι) should rely on the divine law, the law of the harmony opposites by which the polis of Zeus, i.e. the cosmos, is administered. This law permeates the whole Universe and governs all human practices, like art and crafts. But men do not «notice» this because of their stupidity and lack of understanding. As «workers» (ἐργάται in fr.107L/B75, probably authentic word preserved by Marcus Aurelius), they work correctly, "according to nature". They «work» correctly, without realizing this. It is only in the sphere of religion and politics that they err and act «contrary to nature». For Heraclitus polytheism and democracy (called *isonomia* in his time in Ionia) are inextricably linked as they are related forms of the same unnatural «rule of the many». Bad laws, both political and religious, are established by ignorant *oi polloi* who follow the insane poets; good laws, of which fr.131L/B114 speaks, should be established by the philosophers, exactly as in Plato's *Politeia*. Human laws are laws set by men. The Divine law (*theios nomos*) of the fr. 131L/B114 is not established by anyone; like the cosmos, it is eternal and omnipotent, it is the foundation of the cosmic justice in the Cosmopolis, the universal community of gods and men. If we translate this doctrine from the archaic and figurative language of Heraclitus into familiar modern terms, we have here a theory of natural law. The verb τρέφονται is not a biological, but a social metaphor. Human laws do not "feed on the divine," but are its «nurselings», that is, depend on it. A breadwinner is a metaphorical synonym for "Father," therefore the "divine law" is no different from "the father of and king of all" Polemos, as well as from the «reverse *harmonia*» of war and peace, the identity of opposites and the law of cyclical retribution. The translation of the term νόμοι as "laws" is conventional: in this case, Heraclitus means all the customs and practices of men, including crafts and arts (τέχναι). In fr. 106–124 Heraclitus shows that all technological practices of men mirror or «imitate» the "divine law" of the harmony of opposites. The principal argument of Heraclitus' critical political theory can be reconstructed as follows: 1) human arts and crafts imitate nature and the divine law, 2) human political institutions and religious laws contradict it, 3) therefore, they must be reformed and brought into line with nature and natural law. According to Heraclitus, we do not see in the physical Universe many arrangements (*cosmoi*) or autonomous self-governed states (*poleis*), contrary to Anaximander's blasphemous theory of innumerable worlds. What we see in «this arrangement» (κόσμον τόνδε), i.e.in the visible Universe,

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rule (or principle) that derives from certain practical wisdom and mind." Cf. *Politics*1287a 32 διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν «Therefore the law is a mind without appetite».

is the united empire of Zeus governed by the single providential divine Mind (*Gnome*) of the Wise Being (*To Sophon*).

This is the model (*paradeigma* according to Diodotus) of the correct form of government (*politeia*) that «conforms to nature» (is κατὰ φύσιν) and that will save the Greeks from slavery. In fragment 131L/B114 In 131 Heraclitus proposes a revolutionary for his time transformation of the polis pluralism and separatism into federal monism, the creation of a common Greek (probably Pan-Ionian at the initial stage) unified federal state, with a single government, united army and a unifying common religious cult of Apollo the Sun (consubstantial with his Father, Zeus the Cosmos). This state should be governed not by the ignorant *polloi*, but by the wise, most probably by an enlightened monarch who will model its laws on the heavenly prototype (*paradeigma*), i.e. the Cosmopolis. We have reconstructed this project from the fragments of Heraclitus, but there is an external supporting evidence that proves that the idea of federal state was known in 6th century Ionia and was considered by some as a practical plan of political and religious reforms intended to counterbalance the military might of the Persian empire and to save the Ionian Greeks from slavery. According to Herodotus, Thales of Miletus proposed to the *poleis* of the Ionian Dodecapolis (the Twelve cities that were already affiliated in a loose confederation, the Ionian league, while remaining autonomous states) to form a single *bouleuterion* (councel-chamber) in Teos, the centre of Ionia, and to transform the *poleis* into *demes*, i.e. administrative units, without resettlement of residents. [124]

The connection between the political theory of Heraclitus and his metaphysics and the philosophy of nature becomes apparent through the reconstruction of the triadic structure (see p. 111 above). The principle of the unity of opposites as such is rather abstract, it is of little value in political theory and of no use in political praxis. But once a third element is added to the binary scheme, that of a Moderator placed "above the fray", who sets the rules of competition of two conflicting parties and in this way prevents them from destruction, the abstract metaphysical scheme acquires obvious political meaning and relevance; it becomes a practical recipe of *eunomia* (stability provided by "good laws") and *homonoia* (civil concord).

The reconstruction of the triadic structure in Heraclitus' metaphysics and political theory once again provides a confirmation of the invaluable evidence of the commentator of Heraclitus Diodotus that

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[124] Herod. 1.169 Χρηστὴ δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ διαφθαρῆναι Ἰωνίην Θαλέω ἀνδρὸς Μιλησίου ἐγένετο, …ὃς ἐκέλευε ἐν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Τέῳ (Τέων γὰρ μέσον εἶναι Ἰωνίης), τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλις οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατά περ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν.

«Thales of Miletus even before the desolation of Ionia gave a useful advice to the Ionians to establish one common councel-chamber (*bouleuterion*) in Teos, since Teos is in the middle of Ionia; the other poleis would remain inhabited as they were, but would be considered like demes.»

the subject of Heraclitus' book was "not about nature", but "about the form of government" (περὶ πολιτείας), while the purpose of his discussion of cosmic processes was a kind of theory of natural law rather than scientific physics: nature as a political standard (*paradeigma*).

In political philosophy Heraclitus continues the tradition of "centrism" or impartial moderation "above the fray" that was a guiding principle in the legislation and reflections of Solon.[125] It is significant that even Solon's metaphorical language resembles that of Heraclitus: Solon compared himself to a "boundary stone" (ὅρος) between the rich and the poor. The concept of ὅρος (οὖρος in Ionian dialect), boundary point or limit, plays significant role in Heraclitus theory of the cosmic justice (fr.55L/B120; 56L). Solon complained that his enemies "barked" at him (and *eo ipso* at good laws) like dogs and that he felt himself like a hunted wolf (Solon, Fr. 31.9; 30, 26–27 Gentili – Prato). Heraclitus quotes a Greek proverb about a dog that barks at her master, probably in political context (fr. 126L/B97).

[p.132]

7. Theology: criticism of the popular religion and a manifesto of monotheism.

The third *logos* (discourse or chapter) of Heraclitus' work was theological, "On the gods". It started with reflections on the obscurity and difficulty of subject (fr.136-139L=B86, 47, 28a, 108 DK) that were followed by a criticism of all commonly recognized Greek authorities in the sphere of the divine, religion and mythology. Although we, following an established tradition, have included the invective against Hesiod, Xenophanes, Hecataeus, and Pythagoras in the first chapter on the Logos (fr. 21L/B40), this fragment may well derive from the introduction to the third chapter on the gods, since the only common feature shared by these four "polymaths" is their interest in religion, theology and myth: three of them have written about the gods, and the fourth - Pythagoras, was considered, among other things, an expert on various religious traditions and an authority on questions of the afterlife. The conclusion reached by Heraclitus after an overview of the achievements of his predecessors in the field of theology is that of dissatisfaction and rejection of all existing views: "even the most authoritative person decides to observe what is /just/ his opinions" (fr.138L/B28a). Heraclitus explains the incapacity of *hoi polloi* and of the theologians, both poets and philosophers, to cognize the true god by their failing to understand that the Wise Being is absolutely "distinct from all other creatures" (fr.139L/B108). It is so distinct from human nature, that most people cannot believe in it (*apistia*) and find it easier to believe in the familiar anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod that are similar to themselves. The third chapter consisted of two main

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[125] Aristotle on the reforms of Solon, see Dovatour (1965) 197 ff. (1989) 15 ff. On the reforms and *politeia* of Solon see Raaflaub, Ober, Wallace (edd.) 2007: 22–82. The connection between the political philosophy of Heraclitus and Solon was justly pointed out by Ch. Kahn, even without taking into account the triadic structure, Kahn (1979)180. See also Rowe, Schofield (edd.) 2008: 50.

sections: 1) the criticism of the popular anthropomorphic polytheism, both in cult and in mythology (negative theology); 2) constructive philosophical (pantheistic) theology that contained a manifesto of monotheism and practical advice on the reform of cult and dogma, *dromena* and *legomena*, ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. Probably, no other Greek philosopher before the Christian apologists has rejected the Greek religion as a false faith with such categorical force and passion as Heraclitus. This explains why some Christian apologists, like Justine Martyr, sympathized him and recognized him a "Christian before Christ". In the surviving fragments Heraclitus with loathing rejects the Apollonian cleansing rites (Fr. 144), the worship of the statues of the gods, and compares prayer to "talking to the wall." Like Pythagoreans (and influenced by Pythagoras?), Heraclitus rejected not only meat in the diet, but also bloody sacrifices in ritual: the gods should not be fed with "carrion": νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι (fr.143L/B96). Following the suggestion of Plutarch who quotes this saying in *Quaestiones convivales* 668F-669A, we interpret it not as a bizarre and inconceivable for any Greek demand to throw out human bodies instead of burial, but as a prohibition to eat "carrion" i.e. animal food, κρέας δὲ πᾶν νεκρόν ἐστι καὶ νεκροῦ μέρος "all meat is dead body and a part of dead"(Plut. *loc.cit.)*. This is further supported by the biographical tradition that pictures Heraclitus as a vegetarian: πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας "he fed on herbs and plants" (Diog.Laert.9.3). In Heraclitus' poetic cosmology traditional gods are reinterpreted allegorically as stars and elements. The Sun and the stars "feed" themselves on the "exhalation" (*anathymiasis*) from the sea, so the gods actually do not need animal food and wine offered to them by humans. We do not know for certain what kind of ritual (if any) he proposed as an alternative to the traditional *thysia* of animals, but if in the metaphorical model *Templum naturae* (fr.43L/B67 θυώματα; 37L/B30, ἀείζωον πῦρ was the "ever-living fire" kept unextinguished in temples, e.g. in the temple of Apollo in Delphi) the cosmic exhalation was conceived as kind of "natural sacrifice" and self-feeding of Apollo the Sun, a conjecture lies at hand, that he proposed as a "natural alternative" to *thysia* the bloodless burning of incenses (θυώματα) at the altar fire mentioned in fr. 43L/B67DK.

[p.133]

Heraclitus promised to the adherents of the mystery cults of the Bacchic type, as well as to Persian magi and other "liars" and "witnesses of lies" punishment by fire at the time of *koros/ekpyrosis* (fr.146-147L / B14). However, it should be noted that the analysis of the Dionysian ritual in fr.148L / B15 does not contain an unequivocal condemnation of it. On the contrary, Heraclitus seems to admit that the behavior of bacchants *would be impious* if they did not venerate the *phallos*; consequently, once they do venerate it, their behavior is pious, although they do not realize why. In the name of the sacred symbol αἰδοῖον, the organ of the generation of a new life, Heraclitus discovers the name of the death god Aides (cf. aid-oion "penis"); the ritual, like all human *tekhnai* is built on the "conjunction" of opposites and it is its antithetical character, conforming to nature and the *theios nomos*, that makes

it pious. This analysis of the ritual, which reveals the harmony of opposites in its basis unnoticed by men, in the third chapter "On gods" resembles the analysis of technological practices in the chapter two on polis (fr.106 – 124A Leb.). This part of the book of Heraclitus, unfortunately, is very incompletely represented in the preserved fragments and paraphrases. It can be assumed that Heraclitus undertook in the lost parts of the third chapter a systematic etymological analysis and allegorical explanation of the traditional divine names of Greek religion. Plato's *Cratylus* may conceal a lot of unidentified Heraclitean material from this chapter. This hypothesis is supported by the use of the Heraclitean analogy between Logos and the cosmos in the Platonic etymology of the name of Pan in *Cratylus* 408c2, a passage that we include as an anonymous quotation from Heraclitus in our collection of fragments fr. *Probabilia*, Nr. 3L.: [οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὸ πᾶν; "Do you know that the *logos* means "Universe?", asks Socrates. Hermogenes confirms that he knows. The word "do you know" are elliptical for "Do you know the theory that…?" There was only one Greek philosopher who used the word logos metaphorically for the "Universe", Heraclitus of Ephesus (fr.1-2L/B1, B50 DK). The etymology of Pan that follows, may or may not be Heraclitean (to establish this we would need additional evidence), but the division of the logos/cosmos into true (divine, celestial) and false (sublunary, human, the object of poetic lies) is 100% Heraclitean. The ambiguity of the expression τραγικὸς βίος «tragic life» (intending both poetic lies and "goatish life", i.e. hedonistic life of *hoi polloi*) may be also Platonic, but it is a good summary of Heraclitus' anti-hedonistic ethics].

We draw attention to the fact that, in his positive philosophical theology, Heraclitus avoids the word θεός 'god', perhaps because of its association with the anthropomorphic gods of poets. Heraclitus calls the new philosophical god "The Wise Being" (τὸ Σοφόν) in three fragments 139–141L, B108, B41, B32 (with a plausible allusion also in fr.1/B50). In fr.140 "The Wise Being" is identified with the cosmic "Mind" (Γνώμη) that alone steers "the whole Universe". The divine governing principle of the cosmos also appears under the metaphorical names or images of *Polemos* (War), *Aion* (Time), *Keraunos* (Thunder Strike), Shepherd, Breadwinner etc. The question arises, why did Heraclitus argue with such pathos on theological issues with Pythagoras and Xenophanes? There is a remarkable convergence in the philosophical theology of three Western Greek thinkers, all of them Pythagoreans or with Pythagorean background. Parmenides (ἀνήρ Πυθαγόρειος, according to Strabo), Xenophanes and Empedocles, all of them held a monotheistic doctrine, all of them identified this new philosophical god with "mind" (νόος, φρήν), and all of them conceived this god as a "sphere" (*Sphairos*).

[p.134]

There are only two differences. The Pythagoreans recognized the immateriality, the incorporeality both of the soul (conceived as immortal *daimon*) and of god, whereas in Heraclitus

"fire" formally is not incorporeal: it is the thinnest body, that is, a physical substance that fills the cosmos. However, as we have argued above in the section of Heraclitus' concept of fire, the celestial fire is divine and this saves the opposition of the body and the soul in Heraclitus. The second, philosophically and theologically more important difference is this: both the Eleatics and Xenophanes, apparently following Pythagoras, emphasize the "immobility" and immutability of the incorporeal god-mind. Heraclitus, on the contrary, considered rest as a "property of the dead" (εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν, fr.49 b L.). Just as Heraclitean ethics is not an ethics of meditative quietism (despite the principle all-acceptance and of contentedness), but ethics of struggle and participation in the common *agon* and "works" (ἔργα) of the cosmos and polis, so in his eschatology his notion of paradise is not a *nirvana*, but a flight at a cosmic speed with Apollo the Sun across the Universe, and intellectual pleasures reserved for the commensals of the gods at the heavenly *symposia* (fr.159, 159A L).The theological chapter "On gods" most probably ended with questions of the eschatology and the afterlife of souls. Despite some vagueness and inconsistency of the tradition, we can conclude that Heraclitus recognized a kind of naturalized version of the Pythagorean astral immortality for the elect, that is, for those wise and heroes who have purified their souls by philosophical *bios* and vegetarian diet and achieved the "dry" god-like state of the soul (fr.156/B63, 157L/B18). For those who, like beasts, have lived a hedonistic life of *terpsis*, i.e. for *hoi polloi* immersed in the "filth" of bodily pleasures, like gluttony, wine and sex, Heraclitus had bad news: the dissolution of a "wet soul" together with the body at the moment of death (fr.158L cf. A17 DK). Presumably, in the concluding lines of his book Heraclitus touched on the theme of the apotheosis of the philosophers (fr.159L, cf. B13 DK) using the image of the "commensals of gods". According to our conjecture, the very last fragment was the parable about Sibyl and Apollo (fr.160L / B92) intended as a kind of "*exegi monumentum*". Heraclitus, like Sibyl, was a prophet of Apollo ("listening not to my logos…" fr. 1L / B50). Consequently, all that has been said in his logos (in the sense of his book, teaching), is the divine word of Apollo, who "speaks by his mouth". And just as the voice of Sibyl is still heard 1000 after her death, so the words of Heraclitus, written in this book, will be "heard" and read by the future generations. As the unflagging interest in his philosophy shows, this prophecy of Heraclitus came true: we continue to read and to interpret his words 2500 years after his death.

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PART II

THE FRAGMENTS OF THE TREATISE 'ON NATURE' A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE GREEK TEXT WITH A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY.

PRINCIPLES OF THIS EDITION

There are two main types in the edition of fragments of pre-Platonic philosophers: the Diels' model, adopted in his *Die Fragmente der Vosokratiker*, and the model of S. Ya. Lurie, adopted in his edition of Democritus (*Democritea*, 1970). The fundamental difference between them is due to different understanding of the term 'fragment'. According to Diels, a 'fragment' is a verbatim quotation from a lost work of a philosopher, in contrast to doxography or doxographic "evidence" (*testimonia*) - later expositions (usually summarizing) of the 'opinions' of philosophers, usually in the language and terminology of later philosophical schools (peripatetic, Stoic, Skeptical, Epicurean, Neoplatonic, etc.). The advantage of this method is that it seeks to separate 'authentic sources' (the philosopher's own words) from later interpretations and formulations. But this is a formalist method, which at times does not meet the tasks of historical-philosophical reconstruction of the philosophical *content* of the lost work, as well as of the general structure of the text itself. The fact is that it is not always possible to separate a quotation from the context of the citing author, and therefore there can be a lot of "doxography" in the text of "fragments". Conversely, a good quality doxography (for example, the doxography of the Milesians by Hippolytus or the Atomists by Diogenes Laertius) may contain paraphrases close to the original text, including authentic terminology and phraseology. For the reconstruction of the teachings of an early philosopher, such a 'doxography' provides significantly more than a formal 'fragment' consisting of a single word, cited by a lexicographer and lacking context. Understanding this obvious fact, S. Ya. Lurie, who set himself the task to reconstruct the entire system of atomistic philosophy, abandoned the formal division of sources into doxography and fragments and arranged both in a single thematic order. In this case, the 'fragment' is defined not formally-philologically, as a literal quotation, but as a philosophically meaningful piece of information: as documentary evidence containing irreducible (unknown from other sources) information about the teaching and/or part of the lost work. In form, such a "fragment" can be a *verbatim* quote, as well as a paraphrase or a summarizing doxographic evidence. According to the same principle, Jean Bollack published the fragments of Empedocles (1965-1969). There is also a partly "hybrid" method, in which the classical understanding of the "fragment" is taken as the basis, and doxography is printed under individual fragments as *testimonia* to them: this is how Miroslav Marcovich's edition of Heraclitus was built (Marcovich did not invent it, he only expanded a more compact way of presenting the tradition, going back to Bywater and Walzer). The value of this method is limited by the fact that it includes only doxography, which can be derived from extant 'fragments' (which means, that it is mostly

worthless), and leaves out doxography that is not reducible to other sources, i.e., doxography which is much more valuable. Recently, a type of "comprehensive" edition of the entire tradition associated with a particular philosopher has also become widespread, in which all mentions of a certain philosophe's name with extended contexts are arranged in the chronological order of the source authors. In essence, it is rather a raw database (useful in its own way for specialists), without any attempt to reconstruct the text or doctrine of the lost work. Such, for example, is the edition of the Milesians in the series "*Traditio praesocratica*": G. Wöhrle (ed.). Die Milesier: Anaximander und Anaximenes. Berlin, 2012.

Our edition does not compete with such enterprises, it aims to reconstruct (as far as possible) the structure of the lost treatise of Heraclitus "On Nature." If we compare such a task with assembling a picture puzzle, we tried, whenever possible, 'to put together' authentic fragments-citations into thematic groups (and then to integrate these groups into sections and chapter of the lost treatise) and in this way "fill in" the blank spots in the overall picture. But where it was impossible, we used secondary sources: doxography (very moderately), paraphrases, reminiscences, imitations, etc., as a rule, not isolated, but attested by a consensus of several independent sources and forming philosophically meaningful complexes that express a certain thought, idea, argument, analogy etc. These might be called "thought fragments", since their exact verbal form cannot be always established with certainty. However, the reader can always judge the degree of reliability of the reconstruction by the "authenticity grade" that determines the *authenticity status* of the source, accompanying every quotation and piece of evidence. We distinguish the following "grades" or status of authenticity of every text in a hierarchical order from the highest to the lowest:

"Verbatim quotation": verbatim quotation is a flawless text, usually in the Ionian dialect.

"Quotation": a quotation with some elements of later language, but mostly authentic.

 "Paraphrase close to the original text": a paraphrase without dogmatic terminology of later schools, may contain verbatim phrases and authentic terms. In respect of doctrinal content may be almost as good as quotation.

"Paraphrase" (without clarification) – rather common paraphrase which rephrases the original text in later language.

"Interpretive paraphrase" – contains a serious reformulation both of language and thought of the original.

"Doxography" or "doxographical paraphrase" is a summarizing statement of a theory or "opinion", often in later terminology. It may be worthless in some cases, and it may be philosophically valuable in other cases, if it contains unique ('irreducible') information.

"Reminiscence" reminiscence is a brief anonymous quotation or allusion.

"Imitation or adaptation". Requires great care when using, can freely mix authentic elements with non-authentic ones. On the other hand, it may contain verbatim quotations of some words and phrases, including those unknown from other sources.

"Reconstruction". In some rare cases, our edition includes (specially marked) hypothetical fragments - reconstructions based on their summaries in the later sources (e.g. Fr. 44A and 45A in our edition). Strictly speaking, a reconstruction lacks authenticity grade precisely because it is hypothetical, not a transmitted text, but it claims to be essentially correct or very close to the lost original.

The verbatim part of the quotation is highlighted in bold type both in the Greek text and in the English translation, good paraphrases (especially of the first type) are underlined.

Texts given under the same fragment number and distinguished by Latin letters as (a), (b), (c), etc. are usually complementary variants or pieces of evidence without hierarchy.

The index A (B, C...) after the fragment number indicates that it is inextricably linked with the previous one, sometimes as an addition, sometimes as a variant or possibly derivative of the previous one.

In handling "*Dubia et spuria*", I introduce a new category of hypothetical or probable fragments (*fragmenta probabilia*). I do not doubt the authenticity of these texts, but I distinguish them from "*Dubia et spuria.*" I do not include them in the main corpus on formal grounds only: they are quoted anonymously, without mentioning the name of Heraclitus. But in most cases attribution to Heraclitus is supported by verbal coincidences with attested Heraclitus, peculiarity of doctrine, mention of his name in proximate context of the same source, exact parallels, especially forming a consensus etc.

Most of the "probable" fragments are based on my attribution and are published for the first time. The section of unauthentic and erroneously attributed to Heraclitus fragments (*Dubia et spuria*) I limit to only a few philosophically important examples in order to warn the reader against serious misconceptions. The most "pernicious" of them, which has brought confusion to the already complicated issue of the psychology of Heraclitus and his doctrine of the "logos", is, in my opinion, B 115 according to Diels' numbering about the "self-multiplying logos of the soul." I emphasize once again that this text is not attributed to Heraclitus in any ancient source and cannot belong to him on philosophical grounds, either, since it contains the Pythagorean conception of the soul as a (self-multiplying) number or 'proportion' which Heraclitus would have dismissed with indignation as a Pythagorean lie and *kakotekhnia*.

Speaking about "reconstruction", I mean a kind of super-task which, under the present state of our sources, cannot be always achieved with absolute certainty. Only an ignoramus or a charlatan could claim to restore the exact sequence of all fragments. Exact localization with

absolute certainty is possible only for one fragment, fr. 2 (B 1 DK), which, according to the direct testimony of Aristotle and Sextus, was placed "at the beginning" (ἐν ἀρχῆι, ἐναρχόμενος) of the work of Heraclitus. Nevertheless, this ideal super-task can serve as a methodological guiding principle which allows a plausible reconstruction of the general structure of the Heraclitus' treatise, with a more or less probable distribution of individual fragments into three "chapters" (*logoi*) known from Diogenes Laertius, and subsequent localization of these thematic groups in the three chapters. I am fully aware that some epistemological passages about the difficulty of finding the truth, etc., could be found not only in the introduction to the treatise immediately after the passages on the *logos* (where I place them, following the rather common consensus of modern editors), but also at the beginning of the "theological discourse" in chapter 3 ('*logos theologikos*'). I also hesitated whether to place the fragments on "divine and human" knowledge (fr. 82-83) in the introduction to the first chapter or in the ethical-political second '*logos.*' The decision to place them in the ethical-political chapter is justified by the fact that they are dominated by ethical issues proper (especially the problem of pleasure).

Conventional signs, types of brackets in the edition of the text

( ) — regular punctuation mark, parenthesis, part of the ancient text.

<...> — angle brackets, modern editor's insertion into an ancient text, filling in a gap.

{...} – curly braces: athetesis (deletion): a later insertion in the ancient text, usually a gloss, interpolation, deleted by modern editor

[...] — explanatory remarks of the translator (for example, a summary of the context), references to sources, etc. are enclosed in square brackets.

In epigraphic and papyrus texts, square brackets indicate the publisher's filling of a lacune.

/.../ — in the English translation, slash brackets contain words that are not lexically represented in the Greek text, but are implied by the general meaning of a sentence.

= equivalent in meaning to…

~ (tilde) – a connotation

The structure of the treatise «On nature».

I. LOGOS (Metaphysics and theory of knowledge). Fragments 1 – 36.

II. COSMOS (Philosophy of nature). Fragments 37 – 65.

III. MAN. SOUL. LIFE AND DEATH. (Physical anthropology and psychology). Fragments 66 – 81.

IV. ETHOS. GOOD AND EVIL. ARETE. (Moral philosophy). Fragments 82 – 105.

V/1. POLIS: THE WORLD OF CRAFTS AND ARTS (TEXNAI) (Social anthropology).

V/2. POLIS: STATE AND LAWS (Political philosophy). Fragments 125 – 135.

VI. PERI THEON. (Popular religion and philosophical theology). Fragments 136 – 160.

Our 6 sections correspond to the ancient division of Heraclitus' book into three *logoi* (Diogenes Laertius 9.5) – «On the Universe, On Polis, On gods» as follows: sections I-II = «On the Universe», sections III – V/2 = «On polis» («politics» in broad sense, including social anthropology and ethics), section VI = «On the gods».

Inside these sections (comprising 160 fragments) we distinguish 41 thematic groups of fragments:

I. LOGOS (fr.1 – 36)

1. The book of nature and the dreamers: fr.1–3.
2. *Phronesis* and *doxa*, knowledge and imagination: fr.4–10.
3. Personal experience versus oral tradition: fr.11–13.
4. Against the poets: fr.14–17.
5. Sense-perception and the language of phenomena: fr.18–20.
6. Against polymathy of the philosophers and wise men: fr.21–24.
7. Truth is hard to find: fr.25–26.
8. The wisdom of Apollo: harmony and identity of the opposites: fr.27–29.

9. The universality of war and strife. Polemics against Homer's pacifism: fr. 31–36 (cf. fr. *Probabilia* 1-2).

II.   COSMOS (fr. 37– 65)

1. Cosmos as a whole. The law of measures (periodical regularity). The divine Fire: fr.37 – 40.
2. The cosmic cycle. The war of elements and the calendar of the Great year: fr.41–47.
3. Universality of change. The road up and down (The law of pendulum). Fate: fr. 48–53.
4. The cycles of day and night. The seasons. The Sun: fr.54 – 59.
5. The Moon and its phases: fr. 60.
6. Other stars: fr. 61.
7. Living beings: fr.62.
8. Time. The Great year: fr. 63–65.

III. MAN. THE SOUL. LIFE AND DEATH (fr. 66–81).

1. The nature of the soul. Exhalation. The rivers: fr. 66–72.
2. The dry and the wet soul: fr.73–74A.
3. Life and death, awakening and sleep: fr.75–77.
4. Pessimism: life is suffering, death is relief: fr.78–81.

IV.   ETHOS. GOOD AND EVIL. ARETE (fr. 82–105)

1. Divine and human knowledge. The relativity of human values: fr.82–86.
2. Ruling over one's passions: fr.87–89.
3. The relativity of pleasure: proofs from zoology: ft. 90–95.
    1. Monkeys fr. 90
    2. Donkeys fr.91
    3. Oxen fr. 92
    4. Swines fr. 93
    5. Birds fr. 94-
    6. Fishes fr. 95
4. The ethical ideal. Self-knowledge and happiness: fr.96–100.
5. The ethical ideal. The virtues. Self-control. Contentedness: fr.100–101.

6. Heroic ethics. Death in battle. The eternal glory: fr. 102–105.

V/1. POLIS: THE WORLD OF CRAFTS AND ARTS (fr. 106–24A)

1. All men in their «deeds» (*erga*) in the realm of crafts unconsciously follow the divine (cosmic) law of measure and the harmony of the opposites. Craft (τέχνη) imitates nature (φύσις): fr.106–107.

2. Manifestations of the divine law of the harmony of opposites in particular arts and crafts: fr. 108 – 124A.

   1. Grammatical art: fr.108.
   2. Music: fr.109
   3. Art of painting: fr.110.
   4. Medicine fr.111–112.
   5. Fullers: fr. 113.
   6. Carpenters and builders: fr.114–114A.
   7. Potters: fr. 115.
   8. Goldsmiths: fr. 116.
   9. Iron-workers: fr. 116A.
   10. Charcoal-makers (?): fr. 116B.
   11. Bakers (?): fr.117.
   12. Courts: fr. 118–119.
   13. Buyers and sellers, debtors and creditors: fr.120–121.
   14. *Agons* – athletic competitions: fr.122.
   15. The art of divination: f. 123.
   16. Marriage and child-bearing. Man and woman. Father and son: fr. 124–124A.

V/2. POLIS: STATE AND LAWS (fr.125–135).

   1. Against the popular rule. The 'many' lack understanding: fr.125–130.
   2. Cosmopolis and the divine law as a paradigm of the ideal legislation: fr.131–132.
   3. The role of the philosophers: fr.133 –133B.
   4. Against lawlesness and hybris: fr.134 – 135.

VI. ON THE GODS (fr. 136–160).

1. The divine is hard to know. The power of prejudices (*dokeonta*): fr.136–138.
2. The manifesto of monotheism: the Wise Being and the cosmic Mind (*Gnome*): fr.139–141.
3. Critique of popular religion: against rituals and mysteries: fr. 142–149.
4. Eschatology. The Judgement of Fire: fr.157–158.
5. The fate of the souls after death: fr.153–156.
6. The apotheosis of the philosophers: fr.157–158.
7. The wise as commensals of the gods: fr.159–159A.
8. *Exegi monumentum*. The voice of Sibyl: fr.160.

[p.146]

I. LOGOS

<The Book of nature – 'this logos' - and the dreamers>

1 (B 50 DK)   *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio*, IX 9,1

οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ<δε τοῦ> λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν· σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰδέναι.

τοῦ<δε τοῦ> supplevi, cf. fr. 2 ‖ λόγου Bernays : δόγματος Parisinus ‖ ὁμολογεῖν· interpunxi, infinitivus quasi imperativus : ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν, fere omnes ‖ εἰδέναι cod. : εἶναι Miller, edd

Listening not to mine, but to this logos*, one must agree: wisdom consists in knowing all things as one.

Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: "Listening not to mine, but to this logos, one must agree: there is only one Wise being (i.e., god) to know (or to control) all things"

* i.e., to the visible "book of nature", the Universe conceived as word/text.

2 (B 1 DK)   *Verbatim quotation*

Sextus. *adv. math.* VII, 132; Hippolyt. *Refutatio* IX, 9,1 [τοῦ δὲ λόγου ... ὄκως ἔχει]

τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιουτέων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

τοῦ δὲ Hippol. : om. Sextus ‖ αἰεί Clem. Alex. *Str.* V.111.7 : ἀεί Hippol. : om. Sextus ‖ πάντων Hippol : om. Sextus ‖ καὶ ἐπέων Hippol. : ἐπέων Sextus ‖ τοιουτέων Hippol. : τοιούτων Sextus ‖ διερέων κατὰ φύσιν Hippol.: κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον Sext. ‖ ποιοῦσιν Sextus : ποιοῦσιν καὶ λέγουσιν, ut videtur, Marcus, vide fr. 3 infra.

But although this logos exists forever humans fail to understand it both before they have listened to it and once they have listened. And indeed, although all /humans/ encounter this logos *, they look like ignorant of it even when they try /to understand/ such words and deeds as those which I expound by dividing them according to nature and indicating how they are. As regards

the rest of humanity, they do not realize what they are doing awaken, just as they are oblivious /~unconscious/ of what they are doing when they sleep.

----

* Intentional syntactical ambiguity admits alternative translation: "although all things happen according to this logos".

3 (72–73)   *Paraphrase of fr.1-2 and context*

Marcus Antoninus, IV, 46; p. 33, 21–24 Dalfen

ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνῆσθαι <u>ὧι μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγωι τῶι τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτωι διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται</u>. καὶ ὅτι <u>οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν</u>· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε δοκοῦμεν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.

  Always remember the saying of Heraclitus: <u>with the very same logos with which they communicate constantly – the one that governs the Universe – they are at variance, and what they encounter daily seems to them unknown.</u> Also that <u>one should not act and speak like dreamers,</u> for in our dreams we too imagine to act and to speak.

<Phronesis and doxa. Knowledge and imagination >

4 (89)   *Paraphrase of fr. 2 and its context*

Plutarchus, *De superstitione*, 166 C

ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι <u>τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι.</u>

Heraclitus says that for the waking there is one and common world, whereas of the sleepers each turns away into his private world.

5 (17)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* II 8 (II, 117, 1 St.)

οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρέουσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι.

———————

ὁκοίοις Bergk : ὁκόσοι L (Laurentianus V 3) ‖ ἐγκυρέουσιν Schuster : ἐγκυρσεύουσιν L

Most people do not perceive what they encounter /in their experience/, nor do they understand what they have learned, but instead they believe their own imagination.

<div align="center">

6 (113) *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Stobaeus III,1,179 (III, p.129 Hense)

ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν.

Sound mind is common to all.

<div align="center">

7 (2) *Paraphrase + verbatim quotation*

</div>

Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* VII 133 (p. 33 Mutchmann)

<u>διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι κοινῶι</u> {ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός}. **τοῦ < δὲ> λόγου <τοῦ>δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.**

————————

τοῦ < δὲ> λόγου <τοῦ> supplevi (cf. Fr. 1) : τοῦ λόγου δ' codd., edd. ‖ λόγωι post κοινῶι add. N, sed exp.

<u>Therefore, one should follow</u> **the common** /logos/... **but although this logos is common, most people conduct their life as if they had a private intelligence**.

<div align="center">

8 (46) *Paraphrase + quotation*

</div>

Diogenes Laertius, IX,7

τήν τε <u>οἴησιν</u> **ἱερὰν νόσον** ἔλεγε καὶ τὴν <u>ὅρασιν ψεύδεσθαι</u>

Heraclitus said that <u>imagination</u> is **madness*** and that the <u>sight lies</u>.

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 *Literally "holy disease", i.e., epilepsy.

<div align="center">

9 (34) *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V, 115,3 (II, 404, 5-6 St.)

ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι.

Those who listen, but do not understand, are like deaf: it is about them the porverb says "while being here they are away".

<div align="center">

10 (19) *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* II, 24, 5 (II, 126 St.)

ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν.

Unable to listen, they are unable to speak, as well.

<Personal experience versus oral tradition>

11 (74) *Verbatim quotation*

Marcus Antoninus IV, 46

οὐ δεῖ ὡς παῖδας τοκεώνων, τοῦτ' ἔστι κατὰ ψιλόν· καθότι παρειλήφαμεν.

 [Always remember the saying of Heraclitus] that <u>one should not /act and speak/</u> like "**children of their parents**", i.e. , in plane words, following the tradition.

12 (87) *Verbatim quotation*

Plutarchus, *De audiendo,* 40F

βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγωι ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ.
A fool gets excited upon hearing any speech (logos).

13 (101a) *Paraphrases*

(a) Polybius XII, 27

ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες.
Eyes are more trustworthy witnesses than ears.

(b) Polybius IV, 40, 2

ἀπίστους ... βεβαιωτὰς κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον.
[Poets and mythologists are] untrustworthy witnesses on what is disputed.

<Against the poets>

14 (57) *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* IX, 10

διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν.
The teacher of most is Hesiod. It is him that they recognize as the one who knows most of all, although he did not know even Day and Night, for they are one and the same.

15 (106) *Paraphrase + interpretation*

Plutarchus, *Camillus* 19, 3

περὶ δ' ἡμερῶν ἀποφράδων εἴτε χρὴ τίθεσθαί τινας εἴτε ὀρθῶς Ἡράκλειτος ἐπέπληξεν <u>Ἡσιόδωι τὰς μὲν ἀγαθὰς ποιουμένωι, τὰς δὲ φαύλας</u> [*Opp.* 765ff.], <u>ὡς ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας ἁπάσης μίαν οὖσαν</u>, ἑτέρωθι διηπόρηται.

Heraclitus reproached Hesiod for treating some days as fortunate and some as unfortunate; in his opinion Hesiod did not know that the nature of every day is one and the same.

16 (99)   *Quotation*

Plutarchus, *De fortuna* 98c

ἡλίου μὴ ὄντος εὐφρόνην ἂν ἤγομεν

──────────

ἤγομεν codd. : ἠγνοοῦμεν Lebedev FRGF I, 226.

If there were no sun, we would live in (perpetual) night*.

----

* or, accepting the emendation ἠγνοοῦμεν for ἤγομεν: "if there were no sun, we would ignore /the name of/ night".

17 (42)   *Quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* IX, 1

τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι, <u>καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως</u>.

Heraclitus said that **Homer deserved to be thrown out of the competitions and vapulated,** <u>and Archilochus likewise</u>.

<Sense-perception and the language of phenomena>

18 (55)   *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio* IX,9,5

ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω.
All that can be seen, heard and perceived, that's what I prefer.

19 (107)   *Verbatim quotation*

Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII, 126

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων.
Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for people if they have souls unintelligent like barbarians.

20 (56)   *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio* IX,9,5

ἐξηπάτηνται, φησίν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς {τὴν γνῶσιν} **τῶν φανερῶν παραπλησίως Ὁμήρωι, ὃς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων. ἐκεῖνόν τε γὰρ παῖδες φθεῖρας κατακτείνοντες ἐξηπάτησαν εἰπόντες· ὅσα εἴδομεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα ἀπολείπομεν, ὅσα δὲ οὔτε εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα φέρομεν.**

Humans have been deceived by the appearances like Homer, although he was the wisest of all the Greeks. For he too was deceived by the children who told him (a puzzle) while killing lice: "all we have seen and grasped, we have lost, and all we have neither seen nor grasped, we have gained".

<*Against polymathy of philosophers and wise men*>

21 (40)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* IX, 1

πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὗτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

Much learning does not teach understanding, otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras as well as Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

22 (129)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* VIII, 6

[*The text of Diogenes Laertius c. 200 A.D.*]

Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.

Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, practiced inquiry /= gathering information/ beyond all men and having selected these writings claimed as his own wisdom /what was really/ much learning and con game.

[*Reconstruction of Heraclitus' original text*]

Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐπιλεξάμενος Τααύτου τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.

Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, practiced inquiry beyond all men and, having read the writings of Taautos /= Thot/, claimed as his own wisdom /what was really/ much learning and con game.

23 (81)   *Verbatim quotation*

Philodemus, *Rhetorica* I coll. 57, 62 (I p. 351. 354 Südhaus)

<Πυθαγόρας> κοπίδων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός.

[Pythagoras is] a **mastermind of swindles** /or "a chief of impostors"/.

<div align="center">

24 (38)   *Summary paraphrase*

</div>

Diogenes Laertius I, 23

δοκεῖ δὲ (scil. <u>Θαλῆς</u>) κατά τινας <u>πρῶτος ἀστρολογῆσαι</u> ... μαρτυρεῖ δ' αὐτῶι καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Δημόκριτος.

According to some, <u>Thales was the first astronomer</u> ... this is testified by Heraclitus and Democritus.

<div align="center">

<Truth is hard to find >

25 (123)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Themistius, *Orationes* 5, 69b; Proclus, *In remp.* II, p. 107,5 Kroll

φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.

Nature loves to hide itself.

<div align="center">

26 (22)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* IV 4,2 (II 249, 23 St.)

χρυσὸν γὰρ **οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.**

The gold-seekers dig up a lot of earth and find just a little bit /of gold/.

<div align="center">

<The wisdom of Apollo: harmony and identity of opposites >

27 (93)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Plutarchus, *De Pythiae oraculis*, 404 D

ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks directly, nor conceals, but gives signs.

<div align="center">

28 (48)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Etymologicum Magnum, s.v. βιός

τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.

οὖν Et. M.: δέ Tzetzes || τῶι ... τόξωι Et.M., Tzetzes, *Schol. in Il.* : τοῦ βιοῦ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα βίος, τὸ δὲ ἔργον θάνατος Eustath. *in Il.* I,49, acc. Bywater

The name of the bow is life, but its work is death.

<div align="center">

29 (51)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX 9,2; cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 187 AB; idem, Soph. 242 DE; Plutarchus, *De tranquillitate animi* 473 D; idem, *De Iside* 369 FD; idem, *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* 1026 A; Porphyrius, *De antro* 29.

οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει, <ἕ>ν· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

ὁμολογέει Hippol. : συμφέρεται Plato ‖ παλίντροπος Hippol., Plut. : παλίντονος Plato, Porphyr. ‖ ὁμολογέει ἕν Diels, Herakleitos : ὁμολογέειν Parisinus : ὁμολογέει DK alii ‖ ἁρμονίη κόσμου Plut.

They do not understand how the one, being at variance with itself is in perfect agreement /with itself/: a reversed conjunction /~ harmony/ like the conjunction of the bow and the lyre.

<div align="center">

30 (54)

</div>

<div align="right">

Verbatim quotation

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX 9, 5

ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων.

The invisible conjunction (harmony) is stronger /~ superior/ than the visible one.

<div align="center">

<The universality of war and strife. Polemics against Homer's pacifism>

</div>

<div align="center">

31 (80).   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, VI 42 (II 111, 11 Koetschau) **εἰδέ<ναι> χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνὸν καὶ δίκην ἔριν καὶ γινόμενα πάντα   κατ᾽ ἔριν καὶ χρεώμενα.**

εἰδέναι χρή Schleiermacher, acc. Bywater, Walzer, Kirk, Marcovich, Kahn, Conche : εἰ δέ A (Vaticanus graecus 386) : εἰδέναι δὲ χρή DK ‖ χρεώμενα A, acc. Kahn, Conche : χρεών Diels, alii.

One should know that war is really 'common', that strife is the right way of things /~justice/, and that all things are generated by strife and by means of loan /from their opposites/.

<div align="center">

32 (53)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio* IX 9, 4

Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

Polemos (War) is the «father and king of all beings»: some of them he appoints gods, others humans, and some of them he turns into slaves, others sets free.

<div align="center">

33 (52)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio* IX, 9, 4 (p. 344, 13 Marc.)

αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη.

Time (Aion) is a child playing *pessoi*, child is the king!

<div align="center">

34 (8)
</div>

Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, IX,1. 1155 b 4

(a) **τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον**   *Verbatim quotation*

(b) <u>καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν</u>   *Paraphrase*

(c) **καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι**   *Quotation*

And Heraclitus says:

  (a) **the adverse is beneficial**,

  (b) <u>and from conflcting (opposites) consists the most beautiful harmony</u>

  (c) and **all things are generated by strife**.

<div align="center">

35 (A 22)   *Paraphrase*
</div>

Aristoteles, Ethica Eudemia. H 1. 1235a 25

οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα· καὶ Ἡ. <u>ἐπιτιμᾶι τῶι ποιήσαντι «ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο»</u> [Σ 107]· <u>οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶια ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων</u>.

  Others hold that opposites are friendly, and Heraclitus <u>rebukes Homer who said "let the strife vanish from among gods and men!":</u> in his opinion, <u>there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no living beings without male and female sex, which are opposite to each other</u>.

<div align="center">

36   *Paraphrase + quotation*
</div>

  (a) Plutarchus, *De Iside* 370 D (= 28 b3 Ma).

καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον **εὐχόμενον ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν ἔκ τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι λανθάνειν** <u>φησὶ (Ἡράκλειτος)</u> **τῆι πάντων γενέσει καταρώμενον**, <u>ἐκ μάχης καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τὴν γένεσιν ἐχόντων</u>...

And **Homer**, in Heraclitus words, **while praying "might the strife vanish from among gods and men" does not realize that in fact he is cursing the generation of all beings,** since they are born from strugle and antipathy.

(b) Scholia A in Iliadem XVIII 107 (= 28 b 5 Marc)

Ἡράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ᾽ ἔριν συνεστάναι νομίζων μέμφεται Ὅμηρον, σύγχυσιν κόσμου δοκῶν αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι.

Heraclitus who believes that the nature of things is constructed according to strife, reproaches Homer because in his opinion Homer prays for the collapse of the world.

(c) Simplicius, *In categorias,* p. 412,22 Kalbfleisch (= 28 b 6 Marc)

οὐ συγχωρήσουσι δὲ ὅσοι τἀναντία ἀρχὰς ἔθεντο, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἡρακλείτειοι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείψει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα. Διὸ καὶ μέμφεται τῶι Ὁμήρωι Ἡράκλειτος εἰπόντι ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο· οἰχήσεσθαι γάρ φησι πάντα.

But with this will not agree those who posit the opposites as principles of things, among others the Heracliteans. In their view, if one of the opposites will be gone, all things will vanish and disappear. For this reason, Heraclitus reproaches Homer who said "might the strife perish from among gods and men!" He says that in this case everything will perish.

II. COSMOS

< Cosmos as a whole. The law of μέτρα (measured periods or regular cycles). The divine Fire>

37 (30)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V, 104, 2 (II, p. 369 St.)

κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

———————

κόσμον τόνδε (sine τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων) Simplicius, Plutarchus : κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων Clemens, acc. Kahn: κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων Bywater, fere omnes

This world-order (cosmos), the same for all beings, no god and no man has ever made, but it always was, it is and it will be ever-living fire, kindling up by measured periods and going out by measured periods.

38 (124)   *Paraphrase + verbatim quotation*

Theophrastus, *Metaphysica,* 15 p. 16 Ross-Fobes

<u>ἄλογον</u> κἀκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν <u>εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἔκαστα τῶν μερῶν ἄπαντ᾽ ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγωι</u> <u>καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μηθὲν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽</u> **ὥσπερ σαρμὸς** **εἰκῆι κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος**, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, **κόσμος**.

_____

κἀκεῖνο Bergk : κἀκεῖνος codd.‖ σαρμός scripsi : σάρξ codd. : σάρμα Diels, acc. Marcovich : σωρός Usener : σάρον Bernays

<u>It would also seem absurd if the whole Universe and all its parts, everything is</u> <u>arranged in certain order, ratio, forms, powers and periods, whereas in the first</u> <u>principles there is nothing of the kind, but,</u> in Heraclitus words,

  «**the most beautiful cosmos /would be/ like a heap of rubbish dispersed at** **random**».

<div align="right">

39 (cf. 64)   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX 10, 7 (p. 347, 32 Marc.)

λέγει δὲ καὶ **φρόνιμον** τοῦτο **εἶναι τὸ πῦρ** <u>καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον</u>.

  Heraclitus says that this **fire is intelligent** and <u>is the cause of administration of</u> <u>the Universe.</u>

<div align="right">

40 (64)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX,10,7 (p. 347, 33 Marc.)

τάδε πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός, τουτέστι κατευθύνει, <u>κεραυνὸν τὸ πῦρ λέγων τὸ αἰώνιον</u>.

_____

τάδε Boeder ap. Guthrie I, 471 n., acc. West : τὰ δέ P, acc. Diels-Kranz

This Universe is governed by Thunderbolt…
... by "Thunderbolt" he means the eternal fire.

  < The cosmic cycle. The war of elements. The calendar of the Great year>

<div align="right">

41 (65)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium,* IX 10, 7 (p. 347, 35 Marc.)

καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ **χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον·**

χρησμοσύνη δέ ἐστιν ἡ διακόσμησις κατ' αὐτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐκπύρωσις κόρος.

He calls it (= fire) "**Poverty and Abundance**". "Poverty" in his usage means *diakosmesis* (= current world arrangement), and "Abundance" means *ekpyrosis* (= world conflagration)

<center>**42** (90)   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase of context*</center>

Plutarchus, *De E apud Delphos* 8; p. 388E

...τὴν τὰ ὅλα διακοσμοῦσαν ἀρχὴν...ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνην ὑπαλλάττουσαν ἐκ μὲν ἑαυτῆς τὸν κόσμον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου πάλιν ἑαυτὴν ἀποτελεῖν **πυρός τε ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσόν,** οὕτως κτλ.

———————

ὑπαλλάττουσαν Wilamowitz : φυλάττουσαν codd. ‖ ἀνταμοίβηται Γ : ἀνταμείβεται cett., acc.Bywater : ἀνταμοιβὴ τά Diels, Herakleitos 1901, DK fere omnium consensu ‖ χρυσόν scripsi : χρυσός codd.

… the principle that creates /~ sets in order/ all things… just as it by loan and mortgage now produces from itself the cosmos, now from the cosmos again itself, **and obtains by exchange all things for /the price/ of fire and fire for /the price/ of all things as if property /=mortgage/ for gold /=money/ and gold /=money/ for property /=mortgage/,** so etc.

<center>**42A**</center>

Stobaeus, *Anthol.* 1.10.7 (I, 120, 8–9 Wachmusth)

 Ἡρακλείτου· **ἐκ πυρὸς γὰρ** {τὰ} **πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ πάντα τελευτᾶι.**

———————

{τὰ} delevi ‖ πάντα γὰρ ἐκ πυρὸς ἐστι καὶ Schuster

All things are born from fire and into fire they die, too.

<center>**43** (67)   *Verbatim quotation*</center>

Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium, IX 10, 8 (p. 347, 40 Marc.)

(a) **ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος χρησμοσύνη** {τἀναντία ἅπαντα· οὗτος ὁ νοῦς} …

(b) **ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ ὁκόταν συμμιγῆι θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου.**

———————

43 (a) εὐφρόνη Miller : εὐφράνθη P ‖ χρησμοσύνη scripsi conl. fr. 41 L (B 65) : λιμός Hippol., edd.
43 (b) verba ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ Heraclito abrogavit Fränkel Wege 238 n.3 ut "unvollständig, ungenau und unlogish"‖ ὅκωσπερ ὁκόταν Hippol., acc. Kahn : ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ> Diels, acc. Walzer, Marcovich, Conche alii : ὅκως ἀήρ Zeller, ZN I,833, n. 2 : ὅκωσπερ <ἔλαιον> Fränkel TAPA 69 (1938) 234 sq. = Wege 244 n. 4 : <οἶνος> post θυώμασιν Bergk : <θύωμα> θυώμασιν Bernays Ges.Abh. I,78, acc. Bywater : <θυώματα> θυώμασιν Mullach fr. 86.

(a) **God is day – night, winter – summer, war – peace, abundance - poverty**

– {all opposites, this is the meaning} –

(b) and **he changes appearance like fire which – when it becomes mixed with incenses –– is called (by various) names according to the smell of each of them.**

43A (7)   *Paraphrase (interpretive) of fr.43(b)*

Aristoteles, *De sensu*, 5. 443 a 23

εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν.

If all things would turn into smoke, nostrils would discern them.

44 (31)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V, 104, 3 (p. II, 396 St.)

πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πρηστήρ.

τροπαί Clem. : τροπάς Euseb.

Turns of Fire are first Sea, and turns of the Sea are half Earth, half Wind /=Air/

44A   *Reconstruction based on Clement's summary*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *ibidem.*

ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων τὰ αὐτά, i.e.

<θαλάσσης τροπαὶ πρῶτον πρηστήρ, πρηστῆρος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ θάλασσα.

πρηστῆρος τροπαὶ πρῶτον γῆ, γῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ θάλασσα, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πῦρ.

γῆς τροπαὶ πρῶτον πῦρ, πυρὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ πρηστήρ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ θάλασσα>

  In the similar way he says the same about the other elements, i.e.:

Turns of Sea are first Wind, and turns of Wind are half Fire, half Sea.

Turns of Wind are first Earth, and turns of Earth are half Sea, half Fire.

Turns of Earth are first Fire, and turns of Fire are half Wind, half Sea.

45 (31)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata,* V, 104, 5 (II, 396 St.); cf. Eusebius, *PE* XIII 13, 31 (II, 209, 6–7 St.)

θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.

θάλασσα διαχέεται Clem., Euseb.: <γῆ> θάλασσα διαχέεται add. Burnet EGPh 135 n. 2 conl. D.L. IX, 9 τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι ‖ πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ DK, acc. Stählin, Marcovich alii : πρῶτον ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ Clem. : πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι Euseb. : πρῶτον ἦν { ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ} Cherniss

The Sea is dispersed and replenishes herself* exactly to the same measure as was before it became Earth.

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* literally «measures out for herself» /in borrowing/.

<center>

45A   *Reconstruction based on Clement's summary*

</center>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *ibidem*

  ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων τὰ αὐτά, i.e.

<γῆ διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι θάλασσα>

<πῦρ διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι πρηστήρ.>

<πρηστὴρ διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι πῦρ>.

  [In the similar way he says the same about the other elements, i.e.]:

  The Earth is dispersed and replenished to the same measure as was before it became Sea.

  Fire is dispersed and replenished to the same measure as was before it became Wind.

  Wind is dispersed and replenished to the same measure as was before it became Fire.

<center>

45B (A 14a)   *Paraphrase/reminiscence*

</center>

Scholia ad Nicandrum, *Alexipharmaca*, 172a. 174a. p. 85–86 Geymonat

  172a ἀτμεύειν <δὲ> δουλεύειν, ὑποκεῖσθαι. ὡς μῦθον <γὰρ> λέγει ὅτι ἀνέμοις θάλασσα καὶ πῦρ δουλεύει, καὶ θάλασσα μὲν δεσπόζει νηῶν, πῦρ δὲ ὕλης. <τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μενεκράτης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγουσι Υ>. <ἄλλως> · ἀτμεύειν · δουλεύειν · ἀτμένες γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι· ὅτι δὲ <u>δουλεύει ἡ θάλασσα καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀνέμοις</u>, <<u>κατὰ θεῖον νόμον δηλονότι</u>>, <…> καὶ Μενεκράτης εἴρηκεν.

  The word *atmeuein* means «to be slave, to be subordinated», since *atmenes* means «slaves». That <u>the sea and the fire are enslaved by the winds, obeying the divine law,</u> was stated by Heraclitus and Menekrates.

  174a. πῦρ μὲν ἀείζωον· < τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ ἀείζωον> καὶ τὸ ἀχύνετον ὕδωρ ἔτρεσε τοὺς ἀργέστας <οἱονεὶ> τοὺς ἀνέμους . ἀχύνετον δὲ τὸ πολύχυτον <…>. ἐκτίθεσθαι οὖν βούλεται διὰ τούτων <καὶ> Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ κατ᾽ αὐτόν.

<center>

46 (126)   *Verbatim quotation*

</center>

Tzetzes, *Scholia ad Exegesin in Iliadem*, p. 126 Hermann

ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὰ ψύχεται, ὑγρὰ αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέα νοτίζεται.

 _____

ψυχρὰ … θερμὰ … ὑγρὰ …καρφαλέα codex V : ψυχρὸν … θερμὸν … ὑγρὸν …καρφαλέον cett., Hermann

What is cold becomes warm, what is hot becomes cool, what is wet dries up, what is desiccated becomes moistened.

(a) Plutarchus, *De E apud Delphos* 18. P. 392C

πυρὸς θάνατος ἀέρι γένεσις, καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις.
The death of fire is the birth of air, and the death of air is the birth of water.

 (b) Marcus Antoninus, *Ad semet ipsum*, IV, 46 (I, p.68 Farquharson)
Γῆς θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος ἀέρα γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ ἔμπαλιν.

The death of earth is the birth of water, the death of water is the birth of air, the death of air is the birth of fire, and vice versa.

 (c) Maximus Tyrius, *Dissertatio* 41, 145r (p. 334, 146 Trapp)
Ζῆι πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον καὶ ἀὴρ ζῆι τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον· ὕδωρ ζῆι τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος.

Fire lives at the price of earth's death, and air lives at the price if fire's death, water lives at the price air's death and earth at the price of water's death.

<Universality of change. The road up and down or the law of pendulum. Fate>

48 (A 6 DK; 135 Co) *Quotation + paraphrase*

Plato, *Cratylus,* 402a

Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι

(a) **πάντα χωρεῖ** καὶ οὐδὲν μένει

(b) καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆι ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.

 Heraclitus says somewhere that

(a) **all things are moving** and nothing stands still

(b) and assimilating all existent things to the flux of river he says that you cannot step in twice into the same river.

48A   *Verbatim quotation reconstructed from test. a,b,c,d*

ἔμπεδον οὐδέν.

Nothing is steadfast.

(a) Lucian., *Vit. Auct.* 14 {Ἡράκλειτος}   …ὅτι **ἔμπεδον οὐδέν**, ἀλλ᾽…τὰ πάντα … ἄνω κάτω περιχωρέοντα καὶ ἀμειβόμενα…

(b) Arist., *De caelo* 298b32 πάντα γίνεσθαί φασι καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν…

(c) = fr. 48 (a) οὐδὲν μένει

(d) Gregor. Naz. *Carmina* I, sect. 2. Nr. 14 (*PG* 37, p. 757 sq.)

ἔμπεδον οὐδέν· ἔγωγε ῥόος θολεροῦ ποταμοῖο

αἰὲν ἐπερχόμενος, ἑσταὸς οὐδὲν ἔχων.

49 (A6)   *Doxographical paraphrases + quotation*

(a) Arist., *De caelo* 298b32

Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα <u>πάντα γίνεσθαί φασι καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν, ἓν δέ τι μόνον</u> <u>ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν</u>· ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος.

Others claim that that all things are becoming and flow, and that nothing is lasting, but only one (substance) remains unchanged, out of which all these (i.e. changing elements) are produced by its transformation (or reshaping). This is, as it seems, the meaning of what Heraclitus the Ephesian states, among many others.

(b[1]) [Plutarchus] *De Placitis philosophorum* I, 23, 7 (p.96 Lachenaud)   *Quotation*

Ἡράκλειτος ἠρεμίαν μὲν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνήιρει· **ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν**· κίνησιν δ᾿ ἀίδιον μὲν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, φθαρτὴν δὲ τοῖς φθαρτοῖς.

Heraclitus eliminated <u>rest</u> from all things, for, in his opinion, **this is the property of the dead.** On the contrary, he assigned motion to all things: eternal to eternal, mortal to mortal.

(b[2]) Stob. I,19,4 Ἡράκλειτος ἠρεμίαν μὲν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνήιρει· κίνησιν δὲ τοῖς πᾶσι ἀπεδίδου.

50 (60)   *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium,* IX 10, 5 (p. 346, 20 Marc.)

ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὠυτή.

The road up and down* is one and the same.

 ----

*or «to and fro».

51
Verbatim quotation reconstructed from test.a,b,c

<u>χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα</u> **ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα...**

<u>All things, divine and human,</u> **move up and down alternating**

(a) [Hippocr.] *De diaeta* I,5; 128,12 J.-B. : Χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα (scil. ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη, ἥλιος, σελήνη, πῦρ, ὕδωρ)

(b) Lucian. *Vit. auct.* 14 ἄνω κάτω περιχωρέοντα καὶ ἀμειβόμενα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος παιδιῇ.

Paraphrase + verbatim quotation

(c) Philo Alexandrinus*, De aeternitate mundi,* 109–111 (vol. 6, p. 106 Cohn) = fr. 33 d 2 = 66 b Marc.

καθάπερ γὰρ αἱ ἐτήσιοι <u>ὧραι κύκλον ἀμείβουσιν</u> ἀλλήλας ἀντιπαραδεχόμεναι πρὸς τὰς ἐνιαυτῶν οὐδέποτε ληγόντων περιόδους, {εἰς} τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον <u>ἀντιθεῖ</u>* <u>καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου</u> ταῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολαῖς, τὸ παραδοξότατον. <u>θνήσκειν δοκοῦντα ἀθανατίζεται</u> <u>δολιχεύοντα ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω συνεχῶς ἀμείβοντα.</u> ἡ μὲν οὖν προσάντης ὁδὸς ἀπὸ γῆς ἄρχεται· τηκομένη γὰρ εἰς ὕδωρ {μετα}λαμβάνει τὴν μεταβολήν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ἐξατμιζόμενον εἰς ἀέρα, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ λεπτυνόμενος εἰς πῦρ· ἡ δὲ κατάντης ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς, συνίζοντος μὲν πυρὸς κατὰ τὴν σβέσιν εἰς ἀέρα, συνίζοντος δ' ὁπότε συνθλίβοιτο εἰς ὕδωρ ἀέρος, ὕδατος δὲ {τὴν πολλὴν ἀνάχυσιν} κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν πυκνουμένου μεταβολήν. εὖ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἐν οἷς φησι· "ψυχῇσι θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι"·ψυχὴν γὰρ οἰόμενος εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν μὲν ἀέρος τελευτὴν γένεσιν ὕδατος, τὴν δὲ ὕδατος γῆς πάλιν γένεσιν αἰνίττεται, θάνατον οὐ τὴν εἰς ἅπαν ἀναίρεσιν ὀνομάζων, ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰς ἕτερον στοιχεῖον μεταβολήν.

―――――

*ἀντιθεῖ (= ἐναντιοδρομεῖ) scripsi : τίθησι codd., delevit Cohn : περιθέουσι Diels : περιθέει Cumont

<u>[The four seasons and the four elements</u> of the cosmos] in their mutual transformations, while <u>seemingly dying, immortalize themselves running the dolichos race and constantly changing the same route up and down etc.</u>

51A   *Doxographical paraphrase, authentic tenets*

(d) Stobaeus, *Anthologium* I. 1. 29b (I, 35, 7–8 Wachmusth)

Ἡράκλειτος τὸ περιοδικὸν πῦρ ἀΐδιον [scil. εἶναι θεόν], εἱμαρμένην δὲ λόγον ἐκ τῆς <u>ἐναντιοδρομίας</u> δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄντων.

According to Heraclitus, god is the periodical eternal fire, and <u>fate (heimarmene)</u> is the rational principle (logos) that creates all things by means of <u>running into opposite directions</u>.

52 (cf. 84 ab)   *Verbatim quotation*

Plotinus, *Enneades* IV, 8 [6], 1, 8

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος … **ἀμοιβάς τε ἀναγκαίας** τιθέμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδόν τε ἄνω κάτω εἰπὼν καὶ μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται…

Heraclitus ... positing **fateful changes** from the opposites and having spoken about the "road up and down", and "it rests in changing"..

53 (137)   *Verbatim quotation*

Stob.I,5,15 (I, p. 78 Wachsmuth) = Diels, DG 322

Ἡράκλειτος… πάντα δὲ καθ᾽εἱμαρμένην, τὴν δ᾽αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκην. Γράφει γοῦν· **ἔστι γὰρ εἱμαρμένα <πάντα> πάντως**…

──────

εἱμαρμένα F (Farnesinus, Bibl. Nat. III D15) : εἱμαρμένη P (Parisinus 2129) ‖ <πάντα> πάντως lacunam supplevi

   Heraclitus holds that all events occur according to Fate (*Heimarmene*) which is identical with necessity (*Ananke*). And indeed, he writes:

All events are predestined by Fate absolutely...

< The cycles of day and night. The seasons. The Sun.>

54 (C 1 DK)   *Paraphrases, authentic tenets*

[Hippocrates], *De diaeta,* I, 5

  χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα. Ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ὡς καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, πυρὸς ἔφοδος καὶ ὕδατος, ἥλιος ἐπὶ τὸ μακρότατον καὶ βραχύτατον, πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ οὐ ταυτά. Φάος Ζηνὶ, σκότος Ἅιδῃ, φάος Ἅιδῃ, σκότος Ζηνὶ…

   All things, both divine and human, are moving (on the route) up and down alternatingly. Day and night (change) up to the maximum and minimum (duration), and in the same way the moon (changes) between the maximum and minimum, the (alternative) advance of fire and water, the sun (changes) to the longest and shortest, all things are the same and not the same. Light for Zeus is darkness for Hades, light for Hades is darkness for Zeus.

55 (120)   *Verbatim quotation*

Strabo, I,1,6

    ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ Ἄρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς Ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός.

   The turning posts of the Dawn and the Sunset* are the constellation of Bear** and at the opposite end – the limit of the bright Zeus.***

 * the equinoxes   ** i.e. vernal equinox, the time of the culmination of Arktos   *** bright
Zeus = clear sky = (period of) good weather, its «end» being the autumnal equinox

56 *Verbatim quotation (a), quotations (b, c, d)*

(a)   Papyrus Derveni, col. IV, 5–10. 12-13; cf. Lebedev, The authorship of the Derveni papyrus (2019) 532-544

[.}ου ε.[	θ]εῶν[.	1
ὁ κείμ[ενα] μεταθ[έμενος]..ουναι		2
μᾶλλ[ον τ]είνεται [πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ...]·τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ		3
οὐκ εἴ[η λα]μβάνειν. ἆρ᾽οὐ τέ[τακται διὰ τό]νδε κόσμος;		4
κατὰ [Ὀρφέ]α Ἡράκλ[ε]ιτος με[ταθέμενος]		5
τὰ κοινὰ κατ[αγρά]φει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α· ὅσπερ ἴκελα [ἱερο]λόγωι λέγων· **[νόος**		6
ἥλιος [κόσ]μου κατὰ φύσιν, ἀνθρωπ[η]ίου εὖρος ποδὸς [ἐὼν,		7
τὸ μ[έτριο]ν οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων· εἰ γά[ρ τι οὔ]ρους ἐ[οίκοτας].		8
ὑ]π[ερβαλε]ῖ, Ἐρινύες νιν ἐξευρήσουσι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι.		9
[οὕτω δὲ ἔφη ἵνα ὑπερ]βατὸμ ποῆι κ[αὶ ἀσαφῆ τὸν λόγον].		10
....		
]α δίκης[		12
] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι e.g. τροπὰς ποιεῖ ὁ ἥλιος		13

---

3 τ]είνεται [πρὸς τὸν νοῦν supplevi 5 Ὀρφέ]α et με[ταθέμενος] supplevi ‖ 6 καταγράφει Jourdan : [ἱερο]λόγωι Sider νόος vel ἄναξ supplevi ‖ 7 [κόσ]μου et [ἐὼν Lebedev 1989 : 39 ‖ 8 οὔρου]ς et ἐ[οικότα]ς Tsantsanoglou ‖ 9 ὑ]π[ερβαλε]ῖ Tsantsanoglou ‖ 10 [οὕτω δὲ ἔφη ἵνα et κ[αὶ ἀσαφῆ τὸν λόγον] Lebedev ‖ 13 τροπὰς ποιεῖ temptavi

                           "[names?] of gods...

... he [scil. Orpheus] changes the established names ...

[the name of Zeus] rather alludes to the mind since

it would be impossible to understand [the origin of cosmos] as something due to chance. Isn't the cosmos set in order by the mind? In accord with Orpheus Heraclitus [also] changes the common names and uses in his writings peculiar expressions. Speaking similarly to the author of *hieros logos*, he says: **"the Sun is the mind [or "the Lord"] of the cosmos by nature, being one man's foot in width and not exceeding the set limits. For if he does exceed the appropriate limits, Erinyes, the ministers of Justice will find him out."** He said so in order to make his speech

obscure and based on inverse word-order (hyperbaton)…justice… <u>the sun makes reversals (= solstices) in a fixed month</u>».

(b) (3 DK; 57 Ma; 23 Co)

[Plutarchus] *De Placitis philosophorum* II, 21, 3 (περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου); cf. Stob. I,25. Ἡράκλειτος **εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου**.

("On the size of the sun") Heraclitus: **width of a man's foot**.

(c) (94 DK; 52 Ma; 44 Ka; 49 Co)

Plutarchus, *De exilio,* 604A **Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται** <u>μέτρα</u>· εἰ δὲ μή, **Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι** ἐξευρήσουσιν.

"The Sun will not overstep appropriate measures, otherwise Erinyes, the ministers of Justice, will find him out".

(d) Plutarchus, *De Iside,* 370D (52 a2 Marc.)

ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται τοὺς προσήκοντας **ὅρους**, φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· **εἰ δὲ μή**, Κλωθάς μιν **Δίκης ἐπικούρους ἐξευρήσειν**.

"The Sun will not overstep the appropriate limits, says Heraclitus, otherwise the Spinners, the ministers of Justice will find him out".

57 (100)   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase*

Plutarchus, *Platonicae Quaestiones* 8, 4 p. 1007 D

οὕτως οὖν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχων συμπλοκὴν καὶ συναρμογὴν ὁ χρόνος οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐστι κίνησις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται κίνησις ἐν τάξει μέτρον ἐχούσῃ καὶ πέρατα καὶ περιόδους· **ὧν ὁ ἥλιος** <u>ἐπιστάτης ὢν καὶ</u> **σκοπὸς ὁρίζειν καὶ βραβεύειν καὶ ἀναδεικνύναι καὶ ἀναφαίνειν μεταβολὰς καὶ ὥρας 'αἳ πάντα φέρουσι'** καθ' Ἡράκλειτον οὐ φαύλων οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πρώτῳ θεῷ γίγνεται συνεργός.

So, in this way, the time has a necessary connection with and attachment to the heaven, and is not just a motion, but, as it has been said, but a regular motion characterized by measure, limits and cycles, of which "**the Sun being** a Sentinel and **Umpire appointed to delimit, to allot prizes, to proclaim** /the winners in the agon/ **and bring to light the changes and seasons that produce everything**" according to Heraclitus, turns out to be not a weak or small, but the greatest and most important assistant of the supreme god.

58 (6)   *Paraphrase or quotation*

Aristoteles, *Meteor.* II,2. 355 a 14

ἥλιος νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρηι ἐστίν.

The Sun is new* every day.

  ----

  *or 'young'

<div align="center">

59   *Reconstruction*

<ὁ ἥλιος ἅπτεται καὶ ἀποσβέννυται>

</div>

        … **The Sun kindles up and goes out…** [scil. "by measured periods",

μέτρα].

  Plato, *Resp.* VI. 498a

οἱ καὶ <u>ἁπτόμενοι</u> μειράκια ὄντα … πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων <u>ἀποσβέννυνται</u> πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου <u>ἡλίου</u>, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.

<div align="center">

<The Moon and its phases>

60   *Quotation (Heraclitus?)*

</div>

The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. LIII, ed. W.W. Haslam, London, 1986; # 3710 Commentary on Odyssey XX, col. ii, 43–47

  (a) Ἡράκλειτος· **συνιόντων τῶν μηνῶν ἡμέρας — ἐξ [ὅ]του φαίνεται προτέρην νουμεν[ί]ην δευτέρην — ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐλάσσονας μεταβάλλεται ἄλλοτε πλεῦνας**

ibidem, col. iii, 7–11

  (b)   **μεῖς τρ[ιταῖος] φαινόμενος ἐκκαιδ[ε]κάτηι πασσέληνος φαίνεται ἐν ἡμέραις τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα, ἀπολιμπάνει τὸν ὑπόμετρον ἐν ἡμέρηισι ιγ′.**

  (a) Heraclitus: **"At the convergence of the months – from the moment it becomes visible on the day before, the new moon day or the second day – the moon accomplishes her transformations now in fewer days, now in more"**

  (b) **When the moon first appears on the third day, it becomes visible as full moon on the sixteenth. It wanes the remaining time (of the month) during 13 days."**

<div align="center">

<Other stars>

61 (A 1)   *Doxography + quotation*

</div>

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* IX, 9 (p. 637, 18 Marc.)

γίνεσθαι δὲ ἀναθυμιάσεις ἀπό τε γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, ἃς μὲν λαμπρὰς καὶ καθαράς, ἃς δὲ σκοτεινάς. αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ ὑπὸ τῶν λαμπρῶν, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων. τὸ δὲ περιέχον ὁποῖόν ἐστιν οὐ δηλοῖ· εἶναι μέντοι ἐν αὐτῶι **σκάφας** ἐπεστραμμένας κατὰ κοῖλον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐν αἷς ἀθροιζομένας τὰς λαμπρὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις ἀποτελεῖν φλόγας, ἃς εἶναι τὰ ἄστρα. (10) λαμπροτάτην δὲ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου φλόγα καὶ θερμοτάτην. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα ἄστρα πλεῖον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἧττον λάμπειν καὶ θάλπειν, τὴν δὲ σελήνην προσγειοτέραν οὖσαν μὴ διὰ τοῦ καθαροῦ φέρεσθαι τόπου.

(According to Heraclitus) exhalations occur both from the earth and from the sea, the former are bright and pure, the latter dark. The fire is nourished by the bright exhalations, the wet element from the dark ones. He does not explain the nature of the heavenly vault, but in his view, there are some "**bowls**" in it turned towards us with their concave side. The bright exhalations are gathered in these and produce flames which are the stars. The brightest and the hottest flame is that of the Sun. The other stars are father distant from the earth and therefore produce less heat and shine, whereas the moon is closer to earth and is moving in the place which is not pure.

<div align="center">

… the bowls… (of the sun and the moon)

<Living beings>

62 (11)   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase*

</div>

[Aristoteles] *De mundo* 6, p. 401a 8

τῶν τε ζῴων τά τε ἄγρια καὶ ἥμερα, τά τε ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐν ὕδατι βοσκόμενα, γίνεται καὶ ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται <u>τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμοῖς</u>· **πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν πληγῆι νέμεται,** ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος.

———————

πληγῆι Stob., acc. Bywater, DK, Marcovich, Kahn alii : τὴν γῆν codd., acc. Conche.

(Not only the elements and the stars), but also animals both wild and tame, including those who feed in the air, on earth and in the water, all of them are born, attain mature age and perish <u>obeying the laws of the god</u>, for, as Heraclitus says,

every earthen creature is driven to pasture by the blow.

<center>*<Time. The Great Year>*</center>

<center>**63** (A13)   *Doxography*</center>

(a) Censorinus, *De die natali* 18.11 (p. 43, 9 Sallmann) est praterea annus quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum apellat, quem solis et lunae vagarumque quinque stellarum orbes conficiunt, cum ad idem signum, ubi quondam simul fuerunt, una referuntur. cuius anni hiemps summa est κατακλυσμός, quam nostri diluvionem vocant, aetas autem ἐκπύρωσις, quod est mundi incendium; nam his alternis temporibus mundus tum exignescere tum exaquescere videtur. hunc Aristarchus putavit esse annorum vertentium IICCCCLXXXIIII, Aretes Dyrrhachinus VDLII, <u>Heraclitus et Linus XDCCC</u> etc.

"Aristarchus estimated its duration at 2484 solar years… Heraclitus and Linus at 10800."

(b) Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, 1. 8. 42c (I, 108, 1–2 Wachsmuth); Ps.-Plutarchus, Placita philosophorum, 892C

Ἡράκλειτος ἐκ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἐνιαυτῶν ἡλιακῶν (scil. τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν εἶναι).

ἐνιαυτῶν om. P

Heraclitus holds that the Great year (*Megas Eniautos*) conststs of 18000 solar years.

<center>**64** (126a)   *Verbatim quotation*</center>

Anatolius Alexandrinus, *De decade*, p. 36 Heiberg
κατὰ λόγον δὲ ὧρος συμβάλλεται ἑβδομάσι κατὰ σελήνην, διαιρεῖται δὲ κατὰ τὰς Ἄρκτους, ἀθανάτου Μνήμης σημείῳ.

ὧρος (= ἐνιαυτός) scripsi : ὡρίων cod. Monac. : ὡρέων Diels-Kranz || ἑβδομάσι cod. : ἑβδομάς Diels-Kranz

According to the rational principle the year is composed (= 'reckoned') by hebdomads in accordance with the moon, and is divided /into halves/ by /the rising of/ the Bears *, the double signs of immortal Memory.

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* i.e., by the vernal Equinox, cf. fr. 55.

<div align="center">

65 (103)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Porphyrius, *Quaest. Homer. ad Iliad.*,XIV 200 (p.190,6 Schrader)

ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου {περιφερείας}.

ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας Porphyrius, acc. DK, Conche : {περιφερείας} Walzer, Kirk, Marcovich : Heraclito verba ε. κ. π. abrogavit Wilamowitz.

In the circle the beginning and the end coincide.

III. MAN. THE SOUL. LIFE AND DEATH

<The nature of the soul. Exhalation. The rivers>

<div align="center">

66 (45)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum,* IX. 7

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

You will never find out the limits of the soul, which ever road you take /~ in whichever direction go/**: so immense is its measure** /~**volume**/**.**

<div align="center">

67 (12)   *verbatim quotations*
</div>

Arius Didymus ap. Eusebium, *P. E.* XV, 20 (D. 471, 1):

Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος· βουλόμενος γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι, ὅτι

«αἱ **ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοτεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται**», (fr. 67 a)

εἴκασεν αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς λέγων οὕτως·

«**ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν <δὶς> ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ**» (fr. 67 b)

καὶ «**ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται**». (fr. 67 c)

νοτεραὶ scripsi : νοεραί codd. : νεαραί Meerwald, acc. Marcovich ‖ <δίς> addidi

Zeno holds that the soul is an exhalation endowed with sense-perception, like Heraclitus. The latter, intending to make clear that

"**Souls being evaporated wet are always becoming**" (fr.67 a),

assimilated them to rivers, saying:

"**As we <twice> step into the same rivers, each time we are washed by the afflux of different waters**" (fr.67b)

and again:

"**Souls are evaporated from liquids**" (φp.67 c)

<div align="center">

68 (91)   *Paraphrases*

</div>

Plutarchus, *De E apud Delphos* 18. 392 B

(a) ποταμῶι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῶι αὐτῶι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον

(b) οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δὶς ἅψασθαι καθεξῆς <τῆς αὐτῆς>· ἀλλ'

(c) ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει

(d) (μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδ' ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει)

(e) καὶ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι.

—————

καθεξῆς scripsi : καθ᾽ ἕξιν codd.

According to Heraclitus,

(a) it is impossible to step twice into the same river,

(b) or to touch twice the same mortal being at succession,

(c) because of the quickness and rapidness of change it "scatters and gathers",

(d) or rather neither again nor afterwards, but just at the same moment it takes shape and disappears

(e) and it approaches us and runs away.

<div align="center">

69 (36)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* VI 17, 2 (II 435, 25 St.)

ψυχῆισιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

For the souls it is death to become water, for the water it is death to become earth, while from the earth water comes out, and from the water soul.

<center>

69A (A 15)   *Paraphrase + quotation*

</center>

(a) Aristoteles, *De anima,* A 2. 405 a 24:

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ <u>τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν</u>.

Heraclitus, too (like Diogenes), identifies the first principle of all things with the soul inasmuch as (he conceives the first principle) as exhalation, out of which all other things are composed.

(b) [Aristoteles] *Problemata*, 908 a 30:

πότερον, ὥσπερ τινὲς τῶν ἡρακλειτιζόντων φασὶν ὅτι <u>ἀναθυμιᾶται,</u>
<u>ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι, εἶτα πάλιν ψυχθὲν συνίσταται ἐκεῖ μὲν ὑγρόν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὖρον</u>, ἡ ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς ἀναθυμίασις, ἐξ οὗ ἐγένετο αὕτη συμμιγνυμένη, ποιεῖ τὴν ὀσμήν;

[Problem: why after eating garlic the urine smells, but this is not the case with other foods]. Is it because, as some followers of Heraclitus maintain, exhalation occurs in the human body, just as it occurs in the Universe, and then after cooling it is condensed there [=in the cosmos] as water [=rain], and here [=in the body] as urine, so that the exhalation from food reproduces the smell of the food, with which it became mixed [in the human body]?

(c) [Aristoteles] *Problemata,* 934 b 34:

διὸ καὶ φασί τινες τῶν ἡρακλειτιζόντων <u>ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ποτίμου ξηραινομένου καὶ πηγνυμένου λίθους γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης τὸν ἥλιον ἀναθυμιᾶσθαι</u>.

And therefore, some of the followers of Heraclitus maintain that from the sweet water, when it becomes dry and solidifies, stones and earth are generated, whereas from the sea the Sun is being exhaled /daily/.

<center>

69B (67a)   *Paraphrase*

</center>

Hisdosus Scholasticus, *De anima mundi Plat.,* ad Chalcidius, Plat. *Tim.,* 34 B s., cod. Par. Lat. 8624 (s. XII–XIII), f. 17v, v. 18 sq.

ita vitalis calor a sole procedens omnibus quae vivunt vitam subministrat. cui sententiae Heraclitus adquiescens optimam similitudinem dat de aranea ad animam, de tela araneae ad corpus. Sicut aranea, ait, stans in medio telae sentit, quam cito musca aliquem filum suum corrumpit itaque illuc celeriter currit quasi

de fili persectione dolens, sic hominis anima aliqua parte corporis laesa illuc festine meat quasi impatiens laesionis corporis, cui firme et proportionaliter iuncta est.

——————

persectione cod. teste Conche : perfectione corr. Diels

[Preceding context: some philosophers locate the world soul in the center of the cosmos, others in the sun regarding it as the heart of the world. Just as the soul from its seat in the heart emits vivifying forces /vires/ and animates all parts of the body], in the same way the vivifying heat coming from the sun gives life to all living beings. Agreeing with this view Heraclitus gives an excellent comparison of the spider with the soul, and of the spider's net with the human body. Just as the spider, he says, staying in the middle of the net, senses as soon as a fly breaks some thread of his net and runs in a hurry there as if feeling pain from the rupture of the thread, in the same way the soul of man, when some part of his body is injured, hurries there as if not bearing the injury of the body with which it is connected firmly and in a proportional way.

69C (A 15 DK)   *Paraphrase*

Macrobius, *Comm. in somnium Scipionis,* 1.14.19

Heraclitus physicus scintillam stellaris essentiae (scil. animam esse dixit)

Heraclitus, the philosopher of nature, said that the soul is a spark of the stellar substance.

70 (77)   *Verbatim quotation*

Numenius fr. 30 (p. 81) De Places ap. Porphyr. *De antro nympharum*, 10

καὶ Ἡράκλειτον **ψυχῇσι φάναι τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι**. τέρψιν δὲ εἶναι αὐταῖς τὴν εἰς γένεσιν πτῶσιν. ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ φάναι ζῆν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον καὶ ζῆν ἐκείνας τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον.

——————

ἢ θάνατον cj. Diels, acc. Marcovich, Conche : μὴ θάνατον codd., acc. Kahn, del. Schuster

Heraclitus said that **for the souls it is pleasure or death, to become moist**. By pleasure he means their fall into generation [= incarnation in mortal body]. On another occasion he said that we live at the expense of their [i.e. of the souls] death, while they live at the expense of our death.

<div align="center">

71 (A 19)   *Paraphrases*

</div>

(a) Plutarchus, *De defectu oraculorum*, 11. 415 E

οἱ μὲν 'ἡβώντων' ἀναγιγνώσκοντες [ap. Hesiod. fr. 304 Merk.-West] ἔτη τριάκοντα ποιοῦσι τὴν γενεὰν καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἐν ᾧ χρόνωι γεννῶντα παρέχει τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννημένον ὁ γεννήσας.

Those who read [in Hesiod fr. 304] "men of mature age", following Heraclitus define the human generation (*genea*) as 30 years: this is the time in which the begetter has the begotten by him begetting.

 (b) Philo Alexandrinus, *Quaestiones in Genesin,* II 5, (p. 84 Petit)

δυνατὸν ἐν τριακοστῶι ἔτει τὸν ἄνθρωπον πάππον γενέσθαι, ἡβᾶν μὲν περὶ τὴν τεσσερεσκαιδεκαετῆ ἡλικίαν, ἐν ᾗ σπείρει, τὸ δὲ σπαρὲν ἐνιαυτοῦ γενόμενον πάλιν πεντεκαιδεκάτωι ἔτει τὸ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῶι γεννᾶν.

 It is possible for a man to become grandfather at the age of 30. He becomes mature at the age of 14, when he produces semen, the offspring sown by him is born a year later and again in the 15th year he begets an offspring similar to himself.

 (c) Censorinus, *De die natali* 17.2

saeculum est spatium vitae humanae longissimum partu et morte definitum. quare qui annos triginta saeculum putarunt multum videntur errasse. hoc enim tempus «genean» vocari Heraclitus auctor est, quia «orbis aetatis» in eo sit spatio; «orbem» autem vocat « aetatis», dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur.

Age (saeculum) is the longest duration of human life defined by birth and death. For this reason, those who have defined age as 30 years seem to have committed a serious mistake. Heraclitus was the first to call this period of time "generation" (*genea*), because it comprises "the circle of life". And "circle of life",

in his opinion, is the period of time in which human nature completes a cycle from semen to semen.

 (d) [Plutarchus] *De placitis philosophorum,* V, 23 (p.184 Lachenaud)

(πότε καὶ πῶς ἄρχεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς τελειότητος)
Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῆς τελειότητος περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα, περὶ ἣν ὁ σπερματικὸς κινεῖται ὀρρός· τὰ γὰρ δένδρα ἄρχεται τότε τελειότητος, ὅταν ἄρχηται γεννᾶν τὰ σπέρματα, ἀτελῆ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἄωρα καὶ ἄκαρπα ὄντα· τέλειος οὖν τότε ἄνθρωπος.

   ("When and how does a man achieve puberty?"). Heraclitus and the Stoics maintain that humans reach completion (of their nature) around the second hebdomad, when the sperm starts to be produced. For the trees attain completion at the time when they start to produce seeds, but remain incomplete when they are not mature and do not produce fruits. By the same token, man also attains completion at this moment.

<div align="center">

72 (125)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Theophrastus, *De vertigine*, 9; p. 192 Sharples.

καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν διίσταται \<μὴ\> κινούμενος

διίσταται A Aldina, acc. Sharples : ἵσταται Mackenzie ‖ \<μὴ\> addidit Bernays conl. Alex. Aphrod. Problem. iv.42 ἐὰν μή τις ταράττηι , acc. Diels-Kranz, Marcovich, Kahn, Conche : κινούμενος codd., acc. Sharples

   And the barley-drink (*kykeon*), too, disintegrates when it is not agitated.

<div align="center">

\<The Dry and the wet soul\>

73 (118).   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Stobaeus, *Anthologium* III,17,42 (v.III, p.505,8 Hense)
αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.

αὔη ψυχὴ Trincavelli ad Stob. III 5,8; Stephanus, Poes. Phil., p. 139 ap. Bernays, p. 30, adn. : αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχή codd.

  The dry soul is the wisest and the most excellent.

<div align="center">

74 (117)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, III, 5, 7 (vol. III, p. 257 Hense)

ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῇι, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων.

When a man becomes drunk, he is conducted < back home > by immature boy; he stumbles and he does not understand where he goes, for he has a wet soul.

<div align="center">

74A (71)   *Paraphrase*
</div>

Marcus Antoninus, Ad semet ipsum, IV, 46

Μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου ῇι ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει.

Also remember /the saying of Heraclitus/ about the man who forgets

where the road leads.

<div align="center">

<Life and death. Awakening and sleep>

75 (26)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* IV,141,2 (v.II, p.310, Stählin)

ἄνθρωπος {ἐν} εὐφρόνη φάος· ἄπτεται ἕωιος {ἀποθανὼν} ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὀψίας. ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται, τεθνεῶτος, εὖτε {ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις} ἐγρηγορὼς ἄπτεται, εὕδοντος.

ἄνθρωπος {ἐν} εὐφρόνη φάος scripsi, cf. ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη (fr. 43a), συλλάψιες οὖλα οὐχ οὖλα (fr. 106) etc.‖ ἕωιος scripsi : ἑαυτῶι codd. ‖ {ἀποθανών} delevit Wilamowitz ‖ ὀψίας scripsi : ὄψεις codd. (ex ὄψιας) ‖ εὖτε scripsi : εὕδων codd. ‖ {ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις} delevit Wilamowitz

Man is night and light: he kindles up in the morning after he had extinguished in the evening.   And he kindles up as alive after he has died just as he kindles up as awake when he sleeps.

<div align="center">

75A
</div>

(a) Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* VII. 130   *Paraphrase*

ὅνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ ἄνθρακες πλησιάσαντες τῶι πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν διάπυροι γίνονται, χωρισθέντες δὲ σβέννυνται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα κατὰ μὲν τὸν χωρισμὸν σχεδὸν ἄλογος γίνεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διὰ τῶν πλείστων πόρων σύμφυσιν ὁμοιοειδὴς τῶι ὅλωι καθίσταται.

 Just as ambers brought closer to the fire undergo qualitative change and become ignited, but separated from fire go out, so the portion of the atmosphere that dwells in exile in our bodies, after

separation /from the atmosphere/ becomes almost deprived of reason, but thanks to the union with it through numerous channels becomes homogeneous with the Whole.

(b) [Hippocr.], *De diaeta*, 1. 29; 146,11–16 Joly-Byl *reminiscence*

Εἰ δέ τις ἀπιστεῖ ψυχὴν μὴ προσμίσγεσθαι ψυχῇ, ἀφορῶν ἐς ἄνθρακας, κεκαυμένους πρὸς <μὴ> κεκαυμένους προσβάλλων, ἰσχυροὺς πρὸς ἀσθενέας, τροφὴν αὐτοῖσι διδούς, ὅμοιον τὸ σῶμα πάντες παρασχήσονται καὶ οὐ διάδηλος ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ' ἐν ὁκοίῳ σώματι ζωπυρέονται, τοιοῦτον δὴ τὸ πᾶν ἔσται· ὁκόταν δ' ἀναλώσωσι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τροφήν, διακρίνονται ἐς τὸ ἄδηλον· τοῦτο καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ πάσχει.

  If someone disbelieves that a soul can mix with another soul, let him look at ambers bringing the ignited ones closer to the not ignited, strong to weak, giving them food: all ambers will form a single body, and no amber will be distinct from another one etc.

(c) Aristophanes, *Nubes* 96 = Hippon 38 A 2 DK (*reminiscence from Heraclitus?*)

ἐνταῦθ' ἐνοικοῦσ' ἄνδρες οἳ τὸν οὐρανὸν
λέγοντες ἀναπείθουσιν ὡς ἔστιν πνιγεύς,
κἄστιν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος, ἡμεῖς δ' ἄνθρακες.

Here dwell the men who speaking about the heaven persuade /their disciples/ that it is a brazier that encircles us inside itself whereas we are ambers.

76 (88)   *Paraphrase*

Plutarchus, *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 10. 106E

  ταὐτό τ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

  One and the same thing is in us the living and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the young and the old. For those conditions* after a sudden change turn into these**, and these in turn, after a /reverse/ sudden change again become those.

  ----

   *i.e., living, waking, young   ** i.e. dead, sleeping, old

77 (21)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata III,21,1 (v. II, p. 205 Stählin)

θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες βίος.

βίος scripsi : ὕπνος codd. : ὕπαρ Marcovich

Death is what we see awake, and what we see asleep is life.

<Pessimism. Life is suffering, death is relief>

78 (20)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata III,14,1 (v.II, p.201, St.)

γενόμενοι ζώειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ' ἔχειν {μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι} **καὶ παῖδας καταλείπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι.**

―――――

μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι Clem., acc. DK, Conche : {μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι} Schleiermacher, Walzer, Kirk, Marcovich alii.

Once born for life they are prone to /premature/ death {or rather to take a rest} and they leave behind children so that /new/ death may be born.

79 (84b)   *Verbatim quotation*

Plotinus, IV,8, [6],1,8 **κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.**

It is fatigue for the same to toil an to start again

80 (84a)   *Verbatim quotation*

Ibidem. **μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται**

…it takes a rest while changing…

81

Quotation

Plotinus, IV,8 [6] 5,5

Οὐδ᾽ ἡ Ἐμπδοκλέους φυγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πλάνη... οὐδ᾽ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου **ἀνάπαυλα ἐν φυγῇι.**

Neither the Empedoclean exile from god and wandering... nor Heraclitus'

repose in running away /~ in exile/

IV. ETHOS. GOOD AND EVIL. ARETE

<Divine and human knowledge. Relativity of juman values.>

82 (78 DK)

Celsus apud Origen. *Contra Celsum* VI 12 (p. 208 Borret)

ἦθος ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.

ἦθος γὰρ Celsus

Human character does not possess wisdom of judgement, but the divine does.

83 (79)   *Verbatim quotation*

Celsus apud Origen. *Contra Celsum*, VI 12 (p. 208 Borret)

ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός

Man is a speechless baby from god's point of view, just as a child from the point of view of a man.

84 (83)   *Paraphrase*

Plato, *Hippias maior* 289 A

ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίαι καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.

The wisest of humans will look like a monkey compared to god both in wisdom and beauty, and in all the rest.

85 (70)

Jamblichus*, De anima* (Stob. *Ecl.* II 1, 16)

Ἡράκλειτος **παίδων ἀθύρματα** νενόμικεν εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα.

Heraclitus regarded human beliefs as **childish toys**.

86 (102) *Paraphrase*

Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem, ad librum Δ, 4 (I, 1969, p. 445 Erbse) = Porphyrius, *Questiones Homericae ad Iliadem*, fasc. I 1880, p. 69 H.Schrader

τῶι μὲν θεῶι καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια.

For a god, all things are beautiful, good and just. But humans conceive some things as unjust and some as just.

<Ruling over one's passions>

87 (110)   *Verbatim quotation*

Stob., III,1,176 (III, p.129 Hense)

ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι ὁκόσα θέλουσιν οὐκ ἄμεινον
It is not better for the humans if what they desire will be fulfilled.

88 (111) *Verbatim quotation*

Stob. III, 1, 177 (III, π. 129 Hense)

νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν.

Disease makes health pleasurable and good, hunger satiety, fatigue relief.

89 (85)   *Verbatim quotation*

Jamblichus, *Protrepticus*, 21,8

θυμῶι μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρήιζηι γίγνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται.

———————

ὅ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται Plut. *Cor.* 22.2 | ὅ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ om. Arist. *EE* 1223 b 22.
It is hard to fight with one's heart, for whatever it is in want of attaining, it pays with one's life.

<Relativity of pleasure. Proofs from zoology>

<Monkeys>

90 (82)   *Paraphrase*

Plato, *Hippias Major*, 289 a

πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν.

The most beautiful of all monkeys is ugly compared with the human race.

<Donkeys>

91 (9)   *Quotation + paraphrase*

Aristot., *Ethic. Nicom.*, X, 5. 1176 a 7

ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν **ὄνους σύρματ ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν**· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις.

The pleasure (*hedone*) of a horse is different from that of a dog or a human: as Heraclitus, says

" **Donkeys would choose straw rather than gold**",

since food is more pleasurable for donkeys than gold.

<Oxen>

92 (4)   *Paraphrase*

Albertus Magnus, *De vegetab.,* VI,401

Heraclitus dixit quod si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum.

Heraclitus saud that if happiness consisted in the pleasures of the body, we would consider happy the oxen when the find bitter vetch on the pasture.

<Swines>

93 (13)   *Verbatim quotations*

(a) (B 37 DK; 36c1 Ma) Columella, VIII, 4, 4

si modo credimus Ephesio Heraclito qui ait sues caeno... lavari

Heraclitus said that swines wash themselves in the mud.

(b) (13 DK; 36 d 1 Ma) Athenaeus, V,178 F

βορβόρωι χαίρειν καθ' Ἡράκλειτον.

…**to enjoy mud…**

(c) (13 DK; 36 a 1 Ma) Clemens Alex., *Stromata*, I,2,2

ὕες βορβόρωι ἥδονται μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῶι ὕδατι.
Swines enjoy mud more that pure water.

<Birds>

94 (37) *Quotation*

Columella, VIII, 4, 4

...Heraclito qui ait ...cohortales aves pulvere lavari.

Heraclitus said that birds wash themselves in the dust.

95 (61) *Verbatim quotation*

Hippol., *Ref*.IX,10,5

θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαρώτατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον.

The sea is the purest and the dirtiest water: for fish it is drinkable and healthy, for humans undrinkable and poisonous.

< The ethical ideal: self-knowledge and happiness>

96 (119) *Verbatim quotation*

Stobaeus IV, 40, 23

Ἡράκλειτος ἔφη ὡς **ἦθος ἀνθρώπωι δαίμων**.

Man's moral character is his fortune.

97 (101) *Verbatim quotation*

Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem*, 20. 1118 C

ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.

I explored myself.

98 *Paraphrase*

Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem*, 1118C :

Καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θειότατον ἐδόκει τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν.

[Plutarch]: Of all the Delphic inscriptions Heraclitus regarded as most divine the dictum "Know thyself".

99 (116) *Verbatim quotation*

Stobaeus III , 5, 6

ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

It befalls all humans to know themselves and to be self-restrained.

100 (112). *Vebatim quotations*

Stobaeus III, 1, 178

(a) **σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη**

καὶ

(b) **σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.**
and

  (a) "Self-control is the greatest of all virtues"
and

  (b) "Wisdom is to tell the truth and to act according to nature, with understanding".

<div align="center">

101 (A 21)   *Ethical doxography*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* II,130, 2 (vol. II, 184, 6 St.)

Ἀναξαγόραν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κλαζομένιον τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν λέγουσιν, Ἡράκλειτόν τε τὸν Ἐφέσιον τὴν <u>εὐαρέστησιν</u>.

  [Heraclitus defined *telos*, the final goal of life as] <u>contentedness</u>.

<div align="center">

<Heroic ethics of eternal glory fr. 102–105>

102 (29)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alex. *Stromata* V,59,1 (II 366, 11) cf. IV 50 (II 271, 17)

αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.

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ἓν ἀντία πάντων Bernays Ges.Abh. I, 32, Bywater : ἐναντία πάντων L
ὅκωσπερ Bernays coll. Strom. IV, 50, 2 : ὅπως L

The noblest of men chose one thing instead of everything else: the eternal glory among mortals. But most indulge in gluttony like cattle.

<div align="center">

103 (24)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alex., *Stromata* IV, 16, 1 (II, 255, 30 St.)

ἀρηϊφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι και ἄνθρωποι

Those fallen in battle are glorified by gods and men.

<div align="center">

104 (136)   *Quotation*

</div>

Scholia Arr. ad Epictetum, IV, 7, 27, p. 422 Schenkl (1916)

Ἡρακλείτου· **ψυχαὶ ἀρηΐφατοι καθαρώτεραι ἢ ἐνὶ νούσοις.**

The souls of the fallen in battle are more pure than of those who died from diseases.

Clemens Alex., *Stromata* IV, 49, 3 (II, 271, 3 St.)

   μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι.

   Greater deaths are awarded with greater fates.

V/1. POLIS: THE WORLD OF CRAFTS AND ARTS.

< All men in their «deeds» (*erga*) in the realm of crafts unconsciously follow the divine (cosmic) law of measure and the harmony of the opposites. Craft (τέχνη) imitates nature (φύσις): *fr. 106 - 124>*

                    106 (10) *vebatim quotation + paraphrase its of context*

[Aristoteles] *De mundo* 5. 396 b 7–25

Καίτοι γέ τις ἐθαύμασε πῶς ποτε, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν συνεστηκὼς ὁ κόσμος, λέγω δὲ ξηρῶν τε καὶ ὑγρῶν, ψυχρῶν τε καὶ θερμῶν, οὐ πάλαι διέφθαρται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς κἂν εἰ πόλιν τινὲς θαυμάζοιεν, ὅπως διαμένει συνεστηκυῖα ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐθνῶν, πενήτων λέγω καὶ | πλουσίων, νέων γερόντων, ἀσθενῶν ἰσχυρῶν, πονηρῶν χρηστῶν. Ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτ' ἦν πολιτικῆς ὁμονοίας τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν μίαν καὶ ὁμοίαν ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἀποτελεῖν διάθεσιν ὑποδεχομένην πᾶσαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ τέχνην[1].

Ἴσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίχεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ οὐχ ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων σηνῆψεν, οὐ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμουμένη τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, ὠχρῶν τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν, χρωμάτων ἐγκερασαμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους, μουσικὴ δὲ ὀξεῖς ἅμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρούς τε καὶ βραχεῖς, φθόγγους μίξασα ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἁρμονίαν, γραμματικὴ δὲ ἐκ φωνηέντων καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κρᾶσιν ποιησαμένη τὴν ὅλην τέχνην ἀπ' αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ·

«Συλλάψιες[2] οὖλα[3] {καὶ}[4] οὐχ οὖλα,

συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον,

συνᾆδον διᾆδον·

ἐκ πάντων ἓν,{καὶ}[5] ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.»

Οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν, οὐρανοῦ λέγω καὶ γῆς τοῦ τε σύμπαντος κόσμου, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων κράσεως ἀρχῶν μία διεκόσμησεν ἁρμονία· ξηρὸν γὰρ ὑγρῷ, θερμὸν δὲ ψυχρῷ, βαρεῖ τε κοῦφον μιγὲν κτλ.

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(1) τέχνην scripsi : τύχην codd. ‖ **(2)** συλλάψιες Lp (Lipsiensis 16), acc. Lorimer, Kirk, Marcovich, Kahn, Graham alii : συλλήψιες P (Vat. 1339) : συλλήψεις v.l. R 233 : σύλληψις Par. 2494 : συλλάψει ἐς Stob. I, 270 Wachsmuth : συνάψιες A[pc] (Parisinus 1102), C (Laurentianus 97, 14) E (Vat. Urbin. 125) cett. (vide app. crit. ap. Lorimer, p. 76 et Marcovich EF, p. 70), acc. Diels, Herakleitos[1], DK, Walzer, Conche alii ‖ **(3)** οὖλα ... οὖλα BTW, Ald, Vat. 1314 acc. : οὖλα ... οὖλα EF : οὖλα ... οὖλα AH : ὅλα καὶ οὐχ᾿ ὅλα P, Amb 174, Bern., Vind. 8 cett. , acc. Diels-Kranz, Marcovich, Kahn, Conche alii. ‖ **(4)** καί del. Zeller ‖ **(5)** καί om. F Fl2

Someone once expressed his wonder how on earth is it possible that the cosmos which consists from opposite principles – I mean from wet and dry, cold and hot – has not already perished. In the same way one might express his wonder about the polis: how can it survive while consisting from radically opposite groups, I mean from poor and rich, young and old, weak and strong, rogue and decent? They ignore that that's exactly the most wonderful ability of the civil concordance (*politike homonoia*), I mean ability to create one from many and similar from dissimilar disposition that accommodates any nature and any art (*tekhne*).

It seems that nature strives after opposites and from them creates what is concordant, not from the similar. For example, she brought together male and female, not creatures of the same sex, and created the first concordance by joining together the opposites, not the similar. It seems that the art (*tekhne*) imitating nature (*physis*) does the same. For example, the art of painting, having mixed together the natures of the black and white, yellow and red colors, created pictures that are concordant with the originals. Music, in turn, having mixed together high and low, long and short sounds, created a harmony in different voices. The art of grammar, producing fusion of voiced (=vowels) and unvoiced (=consonants) letters, constructed from

them the whole *tekhne*. That's exactly the meaning of the saying of Heraclitus the Obscure:

Syllables: voiced and unvoiced /letters/,

concordant discordant,

consonant dissonant,

from all /elements/ one, from one all.

In the same way and the construction of all things, I mean of the Heaven and Earth, as well as of the whole cosmos, was set in order by the single Harmony from completely opposite principles: mixing hot with cold, heavy with light etc.

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106A   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase*

</div>

Plutarchus, *De tranquillitate animi,* 473f — 474a (p. 119 Dumortier — Defradas)

δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν πινακίῳ χρωμάτων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ φαιδρὰ προβάλλοντας ἀποκρύπτειν τὰ σκυθρωπὰ καὶ πιέζειν. ἐξαλεῖψαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι παντάπασιν οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι· 'παλίντροπος γὰρ ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου' | καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καθαρὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀμιγές. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν μουσικῇ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι καὶ ὀξεῖς, ἐν δὲ γραμματικῇ

φωνήεντα καὶ ἄφωνα γράμματα, μουσικὸς δὲ καὶ γραμματικὸς οὐχ ὁ θάτερα δυσχεραίνων καὶ ὑποφεύγων ἀλλ' ὁ πᾶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ μειγνύναι πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστάμενος, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιστοιχίας ἐχόντων, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην,

'οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,

ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς'

In one's soul, <u>like in a picture</u>, one should bring forward <u>bright and cheerful colors</u> while concealing and muting the <u>gloomy ones</u>. To wipe them out completely and to get rid of them is impossible, since

  «**contrarious is the harmony of the cosmos like that of the lyre and the bow**»,

and nothing human is pure and unmixed. But <u>just as in music there are low and high notes, and in the art of grammar the vowels and the consonant letters,</u> and the expert in music and grammar is not the one who dislikes and avoids some /of the opposite elements/, but the one who knows how to use and to combine all of them, since things /in human life/ stand in opposition to each other. According to Euripides, «It is impossible to separate good and evil, but there is a /proportional/ mixture of them, and that's fine».

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106B *Adaptation & summary of Heraclitus' doctrine*

</div>

Philo Alex., *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 207–214 (p. 268–269 Harl)

[207] Διδάξας οὖν ἡμᾶς περὶ τῆς εἰς ἴσα τομῆς ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιστήμην ἄγει φάσκων ὅτι τὰ τμήματα[1] <u>"ἔθηκεν ἀντιπρόσωπα ἀλλήλοις"</u> (Gen. 15, 10). τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πάνθ' ὅσα ἐν κόσμῳ σχεδὸν ἐναντία εἶναι πέφυκεν, ἀρκτέον δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων· [208] θερμὸν ἐναντίον ψυχρῷ καὶ ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ καὶ κοῦφον βαρεῖ καὶ σκότος φωτὶ καὶ νὺξ ἡμέρα, καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ μὲν ἡ ἀπλανὴς τῇ πεπλανημένῃ φορᾷ, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα αἰθρία νεφώσει, νηνεμία πνεύμασι, θέρει

χειμών, ἔαρι μετόπωρον—τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθεῖ, τῷ δὲ φθίνει τὰ {δ'} ἔγγεια—, πάλιν ὕδατος τὸ γλυκὺ τῷ πικρῷ καὶ γῆς ἡ στεῖρα τῇ γονίμῳ. [209] καὶ τἄλλα δὲ ἐναντία προῦπτα, σώματα ἀσώματα, ἔμψυχα ἄψυχα, λογικὰ ἄλογα, θνητὰ ἀθάνατα, αἰσθητὰ νοητά, καταληπτὰ ἀκατάληπτα, στοιχεῖα ἀποτελέσματα, ἀρχὴ τελευτή, γένεσις φθορά, ζωὴ θάνατος, νόσος ὑγεία, λευκὸν μέλαν, δεξιὰ εὐώνυμα, δικαιοσύνη ἀδικία, φρόνησις ἀφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία δειλία, σωφροσύνη ἀκολασία, ἀρετὴ κακία, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἑτέρας πάντα εἴδη τοῖς τῆς ἑτέρας εἴδεσι πᾶσι· [210] πάλιν γραμματικὴ ἀγραμματία, μουσικὴ ἀμουσία, παιδεία ἀπαιδευσία, συνόλως τέχνη ἀτεχνία, καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, φωνήεντα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄφωνα, ὀξεῖς καὶ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι, εὐθεῖαι καὶ περιφερεῖς γραμμαί· [211] καὶ ἐν ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς ἄγονα γόνιμα, πολυτόκα ὀλιγοτόκα, ᾠοτόκα ζῳοτόκα, μαλάκεια ὀστρακόδερμα, ἄγρια ἥμερα, μονωτικὰ ἀγελαῖα· [212] καὶ πάλιν πενία πλοῦτος, δόξα ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια εὐγένεια, ἔνδεια περιουσία, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, νόμος ἀνομία, εὐφυΐα ἀφυΐα, ἀπονία πόνος, νεότης γῆρας, ἀδυναμία δύναμις, ἀσθένεια ῥώμη. καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλέγεσθαι ἀπερίγραφα καὶ ἀπέρατ' ὄντα τῷ πλήθει; [213] παγκάλως οὖν ὁ τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἑρμηνεὺς γραμμάτων [2], τῆς ἀργίας καὶ ἀμελετησίας ἡμῶν λαμβάνων οἶκτον ἑκάστοτ' ἀφόνως[3] ἀναδιδάσκει, καθὰ καὶ νῦν, τὴν ἀντιπρόσωπον ἑκάστων θέσιν οὐχ ὁλοκλήρων, ἀλλὰ τμημάτων ὑπαρχόντων· ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν ἐναντίων, οὗ τμηθέντος γνώριμα τὰ ἐναντία.

Philo Alexandrinus, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 207-213:

   Having taught us the lesson of equal division the Scripture leads us on to the knowledge of opposites, by telling us that "He placed the sections facing opposite each other" (Gen. xv. 10). For in truth, we may take it that everything in the world is by nature opposite to something else.

 (a) [*Cosmos. Elements*] Let us begin with what comes first. Hot is opposite to cold, dry to wet, light to heavy, darkness to light, night to day. In heaven we have the course of the fixed stars opposite to the course of the planets, in the air cloudless to cloudy, calm to wind, summer to winter, spring when earth's growths bloom to autumn when they decay, again in water, sweet to bitter, and in land, barren to fruitful

(b) [*Living beings*] And the other opposites are obvious: corporeal, incorporeal; living, lifeless ; mortal, immortal; sensible, intelligible ; comprehensible, incomprehensible ; elementary, completed ; beginning, end ; becoming, extinction ; life, death ; disease, health ; white, black ; right, left;   (c) [*Ethics*] justice, injustice ; prudence, folly ; courage, cowardice; continence, incontinence; virtue, vice ; and all the species of virtue are opposite to all the species of vice.

(d) [*Polis. Τέχναι*] Again we have the opposite conditions of the literary and the illiterate, the cultured and the uncultured, the educated and the uneducated, and in general the scientific and the unscientific, and in the subject matter of the arts or sciences there are vocal sounds or vowels

and non-vocal sounds or consonants, high notes and low notes, straight lines and curved lines.
(e) [*Zoology*] In animals and plants there are barren and productive, prolific and unprolific, viviparous and oviparous, soft-skinned and shell-skinned, wild and tame, solitary and gregarious.
(f) [*Polis 2: Laws*] In another class there are poverty and riches; eminence and obscurity; high birth and low birth; want and abundance; war, peace; law, lawlessness; gifted nature, ungifted nature; labor, inaction; youth, age; impotence, power weakness, strength.
(g) [*Reading* the *Liber naturae. Diairesis of opposites*] Why attempt to enumerate all and each of them, when their number is infinite and illimitable? How excellent then is this lesson, which the **interpreter of Nature's letters (τῆς φύσεως ἑρμηνεὺς γραμμάτων)** in his pity for our sluggishness and carelessness lavishes on us always and everywhere, as he does in this passage, that in every case it is not where things exist as wholes, but where they exist as divisions or sections, that they must be "set facing opposite each other." For the two opposites together form a single whole, by the division of which the opposites are known. Is not this the truth which according to the Greeks Heraclitus, whose greatness they celebrate so loudly, put in the fore front of his philosophy and vaunted it as a new discovery? Actually, as has been clearly shewn, it was Moses who long ago discovered the truth that opposites are formed from the same whole, to which they stand in the relation of sections or divisions. (*transl. Colson – Whittaker with some alterations*).

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107 (75)   *paraphrase + quotation*

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Marcus Antoninus, *Ad semet ipsum,* VI, 42

Πάντες εἰς ἓν ἀποτέλεσμα συνεργοῦμεν, οἱ μὲν εἰδότως καὶ παρακολουθητικῶς, οἱ δὲ ἀνεπιστάτως, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς καθεύδοντας, οἶμαι, ὁ Ἡράκλειτος **ἐργάτας** εἶναι λέγει καὶ συνεργοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων.

 We all work together for the sake of the one final goal, some of us with knowledge and attention, others without realizing it. It is in this sense, I think, Heraclitus calls the sleepers **«workers»** and co-workers of the cosmic processes.

[Hippocrates] *De diaeta*, 1, 11; p. 134, 21–22   *imitation*

Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανέα σκέπτεσθαι οὐκ
ἐπίστανται· τέχνῃσι γὰρ χρεώμενοι ὁμοίῃσιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ
γινώσκουσιν. *Ibidem* 1,24 Οὕτω μὲν αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἐπικοινωνέουσιν.

   Humans do not know how to conceive things invisible on the ground of what is visible: they use arts similar to human nature without realizing it.

Ibidem, I,24: And so, all human crafts have something in common with human nature.

<Manifestations of the divine law of the harmony of opposites in particular crafts & arts>

<Grammatical art>

108

Verbatim quotation & paraphrases

(a) [Arist.] *De mundo* 396 b 21 = fr. 107

συλλάψιες οὖλα {καὶ} οὐχ οὖλα...

… syllables: voiced and unvoiced letters…

   (b) = fr. 106A ἐν δὲ γραμματικῇ φωνήεντα καὶ ἄφωνα γράμματα κτλ.

   "in grammar vowels and consonants"

   (c) = 106B Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum*, 210 πάλιν γραμματικὴ ἀγραμματία ... καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, φωνήεντα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄφωνα.

   "and again, literacy illiteracy … and in arts vowels and consonant letters".

   (d) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* 1.23; p. 140, 17–23 J.-B.

Γραμματικὴ τοιόνδε· σχημάτων συνθέσεις, σημεῖα φωνῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, δύναμις τὰ παροιχόμενα μνημονεῦσαι, τὰ ποιητέα δηλῶσαι. δι' ἑπτὰ σχημάτων ἡ γνῶσις. ταῦτα πάντα ἄνθρωπος διαπρήσσεται καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος.

   This is the art of grammar: compositions of figures, signs of human voice, the ability to remember the past and to show what is to be done. Through seven figures is /attained/ knowledge. All this is performed by man, both by man who knows letters and by the one who does not.

<Music>

109   *Verbatim quotation & paraphrases*

(a) [Arist.] *De mundo* 396 b 21 = 106 Leb

…συλλάψιες ...συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον...
'**syllables … concordant discordant, consonant dissonant…**'

(b) Aristoteles, *Ethica Eudemia*. H 1. 1235a 25

οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα ... οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ...

 (c) Plutarchus, *De tranquillitate animi*, 473f–474a (p. 119 Dumortier — Defradas) = fr. 106A L.

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν μουσικῇ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι καὶ ὀξεῖς ...

(d) Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 210 = fr. 106B μουσικὴ ἀμουσία … καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις... ὀξεῖς καὶ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι.

(e) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* 1.18; p. 138, 15–21 J.-B.   *imitation*

ἁρμονίης συντάξιες ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐχ αἱ αὐταί, ἐκ τοῦ ὀξέος, ἐκ τοῦ βαρέος, ὀνόματι μὲν ὁμοίων, φθόγγῳ δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίων· τὰ πλεῖστα διάφορα μάλιστα ξυμφέρει, καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα διάφορα ἥκιστα ξυμφέρει· εἰ δὲ ὅμοια πάντα ποιήσει τις, οὐκ ἔνι τέρψις κτλ.

   Musical compositions from the same /notes/ not the same, from high and low, similar by name, dissimilar by sound. What differs most, is in the best concordance. But if one makes everything similar, there is no pleasure in it etc.

<Art of painting>

110   *Paraphrases*

(a) [Aristoteles] De mundo 396 b 12

   Ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, ὠχρῶν τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν, χρωμάτων ἐγκερασαμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους… Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ κτλ. Cf. fr. 107.

   It seems that the art (*tekhne*) imitating nature (*physis*) does the same. For example, the art of painting, having mixed together the natures of the black and white, yellow and red colors, created pictures that are concordant with the originals.

(b) Plutarchus, *De tranq. animi* 473f = Heraclit. fr. 106A

(c) Philo, Quis rerum divinarum, 210 = Heraclit. fr. 106B καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις...εὐθεῖαι καὶ περιφερεῖς γραμμαί.

<Medicine>

111 (58)   *Paraphrase + verbatim quotation*

Hipplytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX,10,3

καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν [scil. ἕν ἐστιν]. οἱ γοῦν **ἰατροί**, φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, **τέμνοντες, καίοντες πάντηι, βασανίζοντες κακῶς τοὺς ἀρρωστοῦντας, ἐπαιτιῶνται μηδέν ἄξιον μισθὸν λαμβάνειν {παρὰ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων}, ταὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰς ὀδύνας.**

———————

καίοντες πάντηι, interp. Diels H2 : πάντηι βασανίζοντες DK, Marcovich alii‖ ἐπαιτιῶνται μηδὲν ἄξιον P, acc. Marcovich, Kahn, Conche : ἐπαιτέονται μηδέν ἄξιοι em. Bernays, acc. DK ‖ μισθὸν

Wordsworth : μισθῶν P ‖ ταῦτα P ‖ τὰ ἀγαθά P : ταὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι {τὰ ἀγαθὰ} καὶ αἱ νόσοι Wilamowitz (Hermes 1927 : 278) ‖ ταὐτά Sauppe : ταῦτα cod. ‖ ὀδύνας scripsi : νόσους P

And good and evil [are the same]. For example, **the doctors**, in Heraclitus' words, **cutting, burning everywhere, badly torturing the ill, complaining that they are underpaid, produce by their work the same: the good and pains.**

<div align="center">

112

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… ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιῆσαι...

…[we need a doctor capable of] **turning inundation into draught**.

(a) Diogenes Laertius 9.3 περιτραπεὶς εἰς ὕδερον κατῆλθεν εἰς ἄστυ καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐπυνθάνετο εἰ δύναιντο ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιῆσαι...

(b) Philsotrati *Vita Apollonii* 1.9

ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Ἡράκλειτος) δεῖσθαι ἔφη τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐξ ἐποβρίας αὐχμόν...

(c) Ps. Heracliti *Epist.* VI, p. 329, 10 et 26 Taran

Πῶς ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιητέον...

<div align="center">

<Fullers>

113 (59)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX,10,4

Γναφέων < ἴπου > ὁδὸς εὐθεῖα καὶ σκολιὴ {ἡ τοῦ ὀργάνου τοῦ καλουμένου κοχλίου ἐν τῶι γναφείωι περιστροφὴ εὐθεῖα καὶ σκολιή· ἄνω γὰρ ὁμοῦ καὶ κύκλωι περιέρχεται}, **μία ἐστί, φησί, καὶ ἡ αὐτή.**

———————

γναφέων Dunker, Bywater, Zeller : γραφέων P, acc. Kirk 97, Guthrie : γνάφων Marcovich, acc. Kahn : γναφείωι Bernays, Diels-Kranz, Conche alii ‖ ἴπου supplevi ‖ γραφείωι P : γναφείωι Bernays fere omnium consensu ‖ περιέρχεται Roeper : περιέχεται P

The way of <the press of> fullers is straight and crooked {the rotation of the instrument in the fuller's shop is straight and crooked, since it moves up and by circles at the same time}, **one and the same**.

cf. [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* I, 14

Καὶ οἱ γναφέες τωὐτὸ διαπρήσσονται, λακτίζουσι, κόπτουσιν, ἕλκουσι, λυμαινόμενοι ἰσχυρότερα ποιέουσι, κείροντες τὰ ὑπερέχοντα, καὶ παραπλέκοντες, καλλίω ποιέουσι· ταὐτὰ πάσχει ὤνθρωπος.

And the fullers do the same: they kick, strike, drag, tearing apart /clothes/ make them stronger … the same suffers a man /from trainers/.

<Carpenters and builders>

114   *Probably, quotation*

(a) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* 1. 6; p. 130, 2 5 J.-B.

πρίουσι ἄνθρωποι ξύλον· ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ. τὸ δ᾽αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιέουσι· μεῖον δὲ ποιέοντες πλέον ποιέουσι. τοιοῦτον φύσις ἀνθρώπου· τὸ μὲν ὠθεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἕλκει· τὸ μὲν δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνει· καὶ τῶι μὲν δίδωσι, τοῦ δὲ λαμβάνει· καὶ τῶι μὲν δίδωσι τοσούτωι πλέον, τοῦ δὲ λαμβάνει τοσούτωι μεῖον.

  Men are sawing wood: one draws, another pushes. They are doing the same. Doing less, they do more. Something like this is the nature of man: one pushes, another draws, one gives, another takes, and to whom it gives, from the same it takes etc.

 (b) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta,* 1.7 ; p. 130, 25-26 J.-B. ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες τὸ ξύλον πρίζουσι, τρυπῶσιν καὶ ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τωὐτὸ ποιέοντες κάτω δὲ πιεζόντων ἄνω ἕρπει κτλ.

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πρίζουσι, τρυπῶσιν scripsi : τρυπῶσιν θM : πρίζουσι corr. θ² : πρίουσι Fredrich, acc. DK

   "Just as carpenters saw and pierce wood, and one draws, another pushes. They are doing the same, and when they press down, it goes up etc."

  (c) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta,* 1.16 ; p. 138, 3–6 J.-B.

Τέκτονες πρίοντες ὁ μὲν ὠθεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἕλκει· τωὐτὸ ποιέοντες ἀμφότεροι· τρυπῶσιν, ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ· πιεζόντων ἄνω ἕρπει, τὸ δὲ κάτω· μείω ποιέοντες πλείω ποιέουσι. φύσιν ἀνθρώπου μιμέονται. τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ μὲν ἕλκει, τὸ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τωὐτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ ἀμφοτέρως.

―――――――

τρυπῶσιν… ὠθεῖ codd. : secl. Fredrich, acc. DK, Joly-Byl

    "Carpenters saw: one pushes, another draws, they both are doing the same. They pierce /wood/: one draws, another pushes, when they press down, it goes up, while the /opposite end/ goes down. Doing less they are doing more. They imitate the nature of man: the breath now draws, now pushes, it does the same and both ways".

(a) Alexander Aphrodisiensis ap. Elias *in Aristotelis Categorias*, p. 242, 13–16 Busse

…εἴ εἰσιν ἀντικείμενα σώζοντα ἄλληλα. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δείκνυσιν Ἀλέξανδρος ὅτι ἀντικείμενα, ὃς καὶ τὰ λαβδοειδῆ ξύλα παράδειγμα λαμβάνει, ἅτινα μετὰ ἀντιθέσεώς τινος σώζει ἄλληλα, ἃ ἡ συνήθεια ἀντηρεῖς καλεῖ, ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς ἀμείβοντας.

… if there are opposites that save each other. Alexander proves that they are opposites, and he takes as example the Λ-shaped logs, which save each other due to a certain opposition. In common language they are called "rafters", the poet calls them "crossing".

(b) Philoponus *in Categorias*, p. 104, 34 Busse ἀπεικάζουσι δὲ αὐτὰ (scil. τὰ πρός τι) καὶ τοῖς ἀντερείδουσιν ἄλληλα ξύλοις · τούτων γὰρ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται τὸ λοιπόν.

They assimilate them /= *ta pros ti*/ to mutually supporting logs: if one them is removed, the whole system will collapse.

<Potters>

115 *Paraphrase*

(a) Plutarchus, *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 106 D

πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καί, ᾗ φησιν

Ἡράκλειτος, "ταὐτό γ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς… [fr.76]". ὡς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πηλοῦ δύναταί τις πλάττων ζῷα συγχεῖν καὶ πάλιν

πλάττειν καὶ συγχεῖν καὶ τοῦθ' ἓν παρ' ἓν ποιεῖν ἀδιαλείπτως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης πάλαι μὲν τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἀνέσχεν, εἶτα συνεχεῖς αὐτοῖς ἐγέννησε τοὺς πατέρας, εἶθ' ἡμᾶς, εἶτ' ἄλλους ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἀνακυκλήσει.

Is there any moment when the death is not present in us? And, as Heraclitus says, "one and the same in us is the living and the dead etc..." [fr. 76]. <u>Just as someone can mould /figures of/ animals from the same clay, and then to commingle them, and then mould again, and so repeat one by one incessantly,</u> in the same was nature long ago produced from the same matter our ancestors, then after them generated our fathers, then us, and then will repeatedly produce new and new generations.

[Hippocrates] De victu, I, 22; p. 140,11–16 J.-B. *imitation*

(b) Κεραμέες τὸν τροχὸν δινέουσι, καὶ οὔτε ὀπίσω οὔτε πρώσω προχωρέει, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωσε ἅμα τοῦ ὅλου ἀπομίμημα τῆς περιφορῆς· ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐργάζονται περιφερομένῳ παντοδαπά, οὐδὲν ὅμοιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ὀργάνοισιν. Ἄνθρωποι ταὐτὰ πάσχουσι καὶ τἄλλα ζῶα, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορῇ πάντα ἐργάζονται, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅμοιον οὐδὲν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ὀργάνοισιν, ἐξ ὑγρῶν ξηρὰ ποιέοντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ξηρῶν ὑγρά.

The potters rotate the wheel, which does not go either backwards or forwards, and at the same time both ways at once, imitating the revolution of the Universe. In the same revolving potter's wheel they produce various figures, not similar at all to one another, from the same /clay/ by the same instruments. The same happens with men and other animals: they produce everything in the same circular motion, from the same /constituent parts/, by the same instruments, /offsprings/ that are not similar to one other at all, by making the dry from the wet and the wet from the dry.

(c) Plato, *Cratylus* 440c

…ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι … ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι κτλ.

... as the followers of Heraclitus and others say... that there is nothing sound in anything, but all things leak like clay pots, and exactly as men who suffer from catarrh, so they think, is the condition of all things.

< Goldsmiths >

116   *Quotation*

(a) Aristoteles, *De caelo* 304a 9

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σχῆμα περιάπτουσι τῷ πυρί, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν πυραμίδα ποιοῦντες, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἁπλουστέρως λέγοντες ὅτι τῶν μὲν σχημάτων τμητικώτατον ἡ πυραμίς, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ, οἱ δὲ κομψοτέρως τῷ λόγῳ προσάγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν σώματα πάντα σύγκειται ἐκ τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου, τὰ δὲ σχήματα τὰ στερεὰ ἐκ πυραμίδων, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ λεπτότατον, τῶν δὲ σχημάτων ἡ πυραμὶς μικρομερέστατον καὶ πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σχῆμα τοῦ πρώτου σώματος, πυραμὶς ἂν εἴη τὸ πῦρ.
Οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν σχήματος οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνονται, λεπτομερέστατον δὲ μόνον ποιοῦσιν, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτου συντιθεμένου φασὶ γίγνεσθαι τἆλλα **καθάπερ ἂν εἰ συμφυσωμένου ψήγματος**.

"Some of them /= of those who accept fire as the primary element/ attach shape to the fire, like those who make it a pyramid. Some of these argue in a more simple way, i.e. that the most able to cut /~pungent/ of all figures is the pyramid, and of simple bodies, the fire. Others adduce a more subtle argument, i.e. that all bodies are composed from the element with subtlest particles, and all solid bodies from pyramids; therefore, since of all bodies the most subtle is fire, and of all figures

the pyramid is the one that consists of smallest parts and is the first, and the first figure must belong to the first body, it follows that fire is a pyramid.

Others say nothing about the figure of fire, but only accept that it consists if the smallest parts, and then, as they say, <u>from the fire</u> – in the process of its composition – <u>other things are generated</u> **as if from the melting of gold sand**."

(b) Arist., *De caelo* 298b32: Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί φασι καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν, ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος.

Others say that all things are becoming and flow, and nothing is stable, but there is <u>something one only that remains /the same/</u>, from which <u>all these things are produced by reshaping.</u> This seems to be the meaning of the teaching of Heraclitus from Ephesus and many others.

(c[1]) [Plutarchus], *De placitis philosophorum* I,13,2

Ἡράκλειτος ψηγμάτιά τινα ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ εἰσάγει.
Heraclitus introduces certain scrapings, smallest and having no parts.

(c[2]) Stob. I,14,2 Ἡράκλειτος πρὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς δοκεῖ τισι ψήγματα καταλείπειν.
Heraclitus is thought by some to admit /scil. as minima/ certain 'scrapings'.

(d) [Hippocrates] *De diatea* I, 20 Χρυσίον ἐργάζονται, κόπτουσι, πλύνουσι, τήκουσι· πυρὶ μαλακῷ, ἰσχυρῷ δὲ οὐ συνίσταται. ἀπεργασάμενοι πρὸς πάντα χρῶνται.

They produce gold: smash, wash, melt. The gold takes body on a soft fire, not on a strong one. Having produced gold, they use it to all purpose.

<Iron-workers >

116A   *Imitation*

(a) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* 1.13 σιδηρουργοὶ τέχνῃσι τὸν σίδηρον περιτήκουσι, πνεύματι ἀναγκάζοντες τὸ πῦρ, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τροφὴν ἀφαιρέοντες, ἀραιὸν δὲ ποιήσαντες, παίουσι καὶ συνελαύνουσιν, ὕδατος δὲ ἄλλου τροφῇ ἰσχυρὸν γίνεται. Ταὐτὰ πάσχει ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβου κτλ.

_____

σιδηρουργοὶ scripsi : σιδήρου ὄργανα codd., secl. Diels, Joly

Iron-workers melt iron by their devices, by air forcing the fire, taking away the existing food, and having made it soft, smite and harden it; by feeding it with another water they make it strong. The same happens with man in body training etc.

Paraphrase

(b) = fr. 158 L. Olympiodorus, *Comm. in Plat. Phaedonem*, 10.2; p. 139 Westerink

τὴν δὲ πεπαιδευμένην (scil. ψυχήν) στομωθεῖσαν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιμένειν <μέχρι> τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, ἧς δόξης ἦν καὶ Ἡράκλειτος.

… the educated soul, hardened /= made into steel/ by virtues, survives /after separation from the body/ until the conflagration. This was the opinion of Heraclitus, among others.

(c) Plutarch. *De facie* 943e   *reminiscence*

…οἷον τὰ στομούμενα βαφῆι...καὶ καλῶς Ἡράκλειτος εἶπεν κτλ. (sequitur fr. 155 L)

… /souls in the region of moon/ like /iron/ hardened by dipping… and Heraclitus was right when he said… [*follows* fr. 155].

<center>*<Charcoal-makers?>*</center>

Fr. 116B = fr.75A

<center>*<Bakers?>*</center>

<center>**117**   *Possible reminiscence*</center>

(a) Aristoteles, *De partibus animalium*, 645 a 20 sq.

Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἰπνῷ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας·
εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ.

In all creations of nature there is something that provokes our admiration. There is a story that when some visitors wishing to meet Heraclitus after approaching his house and seeing that he warmed himself at the oven, stood outside /embarrassed/, Heraclitus encouraged them to enter saying that "there are gods here, too!" In the same way one should approach the investigation of every single living creature without embarrassment, believing that in all of them there is something natural and beautiful.

(b) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* 1.20; p.14, 2–4 J.-B.

ἄνθρωπος σῖτον κόπτει, πλύνει, ἀλήθει, πυρώσας χρῆται, ἰσχυρῷ μὲν πυρὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐ συνίσταται, μαλακῷ δέ.

Man threshes wheat, washes, grounds, having baked it, uses it. It does not take shape in the body on strong fire, but on the soft one.

118 (23)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* IV,10,1

Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ᾔδεσαν εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.

───────────────

ᾔδεσαν Sylburg fere omnium consensus : ἔδησαν codd. ‖ ταῦτα (scil. τὰ ἄδικα, ἀνομίαι) codd. : ταὐτά Reinhardt, Parmenides 204.

They would ignore the name of Justice (Dike) if these things did not exist.

119 (122)   *Verbatim quotation*

Suda, Lexicon, A 1762 s.v. ἀμφισβατεῖν (p.157 Adler)

ἀμφισβατεῖν· ἔνιοι τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν· Ἴωνες δὲ καὶ ἀγχιβατεῖν. καὶ **ἀγχιβασίην** Ἡράκλειτος.

…**dispute [or litigation]** …

< Buyers and sellers, debtors and creditors (120–121)>

<Agora >

120   *Imitation*

(a) [Hippocr.] *De diaeta* 1. 24 (p.140, 29–30 J.-B.)

Ἐς ἀγορὴν ἐλθόντες ἄνθρωποι ταὐτὰ διαπρήσσονται· ἐξαπατῶσι πωλέοντες καὶ ὠνεόμενοι…

 Having come to the agora, men do the same: they cheat selling and buying…

 (b) Lucianus, *Vitarum auctio*, 14   *Reminiscence*

Τοιγαροῦν οὐδὲ ὠνήσεταί σέ τις εὖ φρονῶν. [ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΟΣ] Ἐγὼ δὲ κέλομαι πᾶσιν ἡβηδὸν οἰμώζειν, τοῖσιν ὠνεομένοισι καὶ τοῖσιν οὐκ ὠνεομένοισι.

[BUYER] Nobody in his right senses will ever buy you. [HERACLITUS] I wish you all go to hell, whether you are buyers or non-buyers!

<Give and take >

121   *Imitation*

 (a) διδόναι — λαμβάνειν [Hippocr.] *De diaeta*, 1.6; 1.8

<Becoming more – becoming less. Growth and deminution.>

Reminiscences

(b) πλέον καὶ μεῖον γίνεσθαι, ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ μεῖον ἰέναι: *De diaeta* 1.5; 1.6; 2. Cf. Chrysipp. fr. 599 ap. Euseb. PE XV.9.1 κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη.

<Excess and Deficiency. Poverty and Wealth. Maximum and Minimum >

(c) Fr. 41, 43(a) κόρος χρησμοσύνη, De victu 1.3; 1.4; 1.5 μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον

<Creditors and debtors. Loan and mortgage>

(d) Fr. 31, 42, 45, cf. fr. 47, 153, 154.

<Agons – athletic competitions>

122   *Imitation*

(a)   [Hippocr.] De victu 1. 24; p. 140, 24–142,1 J.-B.

Ἀγωνίη, παιδοτριβίη τοιόνδε· διδάσκουσι παρανομέειν κατὰ νόμον, ἀδικέειν δικαίως… Τρέχουσι, παλαίουσι, μάχονται, κλέπτουσιν, ἐξαπατῶσιν, εἷς ἐκ πάντων κρίνεται.

Sport, gymnastics is this: they teach to break the law lawfully, to commit injustice in a just way … they run, wrestle, fight, steal, deceive, one is chosen from all.

<Running>

(b) Fr. 49(b), 50, 51, 51A, 55, 57

<Chariot race?>

(c) Fr. 44, 65, 56

<Torch race>

(d) Fr. 52 (?), 61, 79–80, cf. 78,

<Wrestling >

(e) Fr. 115, 119 (?).

<Archery >

(f) Fr. 28, cf. 29.

<Board games: pesseia. Dicing>

(g) Fr. 33, cf& fr. 71, D.L. 9.3 Lucian, *Vit. auctio*, 14

Παῖς παίζων, πεσσεύων, διαφερόμενος, συμφερόμενος.

[Human life or time is] a child playing backgammon, now losing, now winning.

123   *doxography*

(a) (A 20 DK; 116c Ma) Chalcidius*, In Platonis Timaeum*, cap.CCLI; p. 260, 20–261, 2 Waszink:

Heraclitus vero consentientibus Stoicis rationem nostram cum diuina ratione connectit regente ac moderante mundana: propter inseparabilem comitatum consciam decreti rationabilis factam quiescentibus animis opere sensuum futura denuntiare; ex quo fieri, ut appareant imagines ignotorum locorum simulacraque hominum tam viventium quam mortuorum. Idemque asserit divinationis usum et praemoneri meritos instruentibus diuinis potestatibus.

Heraclitus (with whom the Stoics are in agreement) connects our reason with the divine reason on the assumption that the world reason rules and governs. Due to the inseparable connection /between them/ our reason partakes in the knowledge of the decision /of the divine/ reason and, when the souls are quiet, through the senses foretells the future. As a result of this /in our dreams/ appear images of unknown places and persons, both living and diseased. He also recognizes the use of divination and believes that by divine providence those who deserve it receive premonitions /about future/.

    (b) [Hippocrates], *De diaeta*, I, 12.   *Imitation (adaptation*)

Μαντικὴ τοιόνδε· τοῖσι φανεροῖσι μὲν τὰ ἀφανέα γινώσκειν, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀφανέσι τὰ φανερὰ, καὶ τοῖσιν ἐοῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀποθανοῦσι τὰ ζῶντα κτλ.

The art of divination is like this: by visible to know the invisible, and by the invisible the visible, and by the present the future, by the dead the living etc.

Vide fr. 148 [*identity of life and death in Bacchic ritual*]

124   *Paraphrases*

(a) [Aristoteles] *De mundo* 396b 7 = fr. 106 Leb Ἴσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίχεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ οὐχ ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων σηνῆψεν, οὐ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων

(b) Aristoteles, *Ethica Eudemia*. Η 1. 1235a 25 οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

For there would be no harmony without the high and the low /notes/, nor living beings without male and female sex which are opposite to each other.

(c) [Hippocrates] *De diaeta* I,12   *reminiscence*

ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ ξυγγενόμενος παιδίον ἐποίησε …

Man, having united with a woman, begets a child.

<center>*<Father and Son >*</center>

<center>**124A**   *Paraphrases*</center>

(a) Plutarchus, *De E apud Delphos*, 392c

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἕνα φοβούμεθα γελοίως θάνατον, ἤδη τοσούτους τεθνηκότες καὶ θνήσκοντες. οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὡς Ἡράκλειτος ἔλεγε, 'πυρὸς θάνατος ἀέρι γένεσις, καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις,' ἀλλ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἡμῶν φθείρεται μὲν ὁ ἀκμάζων γινομένου γέροντος, ἐφθάρη δ' ὁ νέος εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα, καὶ ὁ παῖς εἰς τὸν νέον, εἰς δὲ τὸν παῖδα τὸ νήπιον· ὅ τ' ἐχθὲς εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθνηκεν κτλ.

It is ridiculous that we are afraid of one only death when we have already died many times and are still dying. For not only, as Heraclitus used to say, "the death of fire is the birth or air, and the death of air is the birth of water," but even more obviously in the case of ourselves the adult dies when the old man is born, the young dies into adult, and child into the young, and baby into child, while yesterday has died into to-day.

(b) Hippol. *Ref.* 9.3.9

Ἡράκλειτος μὲν οὖν φησιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαιρετὸν ἀδιαίρετον... πατέρα υἱόν κτλ.

Heraclitus says that the Universe is divisible indivisible, father is son etc.

V/2. POLIS: LAWS AND STATE

<Against the popular rule >

125 (121)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, IX, 2; Strabo XIV, 25; Cicero, *Tusc.* V, 105.

ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήιστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων.

―――――――――

ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι Strabo : ἡβηδὸν ἀποθανεῖν πᾶσι DL : morte multandos Cic. ‖ καὶ ... καταλιπεῖν DL : om. Strabo, Cic. ‖ ἄνδρα Strabo : om. DL ‖ φάντες Strabo : λέγοντες DL ‖ εἰ δὲ μή Strabo : εἰ δέ τις τοιοῦτος DL, sin quis extiterit Cic.

All adult Ephesians deserve to hang themselves and to leave the city to the juniors after they have expelled Hermodorus, the most beneficial citizen of all, saying: "Let no one of us be most beneficial, otherwise let him be elsewhere and with others!".

125A (125a)

Dubious quotation

Tzetzes, *Comm. In Aristophanis Plutum*, 90a, p. 31 Massa Positano

τυφλὸν τὸν Πλοῦτον ποιεῖ... ὡς οὐκ ἀρετῆς, κακίας δὲ παραιτίου· ὅθεν καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἀρώμενος Ἐφεσίοις, οὐκ ἐπευχόμενος "μὴ ἐπιλίποι ὑμῖν πλοῦτος, ἔφη, Ἐφέσιοι, ἵν᾿ ἐξελέγχοισθε πονηρευόμενοι."

 "Let your wealth never fail you, Ephesians, so that your viciousness would be exposed!"

126 (97).   *Verbatim quotation*

Plutarchus, *An seni res publica gerenda*, 7. 787 C

κύνες καὶ βαΰζουσιν ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι.

══════════

καὶ βαΰζουσιν codd. : καταβαΰζουσιν Koraes, acc. Wilamowitz (Gr. Lesebuch I,34), DK ‖ ὃν codd. : ὦν DK

The dogs bark on those whom they do not recognize.

<div align="center">

127 (109)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Stobaeus, III,1, 175. Plut. *Mor*. 43 D, 439 D, 644 EF.

κρύπτειν ἀμαθίην κρέσσον ἢ ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν.

———————

ἀμαθίην κρύπτειν ἄμεινον Plut.

It is better to conceal one's ignorance than to expose it.

<div align="center">

128 (49)

</div>

Theodor. Prodrom., *Epistulae* 1 (PG 133, col.1240)   *Quotation (?)*

εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦι.

One is for me ten thousand if he is the best.

<div align="center">

129 (39)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, I, 88

ἐν Πριήνηι Βίας ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω οὗ πλέων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων.

In Priene was born Bias, son of Teutamos, who deserves more respect than others.

<div align="center">

130 (104)   *Verbatim quotation*

</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V, 59, 4 + Proclus*, In Alcib*. I, p. 255, 15 Creuzer

τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι ἔπονται καὶ νόμοισι χρέονται (scil. δήμων), <οὐκ> εἰδότες ὅτι ‘οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί’

———————

τίς ... φρήν Proclus : om. Clem.‖ δήμων Clem., Proclus : φρὴν δαήμων Bergk : φρὴν δήμων Vollgraff ‖ αἰδοῦς Porclus, ἀοιδοῖσι corr. Bernays ‖ ἔπονται (ἔπεσθαι) Clem. : ἠπιόων τε Proclus cod., πείθονται corr. Diels, ἠπιόωνται corr. Bollack-Wismann ‖ νόμοισι χρέονται Clem. : διδασκάλωι χρείωνται Proclus ‖ <ὁμίλου> scripsi : ὁμίλωι Proclus ‖ οὐκ εἰδότες Proclus : οὐκ om. Clemens

Do they have any intelligence or reason? They follow the singers of the demos and adopt the laws of the crowd, without knowing that "the many are bad, the few are good".

<The divine cosmic law as a paradigm of the best legislation>

131 (114)   *Verbatim quotation*

Stobaeus III, 1, 179 (III, p. 129 Hense)

ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

————————

πολύ Schleiermacher : πόλις Trincavelli (Florilegium ed. Venet. 1536)

   Those who speak /~ 'utter their logos'/ with intelligence, should rely /~ make oneself strong/ on the common /logos/, like a community of citizens on the law, and even stronger. For all human laws /~ customs/ depend /~ are 'siblings' of/ on the one and only divine law. It extends its power as far as it wills, it is sufficient to all and surpasses them all.

132 (33)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V,115,2

  νόμος καὶ βουλή· πείθεσθαι ἑνός.

————————

βουλῆι Euseb. I[2] : βουλή Clem, Euseb. cett.
  The essence of law and decree: obey the one.

<The role of the philosophers >

133 (35)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, 5 140, 5 (II 421, 4 St.)

χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον.

  The men who love wisdom should be judges of the many.

133A (132)   *Quotation (?)*

Gnomologium Vaticanum 743, nr. 312 Sternbach

Τιμαὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους καταδουλοῦνται.

Honors enslave gods and men.

133 B (133).   *Quotation (?)*

Gnomologium Vaticanum 743, nr. 313 Sternbach

ἄνθρωποι κακοὶ ἀληθινῶν ἀντίδικοι.

Vicious men are adversaries of the lovers of truth.

<Against lawlessness and hybris >

134 (44)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, IX, 2

μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου {ὑπέρ τοῦ} **σινομένου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος**.

———————

σινομένου scripsi : γινομένου codd.

 The people should fight for the law, when it is violated, as they fight for the wall of the city.

135 (43)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius IX,2

ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύναι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν.

Hybris should be extinguished sooner than fire.

VI.   ON THE GODS

< The divine is hard to know. The power of prejudices (dokeonta): >

136 (86)   *Quotation + paraphrase*

  (a) Plutarchus, *Vita Coriolani*, 38; cf. Clem. Strom. V, 88, 4.

ἀλλὰ <u>τῶν μὲν θείων τὰ πολλά</u>, καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον, **ἀπιστίηι διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι**.

———————————

ἀπιστίη Υ : πίστιν Ν

  <u>Most of divine things</u> **escape human recognition due to the incredibility.**

137 (47)   *Quotation (?)*

Diogenes Laertius, IX,73

μὴ εἰκῆ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλώμεθα**.**

  Let us not conjecture at random about most important things**.**

138 (28a)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V, 1, 9, 3 (II, 331 St.)

δοκέοντ᾽ ὦν ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει φυλάσσειν.

———————

δοκεόντων L : δοκέοντ᾽ ὦν Diels, Herakl. 1901 ‖ γινώσκει, φυλάσσει Diels conl. Hippocr. *de victu acut. morb*. 11 : γινώσκει φυλάσσειν L : γινώσκει πλάσσειν Bernays, acc. Bywater

And so, the most authoritative discerns what-is-seeming /~ false beliefs, dokeonta/ in order to guard against it.

<The manifesto of Monotheism. The Wise Being and the Cosmic Mind >

139 (108)   *Verbatim quotation*

Stob., III,1,174 (III, p.129 Hense)

ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον.

Of all those whose *logoi* I have listened to, no one reaches the

point of recognizing that the Wise is /totally/ distinct from all.

140 (41)   *Verbatim quotation*

Diogenes Laertius, IX,1 (p. 637, 11–12 Marc.)

ἓν τὸ σοφόν ἐπίστασθαι· Γνώμην ἥτε οἵη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.

To recognize only one Wise Being: that Mind which alone steers the whole Universe.

———

εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφὸν Diog. ‖ ἥτε οἵη ἐκυβέρνησε scripsi : οἵήν τε κυβερνῆσαι tentavi in FRGF 1, 239 : ὅτε ἡ κυβερνησαι B1 (ἥ et -νῆσαι B2) : ὁτέη κυβερνῆσαι P1Q : ὅτ᾽ ἐνκυβερνῆσαι FP4 : ἥ τέ οι κυβερνήσει D : [ὅτε] ἥι κυβερνᾶται Bywater : ἥτε κυβερνᾶι Bernays : ὁτέη <ἐκυβέρνησε> Diels : ἐτεῆι· κυβερνῆσαι Reinhardt, Parmen. 201

141 (32)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* V,115,1

ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.

The one and only Wise Being does not tend and tends to be spoken of by the name of Zeus.

<Critique of popular religion: against rituals and mysteries.>

142 (69)   *Neoplatonic paraphrase*

Jamblichus. *De mysteriis,* V, 15 (219, 12–18 Parthey), p. 170. De Places.

θυσιῶν τοίνυν τίθημι διττὰ εἴδη· τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀποκεκαθαρμένων παντάπασιν ἀνθρώπων, <u>οἷα ἐφ'</u>
<u>ἑνὸς ἄν ποτε γένοιτο σπανίως</u>, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, <u>ἤ τινων ὀλίγων εὐαριθμήτων ἀνδρῶν</u>· τὰ δ'
ἔνυλα καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ διὰ μεταβολῆς συνιστάμενα, οἷα τοῖς ἔτι κατεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ
σώματος ἁρμόζει.

[two kinds of sacrifices]: on the one hand, sacrifices performed by absolutely purified persons, –
which might be rarely performed by one person, as Heraclitus says – and on the other hand,
sacrifices material, corporeal and coming from change, which are appropriate to those who are
still possessed by the body.

143 (96)   *Verbatim quotation.*

Strabo, xvi, 26

νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι.

Corpses should be thrown out sooner than dung.*

————————

**Of animal food and animal sacrifice.*

144 (5)   *Verbatim quotation*

Aristocritus, *Theosophia* 68 (H. Erbse, Fragmente griech. Theosophien, Hamburg 1941, p. 184)

καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλως αἵματι μιαινόμενοι οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῶι ἀπονίζοιτο.
μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκοίη, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιτο οὕτω ποιέοντα. καὶ τοῖς
ἀγάλμασι δὲ τουτέοισιν εὔχονται, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις δόμοισι λεσχηνεύοιτο, οὔ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς
οὐδ' ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

In vain purify themselves by blood those who are polluted /by blood/: imagine that someone
who has stepped into mud would wash himself with yet another mud! Anyone noticing him
to do something like this would deem him insane. And they pray to these statues as if someone
were conversing with a wall, with no understanding whatsoever of who are the gods or
heroes.

————————

ἄλλως codd. : ἄλλωι H.Fränkel ‖ δοκοίηι T : δοκέοι Buresch, Erbse ‖
αὐτόν T : μιν Snell ‖ οὔ τι γινώσκων ...εἰσι ex Origene Contra Celsum Vii 62 inseruit Bywater :
om. T

144A (128 DK)

Quotation + paraphrase

Aristocritus, *Theosophia,* 69

ὅτι ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας <u>γέρα τοῖς δαίμοσιν ἀπονέμοντας</u> εἶπεν· **δαιμόνων ἀγάλμασιν εὔχονται οὐκ ἀκούουσιν, ὥσπερ ἀκούοιεν, οὐκ ἀποδιδοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀπαιτοῖεν.**

Heraclitus, seeing that Hellenes <u>worship the gods by offerings</u>, said: **they pray to the statues of gods that do not hear them, as if they were hearing, /statues/ that would not return them /what they demand/, as if they were not demanding.**

144B *Paraphrase*

Diogenes Laertius 9.7

καὶ πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη.

/Heraclitus said that/ the whole world is full of souls and gods.

145 (27) *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata,* IV, 146

ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας ἄσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν.

 What awaits humans after death they neither expect nor imagine.

146–147 (14) *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protrepticus*, 22, 2.

τίσι δὴ μαντεύεται Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος; **νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λήναις, μύσταις·** <u>τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ τὰ μετὰ θάνατον, τούτοις μαντεύεται τὸ πῦρ·</u> **τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυεῦνται.**

To whom does Heraclitus of Ephesus prophesize? To **the wandering in the night, to the magi, to the Bacchoi, to the Lenai, to the initiates** (*mystai*). It is them that he threatens with after death /punishments/, it is to them he prophesizes the /punishing/ fire, for /as he says/, **they are initiated into what people observe as mysteries in an impious way**.

148 (15) *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protrepticus*, 34, 5

εἰ μὴ γὰρ Διονύσωι πομπὴν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ὕμνεον ᾆσμα αἰδοίοισιν, ἀναιδέστατα εἴργαστ' ἄν· ὡυτὸς δὲ Ἀίδης καὶ Διόνυσος, ὅτεωι μαίνονται καὶ ληναΐζουσιν.

If they did not perform a procession for Dionysus and did not chant a hymn to pudenda (*aidoia*), their deeds would be utterly impudent (*an-aidestata*). In fact Dionysus, obsessed by whom they rave and cry like mad, is the same as Hades (*Aides* = «Pudental»).

<div align="center">

149 (68)   *Neoplatonic paraphrase + quotation*
</div>

Jamblichus, *De mysteriis*, I, 11

ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς θεάμασί τισι καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπʼαυτῶν συμπιπτούσης βλάβης. θεραπείας οὖν ἕνεκα τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς… τὰ τοιαῦτα προσάγεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως αὐτὰ **ἄκεα** Ἡράκλειτος προσεῖπεν ὡς ἐξακεσόμενα τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐξάντεις ἀπεργαζόμενα τῶν ἐν τῆι γενέσει συμφορῶν.

[*Heraclitus called cathartic rituals*] **remedies** [*of the soul*].

<div align="center">

<Eschatology. The judgement of Fire>

150 (66).   *Paraphrase + verbatim quotation*
</div>

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX,10,7

Λέγει δέ καὶ <u>τοῦ κόσμου κρίσιν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι διά πυρὸς γίνεσθαι</u>· **πάντα γάρ, φησί, τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται**.

/Heraclitus/ also says that <u>the judgement of the world and all beings that it contains happens by means of Fire</u>: **the Fire will advance [~ attack] suddenly**, he says, **and will judge all beings, and will condemn** /those found guilty/.

<div align="center">

151 (28b)   *Verbatim quotation*
</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, V,9, 3 ...καὶ μέντοι καὶ

Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας

ὁ Ἐφέσιός φησιν. οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὖτος ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωικοί.

  Justice will befall the inventors and witnesses of lies,

the Ephesian also says. He also knows the doctrine, which he has learned from the barbarian philosophy, about <u>the purification of those who have lived a bad life,</u> that was later called *ekpyrosis* by the Stoics.

<div align="center">

152 (16)   *Quotation*
</div>

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Paedagogus* II,99,5

τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι;

How can one escape from /the light/ **that never sets?**

<The fate of the souls after death>

153 (62)   *Verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX, 10.

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες.

Immortals are mortals, mortals are immortals, they live at the expense of others' death, they die at the expense of others' life.

154

Paraphrase + verbatim quotation

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Paedagogus* III,1,5 (I, p. 236, 24 St.)

<u>ἀνθρωποι θεοί, θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι</u>· **λόγος γὰρ ὡυτός**.

<u>Humans are gods, gods are humans,</u> **for the account (logos) is one and the same**.

155 (98)

Verbatim quotation

Plutarchus, *De facie in orbe lunae*, 28 p. 943 E

αἰ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ᾽ Ἅιδην.

The souls smell in Hades

156 (63)   *Paraphrase + verbatim quotation*

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX, 10, 6 (p. 346, 27 Marc.)

λέγει δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ταύτης τῆς φανερᾶς, ἐν ἧι γεγενήμεθα, <u>καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἶδε ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἴτιον</u> οὕτως λέγων· **ἐν θεοῦ δέοντι** [scil. χρόνωι] **ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι** ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν.

––––––––––

ἐν θεοῦ δέοντι («at God's need») ci. West 153 : ἔνθα δέοντι cod. : ἔνθα δ᾽ἐόντι Diels : ἐνθάδ᾽ἐόντας Wordsworth : διά θεόν τε Bernays, Ges.Abh. I 324

/Heraclitus/ also teaches about the resurrection of this visible flesh in which we have been born, and <u>he knows that god is the cause of this resurrection</u>, saying as follows:

At the due /time/ determined by god, they raise and become waking guardians of the living and the dead.

<Apotheosis of the philosophers>

157 (18)   *Verbatim quotation*

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* II 17 (II 121, 24 St.); Theodoretus, *Graec. Affectionum curatio*, I 88.

ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον, οὐκ ἐξευρήσει ἀνεξεύρετον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον.

──────────

ἀνεξεύρετον scripsi, cf. ἀνεξεύρητον Theodor. LM : ἀνεξερεύνητον Clem., edd.

If you do not hope for what is hopeless, you will not discover what is undiscoverable and hard to achieve.

158 (cf. A17)   *Paraphrases*

(a) Olympiodorus, *Comm. in Plat. Phaedonem*, 10.2; p. 139 Westerink

Τρίτη δόξα ἡ λέγουσα τὴν μὲν ἀπαίδευτον ψυχὴν ἐξιοῦσαν τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς φθείρεσθαι, τὴν δὲ πεπαιδευμένην στομωθεῖσαν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιμένειν <μέχρι> τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, ἧς δόξης ἦν καὶ Ἡράκλειτος.

──────────

<μέχρι> addidi.

The third opinion /concerning the afterlife of the soul/ holds that after leaving the body the uneducated soul perishes immediately, whereas the educated soul, as it has been hard-tempered /like steel/ by the virtues, survives until the conflagration of the world. This opinion was held by Heraclitus among others.

(b) [Plutarchus], *De placitis philosophorum*, IV.7.2; 899C (p.149 Lachenaud)

<Ἡράκλειτος καὶ> οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξιοῦσαν ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν φθείρεσθαι ** ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι <καὶ> σκίδνασθαι ***, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων· τὴν δ' ἰσχυροτέραν, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφούς, <ἐπιδιαμένειν> καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως.

──────────

* <Ἡράκλειτος καὶ> supplevi ‖ τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν φθείρεσθαι scripsi : ὑποφέρεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν codd. ‖ <καὶ> σκίδνασθαι scripsi : γίνεσθαι codd.

[«On the immortality of the soul»] Heraclitus and the Stoics hold that the weaker soul after the exit from the bodies perishes together with the aggregate /of the body/ and is dispersed. This is the soul of the uneducated, whereas the stronger soul, such as that of the wise, survives even until the conflagration.

<The wise as commensals of the gods >

159   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase of lost context*

(a) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, V. 5 p. 178 F = Aristoteles, Συμπόσιον fr. 50 Gigon (cf. fr. B13 DK).

ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ ἦν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἥκειν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον σὺν ἱδρῶτι πολλῷ καὶ κονιορτῷ. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν χαρίεντα μήτε ῥυπᾶν μήτε αὐχμεῖν μήτε **βορβόρῳ χαίρειν** καθ' Ἡράκλειτον.

It was indecent, Aristotle says, to come to the symposium with much sweat and dust. For a decent man should not be either unwashed, or squalid or **to enjoy dirt**, according to Heraclitus.

   (b) Epictetus, *Enchiridion,* 14, 1.   *Reminiscence*

Μέμνησο, ὅτι ὡς ἐν συμποσίῳ σε δεῖ ἀναστρέφεσθαι. περιφερόμενον γέγονέ τι κατὰ σέ· ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε. παρέρχεται· μὴ κάτεχε. οὔπω ἥκει· μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόρρω τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλὰ περίμενε, μέχρις ἂν γένηται κατὰ σέ. οὕτω πρὸς τέκνα, οὕτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, οὕτω πρὸς ἀρχάς, οὕτω πρὸς πλοῦτον· καὶ ἔσῃ ποτὲ ἄξιος τῶν θεῶν συμπότης. ἂν δὲ καὶ παρατεθέντων σοι μὴ λάβῃς, ἀλλ' ὑπερίδῃς, τότε οὐ μόνον συμπότης τῶν θεῶν ἔσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνάρχων. οὕτω γὰρ ποιῶν Διογένης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἀξίως θεῖοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἐλέγοντο.

   …[*if you live a virtuous life and moderate your desires*] you will become one day a commensal of the gods … [*and if you exterminate them completely*], then you will be not only a commensal of the gods, but also their co-ruler. Behaving like this Diogenes and Heraclitus and /the wise/ similar to them were rightly called "divine men", and they indeed were divine.

159A   *Verbatim quotation*

Zenobius Sophista, *Epitome collectionum Lucilli Tarrhaei et Didymi*, *Centuria* II, Nr. 19, in: *Paroemiographi Graeci*, vol. 1, p. 36-37 Leutsch–Schneidewin.

Αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵενται· οὕτως Ἡράκλειτος ἐχρήσατο τῇ παροιμίᾳ κτλ.
 «**The noble men rush to the dinner of noble uninvited**». In this form Heraclitus used this proverb…

<Exegi monumentum. The voice of Sibyl>

160 (92)   *Verbatim quotation + paraphrase*
Plutarchus, *De Pythiae oraculis*, 6 p. 397 A

Οὐχ ὁρᾷς … ὅσην χάριν ἔχει τὰ Σαπφικὰ μέλη, κηλοῦντα καὶ καταθέλγοντα τοὺς ἀκροωμένους; **Σίβυλλα δὲ μαινομένωι στόματι** καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον **ἀγέλαστα** καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα **φθεγγομένη χιλίων ἐτῶν ἐξικνεῖται τῆι φωνῆι διὰ τὸν θεόν**.

Sibyl, with frantic mouth, **vaticinates things joyless… and by the sound of her voice reaches the thousand year time, inspired by the god** /= Apollo/.

PROBABILIA

PROBABLE FRAGMENTS QUOTED WITHOUT HERACLITUS' NAME
LOGOS

1–2

Plato, *Resp*. 607b

προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ

(a) “**λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπότεα κύων**“ ἐκείνη «κραυγάζουσα»

(b) καὶ **“μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισιν**”

(c) καὶ ὁ “τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κράτων“

(d) καὶ οἱ “λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες,” ὅτι ἄρα “πένονται,”

καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων.

———————

δεσπότεα scripsi : δεσπόταν codd.

[context: the «ancient quarrel» between poetry and philosophy].

(a) [*about Homer*]: **the dog that barks at his master** [= Polemos/Zeus].

(b) [*Homer is*] **«great» in the empty talk of those who lack understanding.**

3

Plato, *Cratylus*, 408 c 2

{ΣΩ.} Οἶσθα ὅτι <u>ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει</u> καὶ κυκλεῖ καὶ
πολεῖ ἀεί, καὶ ἔστι διπλοῦς, ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής.
{ΕΡΜ.} Πάνυ γε.
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ
ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι
οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον.
{ΕΡΜ.} Πάνυ γε.
{ΣΩ.} Ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ ἀεὶ πολῶν
"Πὰν αἰπόλος" εἴη, διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ ὑός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν
λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής.

[*Context: etymology of the name of the god Pan whose upper part of the body is human, and the lower part goat-like*].

{Socrates}You know that <u>*logos* means «Universe»</u> and that it goes in circles and revolves always, and is of double nature, true and false.
{Hermogenes} Sure.
{Socrates} Its true part is smooth and divine and dwells in the sky among the gods, whereas the false part lives among the crowds of men, and is coarse and goat-like [= tragic]. Indeed, myths and lies are related to this region and concern the tragic [= goat-like] life.
{Hermogenes} Sure.

4

Plato, *Theaetetus,* 201d

{ΣΩ.} Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτὸ" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκεῖνο" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἕκαστον" οὐδὲ τὸ "μόνον" οὐδὲ "τοῦτο" προσοιστέον οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι,

ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον — ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν — τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ᾽ οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

{SOCRATES} Listen then to a dream in return for a dream. In my dream, too, I thought I was listening to people saying that the primary letters (*stoicheia*), so to speak, of which we and everything else are composed, have no *logos*. Each of them, in itself, can only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is not. That would mean that we were adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself alone. Indeed, we ought not to apply to it even such words as 'itself' or 'that', 'each', 'alone', or 'this', or any other of the many words of this kind; for these <u>run up and down</u> and are applied to all things alike, being other than the things to which they are added, whereas if it were possible to express the element itself and it had its own proprietary *logos*, it would have to be expressed without any other thing. As it is, however, it is impossible that any of the primaries should be expressed in a *logos*; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these, it is another matter. Here, just in the same way as the letters themselves are woven together, so their names may be woven together and become a *logos* of something — a *logos* being essentially a complex of names. Thus, the letters (*stoicheia*) have no *logos* and are unknowable, but they are perceivable, whereas the complexes are both knowable and expressible and can be the objects of true viewpoint (*doxa alethes*). Now when a man gets a true viewpoint about something without a *logos*, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take a *logos* of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got a *logos* of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge. Was the dream you heard the same as this or a different one? [*tr. Levett and Burnyeat with alterations*].

5

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, 1,13, 57 (I, 36, 17 – 37, 2 St.)

πάμπολλα γὰρ τῶν παρὰ ταῖς αἱρέσεσι δοξαζομένων εὕροιμεν ἄν … εἰ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ γένει γε καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁμολογοῦντα· ἢ γὰρ ὡς μέλος ἢ ὡς μέρος ἢ ὡς εἶδος ἢ ὡς

γένος εἰς ἓν συνάπτεται. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑπάτη ἐναντία τῇ νεάτῃ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἄμφω γε ἁρμονία μία, ἔν τε ἀριθμοῖς ὁ ἄρτιος τῷ περιττῷ διαφέρεται, ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ ἄμφω τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ, ὡς τῷ σχήματι ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον καὶ ὅσα τῶν σχημάτων ἀλλήλων διενήνοχεν. ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ παντὶ τὰ μέρη σύμπαντα, κἂν διαφέρηται πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον οἰκειότητα διαφυλάττει. οὕτως οὖν ἥ τε βάρβαρος ἥ τε Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν ἀΐδιον ἀλήθειαν σπαραγμόν τινα, οὐ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δὲ **τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ** θεολογίας πεποίηται. ὁ δὲ τὰ διῃρημένα συνθεὶς αὖθις καὶ ἑνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον ἀκινδύνως εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κατόψεται, τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

"Among the heretical views ... we will find a lot of those which, although seem to be dissimilar, by genus and by the whole truth are in agreement with each other: either as members, or as parts, or as species, or as genera they are combined into one. For example, the lower string is opposite to the upper one; however, both form a single harmony, and even numbers are different with odd numbers, but both agree with the arithmetic art, and <in geometric art> differ by shape from each other circle, triangle, square and other shapes. In the same way in the whole cosmos all parts, although different from each other, nevertheless maintain a harmonious connection with the whole. In the same way the philosophy of the barbarians, and the philosophy of the Hellenes, have dissected the eternal truth not of the myth of Dionysus' mythology, but of the theology of the "**Logos that exists forever and ever**". Someone who will put together the separated parts and unite them will undoubtedly see the complete logos, the truth."

6

Porphyrius, *De abstinentia*, 3, 21

καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων, ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτ' αὖθις ἐπανῆλθεν καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται, νοῦς ὁρᾷ, νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά· ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ τὰ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

Schol. ad loc. P. 195 Bouffartigue-Patillon οἶμαι Ἡράκλειτον τοῦτο λέγειν.

"There is an argument of Straton the physicist, proving that even sensory perception is completely impossible without an attentive mind. It often happens that when we pass by, some letters occur to our sight, and some speeches (*logoi*) to our hearing, but they escape our attention, since our attention (*nous*) is directed to another object. But the next time, when we return to the same place, we are chasing and following all this, while reading. Therefore, it is said: "The mind sees, the mind

hears, everything else is deaf and blind". This means that when intelligence is not present, our eyes and ears do not produce perception". *Scholia to this passage*: "I think, Heraclitus says this".

7

Synesius, *De insomniis*, 2. 40.   *Correct interpretation of Heraclitus 'book of nature' ('this logos') analogy + verbatim quotation.*

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ σοφὸς οἰκεῖος θεῷ, ὅτι πειρᾶται σύνεγγυς εἶναι τῇ γνώσει, καὶ πραγματεύεται περὶ νόησιν, ᾗ τὸ θεῖον οὐσίωται. Αὗται μὲν ἀποδείξεις ἔστων τοῦ μαντείας ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις εἶναι τῶν ἐπιτηδευομένων ἀνθρώποις. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει μὲν διὰ πάντων πάντα, ἅτε ἀδελφῶν ὄντων τῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ζώῳ, τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα γράμματα παντοδαπά, καθάπερ ἐν βιβλίῳ, τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ μὲν Φοινίκια, τὰ δὲ Αἰγύπτια, καὶ ἄλλα Ἀσσύρια, ἀναγινώσκει δὲ ὁ σοφός· σοφὸς δὲ ὁ φύσει μαθών· καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλα, καὶ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ ἧττον, ὥσπερ ὁ μὲν κατὰ συλλαβάς, ὁ δὲ ἀθρόαν τὴν λέξιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν λόγον ὁμοῦ· — οὕτως ὁρῶσι σοφοὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔστι γάρ τις ὡς ἐν συγγενείᾳ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ διχόνοια· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν. καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ μέρη μέρεσι προσήγορα καὶ μαχόμενα, καὶ τῆς στάσεως αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὁμόνοιαν συμφωνούσης, ὥσπερ ἡ λύρα σύστημα φθόγγων ἐστὶν ἀντιφώνων τε καὶ συμφώνων· τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀντικειμένων ἕν, ἁρμονία καὶ λύρας καὶ κόσμου.

"For this reason, the wise is akin to the God because he seeks to be kindred to him in knowledge and studies thinking that makes up the essence of the deity. Let this be taken as proof that the art of divination is one of the most exalted pursuits of humanity. But if all things signify through all, since they are united by brotherly kinship in a single living organism, the cosmos, and these signs are like all kinds of letters written as if in a book in reality itself – some Phoenician, other Egyptian, and other Assyrian – then it is the wise who reads them, and the wise is he who learned from nature. They read in a different way, and one reads more, another less, just as one reads by syllables, another by a whole word, and someone (grasps) the complete speech (logos) at once. In this way the wise men foresee the future, for with all the common kinship in things there is also a discord between the parts: the cosmos is not simply one, but one from many. And its parts are at the same time in agreement with each other, and in a conflict, and their contention contributes to the universal agreement (*homonoia*), just as a lyre is a system of sounds that are dissonant and consonant, and it is from the opposite principles that comes the One, **the harmony of the lyre and of the cosmos**".

8

[Hippocrates] *De diaeta*, I, 3–10 (p. 126, 5–134, 20 Joly-Byl)

(3) Συνίσταται μὲν οὖν τὰ ζῷα τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ δυοῖν, διαφόροιν μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, συμφόροιν δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος. Ταῦτα δὲ συναμφότερα αὐτάρκεά ἐστι τοῖσί τε ἄλλοισι πᾶσι καὶ ἀλλήλοισιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ χωρὶς οὔτε αὐτὸ ἑωυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐδενί. Τὴν μὲν οὖν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον ἔχει τοιήνδε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ δύναται πάντα διὰ παντὸς κινῆσαι, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ πάντα διὰ παντὸς θρέψαι· ἐν μέρει δὲ ἑκάτερον κρατεῖ καὶ κρατεῖται ἐς τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὡς ἀνυστόν. Οὐδέτερον γὰρ κρατῆσαι παντελῶς δύναται διὰ τόδε· τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ ὕδατος, ἐπιλείπει ἡ τροφή· ἀποτρέπεται οὖν ὅθεν μέλλει τρέφεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἐπιλείπει ἡ κίνησις· ἵσταται οὖν ἐν τούτῳ, ὅταν δὲ στῇ, οὐκέτι ἐγκρατές ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη τῷ ἐμπίπτοντι πυρὶ ἐς τὴν τροφὴν καταναλίσκεται. Οὐδέτερον δὲ διὰ ταῦτα δύναται κρατῆσαι παντελέως. εἰ δέ ποτε κρατηθείη καὶ ὁπότερον πρότερον, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τῶν νῦν ἐόντων ὥσπερ ἔχει νῦν· οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων αἰεὶ ἔσται τὰ αὐτά, καὶ οὐδέτερα καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἅμα ἐπιλείψει. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ εἴρηταί μοι, αὐτάρκεά ἐστι πᾶσι διὰ παντὸς ἐς τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὡσαύτως.

(4) Τούτων δὲ πρόσκειται ἑκατέρῳ τάδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν. Οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἰδέας ἀποκρίνονται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ σπερμάτων καὶ ζώων, οὐδὲν ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὴν δύναμιν· ἅτε γὰρ οὔποτε κατὰ τωὐτὸ[126] ἱστάμενα, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ ἀλλοιούμενα ἐπὶ τὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τά, ἀνόμοια ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποκρινόμενα. Ἀπόλλυται μέν νυν οὐδὲν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, οὐδὲ γίνεται ὅ τι μὴ καὶ πρόσθεν ἦν· συμμισγόμενα δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενα ἀλλοιοῦται. νομίζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἐξ Ἅιδου ἐς φάος αὐξηθὲν γενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φάεος ἐς Ἅιδην μειωθὲν ἀπολέσθαι· ὀφθαλμοῖσι γὰρ πιστεύουσι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ, οὐχ ἱκανοῖσι ἐοῦσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁρεομένων κρῖναι. ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε γνώμῃ ἐξηγέομαι· ζῷα γὰρ κἀκεῖνα καὶ τάδε· καὶ οὔτε, εἰ ζῷον, ἀποθανεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ μὴ μετὰ πάντων· ποῖ γὰρ ἀποθανεῖται; οὔτε τὸ μὴ ἐὸν γενέσθαι· πόθεν γὰρ ἔσται; ἀλλ' αὔξεται πάντα καὶ μειοῦται ἐς τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν γε δυνατῶν. Ὅ τι δ' ἂν διαλέγωμαι γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι, τῶν πολλῶν εἵνεκεν ἑρμηνεύω· ταῦτα δὲ συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι δηλοῖ[127]. ἔχει δὲ[128] ὧδε·

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[126] τωὐτὸ M : τωυτα θ : ταὐτά Joly

[127] δηλοῖ scripsi : δηλῶ θM : δηλώσω Joly.

[128] ἔχει δὲ καί M, acc. Joly

γενέσθαι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι τωὐτό, ξυμμιγῆναι καὶ διακριθῆναι τωὐτό, αὐξηθῆναι καὶ μειωθῆναι[129] τωὐτό, γενέσθαι, ξυμμιγῆναι τωὐτό, ἀπολέσθαι, μειωθῆναι, διακριθῆναι τωὐτό, ἕκαστον πρὸς πάντα καὶ πάντα πρὸς ἕκαστον τωὐτό, καὶ οὐδὲν πάντων τωὐτό· ὁ νόμος γὰρ τῇ φύσει περὶ τούτων ἐναντίος.

(5) Χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα. ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ὡς σελήνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, πυρὸς ἔφοδος καὶ ὕδατος, ἥλιος [130] ἐπὶ τὸ μακρότατον καὶ βραχύτατον, πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ οὐ ταὐτά. Φάος Ζηνί, σκότος Ἅιδῃ, φάος Ἅιδῃ, σκότος Ζηνί, φοιτᾷ κεῖνα ὧδε, καὶ τάδε κεῖσε, πᾶσαν ὥρην, πᾶσαν χώρην διαπρησσόμενα κεῖνά τε τὰ τῶνδε, τὰ δέ τ᾽ αὖ τὰ κείνων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρήσσουσιν οὐκ οἴδασιν, ἃ δὲ οὐ πρήσσουσι δοκέουσιν εἰδέναι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁρέουσιν οὐ γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς [131] αὐτοῖσι πάντα γίνεται δι' ἀνάγκην θείην καὶ ἃ βούλονται καὶ ἃ μὴ βούλονται. Φοιτεόντων δ' ἐκείνων ὧδε, τῶν δέ τε κεῖσε, συμμισγομένων πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὴν πεπρωμένην μοίρην ἕκαστον ἐκπληροῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον. Φθορὴ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῷ μέζονι ἀπὸ τοῦ μείονος καὶ τῷ μείονι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέζονος, αὐξάνεται καὶ τὸ μέζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, καὶ τὸ ἔλασσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μέζονος.

(6) Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα, καὶ ψυχὴν [132] ἀνθρώπου, καὶ σῶμα ὁποῖον ἡ ψυχὴ <οἰκεῖ, τὸ πῦρ> [133] διακοσμεῖται. Ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἄνθρωπον μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων, ἔχοντα σύγκρησιν πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος, τὰ μὲν ληψόμενα, τὰ δὲ δώσοντα· καὶ τὰ μὲν λαμβάνοντα πλέον ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ διδόντα μεῖον. πρίουσιν ἄνθρωποι ξύλον· ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιέουσι· μεῖον δὲ ποιέοντες πλέον ποιέουσι. Τοιοῦτον φύσις ἀνθρώπων· τὸ μὲν ὠθεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἕλκει· τὸ μὲν δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνει· καὶ τῷ μὲν δίδωσι, τοῦ δὲ λαμβάνει, καὶ τῷ μὲν δίδωσι τοσούτῳ πλέον, τοῦ δὲ λαμβάνει τοσούτῳ μεῖον. Χώρην δὲ ἕκαστον φυλάσσει τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον ἰόντα διακρίνεται ἐς τὴν ἐλάσσονα χώρην· τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μέζον πορευόμενα, ξυμμισγόμενα ἐξαλλάσσει ἐς τὴν μέζω τάξιν· τὰ δὲ ξεῖνα μὴ ὁμότροπα ὠθεῖται ἐκ χώρης ἀλλοτρίης. Ἑκάστη δὲ ψυχὴ μέζω καὶ ἐλάσσω ἔχουσα περιφοιτᾷ τὰ μόρια τὰ ἑωυτῆς, οὔτε προσθέσιος οὔτε ἀφαιρέσιος δεομένη τῶν μερέων, κατὰ δὲ αὔξησιν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μείωσιν δεομένη χώρης. ἕκαστα διαπρήσσεται ἐς ἥντινα ἂν ἐσέλθῃ, καὶ δέχεται τὰ προσπίπτοντα. Οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ μὴ ὁμότροπον ἐν τοῖσιν ἀσυμφόροισι χωρίοισιν ἐμμένειν· πλανᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἀγνώμονα· συγγινόμενα δὲ ἀλλήλοισι γινώσκει πρὸς ὃ προσίζει· προσίζει γὰρ τὸ σύμφορον τῷ συμφόρῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀσύμφορον πολεμεῖ καὶ μάχεται καὶ

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[129] μειωθῆναι secl. Bywater, acc. Joly.

[130] <οὕτως> ἥλιος suppl. Diels, acc. Joly.

[131] ὁμῶς correxi : ὅμως codd., edd.

[132] ψυχήν Fredrich, acc. DK : ψυχή codd., acc. Joly

[133] <οἰκεῖ, τὸ πῦρ> supplevi

διαλλάσσει ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. διὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ αὔξεται, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν μεγάλων ὡσαύτως·ὅσα δ ἄλλως, ἀπ' ἄλλων ὑπὸ βίης ἀποκρίνεται.

(7) Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐάσω, περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπου δηλώσω. Ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοῖρας[134] σώματος ἀνθρώπου. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρσενα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τρέφεται, τρέφεται δὲ καὶ αὔξεται διαίτῃ τῇπερ ἄνθρωπος. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ μέρεα ἔχειν πάντα τὰ ἐσιόντα· οὗτινος γὰρ μὴ ἐνείη μοῖρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὐκ ἂν αὐξηθείη οὔτε πουλλῆς ἐπιούσης τροφῆς οὔτε ὀλίγης, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ προσαυξόμενον. ἔχον δὲ πάντα αὔξεται ἐν χώρῃ τῇ ἑωυτοῦ ἕκαστον, τροφῆς ἐπιούσης ἀπὸ ὕδατος ξηροῦ καὶ πυρὸς ὑγροῦ, τὰ μὲν ἔσω βιαζομένης, τὰ δὲ ἔξω. Ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες τὸ ξύλον πρίζουσι, τρυπῶσιν[135], καὶ ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τωὐτὸ ποιέοντες· κάτω δὲ πιεζόντων ἄνω ἕρπει, οὐ γὰρ ἂν παραδέχοιτο κάτω ἰέναι· ἢν δὲ βιάζηται, παντὸς ἁμαρτήσεται. Τοιοῦτον τροφὴ ἀνθρώπου· τὸ μὲν ἕλκει, τὸ δὲ ὠθεῖ, ἔσω δὲ βιαζομένου ἔξω ἕρπει· ἢν δὲ βιᾶται παρὰ καιρὸν, παντὸς ἀποτεύξεται.

(8) Χρόνον δὲ τοσοῦτον ἕκαστα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν, ἄχρι μηκέτι δέχηται ἡ χώρη, μηδὲ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ἔχῃ ἐς τὸ μήκιστον τῶν δυνατῶν, ἔπειτεν ἀμείβει ἐς τὴν μέζονα χώρην, θήλεα καὶ ἄρσενα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπὸ βίης καὶ ἀνάγκης διωκόμενα. ὁπότερα δ' ἂν πρότερον ἐκπλήσῃ τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖρην, ταῦτα διακρίνεται πρῶτα, ἅμα δὲ καὶ συμμίσγεται· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ διακρίνεται πρῶτα, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ξυμμίσγεται· χώρην δὲ ἀμείψαντα καὶ τυχόντα ἁρμονίης ὀρθῆς ἐχούσης συμφωνίας τρεῖς, συλλαβήν, δι᾽ ὀξέων, διὰ πασέων, ζώει καὶ αὔξεται τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν οἷσι καὶ πρόσθεν· ἢν δὲ μὴ τύχῃ τῆς ἁρμονίης, μηδὲ σύμφωνα τὰ βαρέα τοῖσιν ὀξέσι γένηται, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ συμφωνίῃ ἢ τῇ δευτέρῃ ἢ τῇ διὰ παντός, ἑνὸς ἀπογενομένου πᾶς ὁ τόνος μάταιος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν προσαείσαι. ἀλλ' ἀμείβει ἐκ τοῦ μέζονος ἐς τὸ μεῖον πρὸ μοίρης· διότι οὐ γινώσκουσιν ὅ τι ποιέουσιν.

(9) Ἀρσένων μὲν οὖν καὶ θηλείων διότι ἑκάτερα γίνεται, προϊόντι τῷ λόγῳ δηλώσω. Τούτων δὲ ὁπότερον ἂν ἐλθὸν τύχῃ τῆς ἁρμονίης, ὑγρὸν ἐὸν κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός. κινεόμενον δὲ ζωπυρεῖται καὶ προσάγεται τὴν τροφὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσιόντων ἐς τὴν γυναῖκα σίτων καὶ πνεύματος, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα πάντῃ ὁμοίως, ἕως ἔτι ἀραιόν ἐστιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς κινήσιος καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ξηραίνεται καὶ στερεοῦται· στερεούμενον δὲ πυκνοῦται πέριξ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐγκατακλειόμενον οὐκέτι τὴν τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ἔχει ἐπάγεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐξωθεῖ διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα τοῦ περιέχοντος· ἀναλίσκει οὖν τὸ ὑπάρχον ὑγρὸν ἔσω. Τὰ μὲν οὖν στερεὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐν τῷ ξυνεστηκότι καὶ ξηρῷ οὐ καταναλίσκεται τῷ πυρὶ ἐς τὴν τροφήν· ἀλλ' ἐγκρατέα γίνεται καὶ συνίσταται τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἐκλείποντος, ἅπερ ὀστέα καὶ νεῦρα ἐπονομάζεται. Τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ συμμιγέντος κινεομένου τοῦ

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[134] μοῖρας scripsi : μοῖραν θM, Joly : membra P

[135] πρίζουσι, τρυπῶσιν scripsi : τρυπῶσιν θM : πρίζουσι corr. θ[2] : πρίουσι Fredrich, acc. DK

ὑγροῦ διακοσμεῖται τὸ σῶμα κατὰ φύσιν διὰ τοιήνδε ἀνάγκην· διὰ μὲν τῶν στερεῶν καὶ ξηρῶν οὐ δύναται τὰς διεξόδους χρονίας ποιέεσθαι, διότι οὐκ ἔχει τροφήν· διὰ δὲ τῶν ὑγρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν δύναται· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῷ τροφή· ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοισι ξηρότης οὐ καταναλισκομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός· ταῦτα δὲ ξυνίσταται πρὸς ἄλληλα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐσωτάτω καταφραχθὲν πῦρ καὶ πλεῖστόν ἐστι καὶ μεγίστην τὴν διέξοδον ἐποιήσατο· πλεῖστον γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐνῆν, ὅπερ κοιλίη καλέεται· καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχε τροφὴν ἔξω, καὶ ἐποιήσατο τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους καὶ τροφῆς ἐπαγωγὴν καὶ διάπεμψιν· τὸ δὲ ἀποκλεισθὲν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα περιόδους ἐποιήσατο τρισσάς, ὅπερ ἦν ὑγρότατον τοῦ πυρός, ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι χωρίοισιν, αἵτινες φλέβες καλέονται κοῖλαι· ἐς δὲ τὰ μέσα τούτων τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον τοῦ ὕδατος ξυνιστάμενον πήγνυται, ὅπερ καλεῖται σάρκες.

(10) Ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ τρόπον αὐτὸ ἑωυτῷ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ πῦρ, ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά. κοιλίην μὲν τὴν μεγίστην, ὕδατι ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ ταμεῖον, δοῦναι πᾶσι καὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, θαλάσσης δύναμιν, ζώων συμφόρων τροφόν, ἀσυμφόρων δὲ φθορόν. περὶ δὲ ταύτην ὕδατος ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ σύστασιν, διέξοδον πνεύματος ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἀπομίμησιν γῆς, τὰ ἐπεσπίπτοντα πάντα ἀλλοιούσης. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναλίσκον, τὰ δὲ αὖξον, σκέδασιν ὕδατος λεπτοῦ καὶ πυρὸς ἐποιήσατο ἠερίου, ἀφανέος καὶ φανεροῦ, ἀπὸ τοῦ συνεστηκότος ἀπόκρισιν, ἐν ᾧ φερόμενα πάντα ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀφικνεῖται ἕκαστα μοίρῃ πεπρωμένῃ. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐποιήσατο τὸ πῦρ περιόδους τρισσάς, περαινούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ ἔσω καὶ ἔξω· αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορὰν, πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρων δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ ἔσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι <ἡλίου δύναμιν>. τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων κρατεῖ, διέπον ἕκαστα κατὰ φύσιν, ἄθικτον καὶ ὄψει καὶ ψαύσει, ἐν τούτῳ ψυχή, νοῦς, φρόνησις, κίνησις, αὔξησις, μείωσις, διάλλαξις, ὕπνος, ἔγερσις. τοῦτο πάντα διὰ παντὸς κυβερνᾷ, καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐκεῖνα, οὐδέκοτε ἀτρεμίζον.

[Hippocrates] *On regimen*, I, 3-10 [English translation of W.H.S. Jones with changes adjusted to our readings of the Greek text noted in apparatus criticus].

3. Now all animals, including man, are composed of two things, different in power but working together in their use, namely, fire and water. Both together these are sufficient for one another and for everything else, but each by itself suffices neither for itself nor for anything else. Now the power that each of them possesses is this. Fire can move all things always, while water can nourish all things always; but in turn each masters or is mastered to the greatest maximum or the least minimum possible. Neither of them can gain the complete mastery for the following reason. The fire, as it advances to the limit of the water, lacks nourishment, and so turns to where it is likely to be nourished; the water, as it advances to the limit of the fire, find its motion fail, and so stops at this point. When it stops its force ceases, and hereafter is consumed to nourish the fire

which assails it. Neither, however, can become completely master for the following reasons. If ever either were to be mastered first, none of the things that are now would be as it is now. But things being as they are, the same things will always exist, and neither singly nor all together will the elements fail. So, fire and water, as 1 have said, suffice for all things throughout the universe unto their maximum and the minimum alike.

4. These elements have severally the following attributes. Fire has the hot and the dry, water the cold and the moist. Mutually too fire has the moist from water, for in fire there is moisture, and water has the dry from fire, for there is dryness in water also. These things being so, they separate off from themselves many forms of many kinds, both of seeds and of living creatures, which are like to one another neither in their appearance nor in their power.

For as they never stay in the same condition, but are always changing to this or to that, from these elements too are separated off things which are necessarily unlike. So of all things nothing perishes, and nothing comes into being that did not exist before. But the current belief among men is that one thing increases and comes to light from Hades, while another thing diminishes and perishes from the light into Hades. For they trust eyes rather than mind, though these are not competent to judge even things that are seen. But I use mind to expound thus. For there is life in the things of the other world, as well as in those of this. If there be life, there cannot be death, unless all things die with it. For whither will death take place? Nor can what is not come into being. For whence will it come ? But all things increase and diminish to the greatest possible maximum or the least possible minimum. […]

“perishing”, “diminution” and “separation” are

the same thing, and so is the relation of the individual to all things, and that of all things to the individual. Yet nothing of all things is the same. For in regard to these things custom (nomos) is opposed to nature (physis).

5. All things, both human and divine, are constantly moving upwards and downwards changing alternatingly. Day and night, to the maximum and minimum; just as the moon has its maximum and minimum, the advance of fire and of water, so the sun has its longest and its shortest course – all things are the same and not the same. Light for Zeus, darkness for Hades, light for Hades, darkness for Zeus, the things of the other world come to this, those of this world go to that, and during every season throughout every place the things of the other world do the work of this, and those of this world do the work of that. And what men work they know not, and what they work not they think that they know; and what they see they do not understand, but nevertheless all things take place for them through a divine necessity, both what they wish and what they do not wish. And as the things of the other world come to this, and those of this world go to that, they combine with one another, and each fulfils its allotted destiny, both unto the greater and unto the less. And

destruction comes to all things from one another mutually, to the greater from the less, and to the less from the greater, and the greater increases from the smaller, and the smaller from the greater.

6. All other things are set in due order, both the soul of man and likewise his body. Into man enter parts of parts and wholes of wholes, containing a mixture of fire and water, some to take and others to give. Those that take give increase, those that give make diminution. Men saw a log; the one pulls and the other pushes, but herein they do the same thing, and while making less they make more. Such is the nature of man. One part pushes, the other pulls; one part gives, the other takes. It gives to this and takes from that, and to one it gives so much the more, while that from which it takes is so much the less. Each keeps its own place; the parts going to the less are sorted out to the smaller place, those

advancing to the greater mingle and pass to the greater rank, and the strange parts, being unsuitable, are thrust from a place that is not theirs. Each individual soul, having greater and smaller parts, makes the round of its own members; needing neither to add to, nor to take from, its parts, but needing space to correspond to increase or decrease of what exists already, it fulfils its several duties into whatsoever space it enters, and receives the attacks that are made. For that which is not suitable cannot abide in regions not adapted to it. Now such wander without thought, but combining with one another realise what

they are joining. For the suitable joins the suitable, while the unsuitable wars and fights and separates itself. For this reason, a man's soul grows in a man, and in no other creature. It is the same with the other large animals. When it is otherwise, there is forcible separation from others.

7. I shall say nothing about the other animals, confining my attention to man. Into man there enters a soul, having a blend of fire and water, a portion of a man's body. These, both female and male, many and of many kinds, are nourished and increased by human diet. Now the things that enter must contain all the parts. For that of which no part were present would not grow at all, whether the nutriment that were added were much or little, as having nothing to grow on to it. But having all, each grows in its own place, nutriment being added from dry water and moist fire, some things being forced inside, others outside. As carpenters saw the log, and one pulls and the other pushes, though they do the same thing. The one that presses below pulls the one above, other- wise the saw could not descend. If force be applied they will lose all. Such is the nutriment of a man. One part pulls, the other pushes; what is forced inside comes outside. But if untimely violence be applied there is success.

8. Each keeps the same position until nourishment no longer receives it, and it has not sufficient room for the greatest possible extension; then it

passes into larger room, female and male, driven along in the same manner by force and necessity. Such as first fill the allotted portion are the first to be separated, and at the same time they also

commingle. For each separates first, and at the same time also commingles. And if, on changing position, they achieve a correct attunement, which has three harmonic proportionals, covering altogether the octave, they live and grow by the same things as they did before. But if they do not achieve the attunement, and the low harmonize not with the high in the interval of the fourth, of the fifth, or in the octave, then the failure of one makes the whole scale of no value, as there can be no consonance, but they change from the greater to the less before their destiny. The reason is they know not what they do.

9. As for males and females, later on in my discourse I shall explain why each severally come to be. But whichever of the two happens to come and achieves the attunement, it is moist and is kept in movement by the fire. Being in movement it gets inflamed, and draws to itself its nourishment from the food and breath that enter the woman. At first, while it is still rare, this occurs equally throughout; but owing to the movement and the fire it dries and solidifies as it solidifies it hardens all round, and the fire being imprisoned can no longer draw to itself its nourishment in sufficient quantity, while it does not expel the breath owing to the hardness of its envelope. So it consumes the available moisture inside. Now the parts in the compacted, dry mass that are solid in substance are not consumed by the fire for its nourishment, but they prove powerful, and as the moisture fails, they become compact, and are called bones and sinews. The fire, meanwhile, being moved out of the moisture which was mixed with it, arranges the body according to nature through the following necessity. Through the hard and dry parts it cannot make itself lasting passages, because it has no nourishment; but it can through the moist and soft, for these are its nourishment. Yet in these too there is dryness not consumed by the fire and these dry parts become compacted one with another. So, the fire shut up in the innermost part both is most abundant and made for itself the

For there the moisture was most abundant, and it is called the belly. Therefrom the fire burst forth, since it had no nourishment, and made passages for the breath and to supply and distribute nourishment. The fire shut up in the rest of the body made itself three passages, the moistest part of the fire being in those places called the hollow veins. And in the middle of these that which remains of the water becomes compacted and congeals.

10. In a word, all things were arranged in the body, in a fashion conformable to itself, by fire, a copy of the whole, the small after the manner of the great and the great after the manner of the small. The belly is made the greatest, a steward for dry water and moist, to give to all and to take from all, the power of the sea, nurse of creatures suited to it, destroyer of those not suited. And around it a concretion of cold water and moist, a passage for cold breath and warm, a copy of the earth, which alters all things that fall into it. Consuming and increasing.it made a dispersion of fine water and of ethereal fire, the invisible and the visible, a secretion from the compacted substance,

in which things are carried and come to light, each according to its allotted portion. And in this fire made for itself three groups of circuits, within and without each bounded by the others : those towards the hollows of the moist, the power of the moon ; those towards the outer circumference, towards the solid enclosure, the power of the stars ; the middle circuits, bounded both within and without. The hottest and strongest fire, which controls all things, ordering all things according to nature, imperceptible to sight or touch, wherein are soul, mind, thought, growth, motion, decrease, mutation, sleep, waking. This governs all things always, both here and there, and is never at rest.

POLIS 1: THE WORLD OF TEXNAI

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[Hippocrates] *De diaeta*, I, 11–24. 11.1

(11) Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανέα σκέπτεσθαι οὐκ ἐπίστανται· τέχνῃσι γὰρ χρεόμενοι ὁμοίῃσιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ γινώσκουσιν· θεῶν γὰρ νοῦς ἐδίδαξε μιμεῖσθαι τὰ ἑωυτῶν, γινώσκοντας ἃ ποιέουσι, καὶ οὐ γινώσκοντας ἃ μιμέονται. Πάντα γὰρ ὅμοια, ἀνόμοια ἐόντα· καὶ σύμφορα πάντα, διάφορα ἐόντα· διαλεγόμενα, οὐ διαλεγόμενα· γνώμην ἔχοντα, ἀγνώμονα· ὑπεναντίος ὁ τρόπος ἑκάστων, ὁμολογεόμενος. Νόμος γὰρ καὶ φύσις, οἷσι πάντα διαπρησσόμεθα, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ὁμολογεόμενα. νόμον μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἔθεσαν αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοῖσιν, οὐ γινώσκοντες περὶ ὧν ἔθεσαν· φύσιν δὲ πάντων θεοὶ διεκόσμησαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωποι διέθεσαν, οὐδέποτε κατὰ τωὐτὸ ἔχει οὔτε ὀρθῶς οὔτε μὴ ὀρθῶς· ὅσα δὲ θεοὶ διέθεσαν, αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καὶ τὰ ὀρθὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθά· τοσοῦτον διαφέρει.

(12) Ἐγὼ δὲ δηλώσω τέχνας φανερὰς ἀνθρώπου παθήμασιν ὁμοίας ἐούσας καὶ φανεροῖσι καὶ ἀφανέσι. μαντικὴ τοιόνδε· τοῖσι μὲν φανεροῖσι τὰ ἀφανέα γινώσκει, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀφανέσι τὰ φανερὰ, καὶ τοῖσιν ἐοῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀποθανοῦσι τὰ ζῶντα, καὶ τοῖσι ἀσυνέτοισι συνιᾶσιν, ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. φύσιν ἀνθρώπου καὶ βίον ταῦτα μιμεῖται. ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ συγγενόμενος παιδίον ἐποίησε· τῷ φανερῷ τὸ ἄδηλον γινώσκει ὅτι οὕτως ἔσται. Γνώμη ἀνθρώπου ἀφανής, γινώσκουσα τὰ φανερά, ἐκ παιδὸς ἐς ἄνδρα μεθίσταται, τῷ ἐόντι τὸ μέλλον γινώσκει. οὐχ ὅμοιον ἀποθανὼν ζώοντι· τῷ τεθνηκότι οἶδε τὸ ζῶον. Ἀσύνετον γαστήρ· ταύτῃ συνίεμεν ὅτι διψῇ ἢ πεινῇ. Ταὐτὰ μαντικῆς τέχνης καὶ φύσιος ἀνθρωπίνης παθήματα, τοῖσι μὲν γινώσκουσιν αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς, τοῖσι δὲ μὴ γινώσκουσιν αἰεὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

(13) Σιδηρουργοὶ τέχνῃσι[136] τὸν σίδηρον περιτήκουσι, πνεύματι ἀναγκάζοντες τὸ πῦρ, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τροφὴν ἀφαιρέοντες, ἀραιὸν δὲ ποιήσαντες, παίουσι καὶ συνελαύνουσιν· ὕδατος δὲ

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[136] Σιδηρουργοὶ τέχνῃσι scripsi : σιδήρου ὄργανα codd. (τέχνῃσι θ, τέχνης Μ) : [σιδήρου ὄργανα] τεχνῖται Joly

ἄλλου τροφῇ ἰσχυρὸν γίνεται. Ταὐτὰ πάσχει ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβεω· τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τροφὴν πυρὶ ἀφαιρεῖται ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἀναγκαζόμενος· ἀραιούμενος κόπτεται, τρίβεται, καθαίρεται· ὑδάτων δὲ ὑπαγωγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἰσχυρὸς γίνεται.

(14) Καὶ οἱ γναφεῖς τωὐτό[137] διαπρήσσονται, λακτίζουσι, κόπτουσιν, ἕλκουσι, λυμαινόμενοι ἰσχυρότερα ποιέουσι, κείροντες τὰ ὑπερέχοντα, καὶ παραπλέκοντες, καλλίω ποιέουσι· ταῦτα πάσχει ὤνθρωπος.

(15) Σκυτεῖς τὰ ὅλα κατὰ μέρεα διαιρέουσι καὶ τὰ μέρεα ὅλα ποιέουσι· τάμνοντες δὲ καὶ κεντέοντες τὰ σαθρὰ ὑγιέα ποιέουσι. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος δὲ τωὐτὸ πάσχει· ἐκ τῶν ὅλων μέρεα διαιρεῖται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερέων συντιθεμένων ὅλα γίνεται. κεντεόμενοί τε καὶ τεμνόμενοι τὰ σαθρὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰητρῶν ὑγιαίνονται. καὶ τόδε ἰητρικῆς· τὸ λυπέον ἀπαλλάσσειν, καὶ ὑφ' οὗ πονεῖ ἀφαιρέοντα ὑγιέα ποιεῖν. Ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτη ταῦτα ἐπίσταται· καθήμενος πονεῖ ἀναστῆναι, κινεύμενος πονεῖ ἀναπαύσασθαι, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει ἡ φύσις ἰητρικῆς.

(16) Τέκτονες πρίοντες ὁ μὲν ὠθεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἕλκει· τωὐτὸ ποιέοντες ἀμφότεροι. τρυπῶσιν, ὁ μὲν ἕλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ[138] πιεζόντων ἄνω ἕρπει, τὸ δὲ κάτω· μείω ποιέοντες πλείω ποιέουσι, <καὶ πλείω ποιέοντες μείω ποιέουσι>. φύσιν ἀνθρώπου μιμέονται. τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ μὲν ἕλκει, τὸ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τωὐτὸ ποιέει καὶ ἀμφοτέρως φέρει· σίτων τὰ μὲν κάτω πιέζεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνω ἕρπει. ἀπὸ μιῆς ψυχῆς διαιρεομένης πλείους καὶ μείους καὶ μέζονες καὶ ἐλάσσονες.

(17) Οἰκοδόμοι ἐκ διαφόρων σύμφορα ἐργάζονται, τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ ὑγραίνοντες, τὰ δὲ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνοντες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέοντες, τὰ δὲ διηρημένα συντιθέντες. μὴ οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ᾗ δεῖ. δίαιταν ἀνθρωπίνην μιμέονται, τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ ὑγραίνοντες, τὰ δὲ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνοντες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέουσι, τὰ δὲ διηρημένα συντιθέασι, ταῦτα πάντα διάφορα ἐόντα συμφέρει[139].

(18) Μουσικῆς ὄργανον ὑπάρξαι δεῖ πρῶτον, ἐν ᾧ δηλώσει ἃ βούλεται[140]. ἁρμονίης συντάξιες ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐχ αἱ αὐταί, ἐκ τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βαρέος, ὀνόματι μὲν ὁμοίων, φθόγγῳ δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίων. τὰ πλεῖστον διάφορα μάλιστα συμφέρει, τὰ δὲ ἐλάχιστον διάφορα ἥκιστα συμφέρει. εἰ δὲ ὅμοια πάντα ποιήσει τις, οὐκ ἔνι τέρψις. αἱ πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ καὶ πολυειδέσταται μάλιστα τέρπουσιν. Μάγειροι ὄψα σκευάζουσιν ἀνθρώποισι διαφόρων, συμφόρων, παντοδαπὰ συγκρίνοντες, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐ τὰ αὐτά, βρῶσιν καὶ πόσιν ἀνθρώπῳ. εἰ δὲ πάντα ὅμοια ποιήσει, οὐκ ἔχει τέρψιν· οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πάντα συντάξειεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ὀρθῶς. Κρούεται τὰ κρούματα ἐν μουσικῇ τὰ μὲν ἄνω, τὰ δὲ κάτω. Γλῶσσα μουσικὴν[141] μιμεῖται διαγινώσκουσα μὲν τὸ γλυκὺ

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[137] τωὐτό M : similia P : τοῦτο θ, acc. Joly

[138] τρυπῶσιν … ὠθεῖ secl. Fredrich, Diels, acc. Joly

[139] συμφέρει τῆι φύσει M.

[140] μουσικῆς … βούλεται secl. Fredrich, acc. DK, Joly.

[141] γλῶσσα θM, acc. DK : γλῶσσαν Koller, acc. Joly

καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ τῶν προσπιπτόντων, καὶ διάφωνα καὶ σύμφωνα. κρούεται δὲ τοὺς φθόγγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ οὔτε τὰ ἄνω κάτω κρουόμενα ὀρθῶς ἔχει οὔτε τὰ κάτω ἄνω· καλῶς δὲ ἡρμοσμένης γλώσσης τῇ συμφωνίῃ τέρψις, ἀναρμόστου δὲ λύπη.

(19) Νακοδέψαι τείνουσι, τρίβουσι, κτενίζουσι, πλύνουσι· ταῦτα παιδίων θεραπηΐη. πλοκεῖς ἄγοντες κύκλῳ πλέκουσιν· ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν τελευτῶσι. τωὐτὸ περίοδος ἐν τῷ σώματι· ὁπόθεν ἄρχεται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο τελευτᾷ.

(20) Χρυσίον ἐργάζονται, κόπτουσι, πλύνουσι, τήκουσι·πυρὶ μαλακῷ, ἰσχυρῷ δ᾽ οὐ συνίσταται· ἀπεργασάμενοι πρὸς πάντα χρέωνται. ἄνθρωπος σῖτον κόπτει, πλύνει, ἀλήθει, πυρώσας χρῆται·ἰσχυρῷ μὲν πυρὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐ συνίσταται, μαλακῷ δέ.

(21) Ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ μίμησιν σώματος ποιέουσιν πλὴν ψυχῆς, γνώμην δ᾽ ἔχοντα οὐ ποιέουσιν, ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ γῆς, τὰ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνοντες καὶ τὰ ξηρὰ ὑγραίνοντες. ἀφαιρέονται ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων, προστιθέασι πρὸς τὰ ἐλλείποντα, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου πρὸς τὸ μέγιστον αὔξοντες. ταὐτὰ πάσχει καὶ ἄνθρωπος· αὔξεται ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου ἐς τὸ μέγιστον, ἐκ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων ἀφαιρεόμενος, τοῖσιν ἐλλείπουσι προστιθείς, τὰ ξηρὰ ὑγραίνων καὶ τὰ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνων.

(22) Κεραμεῖς τὸν τροχὸν δινέουσι, καὶ οὔτε ὀπίσω οὔτε πρώσω προχωρέει, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωσε ἅμα τοῦ ὅλου ἀπομίμημα τῆς περιφορῆς. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐργάζονται περιφερομένῳ παντοδαπά, οὐδὲν ὅμοιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ὀργάνοισιν. ἄνθρωποι ταὐτὰ πάσχουσι καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα· ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορῇ πάντα ἐργάζονται, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ὅμοια τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ὀργάνοισιν, ἐξ ὑγρῶν ξηρὰ ποιέοντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ξηρῶν ὑγρά.

(23) Γραμματικὴ τοιόνδε· σχημάτων συνθέσεις[142], σημεῖα φωνῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, δύναμις τὰ παροιχόμενα μνημονεῦσαι, τὰ ποιητέα δηλῶσαι. δι᾽ ἑπτὰ σχημάτων ἡ γνῶσις. ταῦτα πάντα ἄνθρωπος διαπρήσσεται καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος. δι᾽ ἑπτὰ σχημάτων καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἀνθρώπων· ἀκοὴ ψόφων, ὄψις φανερῶν, ῥῖνες ὀδμῆς, γλῶσσα ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀηδίης, στόμα διαλέκτου, σῶμα ψαύσιος, θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ πνεύματος διέξοδοι ἔσω καὶ ἔξω. διὰ τούτων ἀνθρώποισιν γνῶσις.

(24) Ἀγωνίη, παιδοτριβίη τοιόνδε· διδάσκουσι παρανομεῖν κατὰ νόμον, ἀδικεῖν δικαίως, ἐξαπατᾶν, κλέπτειν, ἁρπάζειν, βιάζεσθαι, τὰ αἴσχιστα καὶ κάλλιστα. ὁ μὴ ταῦτα ποιέων κακός, ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ποιέων ἀγαθός. ἐπίδειξις τῶν πολλῶν ἀφροσύνης· θεῶνται ταῦτα καὶ κρίνουσιν ἕνα ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀγαθόν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους κακούς· πολλοὶ θωμάζουσιν, ὀλίγοι γινώσκουσιν. ἐς ἀγορὴν ἐλθόντες ἄνθρωποι ταὐτὰ διαπρήσσονται·ἐξαπατῶσι πωλέοντες καὶ ὠνεόμενοι· ὁ πλεῖστα ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος θωμάζεται. πίνοντες καὶ μαινόμενοι ταὐτὰ διαπρήσσονται. τρέχουσι, παλαίουσι, μάχονται, κλέπτουσιν, ἐξαπατῶσιν, εἷς ἐκ πάντων κρίνεται. ὑποκριτικὴ ἐξαπατᾷ εἰδότας· ἄλλα λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλα φρονέουσιν, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐσέρπουσιν καὶ ἐξέρπουσιν καὶ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί.

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[142] συνθέσεις θ : σύνθεσις cett., acc. DK, Joly.

ἑνὶ καὶ <τωὐτῶι>[143] ἀνθρώπῳ <συμβαίνει>[144] ἄλλα μὲν λέγειν, ἄλλα δὲ ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἄλλην ἔχειν γνώμην, ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλην. Οὕτω μὲν αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσει ἐπικοινωνέουσιν.

[Hippocrates], On regimen, I, 11-24, Loeb transltion of W.H.S.Jones with changes adjusted to our reading of Greek text noted in apparatus].

(11) But men do not understand how to observe the invisible through the visible. For though the arts they employ are like the nature of man, yet they know it not. For the mind of the gods taught them to copy their own functions, and though they know what they are doing, they know not what they are copying. For all things are like, though unlike, all compatible though incompatible, conversing though not conversing, intelligent without intelligence. The fashion of each is contrary, though in agreement. For custom and nature, by means of which we accomplish all things, do not agree though they do agree. For custom was settled by men for themselves without their knowing those things about which they settled the custom; but the nature of all things was arranged by the gods. Now that which men arrayed never remains constant, whether right or wrong; but whatsoever things were arranged by the gods always remain right. So, great the difference between the right and the wrong.

(12) But I will show that arts are visibly like to the affections of man, both visible and invisible. Divination is after this fashion. By the visible it gets knowledge of the invisible, by the invisible knowledge of the visible, by the present knowledge of the future, by the dead knowledge of the living, and by means of that which understands not men have understanding he who knows, right understanding always, he who knows not, sometimes right understanding, sometimes wrong. Divination herein imitates the nature and life of man. A man by union with a woman begets a child; by the visible lie gets knowledge of the invisible that so it will be. The invisible human intelligence, getting knowledge of the visible, changes from childhood to manhood; by the present it gets knowledge of the future. A corpse is not like a living creature; by the dead he knows the living. The belly is without consciousness, yet by it we are conscious of hunger and thirst. The characteristics of divination and of human nature are these: for those who know, always rightly interpreted, for those who know not, sometimes rightly and sometimes not.

(13) Iron-workers by their crafts melt the iron with fire, constraining the fire with air; they take away the nourishment it has already; when they have made it rare, they beat it and weld it; and with the nourishment of other water it grows strong. Such is the treatment of a man by his trainer.

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[143] <ταὐτῶι> addidi.

[144] συμβαίνει supplevi exempli gratia.

By fire the nourishment he has already is taken away, breath constraining him. As he is made rare, he is struck, rubbed and purged. On the application of water from elsewhere he becomes strong.

(14) This do also the fullers. They trample, strike and pull; by maltreating they make stronger; by cutting off the threads that project, or by weaving them in, they beautify. The same happens to a man.

(15) Cobblers divide wholes into parts and make the parts wholes; cutting and stitching they make sound what is rotten. Man, too has the same experience. Wholes are divided into parts, and from union of the parts wholes are formed. By stitching and cutting, that which is rotten in men is healed by physicians. This too is part of the physician's art: to do away with that which causes pain, and by taking away the cause of his suffering to make him sound. Nature of herself knows how to do these things. When a man is sitting it is a labor to rise; when he is moving it is a labor to come to rest. In other respects, too nature is the same as the physician's art.

(16) When carpenters saw, one pushes and the other pulls, in both cases doing the same thing. When boring, one pulls and the other pushes. When they press the tool, this goes up, that goes down. When they diminish, they increase. They are imitating the nature of man. This draws breath in, that expels it; in both cases the same thing is done. Some parts <of the food> are pressed down, some come up. From one soul when divided come more and less, greater and smaller.

(17) Builders out of diverse materials fashion a harmony, moistening what is dry, drying what is moist, dividing wholes and putting together what is divided. Were this not so, the result would not be what it should. It is imitation of the diet of man; moistening the dry, drying the moist, they divide wholes and put together what is divided. All these being diverse are harmonious.

(18) First there must be an instrument of music, whereby to set forth what is intended. From the same notes come musical compositions that are not the same, from the high and from the low, which are alike in name but not alike in sound. Those that are most diverse make the best harmony; those that are least diverse make the worst. If a musician composed a piece all on one note, it would fail to please. It is the greatest changes and the most varied that please the most.

Cooks prepare for men dishes of ingredients that disagree while agreeing, mixing together things of all sorts, from things that are the same, things that are not the same, to be food and drink for a man. If the cook makes all alike there is no pleasure in them; and it would not be right either if he were to compound all things in one dish. The notes struck while playing music are some high, some

low. The tongue imitates music in distinguishing, of the things that touch it, the sweet and the acid, the discordant from the concordant. Its notes are struck high and low, and it is well neither when the high notes are struck low nor when the low are struck high. When the tongue is well in tune the concord pleases, but there is pain when the tongue is out of tune.

(19) Curriers stretch, rub, comb and wash. Children are tended in the same way. Basket-makers turn the baskets round as they plait them; they end at the place from which they begin. The circuit in the body is the same; it ends where it begins.

(20) Men work on gold, dig up, wash it and melt it. With gentle, not strong, fire it is compacted. When they have wrought it, they use it for all purposes. So a man beats corn, washes it, grinds it, applies fire and then uses it. With

strong fire it is not compacted in the body, but with gentle fire.

(21) Statue-makers copy the body without the soul, as they do not make intelligent things, using water and earth, drying the moist and moistening the dry. They take from that which is in excess and add to that which is deficient, making their creations grow from the smallest to the tallest. Such is the case of man. He grows from his smallest to his greatest, taking away from that which is in excess, adding to that which is deficient, moistening the dry and drying the moist.

(22) Potters spin a wheel, which shifts neither forwards nor backwards, yet moves both ways at once, therein copying the revolution of the universe. On this wheel as it revolves, they make pottery of very shape, and no two pieces are alike, though they are made from the same materials and with the same tools. Men and the animals too are in the same case. In one and the same revolution they make all things, without two being alike, from the same materials and with the same tools, making dry from moist and moist from dry.

(23) The art of writing is of this sort: combinations of characters, symbols of human voice, a power to recall past events, to set forth what must be done. Through seven characters knowledge is achieved. All these things a man performs, both he who knows letters and he who knows them not.

Through seven figures come sensations for a man; there is hearing for sounds, sight for the visible, nostril for smell, tongue for pleasant or unpleasant tastes, mouth for speech, body for touch, passages outwards and inwards for hot or cold breath. Through these comes knowledge or lack of it.

(24) The trainer's art is of this sort: they teach how to transgress the law according to law, to be unjust justly, to deceive, to trick, to rob, to do the foulest violence most fairly. He who does not these things is bad; to be good and the others to be bad. Many admire, few know. Men come to the market-place and do the same things; men deceive when they buy and sell. He who has deceived most is admired. When drinking and raving they do the same things. They run, they wrestle, they fight, they trick, they deceive. One out of them all is judged. The actor's art deceives those who know. They say one thing and think another; they come on and go off, the same persons yet not the same. To one and the same man it happens to say one thing and do another; the same

man can be not the same; he may be now of one mind, now of another. So, all the arts have something in common with the nature of man.

THEOLOGY

10

(a) Plato, *Resp*. 533d

ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος… τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω…

'The dialectical method ... gently draws and raises up the eye of the soul, which indeed (as they say) is buried in a kind of barbaric filth ...'

(b) Plotin. *Enn*. 1.6.5

Ἔστι γὰρ δή, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. Διὸ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς Ἅιδου κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον· οἷα δὴ καὶ ὕες, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη σωφροσύνη ἀληθὴς ἢ τὸ μὴ προσομιλεῖν ἡδοναῖς τοῦ σώματος κτλ.

"As the ancient doctrine says, chastity, courage and all virtue consist in purification (*katharsis*), as well as the moral prudence (*phronesis*) itself. Therefore, secret rites rightly hint that one who has not been purified, **will lie in the filth in Hades**, since impurity, by virtue of its viciousness, is akin to filth. <u>Pigs provide an example of this: since they have filthy bodies, they enjoy what is similar to them</u>. What else might be genuine chastity if not a refusal of bodily pleasures?"

(c) Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* II, 20, 118, 5

οἳ δὲ εἰς ἡδονὴν τράγων δίκην ἐκχυθέντες, οἷον ἐφυβρίζοντες τῷ σώματι, καθηδυπαθοῦσιν, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ μὲν ῥακοῦται φύσει ῥευστὸν ὄν, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν βορβόρῳ κακίας κατορώρυκται, δόγμα ἡδονῆς αὐτῆς, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀποστολικοῦ μεταδιωκόντων.

"And those who, like goats, are mired in pleasures, as if having abused their body, indulge in voluptuousness, not knowing that the body is decrepit, being transient, whereas their soul is buried in the filth of vice ..."

11

Plato, *Leges*, 715e   *Verbatim quotations + paraphrases*

ὁ μὲν δὴ **θεός,** ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος,

(a) **ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων,**

(b) **εὐθέα περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος·**

(c) **τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός**,

(d) ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ, καταλειφθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλους τοιούτους προσλαβὼν σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα ἅμα, καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις, μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησεν.

εὐθέα περαίνει Suda : εὐθείᾳ περαίνει codd.

God, as the ancient doctrine (*logos*) has it, **holding together the beginning, the end and the middle of all things, accomplishes the right deeds according to nature revolving in cycles**. **Justice (*Dike*), who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side**. The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her and follows her with meekness and humility. But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honors or by physical beauty when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others — there's a man whom God has deserted. And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos. Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin. (*tr. Tr. Saunders with alterations*).

12

Plutarchus, *De E apud Delphos*, 388e.   [NB context: right after the quotation of Heraclitus fr.42Leb./B 90 DK on the eternal cyclical alternation of cosmos and fire, gold and property].

ἀκούομεν οὖν <u>τῶν θεολόγων</u> τὰ μὲν ἐν ποιήμασι τὰ δ' <u>ἄνευ μέτρου λεγόντων</u> καὶ ὑμνούντων, ὡς ἄφθαρτος ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀίδιος πεφυκώς, ὑπὸ δή τινος **εἱμαρμένης γνώμης καὶ λόγου** μεταβολαῖς ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος ἄλλοτε μὲν εἰς πῦρ ἀνῆψε τὴν φύσιν πάντα ὁμοιώσας πᾶσιν, ἄλλοτε δὲ παντοδαπὸς ἔν τε μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν πάθεσι καὶ δυνάμεσι διαφόροις γιγνόμενος, ὡς γίγνεται νῦν, κόσμος ὀνομάζεται [δὲ] τῷ γνωριμωτάτῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων. κρυπτόμενοι δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ σοφώτεροι τὴν μὲν εἰς πῦρ μεταβολὴν Ἀπόλλωνά τε τῇ μονώσει Φοῖβόν τε τῷ καθαρῷ καὶ ἀμιάντῳ καλοῦσι, | τῆς δ' εἰς πνεύματα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄστρα καὶ φυτῶν ζῴων τε γενέσεις τροπῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ διακοσμήσεως τὸ μὲν πάθημα καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν διασπασμόν τινα καὶ διαμελισμὸν αἰνίττονται, Διόνυσον δὲ καὶ Ζαγρέα καὶ Νυκτέλιον καὶ Ἰσοδαίτην αὐτὸν ὀνομάζουσι καὶ φθοράς τινας καὶ ἀφανισμοὺς εἶτα δ' ἀναβιώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας οἰκεῖα ταῖς εἰρημέναις μεταβολαῖς αἰνίγματα καὶ μυθεύματα περαίνουσι· καὶ ᾄδουσι τῷ μὲν διθυραμβικὰ μέλη παθῶν

μεστὰ καὶ μεταβολῆς πλάνην τινὰ καὶ διαφόρησιν ἐχούσης· ‘μιξοβόαν’ γὰρ Αἰσχύλος φησί ‘πρέπει διθύραμβον ὁμαρτεῖν σύγκωμον Διονύσῳ’, τῷ δὲ παιᾶνα, τεταγμένην καὶ σώφρονα μοῦσαν, ἀγήρων τε τοῦτον ἀεὶ καὶ   νέον ἐκεῖνον δὲ πολυειδῆ καὶ πολύμορφον ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ πλάσμασι δημιουργοῦσι· καὶ ὅλως τῷ μὲν ὁμοιότητα καὶ τάξιν καὶ σπουδὴν ἄκρατον, τῷ δὲ μεμιγμένην τινὰ παιδιᾷ καὶ ὕβρει [καὶ σπουδῇ] καὶ μανία προσφέροντες ἀνωμαλίαν ‘εὔιον ὀρσιγύναικα μαινομέναις Διόνυσον ἀνθέοντα τιμαῖς’ (Lyr. adesp. 131) ἀνακαλοῦσιν, οὐ φαύλως ἑκατέρας μεταβολῆς τὸ οἰκεῖον λαμβάνοντες. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἴσος ὁ τῶν περιόδων ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς χρόνος, ἀλλὰ μείζων ὁ τῆς ἑτέρας ἣν ‘**κόρον**’ καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ τῆς ‘**χρησμοσύνης**’ ἐλάττων, τὸ κατὰ λόγον τηροῦντες ἐνταῦθα τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἐνιαυτὸν παιᾶνι χρῶνται περὶ τὰς θυσίας, ἀρχομένου δὲ χειμῶνος ἐπεγείραντες τὸν διθύραμβον τὸν δὲ παιᾶνα καταπαύσαντες τρεῖς μῆνας ἀντ' ἐκείνου τοῦτον κατακαλοῦνται τὸν θεόν·ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἐννέα, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν οἰόμενοι χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι.”

“We hear from theologians, some of whom praise God in verses, while others say in prose that God is an imperishable and eternal being, but obeying some fateful decree and reason, undergoes transformations of his being: now he incinerates all nature in fire, erasing all the differences between things, now he is born in a variety of guises, passions and powers, as it happens now, and is called by the most famous name, *kosmos*. The wise, trying to conceal this from the crowd, call the transformation of God into fire Apollo, and - pointing to his solitude and immaculate purity – Phoebus. As for his transformation into winds, water, earth, stars and the birth of plants and animals, they enigmatically call these passions and transfiguration "tearing apart" and "dismemberment", and [at this stage] they call him Dionysus, Zagreus, Nocturnal and Equal-sharing, and speak about his disappearances, revivals and new births, covering these transformations by riddles and myths. And to one of them they sing dithyrambic songs full of passions and transfiguration, accompanied by wandering and devastation - according to Aeschylus, "in the festive procession one should accompany Dionysus with dithyramb..." And they sing paean to another, the pure and strict music. And Apollo is always depicted in the paintings and statues as ageless and young, whereas Dionysus as assuming many shapes and various forms. And in general, one is credited with uniformity, orderliness and impeccable seriousness, and another is disordered, mixed with jokes and impudence, they invoke him like this: "*Evios*, exciting women, blooming with crazy honors Dionysus!" And since the periods of transformations are unequal, but the one that they call "**abundance**" is greater, and the one that "**poverty**" is less, they, observing the proportion here /in Delphi/ use paeans for most of the year in worship, and with the beginning winter stop the paean and awaken the dithyramb, and for three months they pray to this god. So, three to nine - that is, in their opinion, the ratio of the duration of the period of ordered world-formation (*diakosmesis*) to the period of conflagration (*ekpyrosis*)”.

13

[Reminiscences/interpretations of Heraclitus' metaphorical analogy: Apollo the Sun attunes and plays the cosmic lyre with the sunlight as plectrum, by striking, πλήσσων, cf. the 'whip' or 'blow' (πληγή) of god in Heraclit. fr. 62Leb/B11. The consensus of Plutarch and Cleanthes points to the authenticity of πλῆκτρον as Heraclitus' metaphor. Plutarch's source is Scythinus, not Cleanthes.].

(a) Plutarchus, *De Pythiae oraculis* 17. 402A = 22 C 3 DK… περὶ τῆς λύρας,

ἣν ἁρμόζεται

Ζηνὸς εὐειδὴς Ἀπόλλων πᾶσαν, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος

συλλαβών, ἔχει δὲ λαμπρὸν **πλῆκτρον** ἡλίου φάος.

(b) Cleanthes ap. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* V, 8, 47 (II,358,12 St.).

καὶ <**πλῆκτρον**> οἳ μὲν τὸν πόλον, οἳ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν πάντα πλήσσοντα καὶ κινοῦντα εἰς φύσιν τε καὶ αὔξησιν ἢ τὸν πάντων πληρωτικόν. οὐκ ἀνέγνωσαν δ' οὗτοι Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὃς ἄντικρυς πλῆκτρον τὸν ἥλιον καλεῖ· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς ἐρείδων τὰς αὐγάς, οἷον **πλήσσων** τὸν κόσμον, εἰς τὴν ἐναρμόνιον πορείαν τὸ φῶς ἄγει· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου σημαίνει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα.

14

Plotin. *Enneades*, 2. 9. 9.   *Verbatim quotation in Ionian dialect*

Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔχει μέμφεσθαι πόλει διδούσῃ ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἀξίαν; Οὗ καὶ ἀρετὴ τετίμηται, καὶ κακία τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀτιμίαν ἔχει, καὶ θεῶν οὐ μόνον ἀγάλματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄνωθεν ἐφορῶντες, οἳ «**ῥηιδίως αἰτίας**, φησίν, **ἀποφεύξονται πρὸς ἀνθρώπων**, πάντα ἄγοντες τάξει ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος μοῖραν ἑκάστῳ τὴν προσήκουσαν διδόντες κατὰ ἀμοιβὰς βίων τοῖς προϋπηργμένοις ἀκόλουθον· ἣν ὁ ἀγνοῶν προπετέστερος ἀνθρώπων περὶ πραγμάτων θείων ἀγροικιζόμενος».

"Is it right to be angry with the state for giving to everyone what he deserves? Both virtue of everyone is awarded, and vice is punished by appropriate dishonor, and **the gods** - not only their statues, but they themselves, looking from heaven above - as he says, "**will easily avoid accusations from humans**": they perform everything in the right order from the beginning to the end, giving to everyone the appropriate share (moira) as retribution for their lives according to previously committed deeds; one who ignores this, is most reckless of all men, an illiterate person in things divine."

<p style="text-align:center">**DUBIA ET SPURIA (SELECTION).**</p>

<p style="text-align:center">**1**</p>

(B 105 DK) Scholia AT in Homeri Iliad. 18. 251 (VI., p. 255 Maass).

ἰῆι δ' ἐν νυκτὶ γένοντο [scil. Ἕκτωρ καὶ Πολυδάμας]· πῶς ἐν μιᾶι νυκτὶ γενόμενοι τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων δειαφέρουσι, τῆς συμπαθείας τῶν οὐρανίων σωμάτων ὁμοίως πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἐχούσης; ἔστιν οὖν διαφορὰ τοῖς γενομένοις οὐκ ἐν νυκτὶ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὥρας ἀκρίβειαν. Ἡράκλειτος ἐντεῦθεν ἀστρολόγον φησὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ ἐν οἷς φησι 'μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν' κτλ. [Il. 6.488]

<p style="text-align:center">**2**</p>

(B 115 DK) Stobaeus, *Florilegium* III, 1, 180a (v. III, p. 130 Hense)
Σωκράτους [sic!]. ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.

<p style="text-align:center">**3**</p>

Aristocritus, *Theosophia*, 69 (after fr. 144)

ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς Αἰγυπτίους ἔφη· εἰ θεοί εἰσιν, ἵνα τί θρηνεῖτε αὐτούς; εἰ δὲ θρηνεῖτε αὐτούς, μηκέτι τούτους ἡγεῖσθε θεούς.

<p style="text-align:center">**4**</p>

Gnomologium Monacense, in: Caeccilius Balbus, *De nugis philosophorum quae supersunt*, ed. Eduard von Wölfflin, Basileae, 1855 p. 19. Nr.18.19.

Hoc est melius quod honestius. Non convenit ridiculum esse ita, ut ridendus ipse videaris. Heraclitus dixit.

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ridendus Wölfflin : ridiculus DK

<p style="text-align:center">**5**</p>

Gnomologium Parisinum ed. Sternbach, Nr. 209.

ὁ δέ γε Ἡράκλειτος ἔλεγε τὴν οἴησιν προκοπῆς ἐγκοπήν.

<p style="text-align:center">**6**</p>

Gnomologium Vaticanum 743, Nr. 314.

τὴν παιδείαν ἕτερον ἥλιον εἶναι τοῖς πεπαυδευμένοις.

<p style="text-align:center">**7**</p>

Gnomologium Vaticanum 743, Nr. 315.

συντομωτάτην ὁδὸν ἔλεγεν εἰς εὐδοξίαν τὸ γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν.

Codex Parisinus 1630, s. XIV, f. 191r.

Ἡρακλείτου φιλοσόφου κατὰ τοῦ βίου. Ποίην τις βιότοιο τάμοι τρίβον κτλ.

9 (B 139 DK)

Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum VII: *Codices Germanicos descripsit Franciscus Boll*, Bruxellis (in Aedibus Henrici Lamertini 20, Rue du Marche au Bois, 20), 1908, p. 106–107.

F. 146 Ἡρακλείτου* φιλοσόφου. Ἐπειδή φασί τινες εἰς ἀρχὰς κεῖσθαι τὰ ἄστρα, τίνων ἄρχει αὐτὰ οἴονται καὶ κρατεῖν ἴδωμεν· ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε γὰρ τὰ λεγόμενα ἔχει τινὰ πιθανότητα. [A] πάντων περιεκτικός ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανός, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἤρτηται καὶ συνέστηκε τὰ πάντα· συνεκτικὸς δὲ τῶν πάντων ὁ δημιουργός. ἐν δὲ τῶι οὐρανῶι ἕκαστον τῶν πεποιημένων οὐ κυρίαν ἔχει ἀρχὴν οὔτε αὐτοτελῆ φύσιν κέκτηται· ἀλλ᾽ ὅρωι περιεχόμενον οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ πεποιηκότος. διὸ οὔτε Ἥλιος παρίησι** τὴν ἡμερινὴν φαῦσιν, οὔτε μὴν ἡ Σελήνη καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀστέρων χοροὶ τὸν νυκτερινὸν δρόμον. ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν ἴδιον ἐκτελεῖ δρόμον. δι᾽ ἃ παραχωροῦσι ἕτερον τῶι ἑτέρωι· καὶ οὐδ᾽ ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἐμποδῶν ἵσταται τῶι πέλας. [B] ἆρά γε τοὺς τὰ στοιχεῖα τιμῶντας, γῆν ὕδωρ ἀέρα πῦρ, οὐ σκορακιστέον, οἷς καὶ ἐπωνυμίαν ἔθεντο ἑτέραν ἕτεροι, τὸ μὲν πῦρ Ἥφαιστον παρὰ τὴν ἔξαψιν οἶμαι καλοῦντες, Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα παρὰ τὸ αἴρεσθαι καὶ πρὸς ὕψος μετεωρίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα τάχα που διὰ τὸν ποτόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν Δήμητραν, παρόσον πάντων μήτηρ εἶναι δοκεῖ φυτῶν τε καὶ ζώιων· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα σοφιστῶν ἐστιν εὑρήματα, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄψυχος ὕλη καὶ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἀκίνητος ὑποβεβλημένη τῶι τεχνίτηι πρὸς ἁπάσας σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων ἰδέας. [C] ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡμιθέους; τοῦτο δὲ καὶ χλεύης ἄξιον· πῶς γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀθάνατός τε καὶ θνητὸς εἴη; δίχα τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τούτων γενέσεως ἐπίληπτον εἶναι· ὁ δ᾽ οὐρανὸς ἀκατάληπτον ἔχει φύσιν, οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ γνώρισμα σαφὲς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποστείλας. οὐδ᾽ εἰς τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, ἵνα διὰ τῶν ἀστέρων τὰς τύχας καὶ εἱμαρμένας ἐπιχορηγῆι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ περιοχήν τινα τῆς ὁρατῆς κτίσεως τοῦ συνέχειν καὶ συγκρατεῖν αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν κτιστῶν ποιοτήτων, μέχρις οὗ ἐθέλει ὁ ποιήσας αὐτόν.

* Ἡρακλεῖ τοῦ cod. ‖ ** παρίησι scripsi, cf. LSJ, s.v. παρίημι I, 2 «disregard, neglect» : παρίεισι cod. : πάρεισι cj. Boll

ТАБЛИЦЫ СООТВЕТСТВИЯ НОМЕРОВ ФРАГМЕНТОВ

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
1	26	50
2	1	1
3	1(h1) + 3c+ 4	72–73
4	24	89
5	3	17
6	23(d1)	113
7	23	2
8	114	46
9	2	34
10	1(g)	19
11	89	74
12	109	87
13	6	101a
14	43	57
15	59	106
16	60	99
17	30	42
18	5	55
19	13	107
20	21	56
21	16	40
22	17	129
23	18	81
24	63(b)	38
25	8	123
26	10	22
27	14	93
28	39	48
29	27	51
30	9	54
31	28(a)	80
32	29	53
33	93	52

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
34	28(b1)	8
35	28(b2)	A 22
36(a)	28(b3)	—
36(b)	28(b5)	—
36(c)	28(b6)	—
37	51	30
38	107	124
39	cf. 79	cf. 64
40	79	64
41	55	65
42	54	90
42A	—	—
43	77	67
43A	78	7
44	53(a)	31
44A	—	—
45	53(b)	31
45A	—	—
45bis	cf. 28 (b7)	A14
46	42	126
47	66 (e1-e4)	76
48	40 (b1)	A 6
48A	—	C 5
49	40 (d1)	A 6
50	33	60
51	cf. 66(b)	—
51A	—	A 8
52	cf. 56 (a)	—
53	28 (d1)	137
54	—	C 1.5
55	62	120
56 (a)	—	—
56 (b)	57	3
56 (c)	52	94
56 (d)	52	(a2)
57	64	100
58	58 (a)	6
59	58 (c)	

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
60	—	—
61	61	A 1
62	80	11
63	65	A 13
64	118	126 (a)
65	34	103
66	67	45
67	40	12
68	40(c3)	91
69	66	36
69B	115	67a
70	66(d1)	77
71	108	A 19
72	31	125
73	68	118
74	69	117
74A	69(b1)	71
75	48	26
75A	—	A16
76	41	88
77	49	21
78	99	20
79	56(b)	84(b)
80	56(a)	84(a)
81	56(a1)	—
82	90	78
83	92	79
84	cf. 92(b)	83
85	92(d)	70
86	91	102
87	71	110
88	44	111
89	70	85
90	92(b)	82
91	37	9
92	38	4
93(a)	36(c1)	37
93(b)	36(d1)	13

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
93(c)	36(a1)	13
94	36(c1)	37
95	35	61
96	94	119
97	15	101
98	cf. 15(a)	
99	cf. 15(f) =23(e)	116
100	23(f)	112
101	37(a2)	A 21
102	95	29
103	96	24
104	96(b)	136
105	97	25
106	25	10
106A	—	—
107 (a)	1(h1)	75
107 (b)	—	C 1.11
108 (a)	25	10
108 (b)		C 1.23
109 (a)	25	10
109 (b)		A 22
109 (c)		C 1.18
110	25	10
111	46	58
112	cf. 42(c)	—
113	32	59
114	cf. ad 28 (b)	C 1.16
115	—	C 1.22
116 (a)		
116 (b)		
117		A 9
118		cf. A 16
119	45	23
120	111	122
121		cf. C 1.24
122		cf. C 1.24
123	116 (c)	A20
124	25	10

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
125	105	121
125A	106	125(a)
126	22	97
127	110(b)	95
128	98	49
129	100	39
130	101	104
131	23	114
132	104	33
133	7	35
133A	120	132
133B	121	133
134	103	44
135	102	43
136	12	86
137	113	47
138	20	28(a)
139	83	108
140	85	41
141	84	32
142	98(g)	69
143	76	96
144	86	5
144A	86(g1)	128
145	74	27
146	87	14
147	87	14
148	50	15
149	88	68
150	82	66
151	19	28(b)
152	81	16
153	47	62
154	cf.47(c)	—
155	72	98
156	73	63
157	11	18
158(a)	117	—

Lebedev	Marcovich	Diels-Kranz
158(b)	cf.117	cf.A17
159	13	36d 1
160	75	92

Таблицы соответствия номеров
Marcovich — Lebedev и Diels-Kranz — Lebedev

Marcovich	Lebedev	Diels-Kranz	Lebedev
1	2	1	2
1(g)	10	2	7
1(h1)	3	3	56(b)
2	9	4	92
3	5	5	144
3(c)	3	6	58
4	3	7	43A
5	18	8	34
6	13	9	91
7	133	10	106, 108(a), 109(a), 110(a), 124(a)
8	25	11	62
9	30	12	67
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43	14	56	20
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